IR 05000348/1982009
| ML20054D999 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 03/25/1982 |
| From: | Bradford W, Brownlee V, Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054D995 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-82-09, 50-348-82-9, 50-364-82-08, 50-364-82-8, NUDOCS 8204230581 | |
| Download: ML20054D999 (6) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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I REGION ll 101 MARtETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 o,Y
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 g*****
s Report Nos. 50-348/82-09 and 50-364/82-08 Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, AL 35202 Facility Name: Farley Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8 Inspection at Farley site near Dothan, Alabama Inspectors:
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L4 1. Bradford V'
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WA 3lM g A. Peeb1 V7 Date Signed Approved by:
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V. L. l}fownlee, Section Chief, Division of Date Si'gned Project and Resident Programs SUMt1ARY Inspection on February 16 - March 15,1982 Areas Inspected This routine, inspection involved 140 inspector-hours on site in the areas of monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, operational safety verification, independent inspection effort, and significant events.
Results No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
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W. G. Hairston, Plant flanager J. D. Woodard, Assistant Plant Manager D. Morey, Operations Superintendent R. S. Hill, Operations Supervisor W. D. Shipman, thintenance Superintendent C. Nesbitt, Technical Superintendent L. Williaras ing Superintendent R. G. Berr; systems Performance and Planning Superintendent
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L. A. Ward, r.anning Supervisor W. C. Carr, Chemistry and Health Physics Supervisor fl. W. Mitchell, Health Physics Supervisor R. D. Rogers, Technical Supervisor J. Odom, Operations Section Supervisor T. Esteve, Operations Section Supervisor R. Bayne, Chemistry Supervisor J. Thomas, I&C Supervisor J. Hudspeth, Document Control Supervisor K. Jones, Material Supervisor R. H. Graham, Security Supervisor L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Superintendent Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operation personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members, and office personnel.
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2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews held throughout the reporting period with the plant manager and selected members of his staff. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings flot inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
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S.
Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspectors observed Technical Specification required surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate i
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procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that test results met acceptance criteria requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities:
FrtP-(1)(2)-UDP 1.1A - tiode 4 Surveillance check list FNP-(1)(2) - UOP 1.3 - Startup of unit following an at power Reactor trip FNP-1-ETP-173 Engineered Safety Feature Reset Control Test
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FHP-2-STP - 22.18 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification d
FNP-(1)(2) STP-11.4 RHR Pump Annual Inservice Test
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j FNP-(1)(2) STP-23.11 Component Cooling Pump 1C monthly Test
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FNP-(1)(2)STP-63.0 Area Turbine lionitoring
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FNP-(1)(2) STP-201.12 Reactor Coolant system 2B FT-426 FNP(1)(2)STP70.0 Containment Sump Surveillance FNP-(1)(2)STP-1.0 Operations Daily and Shift Surveillance Requirements
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j FNP(1)(2) STP-62.0 fiain Turbine valve operability test FNP(1)(2)-ETP-290 Startup transformer 2A Removal from and Return to service
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Within the areas inspected, there were no violations or deviations identified.
6.
tionthly fiaintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished during approved procedures and were inspected as appli-
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cable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and
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materials were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reivewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
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a.
Unit 1 main electrical generator repair.
b.
Various instrument calibration and repair throughout the plants.
c.
Boric acid system heat tracing.
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d.
Hydraulic snubber inspections - Units 1 and 2.
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Unit 2A seal injection filter replaceemnt.
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2A reactor coolant pump seal replacement.
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Control room chlorine detector.
h.
Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine DEH systems.
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Within the areas inspected there were no violations or deviations identi-fied.
7.
Operational Safety Verification
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The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the report period. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary, diesel, turbine building and
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containment were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations. The inspectors verified by observation and direct interviews that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and
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verified implemenation of radiation protection control.
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following safety-related systems on Units 1 and 2 to verify operability and proper valve alignment:
a.
Unit 1 and 2 charging / safety injection suction.
b.
Diesel Generators starting air systems, fucl oil systems and engine
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l cooling systems.
c.
Electrical switching line up as observed from the control room panels and switch gear.
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d.
Valve line ups for safety systems as observed from the control room.
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Auxiliary feed water systems (Units 1 and 2).
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Accessible areas for other safety-related and non-safety-related systems.
Within the areas inspected, there were no violations or deviations identi-fied.
8.
Independent Inspection Effort The inspectors routinely attended meetings with certain licensee management and observed various shift turnovers between shift supervisors, shift foreman and licensed cperators during the reporting period. These meetings and discussions provided a daily status of plant operating and testing activities in progress as well as discussion of significant problems or incidents.
The inspectors toured the new low level waste storage / shipping building and reviewed the procedures which the licensee had written to utilize the area.
The facility is in current use.
9.
Significant Events During the reporting period, i.he inspectors conducted inspections of the following events:
a.
Unit No. 2 returned to power operation on February 28, 1982 following a forced maintenance outage on January 30, 1982 to replace 2A reactor coolant pump seals. During unit restart the unit tripped twice; the first trip as a result of steam generator water levels and the second trip with safety injection as a result of low steam generator pressure caused by the main turbine DEH control system. When the unit was synchronized the DEH control system caused a sudden 300 MWe load increase. All reactor safety systems functioned as designed. The licensee contacted the turbine vendor (Westinghouse Corporation) and it was determined that during DEH system mode changes, that only one function should be changed at a time with a 15 second settling time allowed.
b.
Unit No.1 returned to power operation following a outage on September 10, 1981 to repair the main electrical generator.
The licensee elected to perform refueling of the reactor concurrrant with the generator outage.
The inspectors observed performance of various testing in progress for adherence to Technical Specification requirements.
The inspectors l
determined that approved test procedures were used, testing prere-quisites had been satisfied, acceptance critieria was specified,
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personnel performing the tests were qualified, and that instrumentation had been calibrated.
Portions of the following tests were observed and/or reviewed.
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FNP-1-ETP-80 - Initial Criticality.
FNP-1-ETP-81 - Bank D partial worth measurement.
FNP-1-ETP-83 - Bank D worth measurement during dilution.
j FNP-1-ETP-84 - Bank C worth measurement during dilution.
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FNP-1-ETP-85 - Bank B worth measurement during dilution.
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FNP-1-ETP-86 - Bank A worth measurement during dilution.
FNP-1-ETP-88 - Control Banks worth measurement in overlap.
FNP-1-ETP-79 - Incore lloveable Detector Alignment RTP_3%.
FNP-1-STP-110 - Flux map power _ 50%.
FNP-1-STP-121 - Power Range axial off-set calibration - RTP _75%.
c.
On fiarch 15,1982 at 1118 hours0.0129 days <br />0.311 hours <br />0.00185 weeks <br />4.25399e-4 months <br /> unit No. 2 tripped from 85% power. The trip appears to have been caused by an electrical ground on the train e
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'A' DC bus.
A ground was found at one of the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) limit switches and the circuit completed by a short in the indicating lights for a 4160 volt emergency supply breaker (DF02),
which caused a signal to trip the main turbine.
The ground at the MSIV was caused by water in the limit switch box.
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These limit switches are not required to be environmentally qualified as they provide a trip signal to the main turbine.
The indicating light shorted out when an operations person was changing a light bulb.
(IE Circular 81-01 addressed this problem for a similar
model assembly if used with a pushbutton switch assembly, but not for just the indicating light portion.) The indicating lights are powered from the DC power to the breaker.
The licensee's investigation as to the cause of the trip is continuing.
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d.
On February 4,1982, the licensee held the annual law enforcement
,I-seminar on site. Attending were state highway patrol and local city and county law enforcement officials.
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