IR 05000333/1982002
| ML20050A729 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 03/18/1982 |
| From: | Doerflein L, Kister H, Linville J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20050A728 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-82-02, 50-333-82-2, IEB-81-01, IEB-81-1, NUDOCS 8204020197 | |
| Download: ML20050A729 (14) | |
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DCS N_ umber U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 50333-820210
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Region I Report No.
82-02 Docket No.
50-333 C
License No.
OPR-59 Priority Category
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Power Authority of the State of New York Licensee:
d P. O. Box 41
Lycoming, New York 13093 Facility Name:
J. A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant i
Inspection at:
Scriba, New York Inspection conducted: February 1-28, 1982
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Inspectors:
. C. Ljnvills Reside Inspector date signed r1, / TAbJFo w
,,/ ll / F 1 L. T. Doerfle n, Resident Inspector date' signed
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date signed
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J /7/77
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Approved by:
H. 'B. Kister, CT1Tef, Reactor Projects date signed Section 1C Inspection Summary:
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Inspection on February 1-28, 1982 (Report No. 50-333/82-02)
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Areas Inspe_cted:
Routine and reactive inspection during day and backshift hours by
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two Resident Inspectors (162 hours0.00188 days <br />0.045 hours <br />2.678571e-4 weeks <br />6.1641e-5 months <br />) of licensee action on previous inspection findings; licensee event report review; operational safety verification; surveillance observations; maintenance observations; IE Bulletin followup; IE Circular followup; primary containment integrated leak rate test observation; voltage profile test observation, I
and ISI activity observation.
Results:
No violations were observed in the ten areas inspected.
8204020197'820319
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PDR ADOCK 05000333
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O PDR
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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1 DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- R. Baker, Superintendent of Powar
- N. Brosee, Maintenance Superintendent V. Childs, Senior Resident Engineer
- R. Converse, Operations Superintendent
- M. Cosgrove, Site Ouality Assurance Engineer W. Fernandez, Technical Services Superintendent
- H. Keith, Instrument and Control. Superintendent
- C. McNeill, Resident Manager
- E. Mulcahey, Radiological & Environmental Services Superintendent C. Oroqvany, Reactor Analyst Supervisor
- D. Tall, Training Coordinator T. Teifke, Security & Safety Superintendent
- V. Walz, Senior Plant Engineer Supervisor The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel during this inspection including shift supervisors, administrative, operators, health physics, security, instrument and control, maintenance and contractor personnel.
- Denotes those present at an exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) UNRESOLVED ITEM (333/80-05-04):
Revision 4 of MP 100.1, Functional Testing of Hydraulic Snubbers, dated April 1980 now requires calibration of the snubber tester velocity meter and documentation of this calibration.
(Closed) SEVERITY LEVEL IV VIOLATION (SUPPLEMENT III) (333/81-26-03):
The inspector has not observed any further instances of failure to take compensatory measures prior to intentional degradation of vital area boundaries. Thus, the licensee's corrective action appears to ht.ve been adequate.
(Closed)
INSPECTORFOLLOWUPITEM(333/81-21-04): The inspector observed that reference sections have been added to F-0P-18, Reactor Protection System and F-0P-22, Emergency Service Water System as required by NCA-304.
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INSPECTORFOLLOWUPITEM(333/81-21-03):
The inspector witnessed a satisfactory test of channel 2 of the radio in the TSC which had been j
inoperable. The licensee stated that the dedicated RSC-E0F-control room telephone can be used but does not ring. The circuit is being modified to make it ring. The inspector observed that the emergency procedures which had been missing from the emergency vehicle kit were in place.
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(Closed) UNRESOLVED ITEM (333/81-12-04):
Since Standard Technical Specifications pemit one containment isolation valve in a line to be increrable for four hours prior to requiring closure of the other isolation valve the inspector finds acceptable the licensee's current method of testing RCIC system steam line isolation signals by racking out the breaker for the valve under test while leaving the other valve operable per F-ISP-22-1, RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm High Pressure Instrument Functional Test / Calibration, Revision 8, dated September 1981.
(Closed) UNRESOLVED ITEM (333/81-12-01): The licensee submitted a followup report to LER 81-31 explaining that indicated core flow appeared higher than expected during single loop operation because adjustments were required to the amplifier scaling factors and input bias.
(Closed)
INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM (333/81-26-01):
The inspector verified that Revision 4 to PSP-1, Reactor Water Sampling and Analysis, dated December 8,1981 includes a requirement to take daily samples while shutdown when the continuous conductivity recorder in the control room is inoperable.
(Closed)
INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM (333/81-27-04):
In a letter to NRR dated January 20, 1982 the licensee stated that the ISI program had been changed to pemit a leakage test in lieu of the currently required hydrostatic test after repairs as permitted by the ASME Code,Section XI, 1977 Edition, Summer 1978 Addenda. This change was effective immediately because of the necessity for a test after repair of the A core spray piping.
(Clored)
INSPECTOR F0LLOWUP ITEM (333/80-21-11):
The inspector observed portlans of the installation and testing of a new control rod drive temperature recording system during the 1981-82 refueling outage.
(Closed) SEVERITY LEVEL V VIOLATION (333/81-18-06): The inspector discussed the failure to follow the RWP protective clothing requirements with the individual involved and his supervisor to verify that the individual had received additional training on RWP's and to ensure that he understands the responsibilities and requirements associated with RWP's.
3.
Review Licensee Event Report (LEP)
The inspector reviewed LER's to verify that the details of the events were clearly reported. The inspector determined that reporting requirements had been met, the report was adequate to assess the event, the cause appeared accurate and was supported by details, corrective actions appeared appropriate to correct the cause, the fom was complete and generic applicability to other plants was not in question.
LER 82-01 reported that the Technical Specification setpoint for the HPCI turbine steam line high flow instrument was non conversatively high since 1974. The licensee will request a Technical Specification change to correct the problem which was identified but not corrected during the startup test
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program.
Subsequent review of startup test program results indicated that
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the RCIC system turbine steam line ficw instrument may also be set improperly.
The licensee will provide a followup report when the evaluation is complete.
This report will address the probable consequences of the event. This item is unresolved pending completion of the evaluation.
(333/82-02-01)
4.
Followup on IE Bulletin The inspector verified the following for the IE Bulletin listed below:
The licensee provided the response within the time period stated in
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the Bulletin.
The response included the required information.
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The response provided adequate corrective action commitments.
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The response was accurate.
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The licensee took the corrective action described in the responte.
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The following IE Bulletin remains open:
IEB 81-01, Surveillance of Mechanical Snubbers.
Two of fifteen mechanical snubbers in the plant were satisfactorily tested at Wylie Laboratory during the 1981-1982 refueling outage. The inspector determined this by a review of the test reports PSC45893-01 and PSC45893-02 and by discussion with the licensee to determine the acceptance criteria of 60 pounds breakaway drag and.0lg activation level for the 6000 pound snubbers. The inspector determined by record review that the stroke test required by the Bulletin was completed during the outage. This Bulletin remains opan pending review of the required 60 day post test report.
5.
Followup on IE Circulars The inspector determined that the following IE Circulars were received.
that the licensee reviewed the listed Circulars for applicability, and that the licensee has taken appropriate corrective action for applicable Circulars.
l The following IE Circulars are closed:
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IEC 81-01, " Design Problems Involving Indicating Pushbutton Switches
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i Manufactured by Honeywell Incorporated."
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IEC 81-03, " Inoperable Seismic Monitoring Information."
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IEC 81-08, " Foundation Materials."
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IEC 81-09, " Containment Effluent Water that Bypasses Radioactive Monitor."
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~IEC 81-11, " Inadequate Decay Heat Removal During Reactor Shutdown."
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IEC 81-14, " Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure to Close."
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The following IF Circular remains open:
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IEC 81-05, "Self-Aligning Rod End Bushings for Pipe Supports."
It is not clear from the licensee's memos regarding this Circular whether any review was done to determine the applicability to pipe struts as well as snubbers at this facility. The licensee agreed to investigate this matter at the exit meeting.
No violations were observed.
6.
Operation Safety Verification a.
Control Room Observations (1) Using a plant specific checklist, the inspectors verified selected plant parameters and equipment availability to ensure compliance with limiting conditions for operation of the plant Technical Specifications.
Items checked included:
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Availability and proper valve lineup of safety systems;
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Availability and proper alignment of onsite and offsite emergency power sources;
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Reactor control panel indications; and
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Stack monitor recorder traces.
(2) The inspectors directly observed the following plant operations to ensure adherence to approved procedures:
Issuance of RWP's and Work Request / Event / Deficiency foms
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(3) Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understcod and corrective action, if required, was being taken.
(4)
Shift turnovers were observed to ensure proper control room and shift manning. Shift turnover checklists and 100 review by the oncoming and offgoing shifts were also observed by the inspectors.
No violations were observed.
b.
Shift Logs and Operating Records (1)
Selected shift logs and operating records were reviewed to:
Obtain infomation on plant problems and operations;
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Detect changes and trends in performance;
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Detect possible conflicts with Technical Specifications
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i or regulatory requirements; Determine that records are being maintained and reviewed
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as required; and Assess the effectiveness of the communications provided
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by the logs.
(2) The following logs and records were reviewed:
Shift Supervisor Log
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Nuclear Control Operator Log
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Night Orders Shift Turnover Check Sheet
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Protective Tag Record Log
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Jumper Log
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Liquid Radwaste Discharge Log
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i Gaseous and Particulate Sample Logs
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Weekly Chemistry Status Log
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Air Sample Log I
t No violations were observed.
c.
Plant Tours (1) During the inspection period, the inspectors nade observations and conducted tours of plant areas including the following:
Control Room
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Relay Room Reactor Building
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Turbine Building
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Diesel Generator Rooms
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Electric Bays
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Pumphouse-Screenwell i
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Standby Gas Treatment Building
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Drywell
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Radwaste Building Crescent Rooms
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Torus
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Plant Perimeter
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(2) During weekly plant tours, the inspector observed general plant / equipment conditions, adherence to administrative controls, and selected examples of the following:
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(a) Fire Protection Conditions l
No significant fire hazards existed.
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Extinguishing equipment, fire alarms, actuating
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controls, fire fighting equipment and emergency equipment was operable.
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Ignition sources and flannable material were properly controlled.
(b) Housekeepinc/ Cleanliness Conditions
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Critical clean areas like the refueling floor were properly controlled.
Combustible material was properly controlled.
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(c) Radiation Protection Controls Surveys were properly performed.
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Radiation Protection instruments were calibrated and operable.
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Radiation Work Permits were complete, appropriate and followed.
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Methods used to control exposures of those working in
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high radiation areas were appropriate.
l Activities in radioactive waste system areas were
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conducted in accordance with approved procedures.
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Physical Security Plan Implementation i
The security organization appeared to be properly
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manned and capable of performing its assigned function.
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Isolation zones were clear.
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Persons ar.d packages were checked prior to er try into
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the protected area.
Vehicles were properly searched and escorted or
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controlled within the protected area.
Persons within the protected area displayed photo
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identification badges and persons requiring escorts were properly escorted.
Compensatory measures were employed when required by
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security equipment failure or impairment.
Protected area and vital area barriers were not degraded
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and access to these areas was properly controlled.
(3)
Findings:
(a) During a tour of the plant perimeter on February 5, 1982, the inspector noted that a cask on a flatbed truck parked near the temporary liner storage area in the northeast corner of the owner protected area was posted as a high radiation area. The truck and several others as well as the temporary liner storage area were partially enclosed by a roped area posted as a radiation area. The rooe was buried in snow in the area near the flatbed truck.
A subsequent review of licensee survey 47780 dated January 27, 1982 indicated that contact readings on the cask were 300 millirem per hour on the north side and 180 millirem per hour on the south side. The licensee stated that the truck had not been shipped because additional shielding was required to meet DOT requirements at six feet from the truck. The inspector was concerned that an individual could be in a high radiation area by standing near the truck without realizing it. The licensee adressed this concern in a response to a similar finding in a Notice of Violation in inspection report 50-333/81-27 by stating that the truck was stored in an enclosed area until shipment on February 2,1982 and that a fenced area would be constructed to house trucks like this in the future. The inspector will monitor licensee progress on this cormtitment.
(b) While witnessing radioactive waste compacting on February 18, 1982, the inspector observed a licensee employee who was exiting the area, remove his full face respirator from over his normal eyeglasses. The individual stated that he felt he could get an adequate seal with his glasses on. The inspector further noted that the individual did not get the nasal smear required by RWP 16115. When the inspector
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discussed this matter with licensee radiation protection personnel, they disqualified the individual in question
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i from using respiratory protection equipment until he has been retrained. The inspector determined that there was no hazard to the individual in question because the air sample in the area was much less than 25 percent of MPC.
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d.
Tagout Verification The inspectors verified that the following safety related protective tagout records (PTR) were proper by observing the positions of breakers, j
switches and/or valves.
PTR 820330 for Reactor Protection System Cable Replacement
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PTR 820262 for Repair of A HPCI Steam Line Isolation Valve PTR 820179 for Installation of the Containment Atmosphere Sampling
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System PTR 820155 for Repair and Testing of Safety Relief Valve Solenoids
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No violations were observed.
e.
Occurrence Report Review The inspectors reviewed occurrence reports 82-06 to 82-17 to detennine that the licensees problem identification system is functioning properly.
No violations were observed.
f.
Radioactive Waste Systems Controls (1) The inspector witnessed selected portions of a liquid radioactive release to verify the following:
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The required release approvals are obtained.
The required samples are taken and analyzed.
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The radioactive waste system is operated in accordance with
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approved procedures.
l On February 23, 1982, the inspector witnessed a portion of the release of Batch 4336, Waste Sample Tank (WST) A, at about 2:10 p.m.
The inspector noted that the canal discharge valve from the Laundry Drain Tank (LDT) 20A0V189 had inadvertantly been left open at the completion of Batch 4335, B LDT discharge at about 1:15 p.m.
according to the radioactive waste operator's log.
In spite of check valve 20RDW160 in the LDT line, it appeared from the LDT B level recorder tLat some of the discharge from A WST had backed up into B LDT. The radioactive waste operator immediately corrected the valve lineup. When the inspector reviewed the procedure for canal discharges of WST's and LDT's in F-0P-49, Liquid Radioactive Waste System, Revision 8, dated July 10, 1982, he found that the procedure did not address restoration of the valve lineup after discharge of one tank and prior to discharge of another tank.
In the past the inspector has observed that the restoration is routinely l
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done immediately after the discharge. The licensee stated that the procedure would be revised by March 15, 1982.
(333/82-02-02)
(2) On February 18 and 23, 1982, the inspector witnessed radioactive waste compacting operations. The inspector observed that licensee personnel were not wearing respiratory protection while opening and sorting bags of waste.
Through discussions with the personnel involved and radiation protection personnel the inspector determined that the licensee doesn't consider respiratory protection necessary for bags which read less than 5 millirems per hour on contact. The inspector also noted that F-0P-488, Waste Packaging and Handling,
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Revision 1, dated June 18, 1981, does not cover compacting the metal LSA boxes currently in use while it does cover wooden boxes using the same compactor. At the exit meeting, the licensee stated that the procedure has been revised. The inspector will review the revision when it is issued.
(333/82-02-03)
No violations were observed.
7.
Surveillance Observations The inspectors observed portions of the surveillance procedures below to verify that the test instrumentation was properly calibrated, approved procedures were used, the work uas performed by qualified personnel, limiting conditions for operation were met, and the system was correctly restored following the testing.
TP 35, Leak Rate Test of 10A0V69A(B), Revision 1, dated June 11, 1980,
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performed on February 3, 1982.
F-ST-39H, Reactor Vessel Operational Pressure Test (ISI), Revision 1,
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dated February 9,1982, perfomed on February 9,1982.
This test was originally performed on February 9,1982. However, due to excessive moisture from several valves with packing and/or body to bonnet leaks, the Quality Assurance (QA) personnel performing the ISI inspection were unable to inspect below the 269 ft. elevation of the Drywell. The licensee repaired the leaking valves and the QA personnel completed their inspection of the Reactor Vessel and attached Class I pipir.g systems when the Reactor Vessel Operational Pressure Test, Temporary Operating Procedure No. 56, was performed on March 1,1982.
F-ISP-1, Instrument Line Flow Check Valve Operational Test, Revision 5,
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dated June 1981, performed on February 9,1982.
During this observation the flow check valve on penetration X27a failed to seat. The licensee replaced the valve and tested the new valve on March 1, 1981. The inspector reviewed the results of this test.
F-ST-39F, Type A Test, Primary Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test,
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Revision 2, dated January 22, 1982, performed on February 13-16, 1982.
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F-ST-398, Type B and Type C Test, Local Leak Rate Testing of
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Containment Penetration, Revision 9, dated October 20, 1981, performed on B main steam line on February 17, 1982.
(Seedetails in paragraph 9).
No violations were observed.
8.
Maintenance Onservations The inspectors observed portions of various safety related maintenance activities. Through direct observation and review of records, they detemined, where appropriate, that:
Qualified personnel perfonned the activities.
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Redundant components were operable.
These activities did not violate the limiting conditions for operation.
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Required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to
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initiating the work.
Approved procedures were used or the activity was within the " skills
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of the trade".
Appropriate radiological controls were properly implemented.
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Ignition / fire prevention controls were properly implemented.
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Equipment was properly tested prior to returning it to service.
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Tools and gages were properly calibrated.
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Parts and materials were properly certified.
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QC hold points were observed and provided independent verification.
During this inspection period, the following activities were observed:
WR 16-8852, Phase II Mark I Torus Modifications (F1-81-024)
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The inspector made tours of the torus on February 4, 6 and prior to closure on February 7, 1982. During the first of these tours, the inspector noticed that some of the holes on the T quenchers between bays D and E and between bays A and P were covered by vertical support plates and/or split rings on the support plates. The inspector had previously determined through discussions with the licensee that Teledyne, the engineering and design organization, would not permit any hole coverage. The problem was resolved by either notching the support plates or split rings up to one-eighth inch in depth and one inch in length in accordance with C. H. Flagg change authorizations (CA) 2449F-33 and 2449F-36 as approved by Teledyne letter 5321-79
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dated February 2, 1982 or by cold springing the T quencher up to one and one quarter inches and installing shims on the lateral stop in accordance with CA 2449F-31 as approved by Teledyne letter 5321-73 dated January 20, 1982. The inspector observed that these resolutions
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had been implemented in the cases described prior to closure of the torus. The inspector reviewed safety evaluation JAF-SE-81-063 Addenda 1 through 14 which covers all aspects of Phase II of the Mark I Torus Modification program.
WR 02/16230, Target Rock Safety Relief Valve (SRV) on February 11, 1982.
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The inspector observed a factory representative overhauling and testing certain SRV solenoids in accordance with Target Rock report number 2075, Assembly and Test Procedure 3 Way Solenoid Valve Assembly Instruction, dated October 6,1977 with Addendum 1 dated February 3,1981. When the inspector aske'd the licensee why all SRV solenoids were not being tested, the licensee stated that the selection was based upon solenoid perfomance on an in place test perfomed on the solenoids by licensee personnel. The inspector detemined that the licensee had used test instructions attached to the work request which were similar to the vendor procedure but not identical to it. At the exit interview, the licensee stated that the instructio s would be included in the procedure fomally and that this would be done prior to implementation in the future. The inspector will review this matter later.
(333/82-02-04)
No violations were observed.
9.
Primary Containment Integrated Leakage Rate Te:t (PCILRT) Observation During the period February 13 to 16, 1982, the inspector witnessed portions of the PCILRT. Prior to containment pressurizations the inspector determined by review of signoffs and selected item verification that PCILRT prerequisites had been met as required.
The inspector noted that the instrument location survey had not been completed because the instruments were in about the same location as they had been for previous PCILRT's.
By observation of the placement of green PCILRT tags ard valve position indication, the inspector verified that the valve lineup was for selected penetrations were proper.
Lines inspected included the main steam lines, the HPCI and RCIC steam lines, and CAD system lines. The inspector noted that HPCI inside containment steam line isolation valve was not properly positioned because it had been disassembled for repair. The licensee stated that a penalty would be taken for this condition. The inspector further observed that ILRT valves CRD 754 and CRD 755 had been closed instead of opened as originally required because of excessive reatu coolant leakage by the check valves in the nomally isolated CRD return line. The licensee stated that an additional penalty would be taken for this condition. Finally, the inspector found that valves 16S0V102B and 16S0V101B, which isolate the Menser manometers required for the test, were in the closed rather than the required open position during initial containment pressurization although they had been signed off as open on the valve lineup sheet and PCILRT tagged l
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the previous day. The licensee reopened the valves and proceeded with the test. The licensee stated that the valves may have closed automatically earlier in the day during checkout of a CAD system modification and may not have been reopened.
During containment pressurization the inspector observed that the RHR shutdown cooling system, the reactor water cleanup system, the control rod drive hydraulic system, two designated drywell fans with blades adjusted as required, the temporary PCILRT air compressors, and the Reactor Building Ventilation system were operating as required by the procedure prerequisites.
During the PCILRT the inspector periodically monitored key parameters such as containment pressure, reactor vessel water level, and torus water level.
During the test the licensee placed an air plug between the isolation valves on B main steam line to stop rhat appeared to be excessive leakage. This was based on an unexpected pressure reading between the valves. Subsequent local leak rate testing of B main steam line did not support this conclusion. The licensee now appears to feel that mass fluctuaticns experienced prior to the beginning of the test period can be attributed to relatively large changes in reactor coolant temperature caused by the infrequent use of RHR service water cooling.
The inspector noted that the two test directors were qualified STA's and
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that they were supported by Stone & Webster consultants.
The inspector reviewed the stack monitor recorder to determine that there was no radioactive release associated with the depressurization of the containment after the PCILRT.
On February 22, 1982, the inspector conducted a detailed post PCILRT inspection of the primary containment.
No violations were observed.
10. Voltage Profile Test Observation On February 18, 1982, the inspector witnessed portions of the procedure 71K Voltage Profile Test Task 81, Revision 0, dated February 1982, on Reserve Station Service Transfonner 3.
The inspector determined that the test procedure addressed the requirements of the NRC NRR letter dated April 15, 1981.
11.
Inservice Inspection (ISI) Activity Observation During the 1982 refueling outage the licensee replaced the "A" Core Spray line between the reactor pressure vessel safe end and the first manual holation valve.
In a letter to Ko dated January 20, 1982, the licensee requested relief from its ISI Program, which complies with ASME Section XI,1974, for testing repaired and replaced components.
The licensee revised this program to specify testing of repaired or replaced components in accordance with ASME Section XI,1977. The 1977 Edition of the Code would allow a system leakage test in lieu of a hydrostatic test for the replaced core spray line.
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j The inspector observed the visual examination performed on the replaced core spray line during the Reactor Vessel Operational Pressure Test,
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i F-ST-39H, to ascertain compliance with the ASME Code,Section XI,1977, and the implementing NDE procedure. The examination was performed by personnel certified to Level III in the visual examination method in accordance with the licensee Nondestructive Examination Procedure 9.5-1,
" Visual Examination Procedure of ISI Components," Revision 1, dated May 1980.
No violations were observed.
12. Unresolved Items i
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviations. The unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 3.
i 13.
Exit Interview At pariodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings.
On February 26, 1982, the inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) and summarized the scope and findings of'the inspection as they are described in this report.
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