IR 05000333/1982010

IE Insp Rept 50-333/82-10 on 820501-31.Noncompliance Noted: Failure to Control Restricted Access Area Keys,To Maintain Fire Door Seals & to Remove Combustible Trash from Vital Area & Storage of Combustible Matl in Vital Area

ML20054J701
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	06/11/1982
From:	Doerflein L, Kister H, Linville J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20054J696	List: IR 05000333/1982010 ML20054J695 ML20054J698
References
50-333-82-10, NUDOCS 8206290467
Download: ML20054J701 (15)

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DCS NUMBERS U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 50333-820402 50333-820419 50333-820423 Region I 50333-820427 Report N Docket N C License N DPR-59 Priority

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Category Licensee: Power Authority of the State of New York P. O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 Facility Name: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Inspection at: Scriba, New York Inspection conducted: May 1-31,1982 Inspectors: (b ,N 6[7/72

. C.'Linville( r. Resident Insp6ctor dats signed ch ~

n7' A date signed

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L.T.Doerflejn,ResidentInspector date signed Appraved by: [ [a_ f,!/(g-)

H.' B. Kis't'ekChief, Reactor Projects dat( signed Section 1C inscection summary:

Inspection on May 1-31, 1982 (Report No. 50-333/82-10)

Areas Inspected: Routine and reactive inspection during day and backshift hours by two Resident Inspectors (103 hours0.00119 days <br />0.0286 hours <br />1.703042e-4 weeks <br />3.91915e-5 months <br />) of licensee action on previous inspection findings; licensee event report review; operational safety verification; surveillance observations; maintenance observations; licensee event followup; review of plant operations, and review of periodic and special report Results: No violations were observed in seven of eight areas inspected. In one area three violations were identified: Failure to control restricted access area keys (paragraph 4.a(1), Failure to maintain fire door seals (paragraph 4.C(3)(a)) and Failure to remove combastible trash from a vital area and storage of combustible material in a vital area (paragraph 4.C(3)(b)).

8206290467 820614 PDR ADOCK 05000333 G PDR Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)

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DETAILS Persons Contacted R. Baker, Superintendent of Power N. Brosee, Maintenance Superintendent

• V. Childs, Senior Resident Engineer

• R. Converse, Operations Superintendent M. Cosgrove, Site Quality Assurance Engineer

• Curling, Training Superintendent W. Fernandez Technical Services Superintendent

• J. Flaherty, Assistant Instrument and Control Superintendent

• H. V.eith, Instrument and Control Superintendent

• R. Liseno, Assistant Operations Superintendent

• C. McNeill, Resident Manager

• E. Mulcahey, Radiological & Environmental Services Superintendent C. Orogvany, Reactor Analyst Supervisor T. Teifke, Security & Safety Superintendent

• J. Troia, Office Manager

• V. Walz, Senior Plant Engineer

• R. Wiese, Assistant Maintenance Superintendent The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel during this inspection including shift supervisors, administrative, operators, health physics, security, instrument and centrol, maintenance and contractor personne * Denotes those present at an exit intervie . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) INSPECTORFOLLOWUPITEM(333/82-02-02): The inspector determined by procedure review that F-0P-49, Liquid Radioactive Waste System, Revision 10, dated March 19,1982 now includes sections for valve lineup restoration after liquid radioactive waste discharge (Closed) INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM (333/82-01-04): The inspector reviewed procedure F-ST-26L, Reactor Vessel Head Bolting Studs Temperature Monitoring, Revision 3, dated February 12, 1982 to ensure that it now requires that a calibrated temperature monitoring device be use (Closed) INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM (333/81-12-02): The inspector determined that thereCoolant Pressure is no longer any(need Injection to equalize pressure between the Low LPCI)ContainmentIsolationValvestoprevent damage to 10MOV25 A/B upon reopening it while performing F-ST-2H, LPCI Subsystem Logic System Functional Test, because the procedure has been modified to prevent the valves from cyclin (Closed) VIOLATION (81-10-01): The inspector determined that the licensee had issued RPOP 3, Picking Up, Receiving, and Opening Radioactive Packages, Revision 0, dated May 11, 1981 to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 20.205 dated May 15, 1981 as comitted in the respons . _

(Closed) VIOLATION (81-27-02): The inspectors observed that the wire mesh fences and gates on the 272 foot elevation of the radioactive waste building for controlling access to high radiation areas have been rearranged to simplify access control and minimize frequency of opening. This appears to have been effective since no further violations were observed during the first quarter of 1982.

(Closed) INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM (333/80-03-03): The area of radiation protection technician training was reviewed in detail during the Health Physics Appraisal as documented in inspection report 50-333/80-20.

Additional followup is required based on the findings of that inspection.

This item is closed for administrative purposes.

(Closed) UNRESOLVEDITEM(78-07-01): The documentation of Emergency Plan training was reviewed during the Emergency Plan Appraisal conducted February 16-25, 1982 and documented in inspection report 50-333/82-03.

Additional followup will be done on the findings of this inspection. This item is closed for administrative purposes.

(Closed) VIOLATION (333/81-26-04): This violation was issued for failure to control the Quality Assurance (QA) classification of safety-related components. The inspector determined that the licensee had issued the Component QA Category List, Revision 0, dated April 1, 1982 and that it is controlled by Plant Standing Order No. 32, Revision 0, dated March 26, 1982.

In addition, the licensee issued QA Procedure 21, QA Program Scope, Revision 2, dated February 11, 1982, which states the scope of the QA Progrdm, is based on the list of Structures and Equipment given in Section 12 of the updated FSAR which will be issued by June. It further references the Component QA Category List for component level classification.

(Closed) UNRESOLVEDITEM(333/81-15-03): On May 11, 1981, the inspector witnessed a post repair test of the diesel driven fire pump during which the coolant did not boil over. Through discussions with licensee personnel the inspector determined that the coolant boil over problem had been resolved by the use of a pressure cap on the cooling system. The licensee stated that the use of a pressure cap has been approved by the vendor.

(Closed) INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM (333/82-02-03): By review of F-0P-48B, Revision 3, dated April 28, 1982, the inspector determined that procedures for compacting metal LSA boxes had been incorporated into the procedure for Waste Packaging and Handling.

(0 pen) UNRESOLVEDITEM(333/81-21-05): The inspector reviewed minor modification M87-3677 which authorized the installation of an additional condensate receiver tank pump discharge line to the waste collector tank on November 1979. Neither the minor modification nor the work request were ever signed off as complete. Similarly, no minor modification was logged for the reroute of the condensate receiver tank vent line accomplished under WR 87/14607 for which the work request package was lost. Although safety evaluation JAF-SE-81-048 was logged for the minor modification, it too appears to have been misplaced. Drawings OP-49-6, Revision 3, and FM-17G-18 were never signed off as complete. Drawings OP-49-6, Revision 3, and FM-17G-18 were not revised to show the new lines which the inspector verified

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to be in place in September 1981. Since failure to maintain drawings up to date was the subject of a violation issued in inspection report 50-333/82-08, for which the licensee response has not been received, an additional violation will not be issued. The inspector will review specific corrective actions for these findings late (Closed) INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM (333/82-06-06): The inspector determined by review of F-ST-4A, HPCI Simulated Automatic Actuation Test, Revision 8, dated May 12, 1982 and F-ST-24E, RCIC Simulated Automatic Actuation Test, Revision 4, dated May 12, 1982, that the test frequency requirement had been changed to require a test at operating pressure as well as reduced pressure upon startup from an extended outag (Closed) UNRESOLVEDITEM(333/81-26-02): The inspector reviewed WACP 10.1.3, Placement of Jumpers / Blocks or Lifted Leads, Revision 6, dated February 9, 1982 to determine that the licensee revised the procedure to require that a second licensed operator determines the application of these devices is acceptable. In addition, the inspector determined by review of outstanding jumper log sheets that modification proposals had been initiated recently for jumpers76-252, 78-157,78-204, 78-205,79-160, 79-192,80-121, 81-048,81-058, 81-083,81-085 and 81-107, 3. Licensee Event Report (LER) Review The inspector reviewed LER's to verify that the details of the events were clearly reported. The inspector determincd that reporting requirements had been met, the report was adequate to assess the event, the cause appeared accurate and was supported by details, corrective actions appeared appropriate to correct the cause, the form was complete and generic applicability to other plants was not in questio LER's 82-17*, 82-18, 82-19* and 82-20 were reviewe *LER's selected for onsite followu LER 82-17 reported the failure of Main Steam Isolation Valve 10 percent closure position switch on two valves. Inspector review of this event is documented in paragraph 7 of inspection report 50-333/82-0 LER 82-18 reported that four smoke detectors had not been properly terminate The inspector will review the licensee's investigation of this matter when the followup report is submitted. (333/82-10-01)

LER 82-19 reported that rod 26-51 was inoperable because of a broken select switch. Inspector review of this event is documented in paragraph 6 of inspection report 50-333/82-0 . Operational Safety Verification Control Room Observations (1) Daily, the inspectors verified selected plant parameters and equipment availability to ensure compliance with limiting conditions for operation of the plant Technical Specification Items checked included:

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-- Power distribution limits;

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Availability and proper valve lineup of safety systems;

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Availability and proper alignment of onsite and offsite emergency power sources;

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Reactor Control panel indications;

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Primary containment temperature and pressure;

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Drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure;

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Standby Liquid Control Tank level and concentration, and

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Stack monitor recorder trace (2) The inspectors directly observed the following plant operations to ensure adherence to approved procedures:

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Routine Power Operation

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Issuance of RWP's and Work Request / Event / Deficiency forms During the day shift on May 13, 1982, the inspector went to the Shift Supervisor for approval of special RWP 2927 for inspection of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system valve lineup in the drywell access hatch area. After obtaining approval of the RWP, the inspector requested the key to the Restricted Access Gate to gain access to the area. The Shift Supervisor was unable to find the X-11 key to this gate in the key locker or any record of its being checked out in the lo The inspector noted that a survey numbered 50514 of the area had been perfomed during the midshift the night before for the RWP and that there was no record of the X-11 having been checked out for that survey. The shift supervisor obtained a duplicate key from the security department and checked it out to the inspector. The inspector noted that the original key had been returned to the key locker the next mornin Failure of the Shift Supervisor to control the key for this Restricted Access Gate is a violation of Radiation Protection Procedures, Revision 5, dated January 1982 and of Technical Specification 6.11 which requires that radiation protection rocedures be adhered to for all plant operation p(333/82-10-02)

(3) Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being take (4) Shift turnovers were observed to ensure proper control room and shift manning. Shift turnover checklists and log review by the oncoming and offgoing shifts were also observed by the inspector . - - _

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6 Shift Logs and Operating Records (1) Selected shift logs and operating records were reviewed to:

-- Obtain information on plant problems and operations;

-- Detect changes and trends in performance;

-- Detect possible conflicts with Technical Specifications or regulatory requirements;

-- Determine that records are being maintained and reviewed as required, and

-- Assess the effectiveness of the communications provided by the log (2) The following logs and records were reviewed:

-- Shift Supervisor Log

-- Nuclear Control Operator Log

-- Night Orders

-- Shift Turnover Check Sheet

-- Protective Tag Record Log

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Jumper Log

-- Liquid Radwaste Discharge Log

-- Gaseous and Particulate Sample Logs

-- Weekly Chemistry Status Log

-- Air Sample Log No violations were observe > Plant Tours (1) During the inspection period, the inspectors made observations and conducted tours of plant areas including the following:

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Control Room

-- Relay Room

-- Reactor Building

-- Turbine Building l

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Diesel Generator Rooms

-- Electric Bays

-- Pumphouse-Screenwell

-- Standby Gas Treatment Building

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Radwaste Building i

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-- Crescent Rooms

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Torus Room

-- Plant Perimeter

-- Battery Rooms

-- Cable Tunnels (2) During the plant tours, the inspector conducted a visual inspection of selected piping between containment and the i

isolation valves for leakage or leakage paths. This included verification that manual valves were shut, capped and locked when required and that motor operated or air operated valves were not mechanically blocked. Other items verified during the plant tours included:

(a) Fire Protection Conditions

-- No significant fire hazards existe Extinguishing equipment, fire alarms, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment and emergency equipment was operable.

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-- Ignition sources and flamable material were properly controlled.

l l (b) Housekeeping / Cleanliness Conditions i

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-- Critical clean areas like the refueling floor were properly controlle Combustible material was properly controlle (c) Radiation Protection Controls

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Surveys were properly performe Radiation Protection instruments were calibrated and operabl . . - . ___ ___

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Radiation Work Permits were complete, appropriate and followe Methods used to control exposures of those working in high radiation areas were appropriat Activities in radioactive waste system areas were conducted in accordance with approved procedure (d) Physical Security Plan Implementation

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The security organization appeared to be properly manned and capable of perfonning its assigned functio Isolation zones were clea Persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the protected are Vehicles were properly searched and escorted or controlled within the protected are Persons within the protected area displayed photo identification badges and persons requiring escorts were properly escorte Compensatory measures were employed when required by security equipment failure or impairmen Protected area and vital area barriers were not degraded and access to these areas was properly controlle (e) Verification of adherence to selected Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation.

(3) Findings (a) While performing a valve lineup check of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system on May 11, 1982, the inspector found that one of the unsupervised double doors for RCIC pump and turbine maintenance access in the RCIC fire protection enclosure area was unlatched. No one else was in the are After investigating and latching the door, the licensee stated that conduit sealing material found on the door frame had been preventing the door from closing properl During a tour of the relay room at about 9:00 a.m. on May 17, 1982, the inspector found the supervised door to the relay room to reactor building cable tunnel-north propped open with a fire extinguisher and unattended. A hose used for a conduit sealing mr.terial machine was run through the door. The inspecto: notified the licensee. Failure to provide a continuous fire watch while fire barrier penetration seals are

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not functional is a violation of Technical Specification 3.1 (333/82-10-03)

(b) During tours on May 10 and 19,1982 of the west cable tunnel, the inspector found the same large plastic bag of combustible waste and cardboard packing material in the area used as a spare parts storage area at the south end of the tunnel. The licensee was infomed of this condition after the inspector's first tou Failure to remove significant quantities of combustible material once per shift from safety related areas, and to imediately remove cardborad boxes or miscellaneous packing material from safety related areas is a violation of procedure WACP 10.1.10, Control of Combustibles and Flamable Material, Revision 1, dated March 16.-1981 and Technical Specification 6.8(A) which requires that Fire Protection Program Procedures be implemented, i In addition, storage of spare parts packed in combustible materials in safety related areas such as the west cable tunnel is a violation of WACP 10.1.10 and the requirements of its source document " Nuclear Plan Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance," i dated June 14, 1977. The licensee is comitted to the latter I document by the Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 47 to the facility operating license. (333/82-10-04)

d. Tagout Verification The inspectors verified that the following safety related protective tagout records (PTR's) were proper by observing the positions of

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breakers, switches and/or valves.

l l -- PTR 820603 on Refuel Floor Exhaust Monitor Blower l

-- PTR 820608 on the Diesel Fire Pump l -- PTR 820620 on B Containment Atmosphere Dilution (CAD) Tank Safety Valve 275Vll4B While verifying PTR 820620, the inspector noted that there was no second verification on either the tags or the tagout record shee Further investigation revealed that there was no ** by the CAD system title on the operating procedure index to indicate that a second verification is required. The licensee stated that this was an oversight since all safety-related systems require second verification of PTR's and that the ** would be added. The inspector will review the revised operating procedure index. (333/82-10-05)

-- PTR 82-629 on Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pump 1A Discharge Check Valve

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10 Radioactive Waste Systems Controls (1) The inspector witnessed selected portions of one liquid radioactive release to verify the following:

-- The required release approvals were obtaine The required samples were taken and analyze The radioactive wasta system wac operated in accordance with approved procedure On May 26, 1982, the inspector observed the release of Batch 4469, Waste Sample Tank (2) On May 25, 1982, the inspector reviewed the shipment records for radioactive waste shipment no. WASH 82-39 and observed that the shipment was properly labelle No violations were observe f. Emergency System Operability The inspectors verified operability of the 125V D-C Power, the Neutron Monitoring, and Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer System The following items were included in the system verification:

-- Confinnation that each accessible valve in the primary flow path was in the correct positio Confimation that power supplies and breakers are properly aligned for components that must activate upon an initiation signa Visual inspection of the major components for leakage and other conditions which might prevent fulfillment of their functional requirement The inspectors also verified the operabitity of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system by performing a complete walkdown of the accessible portions of the system. The following were included in the RCIC system verification:

-- Confinnation that the licensee's system lineup procedures match plant drawings and the as-built configuratio Verification that valves are in the proper position, have power available, and are locked (sealed) as require Verification that system instrumentation is properly valved i Verification that there are no obvious deficiencies which might degrade system performance such as inoperable hangers or support _

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During the walkdown of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)

system, the inspector noted the following discrepancies between the as-built condition, the Operating Procedurs No.19 Valve Lineup Table and Drawing, and the latest Flow and Jachinery (FM) drawings, FM-22A, Revision 13, and FM-22B, Revision 10:

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There is an unnumbered drain valve near the vent from the turbine exhaust line,RCIC 105,just upstream of the RCIC turbine exhaust to torus check valve, RCIC 05,which does not appear on drawing FM-22A-13, drawing OP-19-1 or the Valve Lineup Tabl Valve 13A0V13 is shown closed on drawing FM-228-10 and on drawing OP-19-2, while it is shown to be open/ closed on the Valve Lineup Table. A review of the system logic by the inspector and a shift supervisor led to the conclusion that the open position in which the inspector found the valve was its normal positio The following valves appeared on OP-19-1 or 2 and the Valve Lineup Table but not on FM-22A-13 or B-1 RCIC-102 A/B, Condensate Storage Tank 33-TK-12A/B Level Tes RCIC-774, LLRT Stop Valve Outboard 13MOV13 RCIC-49, Steam Line Drain Manual Isolatio RCIC-763, Test Stop Valve on Condensate Pump to Equipment Dr. Inbor.r Valve RCIC-07, the Vacuum Pump Isolation Stop Check Valve is shown as being locked open on FM-22A-13 and OP-19-1, but is stated as being only open on the Valve Lineup Table and is not locke In addition, several vent and drain lines were shown capped on OP-19-1/2 and FM-22-A/B but were not required to be capped by the Valve Lineup Table and are not capped. Two valves, RCIC 102A/B on the Valve Lineup Table, appear more than once. Numerous valves have lockwires or other locking devices installed which are not called for on either the drawings or the Valve Lineup Tabl Since these findings are similar to those identified on the High Pressure Coolant Injection System in inspection report 50-333/82-08 for which the licensee response has not been received, an additional violation will not be issued. The inspector will review specific corrective action later. (333/82-10-06)

5. Surveillance Observations The inspector observed portions of the surveillance procedures listed below to verify that the test instrumentation was properly calibrated, approved procedures were used, the work was performed by qualified personnel, limiting conditions for operation were met, and the system was correctly restored following the testing:

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-- F-ST-76F, Diesel Fire Pump Battery Specific Gravity Test, Revision 0, dated January 5, 1979, performed on May 10, 198 F-ST-76C, Diesel Fire Pump Operational Check, Revision 1, dated April 14, 1981, performed on May 11, 198 F-ST-90, EDG Inoperative Test / Loss of 115 KV Reserve Power / Loss of Station Battery, Revision 2, dated January 16, 1981, perfomed on May 4 and 14, 198 F-ST-2J. One RHR Service Water Pump Inoperable Test or One Containment Cooling Subsystem Inoperative Test, Revision 2, dated March 18, 1982, perfomed on May 18, 198 No violations wt.re observe . Maintenance Observations The inspectors observed portions of various safety related maintenance activities. Through direct observation and review of records, they determined that:

-- Redundant components were operabl These activities did not violate the limiting conditions for operatio Required administrative approvals and tag outs were obtained prior to initiating the wor Approved procedures were used or the activity was within the " skills of the trade."

-- Appropriate radiological controls were properly implemente Ignition / fire prevention controls were properly implemente Equipment was properly tested prior to returning it to servic During this inspection period, the following activities were observed:

-- WR 17/21695, Replacs . fuel Floor Exhaust Monitor Blower RIS 456B-04-P32B, performed on May 5,198 WR 76/17505, Repair Diesel Fire Pump reduction gear oil cooler leak, performed on May 10, 198 WR 10/17649, Repair 10MOV38A, Torus Spray isolation valve limitorque moto WR 27/21846, Reset 27SV1148, B Cad Tank Safety Valve, perfonned on May 17, 198 No violations were observe _ _ . - . .__ _ .

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13 Licensee Event Followup At 2:45 a.m. on May 1,1982, while performing the monthly surveillance testing on the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG), the licensee declared

"A" EDG inoperable when the frequency and power output of the "A" EDG began oscillating. Simultaneously, the licensee noted that the ground detector on "A" station battery was oscillating and thought that there was a ground in the control circuit of the "A" EDG. The licensee performed F-ST-9D, "EDG Inoperative Test / Loss of 115 KV Reserve Power / Loss of Station Battery," Revision 2, dated January 16,1981 as required, on the "B" and "D" EDG's. At 3:50 a.m. at the conclusion of F-ST-9D, the licensee noted that "B" Emergency Service Water (ESW)

pump, which starts automatically on a EDG start to supply cooling water, could not be turned off. Investigation revealed that the three speed sensing relays on the "D" EDG were still energized. These relays are normally deenergized when the EDG is secured and must deenergize in order to turn off the ESW pump. At 6:00 a.m., the licensee declared the "D" EDG inoperable due to the problem with the speed sensing relay At 0630, the licensee notified the NRC of the situation on the Emergency Notification System (ENS). Before any effective troubleshooting took place, the "D" EDG speed sensing relays deenergized. The licensee performed wiring checks but was unable to find any problems on the "D" EDG. At 7:45 a.m. on May 1,1982, the licensee successfully completed F-ST-9D and declared the "B" and "D" EDG's operable. During testing of the "D" EDG, operation of the speed sensing relays was norma The licensee tested the "A" EDG but was unable to reproduce the oscillations noted earlier. A EDG was declared operable at 9:25 Since no problems could be identified with the "A" EDG control circuitry, the licensee perforned F-ST-90 for the next four days in an attempt to reproduce the problems on either the "A" or "D" EDG but was unable to do so. The inspector witnessed F-ST-90, performed on May 4, 1982 and noted both "A" and "D" EDG's operated normall While performing surveillance test F-ST-2A at about 0445 on May 14, 1982, licensee personnel noted that 10M0V38A, a torus spray loop containment isolation valve failed to close in the 11 seconds allowed by the i Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program. The test was signed off as satisfactory but work request 10/12936 was initiated to correct the

valve stroke time. At 0705 another attempt to stroke 10M0V38M was

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made but the valve failed to close fully. The licensee immediately tagged out 10MOV39A as required by Technical Specification 3.7. making the B side of the containment cooling mode subsystem inoperable and placing the plant in the 7 day action statement of Technical Specification 3.5.B.4. The required surveillance testing of Technical Specification 4.5.A.3 and an investigation into the cause of the i 10M0V38A failure were initiated. The licensee determined that the Limitorque motor for 10M0V38A had failed. The licensee located a replacement motor in the warehouse but decided not to install it until Monday, May 17, 198 In order to change to the less restrictive action statement of Technical Specification 3.5.B.2, the licensee

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manually closed 10MOV38A and restored 10M0V39A to service making only the torus spray loop of the containment cooling mode subsystem inoperabl When the licensee installed the spare motor in 10MOV38A on May 18, 1982, it drew high current during post installation testing. This operation required additional shifting of the isolation between 10MOV38A and 10MOV39A and thus shifting between the 30 day and 7 day action statements of the Technical Specifications. The licensee locatea a second replacement motor in the warehouse with a different horsepower rating. Licensee Quality Assurance personnel authorized a conditional installation of this motor pending approval of Limitorque for its us Although this motor tested satisfactory prior to installation, it too drew high current when tested after installation. The licensee is currently having the first replacement motor rewound to complete the repair and investigating the cause of failure of the replacement motor While perfonning surveillance test F-ST-2R on May 20, 1982, which was required daily with 10MOV38A failed, the discharge check valve on RHR service water pump 1 A failed making the pump inoperable while the PTR was in effect for the valve repair. This again placed the licensee in the 7 day action statement of Technical Specification 3.5.B.4 rather than the less restrictive 30 day action statement of Technical Specification 3.5.B.3 because both the RHR service water pump and 10M0V38A were out of service. The discharge check valve, which was inoperable because a broken cotter pin permitted the disc rut to work loose, was returned to service the same day placing the plant oack in the 30 day action statement of Technical Specification 3.5.B.2 with only 10MOV38A inoperabl . Review of Plant Operations Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) Meeting Observation On May 12,1982, the inspector observed PORC meeting 82-043. The inspector verified the Technical Specification membership and frequency requirement The minutes of the meeting did not accurately reflect the coments and decisions of the PORC in that no reference was made to F-0P-49, Revision 10, Liquid Radioactive Waste System and F-ST-20K, Draft Revision, Control Rod Exercising / Venting which were on the agenda and were submitteo for review but were not approved because the PORC Chairman decided they required more detailed review prior to approval. The licensee acknowledged the coment at the exit meetin During the PORC meeting, Nuclear Safety Evaluation JAF-SE-82-035 regarding the temporary modification involving the installation of lead blankets (shielding) around a 6-inch Bonstrand pipe in the Radioactive Waste Control Room was reviewed and approved. After the meeting, the inspector asked licensee management personnel whether any Nuclear Safety Evaluations had been performed for the placement of existing shielding on seismically designed piping at various locations in the plant. The licensee stated

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that the acceptability of the placement of existing, temporary shielding would be evaluated and that a program for evaluation of the placement of temporary shielding in the future would be developed. The inspector will review this matter further late (333/81-10-07) Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special reports. The review included the following: Inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predications and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems; reportability and validity of reported information. The following periodic reports were reviewed:

-- Cycle 5 Startup Test Report, dated May 7, 1982

-- Annual Sumary of JAFNPP Plant Modifications, Changes, and Experiments for 1981, dated May 6,198 No violations were observe . Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings. On June 1, 1982, the inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are described in this report.