IR 05000334/1981017
| ML20009E779 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 07/01/1981 |
| From: | Beckman D, Greenman E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009E774 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-334-81-17, NUDOCS 8107280434 | |
| Download: ML20009E779 (3) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I R: port No. 50-334/81-17 Docket No. 50-334
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License No. DPR-66 Priority Category C
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Licensee: Duauesne Licht Company 435 Sixth Avenue
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Pittsburah, Pennsylvania 15219 Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1 Meeting at:
Duquesne Light Company offices, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Meeting conducted June 17, 1981 NRC Personnel:
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b 7 'i b D. A. fleckman, Resident inspector date sighed date signed
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date signed Approved by:
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E. G. Greenman, Chief, Reactor Projects Section date signed 2A, DRPI
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Meeting Summary:
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June 17, 1981 (Management Meeting Report No. 50-334/81-17)
Special meeting convened by Region I management to discuss NRC concerns regarding a valve mispositioning event of June 6,1981 and apparently unauthorized removal of locks and chains from three safety related valves on or before June 5,1981, including discussion of licensee investigation status and results; short term and long term planning for operational and security activities; and, human factors considerations relative to the event.
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Region I Form 12-1
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(Rev. August 77)
8107280434 810708 DR ADOCK 05000
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DETAILS 1.
Attendees Duquesne Light Company J. Carey, Vice President, Nuclear Division F. Bissert, Manager, Nuclear Support Services T. Jones, Manager, Nuclear Operations W. Lacey, Chief Engineer, BVPS-1 W. Marquardt, Station Office Manager, BVPS-1 W. O'Brien, Director of Personnel J. Sieber, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing H. Siegel, Supervisor, Onsite Engineering Group U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B. Grier, Director, Region I H. Thornburg, Director, Division of Safeguards and Radiological Safety Inspection,IE:HQ T. Novak, Assistant Director for Operating Reactors, Division of Licensing, NRR J. Cummings, Director, Office of Inspector and Auditor R. Burnett, Director, Divisio'i of Safeguards, NMSS E. Jordan, Deputy Director, Division of Resident and Regional Inspection, IE:HQ J. Miller, Chief, Procedures and Test Review Branch, Division of Human Factors Safety, NRR T. Martin, Acting Director, Division of Engineering and Technical Inspection (DETI),RegionI R. Keimig, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch No. 2, Division of Resident and Project Inspection (DRPI), Region I E. Greenman, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2A, DRPI, Region I J. Devlin, Chief, Physical Protection Section, DETI, Region I D. Beckman, Senior Resident Inspector, Beaver Valley Power Station 2.
Federal Bureau Investigation E. Freilino, FBI Pittsburgh, PA Office P. Adamowski, FBI Pittsburgh, PA Office 2.
Meeting Summary A manual valve in the High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) Pumps' common suc-tion line was found shut during a routine operator tour on June 6, 1981.
With the valve shut, emergency core cooling water from the refueling water storage tank would not have been available to the three HHSI pumps for high
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pressure injection of water into the core under emergency conditions. The chain and padlock which nonnally secure this valve in the open position have not been found. Additionally, on the morning of June 5,1981, similar i
locks and chains were found removed from the three auxiliary feedwater pumps', manual suction isolation valves but the valves were all in their normally open position. These locks and chains also have not been found.
No specific cause(s) for the above conditions have been identified.
The licensee, NRC Region I, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation each initiated investigations into these circumstances. This management meeting-was convened to discuss licenseo actions taken in response to the two events.
Opening remarks made by NRC management summarized NRC concerns regarding the seriousness of the events and the need for continuing licensee attention to the discussion topics (below). The following topics were discussed relative to completed and planned licensee actions:
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Status and results of licensee investigation to date.
Near and long term plans for further investigation.
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Licensee short term actions and planning relative to the operational aspects of the event including the effectiveness of prior and recently implemented administrative contrcls for operations.
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Licensee short term actions and planning relative to augmented physical security measures that have been implemented to preclude unauthorized tampering with plant equipment, including the impact of these measures on normal and emergency p1 ant operations,ethe-control of personnel access to vital areas and equipment, and procedures for notification of licensee management, NRC, and FBI for future incidents.
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Licensee long term actions and planning relative to the operational aspects of the event, including the adequacy of plant staffing levels, equipment status indication, and operator performance.
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Licensee long tenn actions and planning relative to security program improvements for preclusion of future, similar events.
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Human factors considerations relative to the evaluation of the Jula 5-6 events and prevention of future similar events, g.
Development of a system to accumulate lessons learned during the investi-gation(s) of the event for each of the topical areas (a-f), above.
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