IR 05000395/1987003
| ML20211N312 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 02/12/1987 |
| From: | Cunningham A, Decker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211N291 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-87-03, 50-395-87-3, IEIN-83-28, NUDOCS 8703020039 | |
| Download: ML20211N312 (19) | |
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Sn afed UNITED STATES y'
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'3 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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FEB 2 01987
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Report No.: 50-395/87-03 Licensee:
South Carolina Electric and Gas Company'
Columbia, SC 29218 Docket No.:
50-395 License No.:
NPF-12 Facility Name: Summer InspectionConductN: Februa 3-5,
},987 Inspector: _
j f 2 //)]f8f A. L.'Cunningham Date Signed
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Accompanying Personnel:
E. D. Testa T. Guilfoil M. E. Stein R. Prevatte 2[X2[67 Approved by:
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T. R. Decker, Section Chief Date Signed Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This routine announced inspection involved evaluation of the annual radiological emergency preparedness exercise.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- A. Nauman, Vice. President, Nuclear Operations
- 0. S. Bradham, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations
- J. L. Skolds Deputy Director, Operations and Maintenance
- K. Beale, Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- M. Counts, Emergency Coordinator
- L. A. Blue, Manager, Support Services
- W. R. Higgins, Associate Manager, Regulatory Compliance
- M. D. Quinton, Manager, Maintenance Services
- M. N. Browne, Group Manager, Technical and Support Services
- G. Higginbotham, Staff Health Physicist
- H. J. Sefick, Manager, Nuclear Security
- B. C. Williams, Supervisor of Operations
- W. Baehr, Manager, Corporate Health Physics and Environmental Programs Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security office members and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector
- R. Prevatte
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 5,1987, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
The exercise weaknesses identified herein were discussed with licensee representatives during the criticue, and later on February 9,1987.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this exercise.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed during the exercise.
No enforcement matters remain outstanding.
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. Exercise Scenario (82301)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that
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provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion
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organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E
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to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.
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The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and discussed in detail with licensee representatives on several occasions.
' While no major scenario problems were identified, several -inconsistencies became apparent during the exercise.
The inconsistencies, however, failed to detract from the overall performance of the licensee's ' emergency organization.
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The scenario developed for this exercise was detailed, and fully exercised
the ensite emergency organization.
The scenario provided sufficient-information to the State, counties, local governments and Federal agencies
consistent with their participation in the exercise.
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The licensee demonstrated a significant commitment to training and personnel
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j through the use of controllers, evaluators, and specialists participating in
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the exercise.
The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the exercise.
The inspectors observed neither prompting nor undue interaction j
between controllers and players.
The scope and objectives of the exercise were fully satisfied.
j No violations or deviations were identified.
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Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
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This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that adequate
staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific l
guidance promulgated in Section II. A of NUREG-0654.
The inspectors observed that specific emergency assignments were made for
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the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff was available to respond to the simulated emergency.
The initial response i
organization was augmented by designated-licensee representatives; however, l
because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not required.
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Discussions with licensee representatives and detailed review of the site
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Radiological Emergency Plan indicated that a sufficient number of trained
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technical personnel were available for continuous staffing of the augmented emergency organization, if needed.
The inspectors also observed activation, staffing, and operation of the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (E0F).
At the response facilities cited, required staffing and assignment of responsibility were consistent with the licensee's Emergency Plan and approved Implementing Procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
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The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),
Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654:
(1) unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response; (2) provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times; (3) specification of onsite and offsite support organizational interactions.
The inspectors observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined, and staff was available to fill key functional positions within the organization.
Augmentation of the initial emergency response organization was accomplished through mobilization of available onshift personnel.
The on-duty Shift Supervisor assumed the duties of Emergency Coordinator promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by the Plant Manager.
Required interactions between the licensee's emergency response organization and State and local support agencies were adequate and consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to assure that the following arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources were made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3); Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and guidance promulgated in Section II.C of NUREG-0654, namely:
(1) accommodation of selected State emergency response representatives at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility; and (2) identification of organizations capable of augmenting the planned response.
Licensee contact with offsite organizations was prompt, effective, and consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise.
Assistance resources from offsite support organizations were confined to public infonna tion.
Representatives of the State, and participating counties were accommodated at the licensee's Emergency News Center (ENC).
State and county representatives were factored into the decisionmaking process and
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activities regarding preparation and issuance of press releases, preparation, production and participation in press conferences and related public information functions.
Licensee and offsite support emergency response personnel demonstrated a significant commitment to training.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, specific guidance promulgated in Section II.D of NUREG-0654, and guidance recomended in IE Information Notice 83-28.
An Emergency Action Level (EAL) matrix was used to promptly identify and properly classify an emergency and escalate it to more severe emergency classifications as the simulated accident sequence progressed.
Licensee actions in this area were timely and effective.
Inspection confirmed that the Emergency Action Levels were consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan and the regulatory requirements and guidance cited above.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations were established. This area was further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-0654.
An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were established and available for use in providing information regarding the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organizations, if required. Notification of the State of South Carolina and other designated offsite response organizations was completed within 15 minutes following declaration of each emergency classification identified.
Telephone notification of the State and local response organizations was promptly followed by transmission of hard copies of the respective notification.
Such copies included prevailing meteorological information, average release rate (source terms in uC1/sec) where applicable, site boundary integrated dose projections, and recomended protective actions when necessary.
Consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise,
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the prompt notification system (PNS) for alerting the public within the plume exposure EPZ was actuated.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Emergency Comunications (82301)
This area was observed to assure-that provisions existed for prompt comunications among principal response. organizations - and emergency personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to-f 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.F of NUREG-0654.
The inspector observed comunications within and between the licensee's emergency response facilities (Control Room, TSC, OSC, E0F), the licensee and offsite response organizations, and the offsite environmental monitoring teams and the TSC/E0F.
The inspectors also observed information flow arong the various groups within the licensee's snergency organization.
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disclosed that the plant public address system was not available in the
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Simulator Facility used as the Control Room during the Exercise.
The licensee plans to extend the subject system into the Simulator Facility.
Notwithstanding the above, emergency communications and comunication systems were significantly. improved, and consistent with emergency response requirements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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11. Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
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This area was observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and
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equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained L
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.H of NUREG-0654.
The inspector observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency j
response facilities, and observed the use of equipment therein.
Emergency i
response facilities used by the licensee during the exercise included the
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Control Room (CR), Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (E0F).
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Control Room - To preclude undue interference with operation and
l control of the plant, the facility simulator, located in the licensee's j
training center, was used as the Control Room. Required communications
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equipment, Control Room procedures and documents were readily available.
The inspector observed that following review and analysis of the accident sequence, Control Room personnel acted promptly to initiate required responses to the simulated emergency.
Emergency l
procedures were readily available, routinely followed, and factored
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Control Room personnel involvement was essentially limited to those personnel assigned routine and special operational duties.
Effective
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management-of personnel gaining access to the Control Room precluded overcrowding, and maintained an ambient noise level. required for orderly conduct of operations under emergency conditions.
The Shift Supervisor and the Control Room operators were cognizant of their duties, responsibilities, and authorities.
These personnel demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification system and the proficient use of specific procedures to determine and declare
the proper emergency classification.
It was observed that data and information provided during the course of the exercise sequence and conditions were routinely reviewed by the
' Control Room staff and appropriate responses were implemented 'in a timely manner.
The Control Room staff demonstrated the capability to consistently and effectively assess the initial conditions and implement required mitigating actions.
It was noted that a bound log of facility's activities was maintained by the Shift Supervisor throughout the exercise.
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Technical Support Center - The TSC was activated and promptly staffed
- following _ notification by the Emergency Director of the simulated emergency conditions leading to the Alert classification. The facility staff appeared to be cognizant of their emergency duties, authorities, and responsibilities.
Required operation of the facility proceeded in an orderly manner.
The TSC was provided with adequate equipment for support of the assigned staff.
TSC security was promptly established and maintained.
Security maintained a log, or otherwise accounted for all personnel entering and exiting the facility.
During operation of the TSC, radiological habitability was routinely monitored and documented, and personnel dosimetry was available if required.
Status boards and related visual aids were strategically located to facilitate viewing by the TSC staff.
Dedicated communicators were assigned to the facility and all notifications were promptly implemented.
Inspection disclosed the following additional findings, namely:
(1) engineering, maintenance, and other technical support functions were readily implemented and factored into problem solving exercises; (2) assumption of duties by the Emergency Director was definite and firm; (3) transfer of certain emergency responsibilities from the Control Room to the TSC was firmly declared and announced to the TSC staff; (4) briefings of the TSC staff were frequent and consistent with changes in plant status and related emergency conditions; (5) accountability, including identified missing personnel, was readily implemented within the accepted time regime and was consistent with the scenario scope and objectives.
TSC Controllers were effective in identifying minor scenario problems and interacted with players without promptin.
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Operations Support -Center - The OSC was promptly staffed following
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activation of the Emergency Plan by the Emergency Coordinator.
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inspector observed that investigative and repair reentry teams were promptly -selected, briefed,- and dispatched.
A health physics technician accompanied each team.
The OSC Supervisor appeared to
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cognizant of his duties and responsibilities.
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It was noted, however, that effective management and control of the facility staff required improvement in the following area, namely:
effective tracking, documenting, and posting of re-entry teams dispatched to the Rad Control Area (RCA).
The subject finding was fully discussed with licensee representatives during the exercise critique. The item was further discussed with a-principal licensee representative, via telephone, on February 9, 1987. The licensee acknowledged the finding.
Exercise Weakness 50-395/87-03-01:
Provide a method for effectively
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tracking, documenting, and posting repair and investigative reentry teams
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dispatched from the OSC.
This item will be reviewed during subsequent i
exercises.
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Emergency Operations Facility Consistent with the exercise
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objectives, the E0F was promptly staffed and activated following declaration of the Site Area Emergency.
The Emergency Director
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i demonstrated effective management and control of the facility.
The staff was frequently updated regarding plant status and progress in accident mitigation.
Communications between the E0F and TSC were effective. Exchange of technical information and frequent consultation with the TSC was routinely ~ implemented by the staff.
Dose assessment and projections were effectively performed.
The dose assessment group demonstrated proficiency in both manual and computerized dose assessment.
Although dose projections calculated by both methods were within acceptable limits of agreement, the licensee
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committed to continue review of manual dose calculations to achieve
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closer agreement with the computer method.
It was obse:ved, however that offsite dose projections were performed in a timely manner.
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Results were incorporated in followup notification messages. The dose assessment staff demonstrated a significant commitment to training throughout the exercise.
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Access control was effectively maintained throughout the exercise.
Notification of participating offsite agencies was performed in a
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timely manner.
Protective action recommendations were timely and j
consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12. AccidentAssessment(82301)
l This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential ' offsite
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consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required.
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by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria in Section II.I of NUREG-0654.
The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of plant'
status, and an assessment of radiological hazards to onsite and offsite
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personnel resulting from the accident. During the exercise, the engineering.
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accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing plant status to provide recomendations to the Site Emergency Manager concerning-mitigating actions required to reduce damage to plant systems and equipment, prevention of releases of radioactive materials, and termination of the emergency _
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condition.
Radiological assessment activities involved several groups.
An inplant
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group was effective in estimating the radiological impact within the plant based upon inplant monitoring and onsite measurements. Offsite radiological
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monitoring teams were dispatched to determine.the level of radioactivity in i
i those areas within the influence of the plume.
Radiological effluent data was promptly transmitted to the TSC and EOF dose assessment groups.
It was
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observed that the offsite radiological monitoring teams were periodically
updated on plant and emergency status, and current meteorological conditions.
It was also observed that members of the offsite monitoring teams consistently failed to use_ or refer to the monitoring and surveillance
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procedures provided in the assigned field kits.
It is consistent with l
accepted practice that procedures should be used or, at least, referenced to assure that monitoring and surveillance requirements are correctly implemented.
This item was fully discussed with licensee representatives during the critique.
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Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-395/87-03-02:
Assure that monitoring and
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surveillance procedures provided in field team kits are used in implementing field monitoring and surveillance requirements.
This item will be reviewed during subsequent exercises. The licensee acknowledged this finding.
Evaluation of the offsite monitoring teams also disclosed that monitoring
and surveillance procedures provided in field team kits were stamped and classified as "non-controlled."
A detailed review of the subject j
procedures, however, disclosed that they were Controlled Issues and t-consistent with all criteria and references defined in licensee Document Control Procedure PDP-101 (RevisionA-11/19/86).
Note that the term i
"non-controlled" is defined in Section 2.2.9 of the referenced procedure as follows:
" Copies of documents which may be used only for information
purposes.
No work may be performed from copies of documents so marked."
Use of procedures identified as non-controlled is contrary to the Station Operational Quality Assurance Plan, and applicable quality assurance
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regulatory requirements and guidance.
Accordingly, procedures placed in
the field team kits should be identified as " Controlled Issues;" that is, l
documents which assure that only the latest approved revisions are i
included and available for use.
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The finding addressing incorrect classification of the subject procedures was fully discussed with licensee representatives.
The licensee concurred with the finding.
Exercise Weakness 50-395/87-03-03:
Identify and maintain all offsite radiological emergency monitoring / surveillance procedures in field team kits as Controlled Issues.
This item will be reviewed during subsequent exercises.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13. Protective Response (82301)
This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions, consistent with federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of non-essential personnel, were implemented promptly pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654,Section II.J.
The prompt notification system in the 10-mile exposure EPZ was actuated.
All sirens were operational.
Protective action reconinendations regarding sheltering and evacuation of area occupants, where indicated, were promptly made as required.
Prompt notification of the public via radio and television media, and the prompt notification system was successfully implemented.
The protective measures decision-making process was observed by the inspectors.
Protective Action Recommendations implemented by TSC and F0F staffs were timely, effective, and consistent with the above criteria.
Protective measures recommendations were provided by the licensee to the State of South Carolina designated counties, and local offsite organizations.
No violations or deviations were identified.
14. Radiological Exposure Control (82301)
This area was observed to determine that methods for controlling radiological exposures during an emergency were established and implemented consistent with EPA reconinendations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b) guidelines for emergency workers, and that these methods included exposure (11),and specific criteria defined in Section II.K of NUREG-0654.
An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled throughout the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency workers and by conducting periodic radiological habitability surveys in the emergency response facilities.
Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of en.ergency actions, and adequate protective clothing and respiratory protection were available and used as appropriat '
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Health Physics control of radiation exposure, contamination control, and radiation area access appeared ' adequate.
Required improvements in contamination control were noted by inspectors and licensee evaluators, namely:
collection of grass samples by an offsite team technician, and movement of an investigative reentry team member too close to a damaged containment penetration.
The licensee committed to review and implement indicated improvements.
Health physics personnel were observed to brief reentry survey teams prior to their deployment. Dosimetry was availabh ~and was used.
High range dosimeters were also available in case they were needed.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to assure that information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.G of NUREG-0654.
Information was provided to the media and public in advance of the exercise.
The information included details on how the public would be notified and the initial actions which should be taken during an emergency. A rumor control program was also in place.
The licensee activated and fully staffed the Emergency News Center (ENC).
The facility was used by the licensee for preparation, coordination and dissemination of emergency news information.
Written press releases were prepared and issued from the ENC.
Releases issued were timely, and adequately reflected plant emergency conditions.
A corporate spokesman was designated to conduct periodic press briefings.
The briefings were technically accurate and presented in a manner readily understood by laymen; however, improvement in use of visual aids and schematics was disclosed.
The licensee is cognizant of needed improvement.
Question and answer sessions were held following each briefing.
Interaction and direct cooperation of the licensee with the State and counties was effective.
Representatives of State, counties and federal agencies were accommodated at the ENC.
The cited representatives fully participated in the composition of news releases.
News releases were the product of integrated activity of the licensee and the above cited support groups.
Similarly State, Federal and county representatives assigned to the ENC, fully participated in planning and presentation of periodic press briefings held during the exercise.
Operation and management of the ENC was effectively implemented, and was consistent with emergency plan requirements and approved procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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16. Recovery Plannine (82301)
t This area was re'.iewed pursuant to the requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.H, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.M.
The licensee conducted a detailed recovery planning session prior to termination of the exercise; Licensee planners discussed the need for administrative and logistical support, manpower needs, engineering service needs, radiological surveillance, and implementation of the recovery
organization.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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17. Exercise ' Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine s
that shortcrmings identified as part of the exercise were brought to the attention of nanagement and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E,10 CFR 50, and guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
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The licensee's Controller / Evaluator critique conducted on February 4,1987, was observed to verify that deficiencies, weaknesses and indicated improvements were identified, discussed, and documented for required review and corrective action.
Inspection disclosed that the subject critique was comprehensive, and all findings were fully discussed and documented.
The Licensee /NRC critique was conducted on February 5,1987, with exercise controllers and observers, licensee management, and NRC representatives.
Weaknesses identified during the exercise and plans for corrective action were discussed.
Licensee action on identified weaknesses will be reviewed during subsequent exercises and inspections.
The licensee's critique was detailed, and addressed both substantive deficiencies and indicated improvement items. The conduct and content of the critiques were consistent
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with regulatory requirements and guidance cited above.
No violations or deviations were identified.
I 18. FollowupItems(92703)
(Closed) IFI 50-395/82-41-20:
Transportation planning license condition August 6, 1983 (ASLB August 4 Decision Section VIII.4).
Review of pertinent response and attending documents disclosed that subject license condition was satisfied.
(Closed) IFI 50-395/85-18-01:
Required maintenance of Control Room log...
Evaluation of the Control Room during the current exercise disclosed that the Control Room log was updated and maintained throughout the exercis,
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(Closed) IFI 50-395/82-41-18:
Upgrade emergency support facilities License Condition April 1,1983 (III. A.1.2, SSER 4).
These facilities were reviewed for completion and operation which satisfies the subject license condition.
(Closed) IFI 50-395/86-05-03:
Provide training on the use of notification forms.
Review of training records disclosed that additional training of emergency response personnel regarding notification forms was conducted.
(Closed) IFI 50-395/86-05-04:
Review evacuation time estimates and select the correct method to be used.
Evaluation of subject evacuation time estimates disclosed that methods and alternates thereto were reviewed and routinely used.
(Closed) IFI 50-395/86-05-06:
Training to include more emphasis on PARS.
Review of training records disclosed that required emphasis is directed to Protective Action Recommendations.
(Closed) IFI 50-395/86-08-01:
Additional controllers for fire drill.
Evaluation of fire drill conducted during subject annual exercise disclosed that ample controllers were present and functional.
(Closed) IFI 50-395/86-08-03:
Training emphasis on transmission of current status information and termination of superseded message to NRC and offsite authorities.
Review of training records and lesson plans disclosed that recommended emphasis is directed toward the cited item.
(Closed) IFI 50-395/86-08-04:
Keeping Control Room staff informed of emergency stater, Observation of Control Room operation confirmed that Control Room statt ts updated as recommended.
(Closed) IFI 50-395/82-41-22:
Emergency Facilities and Staffing License Condition (ASLB August 4 Decision,Section VIII.8).
During the annual exercise, the inspector noted that the emergency facilities and staffing requirements were adequate to support a response to an emergency.
Attachment:
Summer Exercise Objectives and Timeline
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t EIERGENCY EXERCISE
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FEBRUARY
, 1987 SCENARIO, EVALUATION CRITERIA, AND EXERCISE OBJECTIVES SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY VIRGIL C. SUIOGER NUCLEAR STATION i
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EMERGENCY EXERCISE SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
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On February 4,1987, a small-scale Radiological Emergency Exercise will be conducted at the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within emergency plans and the organizations.
The simulated emergency will require mobilization and response of onsite and offsite Company personnel to verify the capability in an actual emergency.
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The exercise will require limited involvement of state and full involvement local government emergency personnel.
The specific elements of the Virgil C. Summer ' Nuclear Station Radioation Emergency Plan which will be exercised include:
Accident assessment and classification
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Managerial direction and control
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Technical Support Center operations
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Operations Support Center operations
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Emergency Operations Facility operations
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News Media Center operations
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Site evacuation, personnel accountability and access
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control Firefighting operations '
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Radiological monitoring and dose assessment
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Public alerting and notification procedures
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The specific objectives of the small-scale Radiological Emergency Exercise for South Carolina Electric and Gas Company personnel are:
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Test the ability of operations personnel to effectively
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assess and respond to an abnormal operating condition which may produce an actual or potential offsite radioactive release.
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Test the abilities of Health Physics and environmental monitoring personnel, operating under emergency conditions, to monitor and assess radiological dose. rates; to determine t
specific contamination levels, airborne, and/or surface
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deposited concentrations; and, to assess specific indications (including their rates to change) that may be used as they should for initiating emergency measures.
This constitues one of the semi-annual Health Physics Drills and the annual Radioation Monitoring Drill.
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EMERGENCY EXERCISE SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES (Cont'd)
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Test the Station's site warning and evacuation procedures with regards to effectiveness and operability.
4.
Test ethe Station's emergency communications systems between
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the station and federal, state and local governments and field monitoring teams.
This constitutes the Annual Communications Drill.
5.
Test the operations of the Technical Support Center and the Operations Support Center and the ability of staffing personnel to respond to an emergency cond% tion.
6.
Test the Station's onsite fire protection capabilities with respect to response and firefighting procedures.
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Ensure that emergency response personnel are familiar with their duties and responsibilities.
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8.
Test the adequacy and operability of emergency equipment and to identify deficiencies in the quantity or quality of equipment and personnel training.
9.
Test the operations of the Emergency Operations Facility with respect to physical facilities, communications, emergency equipment, operations and assistance provided to i
the Station.
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10. Test the operations of the News Media Center and the ability of staffing personnel to respond to an emergency condition with respect to public information and news media interface.
11. Utilize the training simulator in the exercise with real time Station operating information and to provide more
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l realism in the simulated emergency condition.
12. Test the operability of the Early Warning Siren System.
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Exercise Time vs. Clock Time
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T=0
~0830 T = 15 0845 T = 30 0900 T = 45 0915 T = 60 0930 T = 75 0945 T = 90 1000 T = 105 1015 T = 120 1030 T = 135 1045 T = 150 1100 T = 165 1115 T = 180 1130
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T = 195 1145 T = 210 1200 T = 225 1215 T = 240 1230 T = 255 1245 T = 270 1300 T = 285 1315
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T = 300 1330 T = 315 1345 T = 330 1400 T = 345 1415 T = 360 1430
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1987 Annual Exercise l
CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF MAJOR EVENTS
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T=0 Small Explosion & Fire in Penetration XRP-0028 463 AB West Penetration Room T=2
. Dispatch of Fire Brigade T = 20 Fire Extinguished - Penetration failed through Rx Bldg wall - Begin ramp down of Rx Power T = 30 Alert declared - begin activation of TSC & OSC T = 100 RCP "A" #2 seal failure T = 110 Thru 119
= RCP "A" #2 seal flow oscillation T = 120 RCA "A" Locked Rotor - Rx Trip - Safety Injection T = 121 DMINS Alarm (Rx Vessel Lower)
T = 124 Indications of Fuel Leakage (approximately 1.0 uci/cc)
T = 130 RCP "A"
- 1 Seal Failure T = 135 RCP
"A"
- 3 Seal Failure - approximately 300 GPM LOCA -
Release Commences - General Emergency Declared - sirens activated T = 260 RCP
"A" #3 Seal Seats - LOCA Terminated T = 270 Recovery commences T = Exercise Terminated T = 10 Through T-360 Unavailable Equipment /Punctions
- Charging
- Letdown
- RHR
- RCS Sampling
- PZR Steam Space Sampling
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0830 0900 0930 1000 1030 1100 1130 1200 1230 1330 1400 11:30 l
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-RCP "A" Seal #3 Seats i
j Explosion & Fire in Penetration RCP "A" Seal #1 IOCA Terminated l
Dispatch Fire Brigade Failure Fire Extinguished
- RCP "A" Seal #3 Failure
- Recovery
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300 GPM IOCA Cmmences i
Indication of Release Conmencee Fuel Leakage Dnina Alann Activation l;
Rx Vessel Imer-of EDF
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j Activate Siren System
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,l General Emergency
Declared Exercise
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Terminated -
RCP "A" Incked Rotor
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Rx Tr1Wety Injection
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"A" RCP Seal #2 Failure
- Alert Declared Activate TSC & OSC
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