IR 05000313/2020002
| ML20218A442 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 08/05/2020 |
| From: | John Dixon NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-D |
| To: | Dinelli J Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR 2020002 | |
| Download: ML20218A442 (37) | |
Text
August 5, 2020
SUBJECT:
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000313/2020002 AND 05000368/2020002
Dear Mr. Dinelli:
On June 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One. On July 8, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. J. Sullivan, General Manager of Plant Operations, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Both findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch D Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000313 and 05000368 License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000313 and 05000368
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000313/2020002 and 05000368/2020002
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-002-0003
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Arkansas Nuclear One
Location:
Russellville, AR
Inspection Dates:
April 1, 2020 to June 30, 2020
Inspectors:
I. Anchondo, Reactor Inspector
R. Azua, Senior Reactor Inspector
T. DeBey, Resident Inspector
C. Henderson, Senior Resident Inspector
J. O'Donnell, Senior Health Physicist
T. Sullivan, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief
Reactor Projects Branch D
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Design Alarm Chassis with Reflash Capability with Multiple Inputs Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000313/2020002-01 Open/Closed None 71111.15 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to assure that the applicable design basis requirements, associated with the Unit 1 safety-related electrical equipment room high temperature alarm chassis, were reviewed for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes.
Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure an alarm chassis with multiple inputs had alarm reflash capability to ensure operators would identify a degraded condition associated with the safety-related electrical equipment room emergency chiller system and take appropriate operator action during a loss of coolant accident.
Failure to Take Corrective Actions for Conditions Adverse to Quality Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000368/2020002-02 Open/Closed None 71152 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, associated with the licensees failure to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as, defective material and equipment are corrected. Specifically, the licensee identified through a visual examination (VT-3) of a Unit 2 safety-related snubber and associated attachments identified multiple degraded conditions, but failed to take corrective actions to correct the defective material, a condition adverse to quality. Consequently, the failure to correct the adverse condition contributed to the failure of the snubber.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at full power. On April 1, 2020, power was lowered to 80 percent as requested by the transmission system operator to support the 500 kV Mabelvale line maintenance outage. The unit was returned to full power on April 3, 2020.
Unit 2 began the inspection period in shutdown for Refueling Outage 2R27, which started on March 13, 2020. On April 20, 2020, Unit 2 commenced a reactor startup and the reactor was made critical. The unit was returned to full power on April 26, 2020.
On May 23, 2020, Unit 1 and Unit 2 power was lowered to 71 percent as requested by the transmission system operator to facilitate repairs on the 500 kV Mabelvale line. Unit 1 and Unit 2 were returned to full power on May 24, 2020.
On June 1, 2020, Unit 1 power was lowered to 30 percent to perform main generator voltage regulator power supply replacement and turbine governor valve stroke testing, and then the unit was returned to full power where it remained for the rest of the reporting period except for minor power reductions to support scheduled surveillances.
On June 2, 2020, Unit 2 power was lowered to 70 percent to perform circulation pump B bearing repairs. The unit was returned to full power on June 6, 2020, where it remained for the rest of the reporting period except for minor power reductions to support scheduled surveillances.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities; and completed on site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 impending weather preparation for Tropical Depression Cristobal on June 8, 2020
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 2 pressurizer spray line train A on April 12, 2020
- (2) Unit 1 electrical equipment room emergency chiller system train B for upper north electrical penetration room on April 20, 2020
- (3) Unit 2 low pressure safety injection system train B on April 24, 2020
- (4) Unit 1 penetration room ventilation system train A on April 30, 2020
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Unit 1 upper north electrical penetration room, hot mechanic shop, and decon room, Fire Zone 149-E, Fire Area B-1, on April 8, 2020
- (2) Unit 2 new core protection calculator room, Fire Zone 2098C, Fire Area G, on April 20, 2020
- (3) Unit 2 emergency safeguard room B, Fire Zone 2007-LL, Fire Area AA, on April 24, 2020
- (4) Unit 2 emergency safeguard room A, Fire Zone 2014-LL, Fire Area B-6, on April 24, 2020
- (5) Unit 2 vital switchgear room 2A4, Fire Zone 2100-Z, Fire Area SS, on May 6, 2020
- (6) Unit 2 electrical switchgear room 2B53, Fire Zone 2091-BB, Fire Area B-3, on May 12, 2020
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 fire drill for a fire in the emergency diesel generator 1 room, Fire Zone 2093-P, Fire Area KK, on June 15, 2020
71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, steam generator tubes, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined, and accepted by reviewing the following activities from March 19, 2020, to June 22, 2020:
03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities:
- Eddy Current Examination, Vessel Head Vent Line
- Ultrasonic Examination, Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Channel Inlet Nozzle (N1)/2E-35A
- Visual Examination 2, Bolted Connection associated with Electrical Penetration 2E-66
- Liquid Penetrant Examination, Control Element Drive Mechanism Motor Housing Lower Weld 02-W-057
- Liquid Penetrant Examination, Control Element Drive Mechanism Motor Housing Lower Weld 02-W-069
03.01.b - Pressurized-Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Examination Activities:
- Visual Examination 3, Reactor Vessel Head Instrumentation Nozzle and Vent Line
03.01.c - Pressurized-Water Reactor Boric Acid Corrosion Control Activities:
==2R27 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Evaluation Problem Identification and Resolution:
- ==
The inspector reviewed 12 condition reports associated with inservice and operating experience issues and concluded that NDE/ISI related issues and operating experience are put into the corrective action program at low levels to ensure conditions and problems are identified
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 reactor startup from Refueling Outage 2R27 on April 20, 2020
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated the Unit 1 licensed operator simulator evaluation scenario on June 10, 2020.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Alternating Current diesel generator unavailability hours near the 50.65(a)(1) threshold on April 28, 2020
- (2) Unit 1 emergency feedwater initiation and control system instrumentation Channel C multiple power supply failures on May 21, 2020
- (3) Unit 2 low pressure safety injection system on June 5, 2020
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 2 startup transformer 3 breaker B126 planned outage replacement activities causing unavailability of the Unit 1 technical specification required 500 kV offsite circuit on April 1, 2020
- (2) Unit 2 emergent work activities for control element assembly calculator Channel 1 and 2 failures on April 28, 2020
- (3) Unit 2 emergent work activities for the swing charging pump C failure due to an oil leak on May 13, 2020
- (4) Unit 1 emergent work activities control rod drive cooling pump B failure on May 26, 2020
- (5) Unit 2 emergent work activities and unplanned 72-hour limiting condition for operation entry for emergency feedwater system train B steam generator B discharge valve 2CV-1039-1 failing closed on May 27, 2020
- (6) Unit 2 emergent work for service water pump A failed to start during quarterly surveillance testing on June 9, 2020
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 1 safety-related switchgear and electrical rooms nonconservative heat load values for a failed fan coil unit single failure operability determination on April 8, 2020
- (2) Unit 2 engineering safety feature train B room Door 206 chalk test failure operability determination on April 24, 2020
- (3) Unit 2 containment spray train A header isolation valve 2CV-5612-1 seat leakage operability determination on May 5, 2020
- (4) Unit 2 pressurizer spray line train A snubber failure past operability and increased vibration levels operability determination on May 13, 2020
- (5) Unit 2 reactor coolant pump speed probe failures operability determination on May 20, 2020
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Unit 2 pressurizer spray line train A snubber pin permanent modification on April 20, 2020
- (2) Unit 2 reactor coolant speed probe replacement modification on May 22, 2020
Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) Update (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 severe accident management guidelines update on April 21, 2020
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (9 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 auto transformer restoration following startup transformer 3 breaker B0126 replacement on April 13, 2020
- (2) Unit 2 containment spray header motor operated valve 2CV-5612-1 and 2CV-5613-2 valve seat corrective maintenance on April 16, 2020
- (3) Unit 2 pressurizer spray line train A weld repair for locations 2CCA-47-1 and 2CCA-15-3 on May 5, 2020
- (4) Unit 2 containment sump isolation valve 2CV-5648-2 corrective maintenance on May 5, 2020
- (5) Unit 2 pressurizer spray line train A buffing flaw repair on May 13, 2020
- (6) Unit 2 in core instrument flange number 2, 4, and 6 corrective maintenance on May 13, 2020
- (7) Unit 2 containment penetration 2P68 failed local leak rate testing repair on June 1, 2020
- (8) Unit 2 emergency feedwater motor drive pump room unit cooler leak repair on June 2, 2020
- (9) Unit 2 containment isolation and actuation signal relay failure replacement on June 11, 2020
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated Unit 2 Refueling Outage 2R27 activities from March 13 to April 21, 2020.
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) Unit 1 penetration room ventilation system surveillance testing on April 23, 2020
- (2) Unit 2 control element assembly drop time testing surveillance testing on April 24, 2020
- (3) Unit 2 emergency diesel generator 2 buried fuel oil piping pressure testing on May 1, 2020
- (4) Unit 2 swing charging pump C local operation surveillance testing on May 28, 2020
RCS Leakage Detection Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactor coolant system leakage surveillance on June 2, 2020
Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 hot leg primary sample line containment isolation valve 2SV-5833-1 on April 27, 2020
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) Unit 2 annual dynamic simulator exam with drill and exercise performance indication opportunity on June 24,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (9 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant walkdowns:
- (1) SPING radiation monitors in Unit 1
- (2) SPING radiation monitors in Unit 2 (3)2RE8911, Area Radiation Monitor (ARM) in Health Physics (HP) Area - 386 foot elevation (4)2RE8914, ARM in Cask Washdown Area - 404 foot elevation
- (5) Portable friskers used at the exit to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 radiologically controlled areas
- (6) Survey meters ready for use in HP instrumentation room
- (7) Telepole survey tools ready for use, HR-DR-348 and HR-DR-355
- (8) Personnel contamination monitors used at the exit to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 radiologically controlled areas
- (9) Small article monitors used at the exit to the Unit 1 radiologically controlled area
Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.02) (11 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing of the following radiation detection instruments:
- (1) FASTSCAN-1 Whole Body Counting System, 05/05/2020
- (2) Ludlum-177 Frisker, CHP-CR-067, 02/06/2020
- (3) Telepole WR, HP-DR-348, 01/27/2020
- (4) ARGOS-5AB, ARGOS-003, 07/31/2019
- (5) Canberra GEM-5, GEM-002, 05/20/2019
- (6) Canberra GEM-5, GEM-008, 05/22/2019
- (7) Eberline PCM-1B, PCM-013, 08/31/2019
- (8) Eberline PM-7, EPM-001, 03/31/2020
- (9) Gamma Scintillation Tool Monitor (SAM11), GSAM-007, 12/17/2018
- (10) Ludlum-177 Frisker, CHP-DR-156, 10/14/2019
- (11) ARGOS-5AB, ARGOS-001, 07/14/2019
Effluent Monitoring Calibration and Testing Program Sample (IP Sample 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and maintenance of the following radioactive effluent monitoring and measurement instrumentation:
- (1) Work Order (WO) 52804554, Unit 1 Effluent Process Radiation Monitor, RE-4642, 09/26/2019
- (2) WO 52834502, Unit 1 SPING 3 Radiation Monitor, RX-9830, 03/06/2020
71124.06 - Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radioactive effluent systems during walkdowns:
- (1) Unit 1 Reactor Building Purge Exhaust System
- (2) Unit 1 Liquid Radioactive Waste Systems
- (3) Unit 1 Fuel Handling Area Exhaust System
- (4) Unit 1 Gaseous Radioactive Waste System
Sampling and Analysis (IP Section 03.02) (4 Samples)
- (1) June 18, 2020, Gaseous Effluent Filter, Gas and Charcoal Samples, Unit 2 Auxiliary Building Extension
- (2) March 6, 2020, Liquid Effluent Sample, Neutralizing Tank
- (3) April 26, 2019 - May 2, 2019, Liquid Effluent Sample, Unit 2 Turbine Building Sump
- (4) February 8, 2018, Gaseous Effluent Sample, Charcoal and Gas, SPING 3, Unit 1 Fuel Handling Area
Dose Calculations (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following dose calculations:
- (1) Dose Calculations Associated with Liquid Radioactive Waste Permits:
1LR2018-0030, 2LR2019-0006, 1LR2020-0012
- (2) Dose Calculations Associated with Gaseous Radioactive Waste Permits:
1GR2018-0005, 1GR-2019-0050, 2GR2020-0009
Abnormal Discharges (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) There were no abnormal discharges during the monitoring period.
71124.07 - Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
Environmental Monitoring Equipment and Sampling (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated environmental monitoring equipment and observed collection of environmental samples.
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the licensees radiological environmental monitoring program.
Groundwater Protection Initiative Implementation (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of the Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI) program to identify incomplete or discontinued program elements. There were no incomplete or discontinued program elements identified.
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, &
Transportation
Radioactive Material Storage and Control (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
Inspectors evaluated the licensees performance in controlling, labeling, and securing radioactive materials:
- (1) The inspectors walked down the old and new Radwaste Buildings and Sealand Storage (O/S South) and observed the following containers integrity, labeling, and security from unauthorized access:
- B-25 Box - EQ-116 containing Unit 1 Nozzle Dams
- Sealand - EQ-015 containing Aux/Rx Building Scaffold
- 55-gallon drums containing secondary resins
- (2) The inspectors verified selected sealed sources, Source Identification Numbers 48, 171, 917, 1014, 1015, 1210 and 1211, were labeled, secured, and leak tested. The inspectors reviewed the licensees records regarding leak testing of sources in inventory and transactions in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2207.
- (3) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's 10 CFR Part 37 security plan and associated annual program audits and assessments for program deficiencies regarding access controls and security for subject radioactive material.
Solid Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors walked down the following accessible portions of the solid radioactive waste systems and evaluated system configuration and functionality for:
- (1) New and Old Radwaste Buildings
- (2) Spent Resin Transfer System
Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees characterization and classification of radioactive waste. The inspectors reviewed the following selected 10 CFR Part 61 waste stream analyses:
- (1) F-3 reactor coolant system filters
- (2) F-4 spent fuel pool filters
- (3) Dry active waste
Shipment Preparation (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed the preparation and shipment of a non-excepted, low specific activity (LSA) dry active waste (DAW) radioactive material shipment, RSR-20-069. The shipment was classified as a LSA I shipment.
Shipping Records (IP Section 03.05) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted radioactive material shipments through a record review:
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)
PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
- (1) October 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 obsolete equipment/parts management on June 26, 2020
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Unit 2 pressurizer spray line A snubber failures and reactor coolant system piping defects extent of condition review on May 27,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Design Alarm Chassis with Reflash Capability with Multiple Inputs Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000313/2020002-01 Open/Closed None 71111.15 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50 (10 CFR Part 50), Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to assure that the applicable design basis requirements, associated with the Unit 1 safety-related electrical equipment room high temperature alarm chassis, were reviewed for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure an alarm chassis with multiple inputs had alarm reflash capability to ensure operators would identify a degraded condition associated with the safety-related electrical equipment room emergency chiller system and take appropriate operator action during a loss of coolant accident.
Description:
The inspectors reviewed the current license and design basis associated with the safety-related electrical equipment room emergency chiller system, Procedure OP-1203.012-N, Annunciator K16 Corrective Action, Revision 49, and Procedure OP-1104.027, Battery and Switchgear Emergency Cooling System, Revision 51. From this review, the inspectors identified the following:
- Unit 1 Safety Analysis Report: The electrical equipment room emergency chillers are designed to maintain a maximum temperature of 120 degrees Fahrenheit (F) in the safety-related 4160 V switchgear rooms, the electrical equipment rooms, and the battery/DC rooms during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Long-term operator actions may be required to open doors to the south electrical room (Room 104) to maintain temperatures within limits. The long-term operator actions were established in 2007 when it was identified by the licensee that during worst-case accident/ambient conditions, even if the south emergency switchgear room chiller VCH-4B and the south electrical equipment room emergency unit cooler VUC-14D are operating as designed, action was required to maintain operability of electrical equipment in the room. Additionally, Calculation CALC-91-E-0090-10, ANO-1 North Electrical Room 149 HVAC Evaluation, Revision 4, determined that the maximum temperature of north electrical equipment room (Room 149) was 118.4 degrees F during a LOCA.
Room 149s maximum temperature occurs with the north emergency switchgear room chiller VCH-4A and north equipment room emergency unit cooler VUC-14B are operating as designed.
- Procedure OP-1203.012-N: The safety-related electrical equipment room temperature high alarm setpoint was 104 degrees F and has multiple inputs from temperature switches in safety-related electrical equipment rooms and does not have reflash capability. The purpose of this alarm is to warn control room operators of a degraded condition with the safety-related electrical equipment room emergency chiller system. Additionally, if the alarm is received during a LOCA, Procedure OP-1203.012-N instructs operators to perform actions in accordance with Procedure OP-1104.027.
- Procedure OP-1104.027: In the worst-case LOCA ambient conditions, the following actions are needed as soon as 115 hours0.00133 days <br />0.0319 hours <br />1.901455e-4 weeks <br />4.37575e-5 months <br /> after the accident, but they are taken promptly whenever a room high temperature alarm (104 degrees F) is received, even if the south emergency switchgear room chiller VCH-4B and south electrical equipment room emergency unit cooler VUC-14D are operating as designed. The operator action is to open and hold open the door for the electrical equipment room (Door 49) and the missile door for the electrical equipment room (Door 62) as soon as practicable and within 115 hours0.00133 days <br />0.0319 hours <br />1.901455e-4 weeks <br />4.37575e-5 months <br />. The inspectors did not identify any procedural requirement to monitor the temperatures of unaffected safety-related electrical equipment rooms, once a safety-related electrical equipment room high temperature alarm has been received during LOCA for Room 104 or Room 149.
From the information above, the inspectors concluded without reflash capability of the safety-related electrical equipment room temperature high alarm or additional monitoring of the unaffected safety-related electrical rooms, operators would not be able to identify a degraded condition associated with the safety-related electrical equipment room emergency chiller system and take appropriate alarm card corrective actions during a LOCA. The licensee entered this deficiency into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2020-00668.
Corrective Actions: The licensee initiated a procedure improvement form, PIF-1-20-0130, to update Procedure OP-1104.027 to implement additional monitoring when a room temperature high alarm is received and will not clear. Additionally, the licensee initiated a design change to create a reflash capability for the electrical equipment room temperature high alarm.
Corrective Action References: Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2020-00668
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to design an alarm chassis with multiple safety-related electrical room high temperature alarms with reflash capability was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensees failure to design an alarm chassis with multiple safety-related electrical room high temperature alarms with reflash capability would prevent operators from identifying a degraded condition associated with the safety-related electrical equipment room emergency chiller system and from performing appropriate alarm card corrective actions during a LOCA.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it
- (1) was not a design deficiency or qualification impacting operability or probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)functionality,
- (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function,
- (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time,
- (4) did not represent a loss of the probability risk analysis function of two separate technical specification systems for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />,
- (5) did not represent a loss of probability risk analysis system and/or function for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and
- (6) did not result in the loss of a high safety-significant, nontechnical specification train.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: None. A cross-cutting aspect was not assigned to this finding because the performance deficiency occurred in 2007 and, therefore, is not indicative of current licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: As required, in part, by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 50.2 and as specified in the licensee application, for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies. Measures shall also be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems, and components.
Contrary to the above, from April 2007 to April 2020, the licensee failed to establish measures to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 50.2 and as specified in the licensee application that for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies. Measures shall also be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems, and components for the Unit 1 safety-related electrical equipment room high temperature alarm chassis. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure this alarm chassis with multiple inputs had alarm reflash capability to ensure operators would identify a degraded condition associated with the safety-related electrical equipment room emergency chiller system and take appropriate operator action during a LOCA.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Take Corrective Actions for Conditions Adverse to Quality Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000368/2020002-02 Open/Closed None 71152 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, associated with the licensees failure to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as, defective material and equipment are corrected. Specifically, the licensee identified through a visual examination (VT-3) of a Unit 2 safety-related snubber and associated attachments identified multiple degraded conditions, but failed to take corrective actions to correct the defective material, a condition adverse to quality. Consequently, the failure to correct the adverse condition contributed to the failure of the snubber.
Description:
During the 2020 Unit 2 spring refueling outage, a Lisega hydraulic snubber, 2CCA-15-H60, was found fully disconnected on the reactor building floor during the initial walkdown performed. During walkdowns to identify the source of the disconnected snubber, snubber 2CCA-13-H4 was also identified as disconnected at the pipe clamp. The snubber remained within the degraded pipe clamps, but the load pin could not be located. This condition prompted the licensee to complete a stress analysis to assure that the structural integrity of the piping system remained within design. The licensee concluded that after snubber 2CCA-13-H4 lost its load pin at the pipe clamp, the added vibration experienced in the system resulted in the failure of snubber 2CCA-15-H60. Prior to plant start-up, the inspectors reviewed the vibration analysis and did not identify any issues with continued operation of the pressurizer spray line system.
A review of the past maintenance history for snubber 2CCA-13-H4 revealed that in 2009, snubber 2CCA-13-H4 had been visually examined (VT-3) twice during maintenance activities per WO 51667491. The work was completed using Procedure 1306.003, Visual Inspection, VT-3 & Limited Operability Testing of Snubbers, Revision 28. During the initial VT-3 examination, the licensee documented multiple degraded conditions detailed as spherical bearing damaged, load stud worn and deformed, extension worn down in pipe clamp, excessive clearance from worn extension and bearing damage, and an unacceptable clearance on the structure clevis. The non-destructive examination (NDE) report referenced Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2009-02376 as a corrective action. The inspectors reviewed this condition report and noted that it was closed to Work Order WO 51667491, which performed the removal and installation of several snubbers in accordance with Procedure 1402.130, Snubber Removal and Installation, Revision 51. As required by the procedure, the licensee performed a second VT-3 examination on snubber 2CCA-13-H4 after its maintenance had been completed. The inspectors noted that the second NDE report documented the following degraded conditions: extension paddle has excessive wear, bearing does not have enough surface contact with paddle, pipe clamp has excessive wear from extension paddle rubbing in pipe clamp. The NDE report did not reference any additional corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the Adverse Condition Analysis (ACA)report as documented in Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2020-0867. The inspectors concluded that no additional corrective actions (i.e., condition reports, work orders, evaluations, etc.) had been taken subsequent to the second VT-3 examination of snubber 2CCA-13-H4.
Corrective Actions: The licensee replaced snubber 2CCA-13-H4 and repaired the degraded pipe clamps.
Corrective Action References: Condition Reports CR-ANO-2-2020-00867, ANO-2-2020-02243, and ANO-2-2020-02797.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to take corrective actions following the identification of multiple degraded conditions during a VT-3 examination of snubber 2CCA-13-H4 was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to correct the condition adverse to quality resulted in the failure of snubber 2CCA-13-H4.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it
- (1) was not a design deficiency or qualification impacting operability or PRA functionality,
- (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function,
- (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time,
- (4) did not represent a loss of the probability risk analysis function of two separate technical specification systems for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />,
- (5) did not represent a loss of probability risk analysis system and/or function for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and
- (6) did not result in the loss of a high safety-significant, nontechnical specification train.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: None. A cross-cutting aspect was not assigned to this finding because the performance deficiency occurred in 2009 and, therefore, is not indicative of current licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: As required, in part, by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are corrected.
Contrary to the above, from August 15, 2009 to March 14, 2020, the licensee failed to correct a condition adverse to quality associated with snubber 2CCA-13-H4 defective material and equipment. Specifically, the VT-3 examination identified structural degradation of the extension paddle and pipe clamp of snubber 2CCA-13-H4, but failed to correct or evaluate these conditions adverse to quality.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Observation: Semiannual Trend Review 71152 The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program, performance indicators, system health reports, and other documentation available to help identify performance trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors verified that the licensee was taking corrective actions to address the identified adverse trends. The inspectors did not review any cross-cutting themes because none existed at the site.
To verify that the licensee was taking corrective actions to address identified adverse trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue, the inspectors reviewed the corrective action program documentation associated with a potential adverse trend in management of obsolete equipment from the time period of December 2019 through June 2020. Selected examples of these events included:
- CR-ANO-1-2020-0363: There are 27 overcurrent relays associated with the 4160 Vac safety-related motors that are scheduled for setting changes during the spring 2021 Unit 1 refueling outage. These overcurrent relays are obsolete and replacements are not available. The inspectors did not identify a bridging strategy or an equivalent replacement relay. Unavailability of these relay replacements could extend the outage time and result in a vulnerability of safety systems.
- CR-ANO-2-2020-2602: The emergency diesel generator B heat exchanger drain valve (2SW-1125) was leaking and the handwheel slipped when valve tightening was attempted. Work Order 542027 was issued to repair the valve, but after the valve was disassembled it was determined that parts were unavailable and cannot be purchased because of obsolescence. The valve was reinstalled in the as-found condition and was externally watertight. An equivalent replacement will need to be identified and procured to repair the drain valve leakage. Leakage through this valve could potentially cause a loss of flow to the heat exchanger and threaten the inventory of the emergency cooling pond during situations where it is the source of service water.
- CR-ANO-2-2020-1060: During performance of Procedure OP-2305.003, Emergency Safety Feature Response Time Test, Revision 41, it was determined that relay 2C40-K210B in the containment isolation actuation system (CIAS) had failed.
Work Order 541387 was written to replace the failed relay, but an exact replacement was not available, and an equivalency review was needed before the relay could be replaced. Although a replacement relay was identified and used, the licensee determined that neither the original relay nor the replacement relay were still being manufactured and that spare parts were in very limited supply. The failed relay was kept and designated to be rebuilt or refurbished so it could be reused. A similar issue was identified with another model of CIAS relay in Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2020-1235. Failure of a CIAS relay could result in an uncontrolled radiological release from containment.
- CR-ANO-2-2020-1786, 1944, 1968, 1970, 2142, and 2143: During performance of Work Order 52864561 to calibrate the steam dump and bypass control system, a valve did not stroke as expected. Subsequent actions ultimately resulted in multiple control system cards needing to be replaced. However, replacement cards were not available and emergent repair of failed cards was necessary. This event delayed the return of Unit 2 to power following Refueling Outage 2R27. Condition Report CR-ANO-2-01944 stated, This event highlighted the obsolescence vulnerability of the SDBC system. Planned replacement of this system is scheduled for the fall 2024 Refueling Outage 2R30, but an adequate bridging strategy was not identified by the inspectors. Failure of the steam dump and bypass control system could cause a significant transient to the reactor and could negatively impact the ability of the plant to be cooled through the steam generators after a plant trip.
- CR-ANO-2-2020-2200: Alarms received in the control room for the alternate AC diesel generator flame detectors prompted troubleshooting that revealed that both the engine flame detectors had failed. These items are obsolete, and no replacements are on site for the repairs. An upgrade of the fire detection system is planned for the 2024-2028 timeframe, but it is not acceptable to have the alarms locked in until that work is done. A work request was generated to resolve this issue. Failure of these flame detectors reduces the ability of the alternate AC diesel generator fire protection system to detect and respond to system fires.
The licensees immediate corrective actions for the recent potential adverse trend in equipment obsolescence included:
- Discussions have occurred among the site engineering staff relative to the sites program for managing obsolescence issues.
- The ANO equipment reliability team has initiated tasks to identify critical spares, document the risk significance of limited spares, and prioritize efforts to address the identified vulnerabilities.
- ANO site engineering has identified equipment obsolescence as an area that needs increased attention. An effort has been initiated to determine the safety significance of obsolescent equipment and to develop a bridging or replacement strategy. The sites goal is to have the affected Tier 1 equipment identified and prioritized by the end of July 2020.
The inspectors noted the following:
1. The licensees immediate actions have not been in effect long enough to know
whether they will reduce the number of obsolete equipment issues that are happening at the site.
2. Planning for replacement of obsolete components has resulted in the determination of
equivalence when it actually did not exist. This has caused the inability to complete work orders and the necessity to defer that work until suitable parts can be identified and obtained.
3. Continued aging of the plants will result in additional items becoming obsolete and
may challenge the sites ability to prevent future operability and functionality concerns.
4. The sites method of dealing with obsolescence issues has been more reactive than
proactive, but that is being changed with a new initiative in the engineering department. Obsolescent components exist in both safety and nonsafety systems with a potential increasing site risk to initiating events and unplanned unavailability of systems needed to mitigate design basis events. Many potential benefits can be realized from a proactive response to addressing obsolescence issues, such as it will potentially reduce site risk due to obsolescent equipment.
5. The site has identified multiple instances of their equipment database not being
updated after obsolete components were replaced with new, equivalent components (Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2019-03085). This weakness has a negative effect on work planning and parts inventory. A rollup Engineering Change (EC-84307) was performed to ensure that current equipment information is captured in the sites Asset Suite database. In the EC, 13 condition reports written in 2019 were identified with issues involving accuracy of the sites equipment database, drawings, or Asset Suite database. It is unclear if an attempt was made to identify similar issues prior to 2019, so database errors may still exist.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On June 19, 2020, the inspectors presented the public radiation safety inspection results to Mr. J. Dinelli, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On June 22, 2020, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection results to Mr. J. Dinelli, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On July 8, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. J. Sullivan, General Manager of Plant Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
C-2011-02952
Procedures
OP-1203.025
Natural Emergencies
OP-2203.008
Natural Emergencies
OP-2203.054
Abnormal Grid
Calculations
CALC-2CCA-13-
H4
Pipe Support CALC System Reactor Misc System
CALC-2CCA-15-
H60
Support Qual for 2CCA-15-H60
CALC-80-D-
1083A-01
Room 111 Heat Load Assessment
CALC-84-D-1069-
Room 105 Heat Load Assessment and HVAC Evaluation
CALC-91-E-0090-
ANO-1 4160V Switchgear HVAC Evaluation
CALC-91-E-0090-
ANO-1 North Electrical Room 149 HVAC Evaluation
CALC-93-R-1040-
ANO-1 AB Limiting Component Qualification Temperatures
CALC-E-0090-06
Heat Load Determination for Rooms 95, 98, 99, 100, 104, 109,
110, 149 for Post-Accident Cooling and Appendix R
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2007-00339, 1-2020-00541, 2-2020-00629, 2-2020-00720,
2-2020-00755, 2-2020-00764, 2-2020-00823, 2-2020-01514,
2-2020-01523, 2-2020-01673
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-ANO-
1-2020-00643, 2-2020-01923, 2-2020-02197, 2-2020-02198,
2-2020-02199, 2-2020-02203
Drawings
Large Pipe Isometric Reactor Coolant System
Hanger Detail Reactor Coolant System
Large Pipe Isometric Pressurizer Spray System
Pipe Support Detail Pressurizer Spray System
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
M-2230, Sheet 1
Piping and Instrument Diagram Reactor Coolant System
M-2230, Sheet 2
Piping and Instrument Diagram Reactor Coolant System
M-2231, Sheet 1
Piping and Instrument Diagram Chemical and Volume Control
System
148
Engineering
Changes
Updated CALC-91-E-01334-01 (RM 79), CALC-84-D-1069-02
(RM 1050, and CALC-80-D-1083A-01 (RM 111) to Incorporate
Cable Heat Losses
Enhance Supports 2CCA-13-H4, 2CCA-13-1-H5, 2CCA-14-1-
H3 and 2CCA-15-H60 As a Result of CR-ANO-2-2020-0720,
CR-ANO-2-2020-1633, CR-ANO-2-2020-1655, and CR-ANO-
2-2020-0755
Miscellaneous
ULD-1-SYS-23
ANO Unit 1 Penetration Room Ventilation System
Procedures
OP-1104.027
Battery and Switchgear Emergency Cooling System
OP-1104.043
Penetration Room Ventilation System
OP-1203.012N
Annunciator K16 Corrective Action
OP-5120.417
In-Place Testing of the Unit 1 Penetration Filtration System
Work Orders
WO 541943, 516094, 52841004
Calculations
CALC-95-R-0024-
Basic Requirements for Component Database on Station
Doors and Hatches
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
2-2016-03077, 2-2020-01542, 2-2020-01691, 2-2020-02333,
2-2020-02334, C-2020-01033
Drawings
Fire Operating Floor Plan EL 386'-0"
Miscellaneous
3167
FBDRL 2020-08
Fire Pre-drill Brief Document
Fire Hazard Analysis Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1 and
Unit 2
Procedures
OP-1000.120
ANO Fire Impairment Program
OP-1203.049
Fires in Areas Affecting Safe Shutdown
OP-2203.049
Fires in Areas Affecting Safe Shutdown Technical Guidelines
Work Orders
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
2-2018-01069, 2-2019-00180, 2-2019-03046, 2-2019-03127,
2-2019-03209, 2-2020-00003, 2-2020-00325, 2-2020-00996,
2-2020-01205, 2-2020-01390, 2-2020-01427, 2-2020-01449
NDE Reports
Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 2R26, 10 Year Reactor Vessel
08/27/2018
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Examination, October 2018
Procedures
CEP-BAC-001
Boric Acid Corrosion Control (BACC) Program Plan
CEP-NDE-0400
Ultrasonic Examination
CEP-NDE-0477
Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic and Ferritic
Vessels Not Greater than 2" in Thickness (ASME XI)
CEP-NDE-0641
Liquid Penetrant Examination (PT) for ASME Section XI
CEP-NDE-0902
VT-2 Examination
CEP-NDE-0903
VT-3 Examination
CEP-NDE-0955
Visual Examination (VE) of Bare-Metal Surfaces
307
CEP-WP-GWS-1
General Welding Standard ASME/ANSI
Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program (BACCP)
SEP-CISI-ANO-
105
Program Section for ASME Section XI, Division 1, ANO-2
Containment Inservice Inspection Program
SEP-ISI-ANO2-
105
Program Section for ASME Section XI, Division 1, ANO-2
Inservice Inspection Program
SEP-PT-ANO-001 Arkansas Nuclear One ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection
Pressure Testing (PT) Program Section
Self-Assessments LO-ALO-2019-
00083 CA 2
Arkansas Nuclear One, Pre-NRC 2R27 ISI Activities Self-
Assessment Report
2/03/2019
71111.11Q Procedures
PWR Reactivity Maneuver
OP-2102.016
Reactor Startup
Calculations
CALC-92-D-2011-
AAC Generator Building Heating and Ventilation and AC Eval
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2019-00292, 1-2020-00260, 1-2020-00445, 1-2020-00462,
1-2020-00571, 1-2020-00598, 2-1989-00092, 2-2000-00929,
2-2006-01238, 2-2011-00792, 2-2013-00691, 2-2016-04340,
2-2017-02321, 2-2017-03337, 2-2017-03355, 2-2017-03388,
2-2017-03410, 2-2017-03411, 2-2017-03616, 2-2017-03656,
2-2017-03700, 2-2017-03740, 2-2017-03977, 2-2017-04353,
2-2017-04354, 2-2017-04355, 2-2017-05087, 2-2018-00653,
2-2018-02583, 2-2018-04175, 2-2019-00125, 2-2019-00328,
2-2019-01003, 2-2019-01153, 2-2019-01314, 2-2019-01452,
2-2019-01751, 2-2019-01752, 2-2019-02104, 2-2019-02154,
2-2019-02253, 2-2019-02549, 2-2020-00513, 2-2020-00968,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
2-2020-01078, 2-2020-01234, 2-2020-01395, 2-2020-01424,
2-2020-01447, 2-2020-01486, 2-2020-01611, 2-2020-01615,
2-2020-01633, 2-2020-01642, 2-2020-01658, 2-2020-01665,
2-2020-01673, 2-2020-01682, 2-2020-01709, 2-2020-01731,
2-2020-01802, 2-2020-02104, 2-2020-02197, 2-2020-02198,
2-2020-02199, 2-2020-02203, C-2006-00682, C-2019-02209,
C-2019-02571, C-2020-00456, C-2020-00624, C-2020-00636
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-ANO-
C-2020-01557
Drawings
E-2005, Sheet 1
Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram 4160 Volt System
Engineering System Features
E-2005, Sheet 2
Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram AAC Generator System
4.16 kV Generator and Switchgear
Engineering
Changes
Evaluate the Operational Requirements to Take Either One of
the Three AACG Engine Room Rans Out of Service for
Maintenance
Miscellaneous
STM 2-33
Alternate AC Diesel Generator
ULD-0-SYS-19
ANO Unit 1 and Unit 2 Alternate AC Generator System (AAC)
Procedures
Maintenance Rule Monitoring
OP-1107.002
ES Electrical System Operation
OP-1202.008
Blackout
OP-1416.050
Unit 1 and 2 ICA51A and IAC51B Relay Test Instructions
OP-1416.053
Unit 1 and 2 IAC77 Relay Test Instructions
OP-1416.084
Basler BE1-51 Relay Test Instructions
OP-2104.037
Alternate AC Diesel Generator Operations
OP-6030.110
Termination Splicing and Soldering of Cable and Wires
Work Orders
WO 507265, 525148, 525878, 527408, 531333, 50236653,
2410511, 52617453, 52798794, 52803494, 52868761
Calculations
CALC-09-E-0002-
ANO-1 Start-Up 2 Fast and Manual Transfer Capability
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
2-2020-00642, 2-2020-00651, 2-2020-00657, 2-2020-00650,
2-2020-02122, 2-2020-02153, 2-2020-02171, 2-2020-02193,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
2-2020-02194, 2-2020-02282, 2-2020-02285, 2-2020-02319,
2-2020-02446, 2-2020-02451, 2-2020-02458
Miscellaneous
Fire Hazard Analysis Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1 and
Unit 2
Procedures
Troubleshooting Control of Maintenance Activities
Protected Equipment Posting
On Line Risk Assessment
On Line Risk Assessment
On Line Risk Assessment
OP-1107.001
Electrical System Operations
131
OP-1203.003
Control Rod Drive Malfunction Action
OP-2105.009
CEDM Control System Operation
OP-2107.001
Electrical System Operation
131
OP-2203.049
Fires in Areas Affecting Safe Shutdown
Work Orders
MWO
236324
WO 543225, 543542, 543584, 545045
Calculations
CALC-91-E-0090-
Heat Load Determination for Rooms 95, 98, 99, 100, 104, 109,
110, 149 for Post Accident Cooling and Appendix R
CALC-91-E-0090-
ANO-1 4160V Switchgear HVAC Evaluation
CALC-91-E-0090-
ANO-1 North Electrical Room 149 HVAC Evaluation
CALC-92-E-0103-
ANO-1 Switchgear, Battery, DC, and Corridor 98 HVAC
Evaluation
CALC-93-R-1040-
ANO-1 AB Limiting Component Qualification Temperatures
CALC-95-R-0024-
Basic Requirements for the Component Database on Station
Doors and Hatches
CALC-ANOC-CS-
15-00003
ANO Flood Protection Design Basis
CALC-ANOC-CS-
15-00012
ANO Flood Protection Room Evaluations - Units 1 and 2
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2020-00507, 1-2020-00541,1-2020-00585, 2-2019-02219, 2-
20-00220, 2-2020-00629, 2-2020-01491, 2-2020-01643, 2-
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
20-01706, 2-2020-01743, 2-2020-01954, 2-2020-01972, 2-
20-02000, 2-2020-02113, 2-2020-02115, 2-2020-02187, 2-
20-02192, 2-2020-02296
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-ANO-
1-2020-00668, 1-2020-00669, 2-2020-02264
Engineering
Changes
Reduced Latching Requirements for Watertight Doors - Units 1
and 2
Operability Input for CR-ANO-1-2020-00507
Miscellaneous
ER-ANO-2006-
0308
Evaluate Use of Manually Substituted RCP Speed Inputs to
ULD-1-SYS-16
4.16 kV System
Work Orders
WO 481231, 506581, 513857
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
2-2020-01688, 2-2020-01761, 2-2020-01788, 2-2020-01878,
2-2020-01917, 2-2020-01923, 2-2020-00720, 2-2020-00755,
2-2020-00764, 2-2020-00823
Engineering
Changes
Evaluation for Wireless Vibe Data Equipment in Unit 2
Containment and Wireless Access Point
Enhance Supports 2CCA-13-H4, 2CCA-13-H005, 2CCA-14-1-
H003, and 2CCA-15-H60 As A Result of CR-ANO-2-2020-
00720, CR-ANO-2-2020-01633, CR-ANO-2-2020-01655, and
CR-ANO-2-2020-00755
2CCA-13-H4 Load Pin Configuration Compliance
Miscellaneous
1(2)DPG-001
Diagnostic Process Guideline
1(2)SAG-001
Initial Response
1(2)SAG-002
TSC Recommending Strategies
1(2)SAG-003
Inject into Steam Generators
1(2)SAG-004
Depressurize RCS
1(2)SAG-005
Inject into RCS
1(2)SAG-006
inject into containment
1(2)SAG-007
Reduce Containment Hydrogen
1(2)SAG-008
Control Containment Pressure
1(2)SAG-009
Mitigate Fission Product Release
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
1(2)SAG-010
Control SFP Level
1(2)TSG-001
Instrumentation
1(2)TSG-004
Benefit Consequence
ER-ANO-2006-
0308
Evaluate Use of Manually Substituted RCP Speed Inputs to
Procedures
Temporary Installation of Measurement and Test Equipment
(M&TE)
Work Orders
WO 516094, 541684, 541685, 52810939, 52814416
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
2-2020-00629, 2-2020-00720, 2-2020-00755, 2-2020-00764,
2-2020-00823, 2-2020-01030, 2-2020-01060, 2-2020-01061,
2-2020-01076, 2-2020-01081, 2-2020-01174, 2-2020-01235,
2-2020-01236, 2-2020-01322, 2-2020-01375, 2-2020-01381,
2-2020-01410, 2-2020-01412, 2-2020-01454, 2-2020-01519,
2-2020-01573, 2-2020-01589, 2-2020-01595, 2-2020-01572,
2-2020-01670, 2-2020-01871, 2-2020-01872, 2-2020-01928,
2-2020-01987, 2-2020-01991, 2-2020-02035, 2-2020-02048,
C-2020-01245
Engineering
Changes
Replacement of B0126 22kV Supply Breaker for SRT (Startup
Transformer #3 Voltage Regulator)
Pipe Surface Abrasion/Scratch on 2CCA-15-4", 2CCA-47-1"
and 2CCA-13-3"
Establish New Reference Values for 2CV-5612-1 and 2CV-
5613-2
Replace Corroded Sections of the 2VUC-6B Room Cooler
Housing
Evaluation of Indications on PZR Spray Line
Miscellaneous
2-BOP-UT-20-035
2-BOP-UT-20-057
EN-CS-S-008-
MULTI
Pipe Wall Thinning Structural Evaluation
NCIG-05
Guidelines for Piping System Reconciliation
Procedures
OP-2104.005
84, 86
OP-2305.017
OP-2305.054
Offsite Power Transfer Test
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
OP-3305.001
OPS System Alignment Tests
Work Orders
WO 29657, 478111, 506581, 516094, 518796, 519374, 525675,
541387, 541519, 541821, 542787, 52864390
Calculations
CALC-07-E-0016-
Accountability of Unit 2 Containment Sump Strainers
Sacrificial Surface Area
CALC-94-D-6007-
Pipe Stress and Support Evaluation of ISO 2CCB-51-1
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
2-2020-01439, 2-2020-00948, 2-2020-00755, 2-2020-01587,
2-2020-01590, 2-2020-01683, 2-2020-01710, 2-2020-01711,
2-2020-01824, 2-2020-00979, 2-2020-01115, 2-2020-01836,
2-2020-01843, 2-2020-01846, 2-2020-01860, 2-2020-01861,
2-2020-01892, 2-2020-01893, 2-2020-01745, 2-2020-01896,
2-2020-01899
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-ANO-
2-2020-01229, 2-2020-01908, C-2020-01446
Engineering
Changes
GSI-191 Program Document Updates
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump Alternate Power Source
Connection
Evaluate and Provide Guidance for Providing Temp Power to
Both U2 SFP Cooling Pumps
Procedures
MRS-SSP-3156
Waterford 3 and ANO 2 Fuel Reconstitution 16x16 CE NFG
Fuel Assemblies
NF-ANO-19-049
Core Loading Plan for Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 Cycle 28
0, 1
OP-1015.036
Containment Building Closeout
56, 57
OP-2203.002
Spent Fuel Pool Emergencies
OP-2302.049
ANO-2 Fuel Assembly Reconstitution
OP-2503.003
Operation of Fuel Handling Equipment
OP-6030.110
Termination Splicing and Soldering of Cable and Wire
Work Orders
WO 2863684, 540856, 363443, 363443, 365081, 524119
Calculations
CALC-90-E-0116-
ANO-2 EOP Setpoint Basis Document
CALC-91-E-0090-
ANO-1 North Electrical Room 149 HVAC Evaluation
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2009-00894, 2-2020-00960, 2-2020-01301, 2-2020-01305,
2-2020-01307, 2-2020-01410, 2-2020-01462, 2-2020-01463,
2-2020-01591, 2-2020-01794, 2-2020-01795, 2-2020-01796,
2-2020-01797, 2-2020-02058, 2-2020-02068, 2-2020-02315,
C-2016-03493, C-2020-00965, C-2020-00974, C-2020-01030
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-ANO-
2-2020-02308
Drawings
M-2217, Sheet 1
P&ID Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System
Engineering
Changes
Updated CALC-91-E-01334-01 (RM 79), CALC-84-D-1069-02
(RM 105), and CALC-80-D-1083A-01 (RM 111) to Incorporate
Cable Heat Losses
Miscellaneous
Unit 2 Primary Containment Leak Rate Running Total
Procedures
Troubleshooting Control of Maintenance Activities
PWR Startup Critical Predictions and Evaluation Process
OP-1104.043
Penetration Room Ventilation System
OP-1618.035
Sampling and Analyzing Diesel Fuel Oil from Diesel Fuel Oil
Transports
OP-2104.002
Chemical and Volume Control
OP-2104.033
Containment Atmosphere Control
OP-2302.046
CEA Drop Time Test
OP-2304.112
Plant Protection System Response Time Test Channel A
OP-2304.113
Plant Protection System Response Time Test Channel B
OP-2304.114
Plant Protection System Response Time Test Channel C
OP-2304.115
Plant Protection System Response Time Test Channel D
OP-2305.016
Remote Features Periodic Testing
OP-5120.417
In-Place Testing of the Unit 1 Penetration Filtration Systems
Work Orders
WO 2883, 517477, 52616755, 52661106, 52714799, 52713821,
2751177, 52807705, 52856733
Miscellaneous
SES-2-031 Scenario
April 2020
Calibration
Records
ARGOS-003
ARGOS-5AB Personnel Contamination Monitor Calibration
07/31/2019
CHP-CR-067
Ludlum-177 Frisker Calibration
2/06/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CHP-DR-156
Ludlum-177 Frisker Calibration
10/14/2019
EPM-001
Eberline PM-7 Gamma Portal Monitor
03/31/2020
FASTSCAN-1
Canberra FASTSCAN Whole Body Counting System
Calibration
05/05/2020
GEM-002
Canberra GEM-5 Portal Monitor Calibration
05/20/2019
GEM-008
Canberra GEM-5 Portal Monitor Calibration
05/22/2019
GSAM-007
Gamma Scintillation Tool Monitor Calibration
2/17/2018
HP-DR-348
WR Telepole Calibration
01/27/2020
PCM-013
Eberline Personal Contamination Monitor PCM-1B Calibration
08/31/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2019-00839, 1-2019-02394, 1-2019-04103, 1-2019-04740,
2-2018-01529, 2-2018-01694, 2-2018-02545, 2-2019-01326,
2-2019-02272, C-2019-01052, C-2019-03356, C-2020-00039,
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-ANO-
C-2020-01755
Miscellaneous
2-00023
Primary Calibration Report for Noble Gas Monitor NGM 203
EP-CALC-ANO-
1701
ANO Radiological Effluent EAL Values
ANO Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
Procedures
Laboratory Analytical Quality Control
EN-FAP-RP-007
Operation of the Radiation Protection Central Calibration
Facility
Radiation Protection Fundamentals Program
Whole Body Counting / In-Vitro Bioassay
Area Monitoring Program
Radiation Protection Instrument Control
Operation of Radiation Protection Instrumentation
Source Checking of Radiation Protection Instrumentation
Operation of Counting Equipment
Central Calibration Facility
Self-Assessments LO-ALO-2019-
Radiation Protection - Pre-NRC FSA Radiation Safety -
2/26/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
00086
Monitoring Instrumentation, Effluent Treatment, Environmental
Monitoring and Solid Waste & Material Handling
NQ-2019-028
QA Audit Report QA-14/15-2019-ANO-1, 2019 QA Audit of
Radiation Protection/Radwaste at Arkansas Nuclear One
(ANO)
10/24/2019
Work Orders
2804554
Month Calibration of Unit 1 Effluent Process Radiation
Monitor, RE-4642
09/26/2019
2806735
Week Calibration of Unit 2 Gaseous Process Radiation
Monitor, RE-8271
01/03/2020
2834502
Month Unit 1 SPING 2 Radiation Monitor, RE-9830
03/06/2020
2862864
Unit 2 Containment High Range Radiation Monitor, 2RE-8925
03/30/2020
2866230
Month Calibration of Unit 1 Main Steam Line Radiation
Monitor, RE-2681
04/16/2020
April 2020
Calculations
1GR2018-0005
Gaseous Radioactive Waste Permit
2/05/2018
1LR2018-0030
Liquid Radioactive Waste Permit
03/29/2018
1LR2020-0012
Liquid Radioactive Waste Release Permit
03/07/2020
2GR2019-0050
Gaseous Radioactive Waste Release Permit
07/11/2019
2GR2020-0009
Gaseous Radioactive Release Permit
01/21/2020
2LR2019-0006
Liquid Radioactive Waste Release Permit
04/25/2019
Scaling Factors
10/24/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2018-04561, 1-2019-01326, 1-2019-01515, 2-2018-01418,
2-2018-01529, 2-2018-01644, 2-2018-03171, 2-2019-01056,
2-2020-01477, C-2020-00982, C-2020-01184
Miscellaneous
Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2018
04/25/2019
Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2019
04/27/2020
Results of Radiochemistry Cross Check Program
05/14/2020
Results of Radiochemistry Cross Check Program
10/20/2019
Operability
Evaluations
1604.016
Analysis of Gaseous Waste Decay Tanks
Procedures
1604.014
Reactor Building Purge Analysis
1604.015
Analysis of Unit Vents
1604.017
Analysis of Liquid Waste
1607.009
Sampling the Treated Waste Monitor Tanks (T-16A/B)
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
1607.010
Sampling of Unit Vents
1618.011
Sampling the Unit 1 Neutralizing Tank
HES-06
Ventilation/Filtration Testing Program
Self-Assessments LO-ALO-2019-
00086
Radiation Protection - Pre-NRC FSA Radiation Safety -
Monitoring Instrumentation, Effluent Treatment, Environmental
Monitoring and Solid Waste & Material Handling
2/06/2020
QA-2/6-2019-
ANO-1
Quality Assurance Audit Report; Chemistry, Effluent and
Environmental Monitoring
09/26/2019
WT-WTANO-
2013-00057 CA
ANO Control Room Habitability Assessment
10/07/2019
April 2020
Calibration
Records
CRO-023
Air Station #1, Rotometer Calibration
03/27/2020
CRO-025
Air Station #56, Rotometer Calibration
03/27/2020
CRO-042
Air Station #2, Rotometer Calibration
03/27/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
2-2019-02068, C-2018-01068, C-2018-03464, C-2018-04141,
C-2018-04299, C-2018-04646, C-2018-04709, C-2019-00081,
C-2019-00489, C-2019-01469, C-2019-01578, C-2019-02058,
C-2019-02564, C-2019-03149, C-2019-04560, C-2019-04568,
C-2019-04671
Miscellaneous
Land Use Census 2019
09/03/2019
Analytics Environmental Radioactivity Cross Check Program
2019
Groundwater Protection Plan Arkansas Nuclear One
0CAN051901
Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report for 2018
05/13/2019
0CAN052001
Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report for 2019
05/19/2020
ANO1 TRM
Technical Requirements Manual
SAR Figure No.
11.2-2
Monitored Ventilation Exhaust Release Points
Procedures
Radiological Groundwater Protection Program
Land Use Census
EN-CY-130-01
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP)
Arkansas Nuclear One
Response to Contaminated Spills/Leak
OP-1304.062
Meteorological Monitoring System Calibration
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Self-Assessments 2019 NUPIC
Audit Report
- 24791
Radioanalytical Laboratory Audit Report
05/09/2019
NAQA-17-0038
Audit Report 17-007 for the Audit of Environmental Dosimetry
Company
09/01/2017
Work Orders
Semi-Annual Meteorological Monitoring Calibration
06/03/2019
Semi-Annual Meteorological Monitoring Calibration
11/25/2019
April 2020
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
2-2018-03171, 2-2020-00444, C-2018-02840, C-2018-02871,
C-2018-03001, C-2018-03959, C-2019-00542, C-2019-00663,
C-2019-02020, C-2019-03880, C-2019-04122, C-2019-04770,
C-2020-00754
CR-HQN-
2019-01094 2019-02856
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-ANO-
C-2020-01762
Miscellaneous
Annual Inventory of Radioactive Material Containers
05/26/2020
ANO Part 37 Security Plan for the Protection of Category 1
and 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material
01/26/2016
2019 Sealed Source Leak Test
08/12/2019
20 Sealed Source Leak Test
04/12/2020
17-03187
CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Sample Screening and
Evaluation: Dry Active Waste
08/01/2017
18-11420
CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Sample Screening and
Evaluation: Dry Active Waste
05/21/2019
18-12412
CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Sample Screening and
Evaluation: 2F3/U2 Reactor Coolant System Filters
05/21/2019
19-05931
CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Sample Screening and
Evaluation: Unit 1 Secondary Resin
10/27/2019
19-09120
CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Sample Screening and
Evaluation: Dry Active Waste
2/10/2020
19-09121
CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Sample Screening and
Evaluation: 1F4 /U1 Spent Fuel Pool Filters
03/03/2020
19-09123
CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Sample Screening and
03/03/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Evaluation: 2F4 /U2 Spent Fuel Pool Filters
19-09124
CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Sample Screening and
Evaluation: 1F3/U1 Reactor Coolant System Filters
03/03/2020
Procedures
1601.502
Radioactive Material Control at Radwaste
Material Receipt
Radiation Worker Expectations
Radioactive Material Control
Radioactive Waste Management
Radioactive Shipping Procedure
Radioactive Waste Tracking Procedure
Scaling Factors
Integrated Transportation Security Plan
Radioactive Shipment Accident Response
Self-Assessments
Annual Access Authorization and Security Programs
Pertaining to Part 37
2/11/2019
LO-ALO-2019-
00086
Radiation Protection - Pre-NRC FSA Radiation Safety -
Monitoring Instrumentation, Effluent Treatment, Environmental
Monitoring and Solid Waste & Material Handling
2/06/2020
NQ-2019-030
QA Audit: Audit of Security Including Cyber Security at
Arkansas Nuclear One
2/09/2019
QA-1-2019-ANO-
QA Audit: Fitness for Duty and Access Authorization
08/09/2019
QA-14/15-2019-
ANO-1
2019 QA Audit of Radiation Protection/Radwaste at Arkansas
Nuclear One (ANO)
10/24/2019
Work Orders
489482
GEL Laboratories Ni-63 Analysis
10/04/2019
506544
GEL Laboratories Ni-63 Analysis
04/03/2020
71151
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
C-2020-01230
Calculations
6600-M-2119
Technical Specification for Pipe Hangers, Supports, and
Restraints for a Nuclear Power Plant for the Arkansas Nuclear
One - Unit 2
ANO-C-2443
Technical Specification for the Design of Q/Non-Q Pipe
Support for ANO 1 & 2
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
ANO-M-2410
Installation, Modification, Inspection, & Documentation of
Piping Systems & Pipe, Supports, Hangers & Restrains
SES-22
Snubber Design Criteria
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
2-2009-02376, 2-2013-02242, 2-2020-00678, 2-2020-00681,
2-2020-00701, 2-2020-00703, 2-2020-00710, 2-2020-00720,
2-2020-00755, 2-2020-00867, 2-2020-01544, 2-2020-01648,
2-2020-01655, 2-2020-02243
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-ANO-
2-2020-02243
Drawings
1801558-03
Rear Bracket
08/1976
Pipe Support Detail Reactor Coolant System
Pipe Support Detail Pressurizer Spray System
Miscellaneous
CD30-349
Design Report Summary
CD35-209
Design Report Summary
LF200515-LR-005 Train A Pressurizer Spray Line Support 2CCA-15-H60
Structural End Attachment Opening - ANO Unit 2
Procedures
OP-1306.003
Visual Inspection (VT-3) of Snubbers
Work Orders
WO 513466, 516086, 516094, 540955, 51665737, 51667491,
51674080, 52240727, 52863040