IR 05000346/1979022
| ML19256E353 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 09/25/1979 |
| From: | Reyes L, Tambling T, Warnick R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19256E349 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-79-22, NUDOCS 7911020213 | |
| Download: ML19256E353 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-346/79-22 Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Davis-Besse Site, Oak Harbor, OH Inspection Conducted: July 9-31, August 1-10, 1979 T. d StM Inspectors:
T. N. Tamaling h
NLQ f T $
(July 9-12, August 7-10, 1979)
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RFid for-L. A. Reyes 9-25 79 (July 9-15, 27-30, August 7-10, 1979)
RFlO he L. G. McGregor 9-25-79 (July 16-20, 30-31, August 1-7, 1979)
REZd [vy-J. D. Smith 9-2P79 (July 23 -27, 1979)
R F W Arr-K. R. Baker 9-2S.79 (July 16-22, 1979)
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Approved By:
R. F. Warnick, Chief 9-2F 79 Reactor Projects Section 2 Inspection Summary Inspection on July 9-31, August 1-10, 1979 (Report No. 50-346/79-22)
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of licensee action on previous inspection findings, IE Bulletins 79-11 and 79-05C, and Plant Operations. The inspection involved 369 inspector-hours onsite by five NRC inspectors.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted T. Murray, Station Superintendent B. Beyer, Assistant Station Superintendent P. Carr, Maintenance Engineer S. Quennoz, Technical Engineer G. Wells, Administrative Coordinator D. Miller, Operations Engineer D. Briden, Chemist and Health Physicist J. Hickey, Training Supervisor L. Simon, Operations Supervisor The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees, including members of the technical, operations, maintenance, I&C, training and health physics staff.
2.
Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Inspector followup item (Reference IE Inspection Report 50-346/78-30, Paragraph 7) the inspector reviewed the essential bus voltages gathered during the period of January 3-19 and July 25, 1979. All bus voltages are within their nominal ranges. Some of the non-essential bus voltages are slightly above the 110% nominal range but these have been analyzed by Power Engineering and have been found acceptable. The inspector concluded that the bus voltage data associated with the load rejection test is acceptable.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (Reference IE Inspection Report No. 50-346/79-13, Paragraph 12) the inspector determined that action has not been initiated to correct this unresolved item. The licensee stated in the July 27, 1979 exit interview that corrective action will be initiated within the next 60 days.
3.
IE Bulletin 79-11 Items 1, 2 and 3 of the bulletin directed certain action for plants utilizing Westinghouse type DB-50 and DB-75 circuit breakers in safety related systems. The licensee response indicated that the above mentioned breakers are neither used in safety related class IE service nor are in spares at the Davis-Besse plant.
Item 4 of the bulletin required the licensee to review test procedures and test schedules for all safety related circuit breakers to assure that all such breakers are tested at least each refueling outage to confirm over-current time delay protection. The licensee response indicated the remote relays for 480V circuit breakers are presently tested on a 48 month cycle and that the testing frequency will be
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changed to each refueling cycle and implemented immediately. The inspector verified that this change was made in the maintenance program scheduling for the above mentioned breakers and has no further questions.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
_IE Bullet.in 79-05C Item 1 of the bulletin directed tLe licensee to take the following immediate actions:
a.
Upon reactor trip and initiation of HPI caused by low reactor coolant system pressure, immediately trip all operating RCPs.
b.
Provide two licensed operators in the control room at all times during operation to accomplish this action and other immediate and followup actions required during such an occurrence.
The licensee prepared and implemented temporary modification T-3991 to emergency procedure EP 1202.06, " Loss of RC and RS Pressure", to provide guidance to the reactor operators on the requirements to trip the RCPs upon a reactor trip and initiation of HPI caused by low RCS pressure.
The inspector reviewed the temporary modification to EP 1202.06 and verified that the control room copy was updated to reflect this change. The inspector verified the control room log and observed various shifts to determine that two licensed operators were present at all times in the control room. The inspector interviewed a random sample of licensed operators and reviewed the required reading log to determine if the operators were properly informed of this procedure change.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Plant Tour The inspector walked through various areas of the plant to observe operations and activities in progress, to inspect the general state of cleanliness, housekeeping, and adherence to fire protection rules, and to review with operators the status of various annunciators which were listed in the control room.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Facility Operations The inspector reviewed the following status records to determine whether reactor operations were in conformance with regulatory requirements.
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Shift Foreman-Unit Log
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Reactor Operator Log Daily Log Sheets Jumper / Lifted Lead Log Tagout Log Deviation Report Files Special and Standing Orders No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Plant Startup Following the Lifting of the Shutdown Order The TMI related shutdown order for Davis-Besse was lifted July 6, 1979. The inspector reviewed preparations for the startup to verify that the operability requirements for safety related systems were being met and that startup procedures were being properly implemented.
The following surveillance tests were reviewed to verify that testing and operability requirements were current:
-ST 5011.1, Boron Injection Flow Path-ST 5030.2, RDS Monthly Test of the Manual Reactor Trip-ST 5030.13, Channel Functional Test-ST 5032.01, Monthly Functional Test of Rod Monitor System-ST 5033.01, Incore Channel Check-ST 5033.02, Incore Recorder-ST 5042.01, RCS Leakage-ST 5043.01, Primary-Secondary Rad Chemistry-ST 5050.02, Core Flood Iso Valve Power Source-ST 5052.01, BWST Boron Concentration and Volume-ST 5052.02, BAAT Concentration and Volume-ST 5061.05, Personnel Hatch Leak Test after Personnel Use-ST 5071.01, Aux Feedwater Monthly Test-ST 5073.1, MSIV, Loop 1 and 2-ST 5080.01, Independent Offsite AC-ST 5033.01, Onsite DC-ST 5083.03, Onsite DC, " odes 5 and 6-ST 5071.01, Valve Verification List A Procedures PP 1102.02 and PP 1102.04 were reviewed to verify other surveillance test and operatility requirements had been properly checked off per procedure requirement.
Approach to initial criticality was witnessed by the inspector. The reactor was initially taken critical at 2338 hours0.0271 days <br />0.649 hours <br />0.00387 weeks <br />8.89609e-4 months <br /> on July 10, 1979.
However, when the startup neutron channel NI-1 failed, the shift foreman shut the reactor down to resolve the problem.
The reactor was subsequently taken critical at 0558 hours0.00646 days <br />0.155 hours <br />9.22619e-4 weeks <br />2.12319e-4 months <br /> on July 11, 1979 and synchronized to the grid at 0011 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> on July 12, 1979.
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8.
Load Transient Test The inspector witnessed portions of load transient tests performed August 6, 1979 for compliance with test procedure and over-all test crew performance. The scheduled tests were 90-40-90 percent power swings with four reactor coolant pumps operating and 60-30-60 percent power swings with three reactor coolant pumps operating.
The tests were performed to verify proper plant response to these load changes. The 90-40-90 load swing were completed satisfactorily.
The 60-30-60 load swings were aborted because of delays encountered with axial power imbalance requirements of the technica; specifications and to meet daytime system loads. The 60-30-60 load sw ngs were
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subsequently performed but were not witnessed by the inspector.
No items of noncomplaince or deviations were identified.
9.
Power Level Cut Off Limit During the recovery to full power operation following the 90-40-90%
power load swings, the maximum reactor power was limited to less than 92% because of power level cut off limit of Technical Specifications.
The inspector's review of Technical Specifications section 3.1.3.8 and associated figure 3.1-2 determined that the power level cutoff limit had been inadvertantly left off figure.3.1-2 in amendment 11 to the licensee. The inspectors verified that the licensee was observing the power level cutoff limit. The licensee informed NRR of the omission of the limit on figure 3.1-2.
The omission is to be corrected in a subsequent amendment to the license by NRR.
10.
Containment Hydcogen Analyzers During performance of surveillance testing on the Containment Hydrogen Analyzer on July 18, 1979, tuc licensee encountered two problems:
one was the calibration of chemistry lab H2 analyzer and the other was an apparent zero offset of the online containment H2 analyzers due to high humidity in the containment atmosphere. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures, and proposed corrective action to verify appropriate action was being taken.
Certified standard gases are used in the calibration (span gas). A check of span gases on the chemistry lab H2 analyzer indicated a calibration problem with that analyzer. Two certified standard span gases were used. The first contained 2.3% H2 and the second contained 2.5% H2.
The indicated H2 concentrations on the analyzer were 1.3%H2 and 1.5%H2 respectively. Based upon these results the licensee recalibrated the chemistry lab analyzer.
After calibration of the online containment H2 analyzer with the 2.3% H2 span gas. the analyzer indicated 0.8%H2 in the containment 1259 277-3-
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atmosphere. Normal concentration is expected to be approximately 0.01%H2. Upon discussion with the vendor the licensee dried the inline desiccant (silica gel) in the containment H2 analyzer. This reduced the online reading of containment H2 to 0.3%.
A vendor representative was called in to investigate the appaient problem. He concluded that calibration of online H2 analyzer with a dry span gas and subsequent introduction of high humidity containment atmosphere was causing a zero offset in the analyzer resulting in the higher than expected reading (0.8%H2 was 0.01%). The vendor is in the process of proposing modifications to the system to eliminate this problem.
In the interim, the licensee concludes that continued operation of the H2 analyzer was satisfactory because the sample gas humidity effect resulted in only a zero offset of the detector. Also the zero offset was in the conservative direction (i.e., indicating a higher H2 concentration).
In the exit interview, a representative of the licensee stated that they would also resolve the following items:
Apparent discrepancy between drawing M29B and the vendor's drawing for the containment H2 analyzer.
(i.e., lack of some of the detailed information)
Whether reference should be made in procedures SP1105.25, ST 5065.0 and ST 5065.08 to regeneration of the silica gel.
Currently the monthly regeneration is handled under the preventative maintenance program.
Review the initial preoperational testir.g on the containment H2 anlayzer to insure all systems in the analyzer were properly tested.
Review the original design bases of the analyzer to insure that the original assumptions are met.
This item is considered unresolved pending the licensee's review of the vendor's proposal and the review of the above four items.
11.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which raore information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations. An unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 10.
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12.
Exit interview The inspectors met with the licensee representatives during the course of the inspection to discuss their findings and to resolve outstanding items as discussed in the report.
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