IR 05000346/1979025
| ML19210E605 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 10/30/1979 |
| From: | Reyes L, Warnick R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19210E596 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-79-25, NUDOCS 7912050365 | |
| Download: ML19210E605 (6) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-346/19-25 Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3
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Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Davis-Besse Site, Oak Harbor, OH Inspection Conducted: August 20-24, 31, September 4-7, 10-14, 17-21, and 24-28, 1979 RRo sr Inspector:
L. A. Reyes
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Approved By:
R. F. Varnick, Chief
//',7;* -7f Reactor Projects Section 2 Inspection Summary Inspection on August 20-24, 31, September 4-7, 10-14, 17-21, 24-28, 1979 (Report No. 50-346/79-25)
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of followup on licensee event reports, plant operations, physical protection physical barriers and access control, surveillance of safety related systems required by Technical Specifications, followup on IE Bulletins 79-10 and 79-05C, and review of unit trips data for September 18 and 26,1979. The inspection involved 208 inspector-hours by the NRC resident inspector.
Results: Of the seven areas inspected, no items of noncc,mpliance or deviations were found in six areas; one item of apparent noncompliance was identified in the other area (deficiency - failure to establish a fire watch - Paragraph 6).
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
- +T. Murray, Station Superintendent
- B. Beyer, Assistant Station Superintendent P. Carr, Maintenance Engineer
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S. Quennoz, Technical Engineer G. Wells, Administrative Coordinator D. :* iller, Operations Engineer D. Briden, Chemist and Health Physicist J. Hickey, Traini1g Supervisor L. Simon, Operations Supervisor
+C. Daft, Operations 9A Manager The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees, including members of the technical, operations, maintenance, I&C, training, and health physics staff.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview on September 7, 1979.
+ Denotes those attending the exit interviews on September 14, 21, and 28, 1979.
2.
Plant Operations The inspector reviewed the plant operations including examinations of control room log, lockea valve log book, shift foreman log book, containment purge log, standing orders, and jumper and lifted wire log for the month of September. The inspector observed plant operations during 6 offshifts duriag the month of September.
The inspector also made visual observatirns of the routine surveillance and functional tests in progress du;ing the period. This review was conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the require-ments established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and Administra-tive Procedures.
During the review of the containment purge log the inspector determined that the purge performed on July 26, 1979, was noted but was not reflected in the containment purge accumulated time for the preceeding 365 days. The licensee immediately corrected the accumulated time to reflect the July 26, 1979, purge.
The inspector stated that in order to fully comply with the requirements of Technical Specification 4.6.1.7 the containment purge accumulated time shall be determined at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The inspector verified that the containment pur;e accumulated time was 49 n.c.;r.ca p>..perly for all c her dates isspected.
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The inspector conducted a tour of Unit I reactor building and turbine
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building throughout the period and noted that the monitoring instru-mentation was recorded as required, radiation controls were properly established, fluid leaks and pipe vibrations were minimal, seismic restraint oil levels appeared adequate, equipment caution and hold cards agreed with control room records, plant housekeeping conditions /
cleanliness were adequate, and fire hazards were minimal. The inspector observed shift turnovers to verify that plant and component status and 1,roblem areas were being turned over to relieving shift personnel.
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No items of noncompliance..or deviations were identified.
3.
Physical Protecticu - Physical Barriers The inspector verified that certain aspects of the physical barriers and isolation zones conformed to regulatory requirements and commit-ments in the physical security plan (PSP); that gates in the protected area were closed and locked if not attended; that doors in vital area barriers were closed and locked if not attended; and that isolation zones were free of visual obstructions and objects that could aid an intruder in penetrating the protected area.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Physical Protection - Acce. s Control (Identification, Authorization, Badging, Search, and Escorting)
The inspector verified that all persons and packages were identified and authorization checked prior to entry into the protected area (PA),
all vehicles were properly authorized prior to entry into a PA, all persons authorized in the PA were issued and displayed identification badges, records of access authorized conformed to the PSP, and all personnel in vital areas were authorized access; verified that all persons, packages, and vehicles were searched in accordance to regula-tory requirements, the PSP, and security procedures; verified that persons authorized escorted access were accompanied by an escort when within a PA or vital area; verified that vehicles authorized escorted access were accompanied by an escort when within the PA.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance of Safety Related Systems / Components Required by Technical Specifications The inspector observed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing (other than calibrations and checks) on the Safeguards Actuation Signal Channel No. I and verified that testing was performed in accordance with technically adequate procedures, that test results were in confor-mance with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and 1494 193-3-
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were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Review and Followup on Licensee Event Reports Through direct obsersations, discussions with licensee personnel, and
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review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to deter-mine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been ac:omplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
LER's No. 79-02, -03, -05, -06, -12, -14, -23, -25, -52, -53, -55, -
56, -58, -59, -60, -61, -63, -65, -66, -68, -69, -70, -71, -72, -73, -
75, -76, -78, -79, -80, -81, -82, -83, -85, -86, -87.
The inspector determined while reviewing event report 79-51 that on April 9,1979, at 1450 hours0.0168 days <br />0.403 hours <br />0.0024 weeks <br />5.51725e-4 months <br /> a fire alarm was received on alarm point F-056.
The alarm remained in the alarm state until April 10, 1979, at 1245 without a fire watch being established. Technical Specification 3.3.3.8 requires in part that: with one or more of the fire detection instrument (s) shown in Table 3.3-14 inoperable a firewatch patrol to inspect the accessible zone (s) with the inoperable instrument shall be established within I hour and at least once per hour until the instrument is restorad to operable status. Several fire detection instruments of those listed in Table 3.3-14 of the Technical Specifications alarm on point F-056.
Until an alarm condition is cleared from alarm point F-056 all the other instruments in this alarm point are considered inoperable because they are incapable of providing information on their status in the alarm point. This is an item of noncompliance of the deficiency level.
The licensee has initiated corrective action by revising the procedure used by the guards at the alarm center. The revised procedure requires the guard to log the time and name of the control room operator that is notified when an alarm is received and the control room operator is required to log the time of notification and results of the immediate investigation. The inspector verified that on subsequent fire alarms the procedure was being followed.
While reviewing LER 79-67 the inspector determined that at 0157 hours0.00182 days <br />0.0436 hours <br />2.595899e-4 weeks <br />5.97385e-5 months <br /> on June 28, 1979, while conducting surveillance testing on the Reactor Protection System (RPS) Channel 4, an alligator clip slipped off a terminal screw and shorted across another terminal. This resulted in a loss of power to SFAS Channel 4 and actuated the bistable which closed Decay Heat Normal Cooldown Isolation Valve DH-11.
The closure of DH-11 isolated the decay heat system.
The unit was in mode 5.
TS 3.4.1 requires that in modes 3, 4 and 5 operation may proceed provided i494 194-4-
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at least one Reactor Coolant Loop is in operation with an associated
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decay heat removal pump.
The Technical Specification allows I hour of operation with all RCPs and decay heat removal pumps de-energized for surveillance testing and pre-operational testing. DH-11 was closed for apprcximately 18 minutes.
Th-licensee has initiated FCR 79-273 which will install stads in the test peints of the RPS cabinets. FCR 79-273 is sc5.eduled to be implemented during the April 1980 fuel outage.
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No other items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Review and Followup on IE Bulletins Response Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records,Bulletins 79-10 and Items 2 and 3 of the short term actions of Bulletin 79-05C were reviewed to determine that written response was within the time period stated in the D11etin, written response includes the information required to be reported, written response includes adequato corrective action commitments based on information presented in the Bulletin and licensee's response, licensee management forwarded copies of the written responer> to appropriate onsite management representatives, information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate., and corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Unit Trips on September 18, 26, 1979 The unit experienced a turbine trip at 12:43 p.m. EDT on September 18, 19 D. While performing a periodic test on tLa EHC hydraulic pumps, a press tre surge resulting from a transfer from one pump to the other caused a turbine trip. The new anticipatory turbine-trip-reactor-trip circuitry performed as designed, tripping the reactor.
Initial review indicates all primary systems performed as designed.
Pressurizer level went below the minimum indicaf.ed level for approximately 48 seconds.
(There is approximately 75 inches of water in the pressurizer at the minimum indicated level).
Minimum RCS pressure was approximately 1700 psig.
The unit experienced a reactor trip at 8:56 p.m. EDT on September 26, 1979. The trip was a result of the failure of the Turbine Throttle Pressure Transmitter which caused a rapid load reduction. The reactor was tripped when primary system pressure reached the new setpoint of 2300 psig.
Initial review indicates all primary systems performed as designed except that pressurizer level went below the minimum indicated level for approximately 18 seconds.
Minimum RCS pressure was approximately 1680 psig.
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Prior to startup from both trips the licensee adjuoted the reset
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pressure setpoint for one of the main steam safety valves to prevent excessive steam blow down.
Possible design modifications to the main feedwater pump control circuits are being evaluated to minimize steam generator pressure and level surges during a reactor trip.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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9.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
on September 7, 14, 21, 28, 1979, and summerized the scope and findings of the weeks' inspection activities.
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