IR 05000333/1980001
| ML19323G288 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 03/04/1980 |
| From: | Kister H, Stetka T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19323G273 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-80-01, 50-333-80-1, NUDOCS 8006020092 | |
| Download: ML19323G288 (13) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-333/80-01
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Docket No. 50-333 Licen.se No. DPR-59 Priority
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Category C
Licensee:
Power Authority of the State of New York 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 Facility Name:
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Inspection at:
Scriba, New York Inspection conducted:
February 4-8 and 15,1980 j
Inspector R
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T. 'F. Stetka", Reactor Inspector
'datie signed a
date signed dat si ned Approved by:
3 M SO H. B. b rter7 Chief, Reactor Projec',s dite signed
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Section No. 4, RO&NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on February 4-8,15,1980 (Report No. 50-333/80-01)
Areas Inspected _:
Routine, unannounced inspection of plant operations, Licensee Event Reports (LERs), IE Bulletin responses, licensee action on IE Circulars, and licensee action on prevlous inspection findings.
This report also documents in-office review of LERs and the 197710 CFR 50.59 J
Report. The inspection involved 48-hours onsite by one region based inspector.
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Resul ts: Two items of noncompliance were identified (Infraction -
Failure to comply with Technical Specifications prior to making a control rod inoperable; Deficiency - Uncontrolled release of liquid with pH outside of Technical Specification required range).
Region I Form 12 (Rev.' April 77)
8006020 @ h
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted R. Baker, Maintenance Superintendent N. Brasee, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer
- R. Burns, Radiation and Environmental Services Superintendent
- V. Childs, Assistant to the Resident Manager
- R. Converse, Operations Superintendent
- M. Cosgrove, QA Site Engineer
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W. Fernandez, Assistant to the Maintenance Superintendent
- J. Hoddy, Plant Reliability and Performance Supervisor
- H. Keith, I&C Superintendent
- J. Leonard, Resident Manager E. Mulcahey, Radiation Protection and Radio-Chemistry Supervisor
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C. Orogvany, Reactor Analyst Supervisor
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- R. Pasternak, Superintendent of Power Other personnel contacted included office, operations, engineering and health physics personnel.
- Present at the February 8,1980 exit interview
- Present at the February 15, 1980 exit interview
- Present at both exit interviews 2.
Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Items (Closed) Unresolved Item (333/79-17-04):
Review of CMFLPD limits on computer printouts indicate that the licensee's administrative limit has been effective and no Technical Specification (TS) limit has been exceeded.
In addition, the licensee has revised Reactor
Analyst Procedure 7.3.23, Core Performance Daily Surveillance, to include a limit on the data sheet that will alert operators if the TS limits are being approached.
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(0 pen) Unresolved Item (333/78-08-02):
The licensee has decided that a circuit modification to the 39KW heater control circuit is required and is designing a new circuit.
The status of this new design will be reviewed on subsequent inspections.
(Closed) Noncompliance (333/78-19-02): This issue has been reviewed by the liccnsee and discussed with NRC R0:I management. As a result of these discussions, Plant Standing Order No. 20 entitled
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Technical Specification Compliance was issued.
(Closed) Noncompliance (333/78-17-11):
Review of licensee controls for personnel and tool monitoring during subsequent inspections indicata that these controls appear to be effective.
(Closad) Unresolved Item (333/77-34-03):
The modification proposed by G. E. SIL 186 was installed and tested by June 27, 1979.
(C16 sed) Unresolved Item (333/77-34-01):
Procedure 7.1.9, Shutdown Margin Check, was revised as revision 2 in May 1979 to include the correct sign for the Temperature Defect Compensation and a note to verify that the sign for the vendor supplied moderator temperature coefficient is correct.
3.
Review of Plant Operations The inspector reviewed selected facility operation logs and records and toured areas of the facility to assure that operations were in accordance with the Technical Specifications (TS). At the beginning of this inspection on February 4, the facility was operating at near full power.
a.
Plant Operations During the Inspection Period On January 30, 1980, the licensee had reported to the NRC
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Regional Office, an increased unidentified leak rate in the primary contairment (Drywell) and a failure of the drywell floor sump pump inboard isolation valve (20-MOV-83). The unidentified drywell leakage was 3-4 gallons per minute (gpm)
(TS limit for operations is 5 gpm) at that time and is the source of water for the drywell floor sump.
The failure of primary containment isolation valve 20-M0V-83, prevented the licensee from pumping the sump since the TS requires another valve in the containment penetration piping path to be shut and maintained shut.
In this case, since 20-M0V-83 was failed in the open position, the outboard isolation valve was required
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to be shu.
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These problems were discussed with the onsite inspector and NRC management and on February 4, the licensee commenced a plant shutdown. The plant was in the cold shutdown condition by 2005 hours0.0232 days <br />0.557 hours <br />0.00332 weeks <br />7.629025e-4 months <br /> on February 5.
During this outage, the licensee repaired the failed valve and repaired the valve packing and gasket leaks that were prov'iding
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the unidentified drywell leakage.
The facility commenced startup on February 8, and was in the process of plant heatup for return to full power operations.
The onsite inspector witnessed the facility shutdown, the performance of the various maintenance items worked by the licensee and the facility s tartup.
On February 11, 1980 a plant trip occurred due to personnel error.
The inspector arrived onsite on February 15 and re-viewed the events leading to this plant trip.
The licensee was " marking up" the turbine building closed loop cooling (TBCLC) pump ( non-safety pump) for n.aintenance. An auxiliary operator attempted to remove a fuse for the TBCLC pump but inadvertently removed the wrong fuse which caused a non-safety power bus (10300) to trip.
The tripping of the 10300 bus caused the "A" Recirculation Pump to trip due to a loss of the oil pump. The "B" Recirculation Pump was then manually tripped by the operators. The loss of the recirculation pumps caused a system transient resulting in a high level in the main turbine moisture separator which caused a main turbine trip and finally a reactor trip.
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To prevent this event from recurring, the licensee has in-stalled a warning label on the fuses causing the event.
In addition, the licensee is reviewing system circuits to determine if there are any additional fuses that could cause similar events and are vulnerable to personnel error due to location in design. A permanent design change will be made following completion of this review.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action and discussed the proposed design changes with licensee representatives.
This item will be reviewed on subsequent inspection and is considered unresolved (333/80-01-01).
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l As of February 15, the plant had recovered from the February 11, trip and was operating at approximately 60 percent of full power.
b.
Shift Logs and Operating Records The inspector reviewed the following records:
(1) Operations Department Night Orders for the period January 1,1980 through February 5,1980.
(2) Station Shift Supervisor's Log for the period December 20, 1979 through February 5,1980 and Febr lary 8,1980 through February 15, 1980.
(?,) Control Room Operator's Log for the period January 30, 1980 through February 15, 1980.
(4) Chemistry Logs for the period December 18, 1979 through February 15, 1980.
(5) Daily Surveillance Sheets (F-ST-40D) for the period February 10, 1980 through February 16, 1980.
(6)
Periodic Core Performance Log (P-1) for February 4,1980.
The review consisted of verifying adequate management review, correct identification of problem areas, completeness, and determination that conditions contrary to the Technical Specifications did not exist.
No inadequacies were identified.
c.
Tour of Accessible Areas Facility tours were conducted of the following areas:
All levels of the reactor building;
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Turbine building;
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i Control room;
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Diesel generator rooms;
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Switchgear/ Relay room;
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Primary Containment Drywell;
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Pump house screenwell;
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Radwaste building; and,
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Station Battery rooms
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During these tours the following observations were made:
(1) Monitoring Instrumentation. The following instrumentation was observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO):
Reactor Vessel Level and Pressure;
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Reactor Power Level;
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Control Rod Position;
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Equipment Operating Status;
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Area Radiation and Stack Gas Monitors;
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Suppression Chamber (Torus) Water Temperature and
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Level Process Computer Core Operating Parameters;
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Suppression Chamber (Torus) to Drywell Differential
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Pressure Reactor Cooldown and Heatup Rates;
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Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Lineups;
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Reactor Water Conductivity;
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Standby Liquid Control System Tank Temperature;
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Jet Pump Flows; and
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Recirculation Pump Flows
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(2) Annunciator Alarms.
The inspector observed various alann conditions received and acknowledged by the Control Room Operator on duty.
These conditions were discussed with the operator who was knowledgeable of the alarms and the actions required by these alarms.
Some continuous alanns were identified and the reasons for these were known to operating personnel.
(3) Shif t Staffing. The inspector verified by spot checks that the operating shift met Section 6 of the Technical Specification with regard to numbers and licenses.
(4)
Radiation Areas.
Radiation control zones were observed to verify proper identification and implementation.
These observations included review of step-off pad conditions, disposal of anti-contamination clothing and area posting.
The inspector also observed personnel activity at the radiation check point during a shift change to verify the effectiveness of the licensee's controls.
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During the facility tour of February 15, the inspector observed two in:;tances of self-monitor qualified contractor personnel in designated high radiation areas without a dose rate instrument.
The licensee's Radiological Protection procedures require that self-monitor qualified personnel carry and use the dose rate instrument when entering an area.
The inspector questioned these personnel with respect to use of the dose rate instrument. One individual stated that he
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had been in the area one hour previously and knew the dose rate was below that required for self-monitoring, even though
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it was a posted high radiation area.
The other individual
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stated that he had been in the area yesterday and also knew the dose rate was below that required for self monitoring.
Both individuals were not clear on their responsiblity to carry a dose rate instrument with them each time they enter a high radiation are.
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The inspector requested and obtained surveys of these two areas and determined that they were not high radiation areas.
The licensee took immediate corrective action by down grading both individuals from the self-monitor status and issued a memorandum to all existing self-monitor qualified personnel reminding them of their requirements and responsibilities. The effectiveness of the licensee's action will be observed during subsequent inspections.
This item is unresolved (333/80-01-02).
(5)
Plant Housekeeping and Conditions. Storage of material and components was observed with respect to safety and fire hazards. The licensee is repairing or replacing pipe hangers as required by their Architect-Engineer (A-E) analysis. Additionally, anchor bolts are being inspected and replaced in connection with IE Bulletin 79-02.
Because of the aforementioned work, many areas require cleaning. The inspector also noted excessive oil around the condensate booster pumps and recirculation pump motor-generator sets. These fiadings were discussed with licensee personnel.
The status of these areas will be examined during subsequent inspections.
(6)
Fluid _and Steam Leaks.
During one of the facility tours, the inspector noted an apparent steam leak ~on the second stage steam reheat system of the main turbine.
Discussions with licensee representatives indicate that the leaks are from the packing of the second stage steam reheat low load valves (RS-LL-V1 and RS-LL-V2) which, due to the plant's present operating level of about 60 percent full power, are carrying the reheat steam load.
When the plant increases to full power the high load reheat steam valves will open and the low load valves will backseat thus stopping the steam leak.
The inspector questioned whether the high load valves still had leakage problems (Reference NRC R:I report 50-333/79-17, paragraph 3.b(6)).
The licensee representative stated that these valves had been repaired during the recent plant outage. The licensee is planning to replace these valves during the upcoming refueling outage.
This condition will be examined during subsequent inspection.
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A water leak has developed on the non-safety related 20 inch suction line of the "B" condensate booster pump through an approximately 5 inch axi.1 crack in the line.
The crack, which is adjacent to a - +'d pump support, is believed to be caused by flow indu.u.i vibration.
The licensee has taken temporary corrective action by removing the permanent pipe support, installing a temporary support, and installing a clamp around the pipe to prevent crack propagation. At present the crack does not appear to be propagating and the leak is a slow drip.
The inspector examined the licensee's temporary repair and the pipe crack and will monitor this condition during subsequent inspections.
(7) Piping Vibration.
No excessive piping vibration was noted.
(8)
Pipe Hangers / Seismic Restraints.
Several pipe hangers and seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety related systems were observed.
The licensee is presently re-analyzing remaining pipe supports in areas accessible during normal plant operation and making repairs as necessary to those supports that are found to be inoperable as required by the order lifting the suspension of facility operation issued on August 14, 1979.
(9)
Fire Protection.
Fire extinguishers and fire fighting equipment were observed to be unobstructed and recently inspected for operability.
No evidence of smoking was observed in designated "No Smoking" areas.
The inspector had no further questions on the existing status of the above items.
4.
Review of Licensee Event Reports a.
The inspector reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) to verify that:
The reports accurately described the events;
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The safety significance is as reported;
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The report is accurate as to cause;
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The report satisfies requirements with respect to infortation
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provided and timing of submittal; Corrective action is appropriate;
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Action has been taken; and,
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The event ;as reviewed and evaluated by the Plant Operations
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Review Committee (PORC).
LERs 79-99,79-100, 79-102,79-104, 79-106,79-107, 79-108,79-110, 79-112,79-113, 79-115,79-116, and 80-02 were reviewed.
This review identified the following items.
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LER 79-99 reported that control rod 18-35 was intentionally made inoperable (i.e., incapable of movement with drive or a
scram pressure) to allow isolation of the hydraulic control unit (HCU) for repair of a leaking access plug.
The control rod was partially inserted (75 percent) at position 12 when it I
was made inoperable.
The Technical Specif' ations (TS) requires that the licensee either fully insert the control rod or verify adequate shutdown margin with the control rod in its partially inserted position prior to making the control rod inoperable.
The inspector's review of this event indicated that the control rod was not fully inserted nor was a shutdown margin test /analyEis performed prior to making the control rod inoperable.
This is an item of noncompliance (333/80-01-03).
c.
LER 79-106 reported an apparent failure of the 10 percent valve closure scram switch on Main Steam Isolation Valve
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(MSIV) 29-A0V-80A Subsequent testing of this switch could not identify the cause of the failure and the switch is now operational.
The work request written to investigate this switch is being held open. This item will be reviewed on subsequent inspections and is unresolved (333/80-01-04).
d.
LER 79-115 reported the loss of the stack gas radiation monitor system due to a plugged sample line. The licensee has been unable to determine the cause of the sample line plugging.
The line will be examined during the upcoming refueling outage
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and a possible modification made.
This item is unresolved
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(333/80-01-05).
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e.
LER 80-02 reported an uncontrolled release of regeneration waste water with a pH value outside the limits of the Environmental Technical Specifications (ETS). The release was caused by the failure of the waste neutralizer tank discharge valve to close and the release continued for the period from December 19, 1979 to January 2,1980. The inspector discussed this event with licensee representatives to determine how the valve failure could continue for such a long time period.
These discussions and the inspector's review of the licensee's procedures indicate that a routine valve lineup check or
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monitoring of neutralizer tank levels during dumping to this tank are not performed.
The uncontrolled release of waste water with a pH valve outside th'e limits of the ETS is an item of noncompliance.
(333/80-01-06).
5.
Closeout of IE Bulletins and Circulars a.
Site documents related to the following IE Bulletins were reviewed to verify the licensee's responses were timely, accurate and adequate.
(1)
IEB 79-09, Failures of GE Type AK-2 Circuit Breakers in Safety Related Systems (2)
IEB 79-11, Faulty Overcurrent Trip Device in Circuit Breakers for Engineered Safety Systems
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(3)
IEB 79-12, Short Period Scrams at BWR Facilities (4)
IEB 79-15, Deep Draft Pump Deficiencies The licensee, in their response to this Bulletin, stated they do not have the pumps identified in the Bulletin.
The inspector verified the licensee's response by examining their pumps.
This issue is still being reviewed by an NRC Task Force and, until this review is completed, this Bulletin will remain open.
(S)
IEB 79-18, Audibility Problems Encountered on Evacuation of Personnel from High-Noise Areas.
No inadequacies were identified.
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b.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's action with respect to the following Circulars to determine if the licensee had received them and had taken appropriate action.
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IEC 78-04, Installation Error that Could Prevent Closing of fire Doors (2)
IEC 78-11, Recirculation M-G Set Overspeed Stops (3)
IEC 78-12, HPCI Turbine Control Valve Lif t Rod Bending (4)
IEC 78-13, Inoperability of Multiple Service Water Pumps (5)
IEC 78-14, HPCI Turbine 9eversing Chamber Hold Down Bol ting (6)
IEC 78-15, Tilting Disk Check Valves Fail to Close With Gravity in Vertical Position (7)
IEC 79-07, Unexpected Speed Increase of Reactor Recircu-lation MG Set Resulted in Reactor Power Increase (8)
IEC 79-08, Attempted Extortion-Low Enriched Uranium
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IEC 79-09, Occurrences of Split or Punctured Regulator l
Diaphragms In Certain Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (10) IEC 79-10, Pipefittings Manufactured From Unacceptable Material (11) IEC 79-12, Potential Diesel Generator Turbocharger Problem Review of the licensee's actions indicate that Item 1 of the recommended actions has been completed by a temporary revision to operating procedure F-0P-22.
Items 2 through 4 must still be reviewed by the licensee.
This circular will remain open pending completion of the licensee's review / action.
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(12) IEC 79-13, Replacement of Diesel Fire Pump Starting Contactors (13) IEC 79-18, Proper Installation of Target Rock Safety-Relief Valves (14) IEC 79-19, Loose Locking Devices on Ingersol Rand Pumps (15) IEC 79-20, Failure of GTE Sylvania Relay, Type PM Bulletin 7305, Catalog SUIZ-ll-AC with a 120V AC Coil Except for the open items with respect to IEC 79-12, no other inadequacies were identified.
6.
NRC In-Office Review
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NRC:RI in-office review of the following LERs has been completed with no unacceptable conditions identified:
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79-98 79-109 i
79-101 79-111 79-105 79-114 79-117 b.
NRC:RI in-office review of the 197710 CFR 50.59 report concerning plant modifications, has been completed with no unacceptable conditions identified.
7.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are those items for which further information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or items of noncompliance.
Unresolved items are contained in Paragraphs 3 and 4 of this report.
8.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on February 8,1980 and February 15, 1980 and summarized the scope and findings of the
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inspection as they are detailed in this report.
During these meetings, the unresolved items and items of noncompliance were identified.
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