IR 05000333/1979014
| ML19260D851 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1979 |
| From: | Baunack W, Mccabe E, Stetka T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19260D834 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-79-14, NUDOCS 8002120506 | |
| Download: ML19260D851 (11) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION / OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION I
Report No.
50-333/79-14 Docket No.
50-333 License No.
DPR-59 Priority Category C -- Licensee: Power Authority of the State of New York 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 Facility Name: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At: Scriba, New York and New York, New York Inspection Conducted: September 10-20, 1979 Inspectors: [[ du.e ,e/Sc/79 z-T.F.Stety,.Keact6rInspector(9/10-20) date . ww / ol3a)*)9 W. H. Baunack, Reactor Inspector (9/10-13) ' date - 0 8/ 19 0. Kehoe, Reactor Inspector (9/10-20) edate [d /
2 -- T. A. Rebelo ski, Reactor Inspector (9/17-18) I d te Approved b : ' [O cf/
- E. C. McCab M r.,
Chief, Reactor Projects / dage ' Section No. 2, RO&NS Branch Inspection Summary: Inspection on September 10-20, 1979 (Report No. 50-333/79-14) Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of: valve / breaker / switch lineups completed for the recent plant startup as required by IE Bulletin 79-08; personnel qualifications; action on IE Information Notice 79-20; Licensee Event Reports (LER's); Safety Review Committee (SRC) activities; and, licensee action on previous inspection items.
Plant tours were conducted.
The inspection involved 112 hours onsite by 3 region-based inspectors and 45 hours at the corporate offices by 2 region-based inspectors and the resident inspector for the Indian Point facility.
The report also documented NRC:RI in office review of LER's and monthly operating reports.
Results: Two items of noncompliance were identified (Infraction - inadequate valvelineupproceduresresultinginincompletevalvelineups; Infraction % - failure to properly lock a locked valve).
g4g SO [ 1 20 Region I Form 167 8002 (August 1979) ,
. DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
The following technicc1 and supervisory level site personnel were contacted: E. Abbott, Operations Superintendent
- R. Baker, Maintenance Superintendent
- R. Converse, Assistant Operations Superintendent
- M. Cosgrove, QA Site Engineer
- W. Fernandez, Assistant to Maintenance Superintendent H. Keith, Assistant to I&C Superintendent
- J. Leonard, Resident Manager
- R. Liseno, Assistant Plant Engineer (Systems)
L. Milesi, Security and Safety Supervisor
- R. Paternack, Superintendent of Power D. Tall, Training Coordinator V. Walz, Electrical Maintenance Engineer Other personnel contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, and health physics personnel.
- Present at the September 14, 1979 exit interview.
b.
The following technical and supervisary level corporate offir.e personnel were contacted:
- J. Bayne, Resident Manager, Indian Point Unit 3 G. Berry, President and Chief Executive Officer
- J. Boston, Executive Vice President and Director of Power Operations
- J. Davis, SRC Chairman
- A. Dower, QA Engineer, Indian Point Unit 3
- P. Early, Assistant Chief Engineer - Projects
- R. Goyette, Operations Engineer, Indian Point Unit 3
- J. Helland, Project Engineer, J. A. FitzPatrick
- A. Klausmann, Director of Quality Assurance
- J. Leonard, Residnet Manager, J. A. FitzPatrick
- R. Leopold, Contract Administrator
- P. Lyon, Manager - Nuclear Operations
- J. Lyons, Senior Attorney
- 0. Mallon, Principle Civil Engineer M. Maltese, Director of Security and Safety
- R. Rajaram, Project Engineer, J. A. FitzPatrick
- R. Schomer, Principle Nuclear Engineer - Projects
- W. Simpson, QA Project Engineer
- K. Sunder Raj, Project Engineer, Indian Point Unit 3
- G. Trevors, Director of Administration
- S. Whitt, Records Manager
- G. Wilverding, Licensing Supervisor
- }9k9
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Other personnel contacted included office personnel and file clerks.
- Present at the September 20, 1979 exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items (Closed) Unresolved Item (333/79-04-05): The licensee has submitted Revision 1 of LER 79-17 identifying the correct event date of March 20, 1979.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (333/79-09-08): Procedure F-ST-2C has been revised during PORC Meeting 79-39 on July 18, 1979, to specify an OP to use to return the system to a standby mode.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (333/79-09-09): Procedure F-ST-2S was revised (Revision 1 of July 18,1979) to specify an acceptable return to normal configuration.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (333/79-04-03): The licensee has issued a new procedure, F-E0P-32, Recovering From An Isolation, on June 21, 1979.
This procedure provides specific direction to assure that systems isolated as the result of an automatic isolation are returned to their normal configur-ation.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (333/79-04-04): The licensee has removed the incorrect file copies of procedure F-ST-400 and added page numbers, revision numbers, and dates to the data sheets.
The inspector examined the issued copies of F-ST-400 and verified that the file copies of this procedure are consistent with the master copies.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (333/79-04-09): The licensee has revised 0P-13, Residual Heat Removal; OP-14, Core Spray; and, OP-19, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling, to include a caution against overriding of these systems until it .2s been verified that their use is no longer required.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (333/79-09-03): The licensee has added a note to their Emergency Plan designating the Off Premise Extension Network Phone (Red Phone) as the telephone to use to notify the NRC in the event of an emergency.
(0 pen) Noncompliance (333/79-04-02): Review of PORC Meeting 79-50 minutes indicate that this issue has been reviewed by the PORC members.
During this meeting, the PORC re-reviewed the items covered in PORC Meeting 78-47 to verify that an adequate review was conducted.
The licensee must still address the actions to be taken to prevent recurrence of this event.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (333/79-01-02): The licensee has changed the method of rescheduling partially complete surveillance tests to assure that the computer scheduling is not upset when partial tests are performed.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (333/79-09-06): Procedure F-XSP-5-4 was revised (July 31, 1979, Revision 6) to delete reference to the Auxiliary Feedwater System.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (333/79-04-06): The BUNA-N component replacement was completed by the end of August, 1979.
The licensee still must provide a schedule for replacement of these components on a periodic basis.
This schedule is to be developed and implemented by December 31, 1979.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (333/79-09-11): WACP 10.1.1 was revised (Revision 2 of July 18,1979) to specify the correct Work Request / Event / Deficiency Form to use.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (333/79-09-10): The licensee has issued Maintenance Department Standing Order No. 3, Initiation of Preventive Maintenance, on July 6, 1979, requiring issuance of a Work Request / Event / Deficiency Form to perform preventive maintenance.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (333/79-09-07): The licensee has revised the procedures identified by the inspectors and has reviewec' and revised other applicable instrument surveillance tests.
The inspecto * review of these procedures and a sampling revi u of other instrument surveillance procedures indicates that the review has oeen effective.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (333/79-01-05): An analysis of battery capacity versus required capacity has oeen performed to verify that the battery capacity is more than sufficient to support system operability even with some individual cell degradation.
The licensee plans to replace all cells showing degradation during the upcoming refueling outage.
The licensee will also investigate additional testing methrds to improve battery life (e.g., more periodic deep discharges), and is reviewing this matter with the battery vendor.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (333/79-09-04): Revisim.. to system diagrams have not been completed.
About fifty percent of the drawings have been revised.
The licensee expects the drawing updates by October 29, 1979.
The licensee has completed the revisions to the valve / breaker / switch lineups.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (333/79-09-05): Instrument and plant valve labeling are still in progress.
All accessible instrument and safety related plant valves will be labeled by October 26, 1979.
Until these valves are labeled, independent verification of unmarked instrument valve positions will continue.
The lic see will complete labeling of all remaining accessible plant valves by December 31, 1979.
Inaccessible piant valves will be labeled during the next refueling outage scheduled for Spring,1980, or if the plant is shut down for 30 days or longer prior to the scheduled refueling outage.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (333/78-13-11): The inspector reviewed procedure APP 8000, Reporting Defects and Noncompliance Involving Nuclear Power Plants, and EDP 15.2, Reports to the NRC, discussed the handling of records 1949 331
pursuant to 10 CFR 21.51(b) with cognizant licensee representatives, and concluded that there is sufficient guidance to provide adequate handling of records.
3.
Review of Engineered Safety Features (ESF) a.
NRC Inspection 50-333/79-09, conducted on June 25-29, 1979, verified by independent examination of records and procedures that ESF are ope-rable.
This inspection verified, by observation, that the actual valve / breaker / switch positions that could affect initial system acci-dent response are in accordance with the lineups associated with the following procedures and, therefore, are correct for system operation: F-0P-1, Main Steam System, Revision 5; -- F-0P-5, Condensate Transfer System, Revision 2; -- F-0P-13, Residual Heat Removal System, Revision 4; -- F-0P-14, Core Spray System, Revision 2; -- F-0P-15, High Pressure Coolant Injection System, Revision 3; -- F-0P-17, Standby Liquid Control System, Revision 2; -- F-0P-19, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, Revision 3; -- F-0P-20, Standby Gas Treatment System, Revision 3; -- F-0P-21, Emergency Service Water System, Revision 0; -- -- F-0P-22, Diesel Generator Emargency Power, Revision 3; F-0P-27, Recirculation System, Revision 1; -- F-0P-40, Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling System, Revision -- 1; F-ST-40G, Locked Valve Surveillance, Revision 1; -- -- F-0P-43A, 125V D-C Power System, Revision 3; F-0P-43C, LPCI Independent Power Supply System, Revision 0; -- -- F-0P-46A, 4160V and 600V Normal A-C Power Distribution System, Revision 3; and, F-0P-51, Reactor Building Ventilation and Cooling System, -- Revision 1.
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.
During these position verifications, it was determined that three additional system lineups needed review.
The lineups, part of proce-dures F-0P-27, F-0P-43C, and F-0P-51, listed above, were checked against system drawings to verify that the lineups were correct prior to observing component positions in the field.
These reviews identified two items of noncompliance that are described in the following paragraphs.
b.
During a valve check on the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Core Spray (CS) systems on September 12, 1979, the inspector noted that the instru-ment root valves (the first valves off the process system piping) were not included on the valve lineup sheets.
When a cognizant licensee operations representative was quiered about the listing of these valves, he stated that these valves were controlled by the Instrument and Control (I&C) department in accordance with.their procedures.
Subsequent questioning of cognizant I&C representatives revealed that neither the I&C nor the operations department had included the instru-ment root valves on their valve lineups and that the valves had not been checked for positioning.
The inspector notified senior plant management of this discrepancy and expressed his concern that instru-ments required for safe plant operation may be isolated or otherwise inoperative.
Licensee representatives took immediate action to iden-tify all the valves involved, their required positions, and dispatched teams throughout the plant to verify actual valve positions.
Coincident with this licensee action, the inspector reviewed the licens-ee's instrument valve lineup procedure, F-ISP-73, During Refueling Prior to Startup Inst"ument Line Valve Check Off List, and the "Instru-ment Penetration Root Vs ve Lineup." This review identified that the Instrument Penetration h^3t Valve Lineup, which is being utilized by the licensee to position valves, was apparently not reviewed and approved by the Plant Operi.tions Review Committee (PORC).
NRC management was notified of these occurrences.
Immediate Action Letter (IAL) 79-15 was issued on September 13, 1979 to document the licensee's commitment to actions to be taken to correct these discre-pancies.
All instrument root valve positions were verified by September 13, 1979.
The PORC reviewed and approved the revised instrument valve lineups by 2330 hours on September 13.
The instrument valve verifi-cation exercise identified one nonsafety related instrument valve to be out of position.
The revised instrument valve lineup was issued by September 19, 1979.
Failure to provide adequate procedures for plant operation is contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, and is an item of noncompliance (333/79-14-01) The licensee's response . to IAL 79-15 will be considered the response to this item.
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c.
During the valve check on the CS system in accordance with procedure F-0P-14, torus suction lir.e drain valve CSP-716A was found to be closed but not locked closed as required by F-0P-14.
In addition, the valve was signed off on the mastar valve lineup sheet as being locked closed.
Failure to lock CSP-716A as required by F-0P-14 is contrary to Techni-cal Specifications 6.8(A) and is an item of noncompliance (333/79-14-02).
Since failure to control locked valves was identified previously (NRC Inspection 50-333/78-12), this is a repeat item of noncompliance.
4.
Tour of Accessible Areas Facility tours were conducted of the following areas: All levels of the reactor building; -- -- Turbine building; Control room; -- -- Diesel generator room; Relay room; -- -- East and West crescent rooms; and, -- Pump house screenwell.
During these tours the following observations were made: a.
Monitoring Instrumentation.
The following instrumentation was observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO): Reactor Vessel Level and Pressure; -- -- Reactor Power Level; Control Rod Position; -- Equipment Operating Status; -- Area Radiation and Stack Gas Monitors; -- Suppression Chamber (Torus) Water Temperature and Level; -- Process Computer Core Operating Parameters; and, -- Suppression Chamber (Torus) to Drywell Differential Pressure.
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b.
Annunciator Alarms.
The inspector observed various alarm conditions received and acknowledged by the Control Room Operator on duty.
These conditions were discussed with the operator who was knowledgeable of the alarms and the actions required by these alarms.
Some continuous alarms were identified and the reasons for these were known to operating personnel, c.
Shift Staffing.
The inspector verified by spot checks that the operating shif t met Section 6 of the Technical Specification with regard to numbers and licenses.
d.
Radiation Areas.
Radiation control zones were observed to verify proper identification and implementation.
These observations included review of step-off pad conditions, disposal of anti-contamination clothing and area posting.
No adverse conditions were identified.
e.
Plant Housekeeping Conditions.
Storage of material and components was observed with respect to safety and fire hazards.
The licensee is repairing or replacing pipe hangers as required by their Architect-Engineer (A-E) analyses and, therefore, many areas will require cleanup.
The licensee was in the process of cleaning the East and West crescent rooms.
Progress on housekeeping conditions will be examined on subse-quent inspections.
f.
Fluid Leaks.
No significant leaks were noted.
g.
Piping Vibration.
No excessive piping vibration was 'loted.
h.
Pipe Hangers / Seismic Restraints.- Several pipe hangers and seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety related systems were observed.
The licensee is presently re-analyzing remaining pipe supports in areas accessible during normal plant operation and making repairs as necessary to those supports that are found to be inoperable as required by the order lifting the suspension of facility operation issued on August 14, 1979.
i.
Fire Protection.
Fire extinguishers and fire fighting equipment were observed to be unobstructed and recently inspected for operability.
No evidence of smoking was observed in designated "No Smoking" areas.
The inspector had no further questions on the existing status of the above items.
5.
Review of Personnel Qualifications The licensee has appointed an individual to fill the position of Assistant to the Instrumentation and Control ^"perintendent and has designated another individual to fill the position of Operations Superintendent when the position is vacated by the present superintendent in the near future.
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The inspector reviewed the qualifications of these individuals to verify that their qualifications were consistent with the requirements of the facility Technical Specifications and ANSI 18.1.
No inadequacies were identified.
6.
Information Notice 79-20 The inspector quiered licensee representatives to determine whether licensed operators were aware of and had reviewed the information discussed in Information Notice 79-20, NRC Enforcement Policy-NRC Licensed Individuals.
These representatives stated that the operators had reviewed 79-20 and provided the inspector with sign-off sheets documenting this review.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
7.
Review of Licensee Event Reports The inspector reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) to verify that: a.
The reports accurately describe the events; -- The safety significance is as reported; -- The report is accurate as to cause; -- -- The report satisfies requirements with respect to information provided and timing of submittal; Corrective action is appropriate; -- Action has been taken; and, -- The event was reviewed and evaluated by the Plant Operations -- Review Committee (PORC).
LERs 79-27, 79-31, 79-36, 79-37, 79-40, 79-41, 79-42, and 79-46 were reviewed.
This review identified the following items.
b.
LER 79-40 reported a failure of an RHR pump discharge check valve.
Such failures have occurred before (LERs 78-12, 78-109, and 78-111).
The inspector quiered the licensee as to what actions are being taken to prevent these repeated failures.
A licensee representative stated that a study for a design modification is in progress to improve valve reliability.
This item will be reviewed on subsequent inspections and is unresolved (333/79-14-03).
c.
LER 79-42 reported failure of surveillance test F-ST-2R for the RHR service water pumps due to installation of orifices in the pump dis-charge lines combined with pump wear.
The licensee will issue a fol-lowup report to describe the results of further reviews of this issue 1949 D6
and planned permanent corrective actions.
This item is unresolved (333/79-14-04).
8.
Safety Review Committee (SRC) SRC meeting minutes for both scheduled and special meetings for the a.
period of March,1978, througn September,1979, were reviewed to verify the following: Membership, meeting frequency and quorum for each meeting was as -- required by the Technical Specifications (TS); The SRC review and audit responsibilities were consistent with -- those delineated in the Technical Specifications; and, SRC meetings were conducted with attendees having sufficient -- expertise in the fields reviewed to assure an adequate review was conducted.
As a result of this review, the following items were identified: b.
The SRC is required to audit the performance activities required by the Operational Quality Assurance Program and the Facility Security Plan at least once per 24 months.
The SRC must still review the Quality Assurance Audit performed on June 6-9, 1978, and the Security Plan Audit #261.
This item is unresolved pending review of these items by the SRC (333/79-14-05).
The SRC Charter requires a radiological engineer as a member of the c.
committee.
The radiological engineer assigned to the committee has resigned and a replacement has not yet been located.
Review of SRC activities dealing with radiological subjects indicates that the com-mittee has utilized consultants with sufficient expertise to perform adequate reviews in this area.
Filling of this vacancy will be exa-mined in subsequent inspections.
9.
NRC In Office Review NRC:RI in office review of the following LERs has been completed with a.
no unacceptable conditions identfied: 79-20 through 79-26 79-35 79-28 79-38 79-29 79-39 lqg 3}7 79-30 79-43 79-32 79-44
.
79-33 79-45 79-34 79-47 through 79-52 b.
NRC:RI in office review of Monthly Operating Reports for the months of April, May, June, July, and August, 1979, and of the 10 CFR 50.59 report concerning plant modifications, has been completed with no unacceptable conditions identified.
10.
Unresolved Items Uniesolved items are those items for which further information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or items of noncompliance.
Unre-solved items are contained in Paragraphs 7.b, 7.c, and 8.b of this report.
11.
Exit Interview . The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on September 14, 1979 and September 20, 1979, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report.
During these meetings, the unresolved items and items of noncompliance were identified.
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