IR 05000348/1982003
| ML20054D935 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 03/05/1982 |
| From: | Bradford W, Brownlee V, Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054D871 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-82-03, 50-348-82-3, 50-364-82-02, 50-364-82-2, NUDOCS 8204230522 | |
| Download: ML20054D935 (8) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI'3N o
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REGION 11
o 101 MAnlETTA ST., N.W., SulTE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 o
Report flos. 50-348/82-03 and 50-364/82-02 Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 fiorth 18th Street Birmingham, AL 35202 Facility flame:
Farley fluclear Plant Docket fios. 50-348 and 50-364 License flos. flPF-2 and flPF-8 Inspection at Farley site near Dothan, Alabama and licensee requested management meeting at flRC Region II office, Atlanta, Georgia d
Sek M NO Inspectors:
W. H./Br adford
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Date Signed UEulf2nv.A fn 3k/r" T. A. feebles
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Date Signed Approved by:
[A kf/P7 V. L. Brg/nlee, Section Chief, Division of Date Signed Project and Resident Programs SurtitARY
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Inspection on December 16, 1981 - January 15, 1982 and management meeting on January 26, 1982 Areas Inspected This inspection involved 140 inspector-hours on site by the resident inspectors in monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observations, operational safety verification, Unit 1 outage, independent inspection effort, and followup of plant incidents and twenty hours during the management meeting on January 26, 1982.
Resul ts Of the 6 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were found in 5 areas; two violations were found in one area (see paragraph 7a and 7b).
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L DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- R. P. ficDonald, Vice President, Nuclear Generation
- 0. D. Kingsley, fianager, Nuclear Engineering and Services
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- R. L. George, Superintendent of Nuclear Licensing and Design
- D. E. liansfield, Startup Superintendent
- W. G. Hairston, Plant flanager
- J. D. Woodard, Assistant Plant 11anager
- D. fiorey, Operations Superintendent
- R. S. Hill, Operations Supervisor
- W. D. Shipman, liaintenance Superintendent
- C. Nesbitt, Technical Superintendent
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L. Williams, Training Superintendent R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Superintendent L. A. Ward, Planning Supervisor it. W. filtchell, Health Physics Supervisor J. Odom, Operations Sector Supervisor
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R. Bayne, Chemistry Supervisor
T. H. Esteve, Operations Sector Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operating
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personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members, office personnel, and Westinghouse Turbo-Generator Repair personnel.
Contract Personnel L. E. Conway, Westinghouse W. S. Broson, Westinghouse K. Ruben, Westinghouse N. M. Howard, Bechtel
- Attended the site Exit Interview
- Attended the llanagement meeting on January 26, 1982
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- Attended both site and management meetings i
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management
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interviews held throughout the reporting period with the plant manager and selected members of his staff. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings l
Not inspected.
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4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
fionthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed Technical Specification required surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that test results met acceptance criteria requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities:
FitP-2-STP-35.1 - Unit Startup Technical Specifications Verification FilP-2-STP-35.1A - liode 2 Surveillance Checklist FilP-2-STP-35-1B - flode 1 Surveillance Checklist E0P-5.0 - Reactor Trip FilP-2-STP-12.0 - Boron Injection Tank Operability Test Ff4P-2-STP-109.0 - Power Range fleutron Flux Channel Calibration FilP-2-STP-22.18 - Auxiliary Feedwater Automatic Valve Position Verification FilP-2-STP-14.0 - Containment Integrity Verification Test FilP-2-STP-47.0 - fitscellaneous Valves Inservice Test FflP-1-2-STP-1.0 - Operations Daily and Shift Surveillance FilP-1-2-STP-27.1 - A.C. Source Verification Flip-2-STP-9.0 - RCS Leakage Test Ff1P-1-STP-4.9 - Charging Pump 1C Operability Check Ff4P-1-STP-29.2 - Shutdown fiargin Calculation Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
6.
fionthly fiaintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as dpplicablei functional testing and/or Calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.
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Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
a.
Unit 1 reactor coolant pump seals b.
Unit 1 A charging pump c.
Unit 1 steam generators A, B and C first row tube plugging d.
Unit 1 B residual heat removal pump seal replacement e.
Unit 1 A steam generator hot leg primary man-way bolt hole repair Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Operational Safety Verification The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the report period. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary, diesel, Unit 1 containment and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations.
The inspectors by observation and direct interviews verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection control.
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following safety-related systems on Units 1 and 2 to verify operability and proper valve alignment:
a.
Portions of the boric acid systems b.
Charging pump suction c.
Component cooling e.
Diesel generator support systems f.
Component cooling g.
Spray additive system L
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i These reviews were conducted to ascertain that facility operations were in conformance with regulatory requirements, Technical Specifications and i
Administrative Procedure fio.16 " Conduct of Operation, Operations Group".
Within the areas inspected two violations were identified:
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a.
On December 16, 1981, the manual isolation valve for the spray additive tank was found locked closed which disabled both trains of spray addition. The time period this system was inoperable is not known but is believed to be in excess of technical specification allowance of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. This is a violation of Section 3.6.2.2 of the Technical
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Specifications which requires the spray additive system to be operable when the reactor is in ibde 1.
This incident was found by the licensee and was reported to the fiRC.
This violation is covered in f4RC Special Report flos. 50-348/81-31 and 50-364/81-34.
b.
On December 15-18, 1981, the licensee discovered, during performance of surveillance testing, that Unit 1 containment spray header nozzles were not installed in accordance with design drawings. The licensee identified the following discrepancies:
(1) Type "R" nozzles on headers SA and SB and type "T" nozzles on
headers 4A and 4B were found pointing toward the containment center line instead of the containment wall as specified in referenced drawings.
(2) All of the horizontally mounted nozzles of group types "B" and "0" on headers 1-A and 1-B were incorrectly mounted on the inboard side of the header rather than the outboard side. The nozzles were pointed down as specified.
(3) Two nozzles, a type "R" on header S-B and a vertical type "F" nozz!e on header 2-B, were not installed due to an apparent hanger interference. These descrepancies are attributable to the following:
d.
The piping fabricator made on error in developing detailed shop fabrication drawings and isometric drawings from the
Architectural Engineer (AE) design drawings.
b.
The error was not discovered by the piping fabricator during internal checks or by the AE or licensee audits.
c.
Piping was fabricated and inspected using the erroneous.
drawings.
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d.
The piping was Q.C. inspected upon receipt by the licensee only for shipping damage and verification of proper quality assurance documentation.
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e.
The containment spray header was installed but the spray header nozzles were not to be installed until after hydrostatic test completion by the construction completion and testing group. This generated a outstanding QC exception item pending spray nozzle installation and verification.
f.
Af ter hydrostatic test completion the system was turned over to the plant start-up group for functional testing with the QC exception outstanding.
g.
Prior to start-up preoperational testing the spray nozzles were installed on the spray ring.
This work was done without obtaining a Construction Work Request (CWR). This was not in accordance with the QC program. A QC verification of the nozzle installation was not performed, h.
QC procedures would have identified the discrepancy if the work had been performed under a CWR.
The inspection would have been performed against the AE design drawings which indicated proper norzle location and orientation.
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Approximately 4 months after the nozzles had been installed and the scaffcid to the spray ring header had been removed, a memo was written to Construction Mechanical QC by the Construction Piping Department stating that the spray nozzles had been installed.
This memo was to clear the outstanding QC exception regarding the nozzle installation.
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The applicable QC procedures were violated when QC accepted this memo in lieu of performing the required inspections.
This is a violation in that established procedJres were not followed as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V as implemented by paragraph 17.1.5 of the FSAR and Alabama Power Company Field Quality Control procedure No. 5.6.1.2 (Violation No. 50-348/82-02-01).
A meeting was held in Region II on Janaury 26, 1982 between Alabama Power Company (APC0) and NRC. The meeting was requested by APC0 to review the containment spray nozzle misalignment problem.
The licensee
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presented evaluations concerning the impact of containment spray nozzle misorientation on the design basis containment temperature and pressure calculations and what could be experienced in the containment building during certain accident conditions. Additionally, the iodine removal coefficient with the spray nozzles in the as-found conditions was dddressed. The licensee concluded that the as constructed conditions have been analyzed and do not adversely affect the ability of the containment spray system to meet its intended function.
The licensee has reoriented the misaligned nozzles to conform with the design drawings.
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NRC II has reviewed the liecnsee's containment spray header evaluation and conclude that the spray header installation errors do not represent real or eminent safety concerns.
8.
Unit 1 Outage
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The inspectors toured various portions of Unit 1 to witness various maintenance activities, instrument loop response time testing and instrument cal ibra tion.
All activities were covered by appropriate procedures and with proper health physics surveys and control.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping and fire protection activities and fire detection systems.
Security activities during the shut down were monitored for adherence to the security plan.
Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Independent Inspection Effort The inspectors routinely attended meetings with certain licensee management and various shift turnovers between shift supervisors, shift foreman and licensed operators during the reporting period.
These meetings and discussions provided a daily status of plant operating and testing activities in progress as well as discussion of significant problems or incidents.
10.
Followup of Plant Incidents During the reporting period, the inspectors conducted followup activities on the fellowing:
a.
On December 22,1981, at 2:31 a.m. hours Unit No. 2 reactor tripped on low steam generator water level.
The trip was caused by a shorted diode which caused 2A steam generator feed pump to trip when the indicating lamp test push button was pushed to the test position.
The shorted diode was replaced and the unit was returned to criticality at 5:20 a.m.
b.
On January 8,1982 at 11:40 a.m. Unit No. 2 reactor tripped on low steam generator water level.
The trip occurred during the performance of turbine valve testing. While changing the turbine valve control from sequential to single valve control, oscillations in the turbine valves caused the steam generator water levels to shrink, causing the reactor to trip on low steam generator level.
The licensee has investigated the cause of the valve oscillations.
The licensee has monitored the turbine valves during succeeding testing but the cause of the valve oscillation has not been determine '
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c.
On January 11,1982, at 9:09 a.m. Unit No. 2 reactor tripped due to main steam line high differential pressure.
This trip initiated safety injection. Engineered safeguards equipment operated as designed.
The trip was caused by excessive cold weather which had frozen a main steam pressure sensing line.
In the process of thawing and returning the instrument to service a high steam line differential pressure signal was generated.
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances involved in each incident and, where appropriate, the action taken by licensee management in response to the incident. The licensee's management activities appeared to be both timely and adequate in each case.
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