IR 05000346/1980006
| ML19310A472 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 04/29/1980 |
| From: | Reyes L, Tambling T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19310A471 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-80-06, 50-346-80-6, NUDOCS 8006170799 | |
| Download: ML19310A472 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No.
50346/80-06 Docket No.
50-346 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza, 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, Ohio 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Inspection At: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Oak Harbor, Ohio Inspection Conducted: Ma rch 10-14, 17-21, 24-28, 30- 31, April 1-4, 7, 1980 Inspector:
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Approved By: T.N.Tambling, Acting 9hief,
2.%; TfD Reactor Projects Section
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Inspection Summary Inspection on March 10-14, 17-21, 24-28, 30-31, April 1-4, 1980 (Report No. 50-346/80-06)
Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection of followup on previous inspection. findings, Operational Safety Information Meeting with local officials, CILRT Procedure, Radiation Protection, reactor trip on March 27 and April 7, 1980, followup of Licensee Event Reports and IE Bulletin followup. The inspection in;olved 166 inspector hours onsite by the Resident Inspector.
Results: No items of nontompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- T. Murray, Station Superintendent
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B. Beyer, Assistant Station Superintendent P. Carr, Maintenance Engineer S. Quennoz, Technical Engineer D. Miller, Operations Engineer D. Briden, Chemist and Health Physicist J. Hickey, Training Supervisor L. Simon, Operations Supervisor C. Daft, Operations QA Manager G. Grime, Nuclear Security Manager
- D. Huffman, Administrative Coordinator
- R. Chesko, Operations Support Engineer
- Denotes those present at the exit interview on March 21, 1980.
The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees, including members of the technical, operations, maintenance, I&C training and health physics staff.
2.
Previous Inspection Findings (closed) Noncompliance (50-346/80-01; Reference Paragraph 3)
Control Room Emergency Ventilation System switch misalignment.
The inspector verified that the handles of all local remote switches have been removed to prevent inadverting misalignment
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caused by bumping the switch. The inspector verified that handles were available in adjacent location to the cabinets and in the control ro During the routine plant tours conducted by the int _.ctor, subsequent to the removal of the handles, no additional misaligned local remote switches have been identified.
3.
Operational Safety The inspector reviewed the plant operations including examinations of control room log books, locked valve log, shift foreman log book, containment purge log, special operating orders, monthly activity log, and jumper and lifted wire logs for the month of March. The inspector observed plant operations during 8 offshifts during the month of March. The inspector also made visual observations of the routine surveillance and functional tests in progress during the period. This review was conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the require-ments established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and Administrative Procedures.
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- The inspector conducted a tour of the auxiliary building and turbine building throughout the period and noted that the monitoring instrumentation was recorded as required, radiation controls were properly established, fluid leaks and pipe vibrations were minimal, seismic restraint oil levels appeared adequate, equipment caution and hold cards agreed with control room records, plant housekeeping conditions / cleanliness were adequate, and fire hazards were minimal. The inspector observed shift turnovers to verify that plant and component status and problem areas were being turned over to relieving shift personnel.
The inspector verified by observation and personnel interview (once during each operating shift) that at least one full time member of the security organization who has the authority to direct the physical security activities of the security organization was onsite at all times: verified by observation that the security organization was capable of performing their assigned tasks.
The inspector verified that all persons and packages were identi-fied and authorization checked prior to entry into the protected area (PA), all vehicles were properly authorized prior to entry into a PA, all persons authorized in the PA were issued and dis-played identification badges, records of access authorized conformed to the PSP, and all personnel in vital areas were authorized access; verified that all persons, packages, and vehicles were searched in accordance to regulatory requirements, the PSP, and security pro-cedures; verified that persons authorized escorted access were accompanied by an escort when within a PA or vital area; verified that vehicles authorized escorted access were accompanied by an escort when within the PA; and verified by review of the licensee's authorization document that the escort observed above was authorized to perform the escort function.
The inspector verified that certain aspects of the physical barriers and isolation zones conformed to regulatory requirements and commit-ments in the physical security plan (PS); that gates in the pro-tected area were closed and locked if not attended; that doors in l
vital area barriers were closed and locked if not attended; and that isolation zones were free of visual obstructions and objects that-could aid an intruder in penetrating the protected area.
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The inspector verified by observation (during each operating shift)
that communications checks were conducted satisfactorily at the beginning of and at other prescribed times during the security personnel work shift and that all fixed and roving posts, and each member of the response team successfully communicate from their remote location; and verified that equipment was operated consistent with requirements in the PSP and security procedures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Information Meeting with Local Officials On March 31, 1980 a meeting was held between NRC officials and local officials. Four persons from the Region III office and the Resident Inspector were representing the NRC.
Local officials included Ottawa County Commissioners, one Ohio State Representative, Jerusalem and Carroll Township trustees and the Oak Harbor Mayor.
The informational meeting was called primarily to explain the NRC's function, the job of the resident inspecto, and the reg-ulatory procedure 'concerning nuclear power stations. The resident inspector informed the local officials how to get in contact with him or the regional office. A question and answer session followed the presentation of the NRC.
5.
CILRT Procedure Review The inspector reviewed a copy of the CILRT test procedure.
The procedure is in draft form and will be finalized and approved before the test is conducted. The inspector has the below listed questions on the procedure.
a.
Data Rejection The intpector stated that, during the conduct of CILRT, individual data points are sometimes erroneous for various reasons. The inspector also stated that these erroneous data points cannot be rejected without a definitive data rejection criteria. The licensee's procedure contains no such criteria.
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The inspector stated thct the draft ANS 274 standard contains acceptable data rejection criteria.
b.
Volume Change Corrections The inspector stated that, during the conduct of CILRT, changes in reactor vessel level and sump levels can occur for various reasons. These changes have to be included in the adjusted leakage before it is compared to the acceptance criteria. The licensee's procedure contains no adjustment to the leakrate due to level changes.
c.
Containment Sample The inspector stated that before the supplemental test is started, a sample of containment shall be analyzed for act-ivity levels and isotopic concentration.
The licensee pro-cedure does not require a sample of containment before the commencement of the supplemental test.
Items a through c are considered to be unresolved. These items will remain unresolved until the inspector reviews the revised CILRT procedure.
(50-346/80-06-01)
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Radiation Protection On March 12, 1980 a reporter from the Celveland Plain Dealer contacted the resident inspector to relate information he re-ceived from a construction worker regarding radiation protec-tion practices at the plant. The inspector interviewed the worker and immediately investigated the concerns. During the inspection, the inspector accompanied the Chemistry and Health physics technicians performing the general surveys on March 17, 1980 ceviewed the radiation exposure record of the worker and other coworkers and participated in a safety meeting held on March 24, 1980 where radiation protection practices and NRC regulations were discussed with the construction workers. The inspector notified the reporter of his findings. The reporter stated that the worker had contacted him and was satisfied with the inspectors findings.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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7.
Reactor Trip on March 27, 1980 The reactor was manually tripped at 10:15 a.m.
(EST) on 3/27/80 when~ safety rods group 3 dropped into the core and group 4 started to drive in.
Subsequent to the reactor trip the main steam isola-tion valves (MSIV's) closed automatically. The operator manually tipped the Steam Feedwater Rupture Control System in response to the MSIV's closure isolating the main feedwater and initiating auxiliary feedwater flow. There was no actuation of the Safety Features Actuation System (ECCS). Pressurizer level indication was not lost (minimum level was 85 inches) and minimum reactor coolant system pressure was 2006 psig.
The MSIV's were reopened at 12:01 p.m. to terminate steam venting to the atmosphere.
There was no evidence of significant release of activity to the atmosphere via the secondary side steam relief. Analysis of a secondary system water sample shnwed no I-2 and a gross B activity of 2X10-8 uci/cc.
The feedwater zero demand signal on a reactor trip was removed to prevent inadvertent closure of the main steam isolation valves. The failed power supply in the control rod drive system that caused the safety rod group 3 and 4 to be inser-ted was replaced. The unit returned to Mode 1 (Power Opera-tion) on March 30, 1980.
No special problems were encountered during the startup with three reactor coolant pumps.
(RCP 1-1 was shutdown on March 23, 1980 due to degraded pump shaft seals).
On April 7, 1980 at 3:15 p.m.
(EST) the reactor tripped on High Flux after valving.1 and out of service a feedwater
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heater that caused a part.a1 loss of main condenser vacuum.
The partial loss of vacuum caused the main turbine control valves to open to increase steam flow. The reactor auto-matic controls responded to the increased steam demand by increasing reactor power until the reactor protection systen high flux trip setpoint of 78 percent was reached.
(Unit was operating at reduced power because of 3 reactor coolant pump operation). There was no actuation of the Safety Features Actuation System (ECCS) nor the Steam Feedwater Rupture Control System.
Pressurizer level was not lost (minimum level.was 13.8 inches) and minimum reactor coolant system pressure was 1756 psig. There was no evidence of any signific ant activity release to the atmosphere due to the venting of steam through the main steam safety valves and atmospheric vent valves. Condenser vacuum was reestablished and unit was stabilized at Hot Standby Condition (Mode 3).
A subsequent decision was made by the licensee to proceed-6-
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to cold shutdown (Mode 5) and begin the tefueling outage
that was scheduled to start on 4/1 /80.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Review and Followup on Licensee Event Reports Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
LER's 79-98,79-108, 79-112,79-115, 79-127,79-128, 79-129,79-130, 79-133,79-134.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
IE Bulletin Followup For the IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective
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action commitments based on information presentation in the bulletin and the licensee's response to the appropriate onsite management rep-resentatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is re-quired in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. An unresolved item dis-closed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 5.
11.
Exit Interview The inspector met whith. licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
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