IR 05000333/1982001
| ML20041D612 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 02/12/1982 |
| From: | Doerflein L, Kister H, Linville J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041D611 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-***, TASK-TM 50-333-82-01, 50-333-82-1, NUDOCS 8203050463 | |
| Download: ML20041D612 (14) | |
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DCS NUMBERS 50333-811217 U.S. flVCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI0f; 50333-811230
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Region I 82-01 Report No.
50-333 Docket No.
DPR-59 C
License No.
Priority Category
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Licensee:
Power Authority of the State of New York P. O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Facility Name:
Inspection at: Scriba, New York ah J/Tr!f2-rs:
.L ville, Inspector da'te / signed aA/n m.
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L. T. Doerflein,' Resident Inspector date' signed
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date signed Approved by:
[w 1//2[g
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if. B. Kister, Chief, Reactor Projects date signed Section 1C Inspection Summary:
Inspection on January 1-31,1982(ReportNo. 50-333/82-01)
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Areas Inspected:
Routine and reactive inspection during day and backshift hours by two Resident Inspectors (165 hours0.00191 days <br />0.0458 hours <br />2.728175e-4 weeks <br />6.27825e-5 months <br />) of licensee action on previous inspection findings; licensee event report review; operational safety verification; surveillance observations; maintenance observations; followup on TMI TAP items, and ISI Program.
Results: No violations or deviations were observed in the seven areas inspected.
Region I Form 12 (Rev. ancil 77)
8203050463 B20216 PDR ADOCK 05000333
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
- R. Baker, Superintendent of Power N. Brosee, Maintenance Superintendent
- R. A. Burns, Assistant to Superintendent of Power
- V. Childs, Assistant to Resident Manager
- R. Converse, Operations Superintendent M. Cosgrove, Site Quality Assurance Engineer W. Fernandez, Technical Services Superintendent H. Keith, Instrument and Control Superintendent
- C. A. McNeill, Resident Manager
- E. Mulcahey, Radiological & Environmental Services Superintendent C. Orogvany, Reactor Analyst Supervisor
- R. Peters, Electrical Maintenance Engineer D. E. Tall, Training Coordinator T. Teifke, Security & Safety Superintendent The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel during this inspection including shift supervisors, administrative, operators,
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health physics, security, instrument and control, maintenance and contractor personnel.
- Denotes those present at an exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) UNRESOLVED ITEM (333/81-21-02):
License Amendment No. 6 changed Technical Specifications deleting the requirement for the annual emergency drill because this requirement was redundant to the requirements of paragraphs q and t of 10 CFR 50.54.
3.
Review Licensee Event Report (LER)
The inspector. reviewed LER's to verify that the details of the events were clearly reported. The. inspector detennined that reporting requirements had been met, the report was adequate to assess the event, the cause appeared accurate and was supported by details, corrective actions appeared appropriate to correct the cause, the form was complete and generic applicability to other plants was not in question.
The inspector reviewed LER's 81-81 and 81-82.
LER 81-81 reported that a HPCI system drain line pipe restraint had never been installed during construction. The licensee stated that the restraint would be installed prior to startup, and that a followup report with an evaluation of the effect of the missing restraint would be submitted.
The inspector will review this matter later (333/82-01-01).
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LER 81-82 reported a failure of the 24VDC power supply for the SRM's and IRM's while tiie AC power supply was de-energized. The licensee stated that a followup report would be submitted later with an evaluation of the event and a description of action taken to prevent recurrence. The inspector will review this infomation when it becomes available (333/82-01-02).
No violations were 1 served.
4.
Operation Safety ~terification a.
Control Room Observations (1) Using a plant specific checklist, the inspectors verified selected plant parameters and equipment availability to ensure compliance with limiting conditions for operation of the plant Technical Specifications.
Items checked included:
Availability and proper valve lineup of safety systems;
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Availability and proper alignment of onsite and offsite
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emergency power sources; Reactor control panel indications; and
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Stack monitor recorder traces.
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(2) The inspectors directly observed the following plant operations to ensure adherence to approved procedures:
Issuance of RWP's and Work Request / Event / Deficiency forms
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(3) Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being taken.
(4)
Shift turnovers were observed to ensure proper control room and shift manning. Shift turnover checklists and log review by the oncoming and offgoing shifts were also observed by. the inspectors.
No violations were observed.
b.
Shift Logs and Operating Records (1)
Selected shift logs and operating records were reviewed to:
Obtain information on plant problems and operations;
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Detect changes and trends in perfomance;
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Detect possible conflicts with Technical Sepcifications
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or regulatory requirements;
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Detennine that records are being maintained and reviewed
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as required; and Assess the effectiveness of the connunications provided
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by the logs.
(2) The following logs and records were reviewed:
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Shift Supervisor Log Nuclear Control Operator Log
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Night Orders
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Shift Tur:1over Check Sheet
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Protective Tag Record Log
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Jumper Log
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Liquid Radwaste Discharge Log
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Gaseous and Particulate Sample Logs
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Weekly Chemistry Status Log
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Air Sample Log
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No violations were observed.
c.
Plant Tours (1) During the inspection period, the 1 spectors made observations and conducted tours of plant arcas including the following:
Control Room
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Relay Room
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Reactor Building
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Turbine Building
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Diesel Generator Rooms
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Electric Bays
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Pumphouse-Screenwell
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Standby Gas Treatment Building
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Radwaste Building
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Crescent Rooms
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Torus
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Torus Room
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(2) During weekly plant tours, the inspector observed general plant / equipment conditions, adherence to administrative controls, and selected examples of the following:
(a) Fire Protection Conditions No significant fire hazards existed.
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Extinguishing equipment, fire alarms, actuating
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controls, fire fighting equipment and emergency l
equipment was operable.
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Ignition sources and flamable material were properly
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controlled.
(b) Housekeeping / Cleanliness Conditions
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Critical clean areas like the refueling floor were
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properly controlled.
Combustible material was properly controlled.
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(c) Radiation Protection Controls Surveys were properly performed.
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Radiation Protection instruments were calibrated and
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Radiation Work Pemits were complete, appropriate and
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followed.
Methods used to control exposures of those working in
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high radiation areas were appropriate.
Activities in radioactive waste system areas were j
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conducted in accordance with approved procedures.
(d) Physical Security Plan Implementation The security organization appeared to be properly
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manned and capable of perfonning its assigned function.
Isolation zones were clear.
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Persons and packages were checked prior to entry
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into the protected area.
Vehicles were properly searched and escorted or
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controlled within the protected area.
Persons within the protected area displayed photo
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identification badges and persons requiring escorts were properly escorted.
Compensatory measures were employed when required by
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security equipment failure or impaiment.
Protected area and vital area barriers were not
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degraded and access to these areas was properly controlled.
During a tour of the reactor building on January 29,1982, the inspector found a can containing unused E7018 weld rod. No one working in the area claimed this weld rod. WSP4, Control of Welding and Cutting, dated April 13, 1981 required temperature control for this type of weld rod but pemits exposure to the environment for periods up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
WSP4 does not specify the manner in which unused weld rod must be disposed of. The licensee imediately disposed of the weld rod when informed of the situation by the resident inspector. The licensee considers this an isolated event and plans no procedural changes because supervisors are instructed to dispose of unused weld rod and have done so effectively to date. The inspector will continue to monitor perfomance in this area during future inspections (333/82-01-03).
No violations were observed.
d.
Tagout Verification The inspectors verified that the following safety related protective tagout records (PTR) were proper by observing the positions of breakers, switches and/or valves.
PTR 820005 on Control Rod 26-27.
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PTR 820053 on the Rod Movement Switch.
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PTR 820104 on A Reactor Protection System Motor Generator.
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No violations were observed.
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e.
Occurrence Report Review The inspectors reviewed occurrence reports 82-01 to 82-07 to determine that the licensees problem identification system is functioning properly.
No violations were observed.
f.
Radioactive Waste Systems Controls The inspector witnessed selected portions of a liquid radioactive release to verify the following:
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The required release approvals are obtained.
The required samples are taken and analyzed.
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The radioactive waste system is operated in accordance with
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approved procedures.
On January 14, 1982, the inspector observed the release of Batch 4060 of Laundry Drain Tank B.
No violations were observed.
5.
Surveillance Observations The inspectors observed portions of the surveillance procedures below to verify that the test instrumentation was properly calibrated, approved procedures were used, the work was perfomed by qualified personnel, limiting conditions for operation were met, and the system was correctly restored following the testing.
F-ST-50, SRM Functional Test, Revision 4, dated November 7,1980,
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perfomed on January 5,1982.
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F-ST-SA, SRM, IRM Detector Not in Startup Rod Block Functional Test, Revision 3, dated December 7,1981, performed on January 5,1982.
F-ST-9B, EDG Full Load Test and ESW Pump Operability Test (ISI),
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Revision 13, dated October 2,1981, perfomed on January 11, 1982.
F-ST-26L, Reactor Vessel Head Bolting Studs Temperature Monitoring,
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Revision 2, dated December 1,1980, perfomed on January 18, 1982.
While observing this test the inspector noted that the procedure did not contain the appropriate Technical Specification reference of paragraph 3.6.B.1 and did not require the use of a calibrated pyrometer if one was used in lieu of installed instrumentation. A new Digicon II
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pyrometer serial number 7459 which had not been calibrated was used.
A subsequent calibration check on January 27, 1982 demonstrated that the instrument had been within acceptable accuracy. At the exit interview the licensee agreed to correct the procedure to require a
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calibrated pyrometer if used and to reference the appropriate
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technical specification.
(333/82-01-04)
F-ST-76U, " Fire System Flow Test," Revision 1, dated January 1982,
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perfomed January 26, 1982.
F-ST-76J23 " Diesel Fire Pump 76-P-1 Perfomance Test," Revision 2,
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dated July 1981, perfomed January 27, 1982.
No violations were observed.
6.
Maintenance Observations The inspectors observed portions of various safety related maintenance activities. Through direct observation and review of records, they determined, where appropriate, that:
Qualified personnel perfomed the activities.
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Redundant components were operable.
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These activities did not violate the limiting conditions for operation.
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Required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to
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initiating the work.
Approved procedures were used or the activity was within the " skills
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of the trade".
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Appropriate radiological controls were properly implemented.
Ignition / fire prevention controls were properly implemented.
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Equipment was properly tested prior to returning it to service.
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Tools and gages were properly calibrated.
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Parts and materials were properly certified.
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QC hold points were observed and provided independent verification.
During this inspection period, the following activities were observed:
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WR 03/4838, Scram Pilot Valve Preventive Maintenance on January 8,1982.
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While observing the replacement of Buna N components in selected scram pilot valves, the inspector noted that one of the torque wrenches being used had a calibration card while the other did not. Further, the one with the calibration card had no recorded uses.
Subsequent investigation showed that both torque wrenches were in calibration.
In addition, the licensee stated only one entry on the cards is required for the entire job. A card was placed with the torque wrench which had not had on _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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In reviewing the torque wrench calibration records further, the inspector found that a three quarter inch Derochrome torque wrench with a range of 0-300 foot-pounds was found out of tolerance at 300 foot-pounds when it was calibrated on April 15, 1981. The licensae was unable to show that this torque wrench had been removed from service for repair or to locate it at all.
In addition, there were no calibration card entries on the card for the torque wrench tester indicating that it had been used to calibrate the torque wrenches used in the scram pilot valve job although there were calibration data sheets. These wrenches were Snap On torque wrench serial number AB41171 calibrated on November 4,1981 and Proto torque wrench serial number TX 70917006PA calibrated on October 28, 1981.
Maintenance Procedure No. 110, On Site Calibration and Verification, Revision 0, dated January 22, 1980 requires that periodic maintenance and test equipment have a log card that records the date used and the item, cat the exit interview the licensee agreed to investigate revisions of their calibration program to provide accountability for calibrated tools.
(333/82-01-05)
WR 46/4774, ESW Valve Replacement Modification F1-81-51 on January 14, 1992.
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WR 02-1/16001, Reactor Vessel Reassembly on January 18, 1982.
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WR 15/11296, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System valve
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replacement modification F1-81-25 on January 19, 1982.
No violations were observed.
7.
Followup on TMI TAP Items The inspector reviewed the modification packages and the installation status of the following items which are scheduled for completion during the current
outage according to the licensee's lett4r JPN 82-7 dated January 11, 1982.
These items remain open pending the ;ospector's determination of their completion prior to startup scheduled for February 15, 1982.
II.B.2.2, Plant Shielding Modifications II.F.1.3, Containment High-Range Radiation Monitor II.F.1.4, Containment Pressure Monitor-II.F.1.5, Containment Water Level Monitor In the same correspondence noted above, the licensee stated that the following modifications would be completed during the current refueling outage except that some components would not be environmentally qualified because of
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unavailability. The licensee further stated that the unqualified components would be replaced with qualified components as soon as they are available.
The inspector will evaluate the partial completion of this modification prior to startup.
However, these items will remain open pending completion of a ' fully qualified modification.
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II.F.1.1, Noble Gas Effluent Monitor II.K.3.22, Automatic Switchover of RCIC Suction For various reasons such as equipment unavailability and delays in the development of BWR owner's group positions, the licensee requested
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l extensions for the completion dates to the dates indicated for the following modifications in the same letter referenced above.
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j II.B.3.2, Post-Accident Sampling Modifications to December 31,1982.
l The inspector has observed that a substantial portion of the installation has been completed during the current outage. However, the inspector disagrees with the licensee's justification in letter JPN-82-7, dated January 11, 1982, that current capabilities meet the objectivet of the new system, in that, there currently exist no capabilities for sampling the containment atmosphere outside secondary containment as required by NUREG 0737.
II.F.1.6, Containment Hydrogen Concentration Monitor to December 31, 1982.
II.K.3.28, Qualification of ADS Accumulators to provide modification description and schedule by April 1,1982.
The following items remain open for the reasons discussed below.
II.B.l.3, Reactor Coolant System Vent Procedures The licensee has not developed emergency procedures for reactor coolant system venting because emergency procedure guidelines being developed by the BWR owner's group have not been completed. The licensee has not given any schedule for implementation of these procedures.
II.F.1.2, Post-Acciden_t Effluent Sampling for Iodine and Particulates In earlier correspondence, the licensee maintained that existing instrumentation and equipment were adequate to satisfy the NUREG 0578 requirement.
In the letter referenced above, the licensee stated that this position is being re-evaluated based on the clarification of NUREG 0737.
No schedule has been given for a revised response.
II.F.2, Instrumentation for the Detection of Inadequate _ Core Cooling The licensee is awaiting the development of the generic BWR owner's group response to this item before developing a plant specific response. No schedule was given for this response in the letter noted above.
The following items are closed based on inspector review and verification of the licensee response noted abov.
II.K.3.24, HPCI and RCIC Space Cooling Systems By reviewing appropriate operating procedures and operating procedure drawings,the inspector verified that the crescent area unit coolers are supplied with emergency power independent of offsite power supplies and with emergency service water cooling water. The inspector further verified that these coolers alone are capable of cooling the crescent areas according to the FSAR.
The inspector reviewed the modification package for the RCIC fans (F1-79-250) to verify that one 100% capacity fan is powered from an emergency power source. The inspector noted that this modification has not.been incorporated into the plant operating procedures yet. The inspector concluded that the existing design needs no additional modification to meet the requirement.
II.K.3.25, Effects of the Loss of Power on Pump Seals By reviewing the appropriate operating procedures and operating procedure drawings, the inspector verified that recirculation pump seals are provided with backup emergency service water cooling in the event of a loss of offsite power.
In addition, the seal purge water provided directly to the recirculation pump seals is provided by the control rod drive pumps in the event of a loss of offsite power. Thus, the existing design meets the intent of this requirement and no modification is required.
No violations were observed.
8.
Inservice Inspection (ISI) Activities a.
ISI Program Review In accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g), the licensee submitted to the NRC, on September 9,1979, an updated ISI program to comply with the ASME Code,Section XI,1974 Edition through Sumer 1975 Addenda. The program, as submitted, included requests for relief from specific code requirements.
In a letter dated August 25, 1981, NRR granted relief, on an interim basis, for the code requirements requested and authorized the licensee to implement the proposed program pending final approval by NRR.
The inspector reviewed the ISI program to ascertain that it included a description of the areas to be examined in accordance to the 1974 ASME Code,Section XI, Articles IWB-2000 and IWC-2000, the examination category for each area, the method of inspection for each area, the extent of examination for each area, and justification for exceptions to codes and standards. The inspector then reviewed the list of items scheduled to be examined during the current refueling outage and found that the applicable requirements of the 1974 ASME Code,Section XI, the plant Technical Specifications, and the ISI program were me _
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The licensee has contracted EBASCO Services, Inc. to perfonn the required ISI examinations. The inspector reviewed the Ebasco QA Manual - Inservice Inspection, Revision 0, dated October 12, 1975, to verify it covered all ISI activities which included, but was not limited to the following:
Training program for QA personnel, Audits, Work and Inspection Procedures, Corrective Action, Document Control, and Control of Examination Equipment.
No violations were observed.
b.
Nondestructive Examination (NDE) Procedure Review The inspector reviewed the following Ebasco procedures governing the perfonnance of NDE during the on-going refueling outage:
JAF-UT-1, "UT Examination of Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds,
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RPV Head Weld, Nozzle to Vessel Welds," Revision 3, dated May 5,1980.
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JAF-UT-3, "UT Examination of Pressure Retaining Bolting 2 Inches
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and Larger in Diameter," Revision 4, dated May 5, 1980.
JAF-UT-4, " Ultrasonic Examination of RPV Shell-to-Flange Weld,"
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Revision 0, dated October 27, 1981.
JAF-UT-6, " Ultrasonic Examination of Flange Ligament Areas of
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the Reactor Vessel," Revision 0, dated October 27, 1981.
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JAF-PT-1, " Color Contrast-Solvent Removable Liquid Penetrant
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Examination," Revision 3, dated May 5,1980.
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ISI-VT-76 1, " Visual Examination of Welds," Revision 2, dated
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April 22, 1980.
ISI-VT-76-2, " Visual Examination of Support Members," Revision 2,
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dated April 22, 1980.
ISI-VT-76-5, " Visual Examination of Bolting Components," Revision 2
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l The procedure review was done to verify that they were approved by authorized licensee personnel, that they specified the personnel qualification requirements and that they were in compliance with the requirements of the 1974 ASME Code,Section XI, the facility ISI l
program and the Technical Specifications.
In addition, procedures l
UT-1, UT-3, UT-4, UT-6 and PT-1 were reviewed for technical adequacy.
l This included, but was not limited to, the parameters described below for the ultrasonic and liquid penetrant method.
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(1) Ultrasonic Examination a.
The type of apparatus including frequency range is specified.
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The extent of coverage, beam angles, scanning rate and directions are specified.
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Calibration requirements are specified and consistent with the applicable ASME Code.
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The reference level for monitoring discontinuities is defined and the scanning gain setting is specified and these values are consistent with the ASME Code.
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Levels or limits for evaluation and recording of indications are specified and are consistent with the ASME Code.
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Acceptance limits are consistent with the ASME Code,Section XI.
(2) Liquid Penetrant Examination a.
The penetrant, penetrant remover and developer are specified.
b.
Penetrant materials used for the examination of nickel based alloys and austenitic stainless steel are required to be i
analyzed for sulfur content and total halogens and the specified limits are consistent with the applicable ASME Code.
f c.
Methods for acceptable pre-examination surface preparation are specified and are consistent with the applicable ASME Code, d.
The examination surface temperature is specified and the
specified range is between 60 and 125 F, e.
The method of penetrant application and penetration time are specified and are consistent with the penetrant manufacturer's recortnendation, f.
Examination technique is specified and the time interval during which the " final interpretation" is made falls within 7 to 30 minutes after developer application.
No violations were observed.
c.
NDE Personnel and Equipment Certification Records The inspector reviewed the qualification and certification records of several NDE personnel performing examinations during the 1981 - 1982 refueling outage. This review included records of all three levels of examiners and was done to ascertain that the records properly reflected the person certified, the activity qualified to perfonn, the level of
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certification, the signature and level of certifying individual, the basis for certification, and the results of the annual visual acuity and color vision examinations.
In addition, the inspector reviewed the calibration and certification records for the ultrasonic aquipment and liquid penetrant materials to verify that the equipment was calibrated and that the quantities of sulfur and halogens contained in the penetrant materials were below the specified limits.
No violations were observed.
d.
Observation of NDE in Progress The inspector observed the liquid penetrant examination of the following welds in the Residual Heat Removal System to ascertain compliance with the applicable requirements of the ASME Code,Section XI and the implementing NDE procedures:
Weld #8-10-515, Pipe to Elbow Weld
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Weld #8-10-516, Pipe to Elbow Weld
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The examination was done by personnel certified to Level II in the liquid penetrant method using the color contrast, solvent removable method in accordance with Ebasco procedure JAF-PT-1, Revision 3.
No violations were observed.
9.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings.
On January 29, 1982, the inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are described in this report.
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