IR 05000382/1993008
| ML20035F362 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1993 |
| From: | Murray B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035F358 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-93-08, 50-382-93-8, NUDOCS 9304210192 | |
| Download: ML20035F362 (14) | |
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APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION IV
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Inspection Report:
50-382/93-008
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Operating License: NPF-38 Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066
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Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit-3 Inspection At: Taft, Louisiana Inspection Conducted: March 29 - April 2, 1993
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Inspectors:
D. Blair Spitzberg, Ph.D., Emergency Preparedness Analyst
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(Lead Inspector) Facilities Inspection Programs Section Ryan Lantz, Reactor Engineer (Examiner), Operations Inspection Section
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Accompanying Personnel:
Tim Reidinger, Emergency Preparedness Analyst, Region III Approved:
O p,M14f1ft#7
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B. M'rray, Chief, Fac' ities Inspection
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Programs Section Inspection Summary Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the operational status of the emergency preparedness program, including changes to the emergency plan and implementing procedures; emergency facilities, equipment, and supplies; organization and management control; training; and internal reviews and audits. Two regional inspection initiatives were performed, one in the area of knowledge and performance of duties of emergency response personnel, the second involving the evaluation of an unannounced off-hours emergency response organization callout drill.
Results:
The licensee had reviewed and properly submitted to NRC changes in the
emergency plan and implementing procedures.
The licensee had maintained a close relationship with offsite radiological emergency response organizations (Section 2.1).
Emergency f acilities, equipment, and supplies had been maintained in a
state of operational readiness (Section 3.1).
9304210192 930416
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-2-The licensee had trained and qualified an appropriate number of
emergency response personnel.
The emergency planning staff was fully staffed with qualified personnel.
The licensee had taken positive steps aimed at continually upgrading emergency response capabilities (Section
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4.1).
The emergency plan training program had been effective in preparing
emergency response personnel to fulfill response duties.
Several recent program improvements were noted (Section 5.1).
During walkthrough evaluations, control room crews responded well to a
challenging scenario with respect to operational activities.
A weakness was identified for an improper emergency classification by one crew.
A second weakness was identified for emergency decision making which was i
based on dose assessments performed by individuals who were neither
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fully trained nor authorized to perform the dose assessments (Section 6.1).
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Audits of emergency preparedness had been conducted in accordance with
Audits and surveillances had been performed by qualified personnel and were of sufficient scope and depth (Section 7.1).
During an unannounced drill evaluated by the NRC inspectors, the
licensee's emergency response organization demonstrated the capability to staff and activate onsite and nearsite emergency response facilities during off-hours in a timely manner (Section 8.1).
Summary of Inspection Findings:
Weakness 382/9308-01 was opened (Section 6.1).
Weakness 382/9308-02 was opened (Section 6.1).
Weakness 382/9207-01 was closed (Section 9.1).
Attachments:
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i Attachment 1 - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeti,9 Attachment 2 - Operator Walkthrough Scenario Attachment 3 - Simulation Facility Report J
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DETAILS i
a 1 PLANT STATUS l
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During this inspection, the plant was operating at 100 percent power.
2 EMERGENCY PLAN AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES (82701-02.01)
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The inspectors reviewed changes in the licensee's emergency plan and implementing procedures to verify that these changes had not decreased the i
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effectiveness of emergency planning and that the changes had been reviewed j
properly and submitted to NRC.
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Since the previous inspection, two emergency plan revisions had been i
implemented. Revision 16 was submitted-to NRC as required. Revision 17 had l
been approved by the licensee in March 1993 and was not yet due for NRC
submittal.
For both emergency plan revisions, the licensee had performed a documented review in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q) to determine that the
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revisions did not decrease the effectiveness of emergency preparedness.
l The inspectors reviewed documentation pertaining to approximately 54 Emergency l
Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) revisions implemented since January 1992.
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All but those issued within last 30 days had been submitted to NRC within 30
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days of becoming effective as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.V.
.The EPIP revisions had been made in accordance with UNT-004-009, " Administrative Procedure - Control, Distribution, Handling and Use of Plant Procedures", Rev.
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The inspectors reviewed Letters of Agreement established with support agencies l
and determined that they were current and had been reviewed and updated l
annually. The inspectors reviewed correspondence indicating that the licensee
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had continued a close working relationship with the State of Louisiana
Radiation Protection Division, and local offsite organizations. Meetings had j
been held with offsite organizations to coordinate the emergency planning transition to the revised 10 CFR Part 20, and EPA-400 terminology / dose
factors.
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2.2 Conclusions The licensee had reviewed and properly submitted to NRC changes in the emergency plan and implementing procedures.
The licensee had maintained a close relationship with offsite radiological emergency response organizations.
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3 EMERGENCY FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT, INSTRUMENTATION, AND SUPPLIES
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The inspectors toured onsite emergency facilities and reviewed the licensee's emergency equipment inventories and maintenance to determine whether facilities and equipment had been maintained in a state of operational readiness.
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Onsite emergency facilities were inspected and a review was made of emergency
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j equipment inventories.
No significant changes in the nearsite emergency l
response facilities had been made since the previous inspection and the facilities were found to be configured as indicated in the emergency plan and implementing procedures. The inspectors noted that the facilities were secure and orderly.
Equipment and supplies placed in response facilities and in emergency equipment lockers matched scheduled inventories.
Radiological monitoring equipment was calibrated and operational. Current copies of the emergency plan and implementing procedures were maintained in all facilities.
The inspectors reviewed documentation of inventories of emergency response facilities and noted that they had been performed as required by procedures.
The inspectors noted that inspection tags on several respirators maintained in equipment locker 2 in the Operational Support Center (OSC) had been misdated as to their last, and next scheduled inspection date. The inspection tags showed March 1994 and April 1994, respectively, for these dates. The inspectors interviewed the technician who had performed the respirator
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inspections and reviewed the tracking records for each respirator and
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determined that the respirators had been inspected in March 1993. Thus, the dates indicated on the inspection tags were recorded in error.
The inspectors reviewed documentation of periodic tests and surveillance of emergency facilities and equipment.
Such tests included communications systems, sirens, the Emergency Operation Facility (EOF) emergency diesel generator and the EOF emergency ventilation system. The documentation indicated that such equipment and systems had been maintained in a state of operational readiness.
3.2 Conclusions Emergency facilities, equipment, and supplies had been maintained in a state of operational readiness.
4 ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL (82701-02.03)
The inspectors reviewed the emergency response organization staffing levels to determine whether sufficient personnel resources were available for emergency response. The emergency planning organization was reviewed to ensure that an effective programmatic management system was in place.
4.1 Discussion The inspectors determined that no significant changes had been made in the licensee's emergency response organization since the previous inspection.
Duties and responsibilities of response personnel were clearly defined. An appropriate number of response personnel had been trained and qualified to fill the designated response positions.
The emergency planning organization had remained fully staffed since the previous inspection with well qualified professionals. The licensee had
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continued with specific efforts to upgrade emergency preparedness.
For example, a recent initiative had been undertaken with the formation of a multidisciplined quality action team which was focused on improving operational support center response timeliness.
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4.2 Conclusions The licensee had trained and qualified an appropriate number of emergency response personnel.
The emergency planning staff was fully staffed with qualified personnel.
The licensee had taken positive steps aimed at continually upgrading emergency response capabilities.
5 TRAINING (82701-02.04)
The inspectors met with personnel responsible for conducting the licensee's emergency response training program. The training program was reviewed to determine whether adequate emergency response training had been given to personnel designated to respond to emergencies, and to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15); 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.F; and the emergency plan.
5.1 Discussion The inspectors observed improvements in the training program with respect to observations contained in the previous Inspection Report 50-382/92-07 and a continued improving performance in other training areas. Training staff who were interviewed displayed a conscientious attitude and were motivated toward conducting an effective emergency preparedness training program.
The inspectors noted that all emergency response personnel had completed their training as specified in Procedure NTC-216, " Emergency Plan Training -
Ini ti al. " Refresher training had been administered within the time requirements as specified in Procedure NTC-217, " Emergency Plan Continuing Training." Training records were complete and accurate. The tracking system
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to monitor training status had been effective in ensuring that training and required supplemental reading were scheduled and completed in a timely manner.
The inspectors noted that two learning objectives had been added since the previous inspection to control room responders' required training. The added objectives addressed response to medical and fire emergencies that occurred during implementation of the emergency plan.
The examination question bank developed by the licensee for use in preparing initial and continuing training examinations of emergency response personnel was reviewed for content and level of knowledge tested. One of the examinations most recently given to a continuing training class and an examination under development were also reviewed for the level of lesson plan coverage and individual question point values. The inspectors utilized the guidelines of NUREG/BR-0122, " Examiner's Handbook for Developing Operator Licensing Examinations," and Section 602 of NUREG-1021, " Operator Licensing Examiner Standards." The inspectors verified that the examination author followed the guidelines of NTP-006, " Control and Administration of Examinations" and NTC-217, " Emergency Plan Continuing Training."
Examination
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l questions were weighted, or were in the process of being revised to reflect consistent point values based on difficulty / level of knowledge / consistency in grading. The examinations and related training materials supported the training objectives.
The inspectors reviewed documentation related to the development of emergency preparedness training materials.
Nuclear Training Procedure - 005, " Training Materials," and the lesson plan for certifying new instructors, " Training System Development," were found to give clear and specific guidance for the development, revision, and presentation of training materials.
Procedures specified an examination review and approval process, and requirements to prevent examination compromise. The inspectors noted, however, that the content and size of emergency preparedness training examinations had been determined primarily by the judgement of the author and reviewers, without the benefit of specific procedural guidance for the development of examinations.
This matter was discussed with licensee representatives as a program vulnerability in the event that the existing emergency plan training staff was unavailable.
5.2 Conclusion The emergency plan training program had been effective in preparing emergency response personnel to fulfill response duties.
Several recent program improvements were noted.
6 KNOWLEDGE AND PERFORMANCE OF DllTIES (82206)
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The inspectors conducted a series of walkthroughs on the plant specific control room simulator to evaluate the current knowledge and ability of personnel assigned emergency response duties in the control room. The scenarios used in the evaluations were developed by the inspectors to
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determine if control room teams were able to classify events accurately, perform the required notifications in a timely manner, perform offsite dose assessments, and make adequate protective action recommendations.
6.1 Discussion The inspectors observed three operating crews during the walkthroughs using the control room simulator in the dynamic mode. The scenario consisted of a sequence of events requiring an escalation of emergency classifications, culminating in a General Emergency.
A narrative description of the scenario is contained in Attachment 2 to this report.
Each walkthrough lasted approximately 90 minutes. During the walkthroughs, the inspectors were able to observe the interaction of the response crews to verify that authorities and responsibilities were clearly defined and understood.
The walkthroughs also allowed the evaluation of the crews' abilities to assess and classify accident conditions, perform dose assessments, develop protective action recommendations, and make timely and complete notifications to offsite authorities.
The simulator was considered a highly effective tool for evaluating crew emergency response capabilities, however, a simulator software problem and
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caused some interruptions in the ~nduct of the walkthroughs.
Licensee representatives affirmed that the simulator problems were identified and corrected prior to the conduct of the third walkthrough. The inspectors
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concluded that the simulator problems were of minor consequence to the overall j
conduct of the walkthroughs, and did not effect the validity of the inspection results. A simulation facility report has been submitted to the Chief,
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Programs Development and Review Section, Operator Licensing Branch, Office of i
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, and is enclosed in attachment 3 to this report.
j The inspectors evaluated three control room teams, each representative of a normal group of early responders to an emergency.
Each crew consisted of an emergency coordinator (shift supervisor), control room supervisor, shift
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technical advisor, two reactor operators, and three auxiliary operators. The
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auxiliary operators were to be called into the control room during emergencies
to perform as shift communicators.
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Operationally, the crews responded well to a challenging scenario.
Communication was effective overall; '.10 wever, minor instances of open-ended communication and lack of specific supervisory direction led to some confusion among the crews as to the current declared emergency action level.
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confusion was exacerbated during one walkthrough by the failure of the crew to i
make announcements over the plant public address system of the declared emergencies.
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Command and control by the shift supervisors (emergency coordinators) was also
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observed to be generally effective.
In some instances, however, the shift
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supervisor's coordination of personnel resources and the delegation of duties
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slowed the implementation of the emergency plan. Abnormal and emergency operating procedures were properly executed to evaluate and mitigate the numerous malfunctions and major transient in the scenario.
l During the walkthroughs, required notifications to offsite authorities were i
made within the required timeframes, although notifications to the NRC
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Operations Center were slow.
In one walkthrough, the NRC was first contacted about one hour following the Notification of Unusual Event declaration.
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the time this notification was made, plant conditions had degraded to a General Emergency. The inspectors noted that minor errors were transmitted in some notification messages.
For example, in notification messages for the General Emergency, two crews did not properly indicate or apply the anticipated duration of the release for which the dose projections were calculated. The notification messages also did not always contain clear incident descriptions in item 6 of the message forms.
During the walkthroughs, the shift supervisors were effective in arriving at accurate and timely classifications with one exception. Approximately 6 minutes into a scenario, one shift supervisor declared an Alert based on a valid high radiation alarm on the containment purge monitor.
The shift supervisor referenced Emergency Action Level (EAL) A/A/II in making the classification. This EAL states "A fuel handling incident resulting in a release of radioactivity to the containment or fuel handling building > high alarm limits". At the time the classification was made, the reactor was at
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i full power with no fuel operations in progress.
Consequently, the classification of an Alert was made using an EAL which was not applicable at the time, and without the plant having reached initiating conditions for this j
classification.
Improper emergency classification was identified as a weakness (382/9308-01).
The inspectors noted that the licensee had improved and simplified its
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computer based dose assessment methodology in the control room since the previous inspection.
Improvements were incorporated into the program to i
automatically determine protective action recommendations, affected downwind i'
sectors, and atmospheric stability class. During the walkthroughs, dose projections were made by either the Shift Technical Advisors, the Shift l
Supervisors, or most frequently, by the auxiliary operators called into the
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control room to serve as communicators. According to licensee
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representatives, the communicators had been given informal training on l
utilization of the dose assessment program for the purpose of expediting the
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acquisition of information transmitted in notification messages such as
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affected downwind sectors, and atmospheric stability class.
During the walkthroughs, the inspectors observed that shift supervisors relied heavily on the dose assessments performed by the communicators. After reaching General Emergency conditions, communicators on each crew performed
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some, or all of the dose projections generated.
In two of the walkthroughs, the Shift Supervisor upgraded the emergency classification to General
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Emergency based on the dose assessments performed by the communicator. One Shift Supervisor issued protective action recommendations based on a dose assessment performed by a communicator.
All three crews evaluated were
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observed to rely on the assessments made by the communicators for I
classifications, dose projections, or formulation of protective action recommendations issued to offsite authorities. While the licensee's efforts i
to simplify the dose assessment program had succeeded in making it easier to
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use, the inspectors did note occasions when the communicators were unsure of the proper plant data to input into the program.
Following the walkthroughs, the inspectors determined that the dose assessment training received by the communicators was less than that given to control room personnel.
For example, the auxiliary operators (communicators) were not i
on the required reading list for EP-2-050, " Dose Assessment Computer and i
Nomogram". Further, EP-2-050, rev. 11, attach 7.1, specifies that the i
procedure should only be used initially by control room personnel. The
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inspectors concluded that the communicators were neither fully trained on dose assessment methodology, nor were they authorized to perform dose assessments.
The shift supervisors (emergency coordinat" -) were observed to rely on the dose assessments performed by the commur
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aicators who had not received all dose assessment training was identified as a weakness (382/9308-02).
6.2 Conclusions During walkthrough evaluations, control room crews responded well to a challenging scenario with respect to operational activities. A weakness was identified for an improper emergency classification by one crew. A second
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weakness was identified for emergency decision making which was based on dose assessments performed by individuals who were neither fully trained nor authorized to perform the dose assessments.
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7 INDEPENDENT AND INTERNAL REVIEWS AND AUDITS (82701-02.05)
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The inspectors met with quality assurance personnel and reviewed independent and internal audits of the emergency preparedness program performed since the last inspection to determine compliance with the requirements of
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7.1 Discussion The Quality Assurance organization was reviewed and it was confirmed that it was separate and independent from line management for emergency planning.
Quality Specialists who had been responsible for conducting audits and surveillance of emergency planning were found to be qualified in accordance with QA procedures. The lead auditor for the annual audit had been certified to the lead auditor rtandards contained in ANSI N45.2.
The inspectors reviewed the last annual audit of emergency preparedness performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(t).
The audit was conducted from January 20 - February 16, 1993. Audit personnel included the lead auditor and an emergency planning specialist from another power reactor facility. The audit plan was found to have been prepared by the lead auditor and approved by QA management prior to the audit.
Included in the audit planning process was a review of NRC inspections, INP0 assessments, bulletins, information notices, and emergency preparedness issues from sister facilities.
The inspectors
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discussed procedures for the characterization of audit findings and followup.
An appropriate tiered system had been established for classifying and tracking findings according to their safety significance.
The last annual audit resulted in no findings of noncompliance. Two " Opportunities for Improvement" were identified which resulted in a request for responses from the audited organization. The inspectors found that the scope and depth of the audit met j
the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t).
The quality assurance organization had conducted periodic surveillance of emergency preparedness. Approximately eight surveillance had been conducted since the previous inspection by QA personnel. The determination to perform surveillance had been based on an area's performance with no prior established number or frequency.
Surveillance documentation reviewed showed that the scope of the surveillance had been weighted toward performance during emergency drills and exercises.
7.2 Conclusion Audits of emergency preparedness had been conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(t).
Andits and surveillance had been performed by qualified personnel
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EVALUATION OF UNANNOUNCED, OFF-HOURS EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION l
CALLOUT DRILL (82301)
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On March 31, 1993, the licensee conducted an unannounced drill to test its l
l capabilities to staff and activate nearsite emergency response facilities in a timely manner during off-hours. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's
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response from the OSC, Technical Support Center.(TSC), and EOF.
i 8.1 Discussion The emergency plan and NRC guidance specify that over a 5 year period, the j
licensee will exercise its off-hours emergency response organization staffing capabilities. The licensee opted to conduct a drill apart from its annual i
exercise to meet this objective because offsite support organizations
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scheduled to participate in the annual exercise had previously met their off-
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l hours staffing objectives. The time of the licensee's drill was not j
established until the NRC arrived for the inspection. The drill began at
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j 8:00 pm on March 31, 1992 with the activation of the voice notification j
callout system from the control room following a simulated Alert declaration.
I NRC inspectors observed the arrival of emergency responders at the~ TSC, OSC, j
and EOF.
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Upon arriving at their designated facilities, emergency responders promptly set up communications equipment, deployed procedures and assessment aids, and assumed emergency duties. The inspectors noted that responders appeared to be
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well trained in their emergency responsibilities and exhibited excellent
teamwork and drillsmanship attitude.
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Soon after the declaration of the Alert, a security guard was posted at the
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designated entrance to the EOF. The inspectors noted, however, that during
the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> period while the EOF was being staffed, security was not
established at other access doors to the EOF. The inspectors found that i
several of these doors were unlocked during this period and could have allowed
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unauthorized individuals to enter the EOF.
Following the drill, licensee
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representatives acknowledged the inspector observations in this area.
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The following table contains the times noted by the inspectors for each facility to reach minimum staffing, activation, and full staffing:
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY STAFFING AND ACTIVATION TIMES
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(in minutes after the Alert declaration)
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Facility Minimum Staffing Activation Full Staffing
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50 110 j
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E0F 105 120 125 i
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organization staffing and activation timing considerations. The plan specifies 30-60 minutes for manning the TSC and OSC from the time of notification.
Emergency Operations Facility personnel are to report to the facility within 1 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> depending on their location at the time of the notification.
Licensee representatives stated that the time of notification is considered to be the time the group page is transmitted for designated responders.
During the drill, the licensee successfully demonstrated the
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capability to provide minimum staffing during off-hours necessary to activate onsite and nearsite emergency response facilities within the timeliness
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guidelines specified in the emergency plan. The licensee also demonstrated the capability to fully staff onsite and nearsite facilities during off-hours in a timely manner.
8.2 Conclusion During an unannounced drill evaluated by the NRC inspectors, the licensee's emergency response organization demonstrated the capability to staff and
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activate onsite and nearsite emergency response facilities during off-hours in a timely manner.
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9 FOLLOWUP ON PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS (92702)
9.1 (Closed) Weakness 382/9207-01. This item was identified during the walkthroughs conducted in 1992 for problems with crews' abilities to assess properly the onsite and offsite consequences of a release and to formulate proper protective actions.
The inspectors reviewed the revised lesson plan which incorporated lessons
from the weakness and documentation of seminars conducted to communicate the
lessons.
In walkthroughs conducted during this inspection, crews properly
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implemented protective measures onsite and made proper protective action recommendations for offsite populations based on plant conditions.
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ATTACHMENT 1 i
1 PERSONS CONTACTED 1.1 Licensee Personnel
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- R. E. Allen, Manager, Security and General Support F. J. Drummond, Director, Site Support
- F. J. Er.glebracht, Manager, Emergency Planning and Administration
- M. Ferri, Manager, Training l
- T. J. Gaudet, Operational Licensing Supervisor
- T. R. Leonard, Manager, Technical Services
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- J. J. Lewis, Emergency Planning Supervisor
- A. S. Lockhart, Quality Assurance Manager J. M. O'Hern, Operations Training Supervisor M. Mills, Emergency Plan Instructor
- D. F. Packer, General Manager, Plant Operations
- G. Scott, Licensing Engineer
- C. J. Thomas, Licensing Engineer
- D. W. Vinci, Operations Superintendent 1.2 NRC Personnel D. Garcia, Reactor Engineer, Region IV l
- Denotes personnel that attended the exit meeting.
In addition to the l
personnel listed, the inspector contacted other personnel during this j
inspection period.
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2 EXIT MEETINC l
An exit meeting was conducted on April 2, 1993. During this meeting, the inspector reviewed the scope and findings of the report. The licensee did not identify as proprietary, any information provided to, or reviewed by the inspector.
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ATTACHMENT 2 t
l EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS INSPECTION SCENARIO NARRATIVE SUMMARY t
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Simulation Facility:
Waterford 3 Initial Conditions:
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100% Power, B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) running paralleled to grid / loaded for operability verification.
A EDG is inoperable, estimated i
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repair in 24-30 hrs.
IA MD Emergency Feedwater Pump is inoperable for l
maintenance, (Malf FWO7 A) estimated repair in 6-8 hrs. Time is 3:45 am,
j Sunday morning.
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,i Events Secuence:
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l A very small steam generator-(SG) tube leak starts at 10-15 gpm.-
Secondary radiation and increased charging give indication of the leak. SG tube leakage l
greater than I gpm requires declaration of a NOUE (B/UE/I,C/UE/III) and T/S
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3.4.5.2 shutdown. The standby charging pump.will fail to start, requiring j
start of the third charging pump to maintain pressurizer and chemical and
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volume control tank levels.
One 230KV offsite line is lost when switchyard feeder breakers 7172-4W and
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7176-4M trip. Switchyard investigates and reports an acrid odor coming from
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j the switchyard breakers, which have tripped open.
Loss of one offsite circuit i
and one EDG requires T/S 3.8.1.lc shutdown if one circuit is not recovered j
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within 12 hrs.
Event classification should not change.
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The leak rate increases to 60 gpm, as indicated by continuous need of a second
charging pump to maintain pressurizer and chemical and volume control tank
levels. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage of any kind greater than 44 gpm j
j; requires declaration of ALERT (B/A/I.) SG tube leakage greater than capacity i
of available charging pumps requires declaration of a Site Area Emergency. A
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small fuel failure raises radiation levels in the RCS and in the secondary.
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The operators may elect to trip the reactor and initiate safety injection at
this point based on inability to maintain pressurizer level.
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The running EDG trips later for unknown reasons. A safety valve fails full i
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SAE (B/SAE/II) must be declared based on the added steam break, and the Emergency Coordinator should escalate rapidly. to a General
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Emergency (B/GE/II,III) due to high radiation levels and dose projections greater than limits. This is a direct release and constitutes a breach of all i
three fission product barriers.
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ATTACHMENT 3
SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT (
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Facility Licensee:
WATERFORD 3 Facility Docket No.:
50-382
i Operating Tests Administered on:
MAR 31 - APR 1, 1993 j
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l This form is to be used only a report observations. These observations do
not constitute audit or inspection findings and are not, without further
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verification and review, indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b).
These observations do not affect NRC certification or approval of the
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simulation facility other than to provide information that may be used in
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j future evaluations.
No licensee action is required in response to these
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j observations.
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While conducting the walkthrough (dynamic simulator) portion of the Emergency
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Preparedness Inspection (IP 82701), the following items were observed (if
none, so state):
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ITEM DESCRIPTION Dynamic The simulator dynamic models for several systems, including
models component cooling water (CCW), containment temperature and l
.;
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pressure, steam generator levels, and others related to CCW, i'
J exceeded simulator capabilities after one train of ESF vital
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switchgear was de-energized for 43 minutes (and only 19 minutes in
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l a second scenario.)
For example, containment pressure reached
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j greater than 1 million psig just prior to simulator lockup.
i Facility simulator technicians attributed the failed dynamic
j models to an error in the software for the CCW dynamic model which
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is adversely affected when DC bus voltages drop below some value, l
which did occur due to loss of the ESF buses in one train. This
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error then propagated to the other dynamic' models. The simulator
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j operator was able to compensate for the error by freezing DC bus
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voltages at their initial values.
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DC bus After a loss of one train of ESF Vital AC buses, associated voltages DC buses on that train dropped in voltage at a much higher rate l
q-than expected in the actual plant.
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Station After a station blackout (neither offsite power nor
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Blackout emergency diesel generators available) the dose assessment computer and 120VAC outlets in the control room were still
energized, contrary to the actual plant.
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