IR 05000329/1980010
| ML19323J092 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Midland |
| Issue date: | 04/22/1980 |
| From: | Cook R, Knop R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19323J085 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-329-80-10, 50-330-80-10, NUDOCS 8006170763 | |
| Download: ML19323J092 (6) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report Nos. 50-329/80-10; 50-330/80-10 Docket Nos. 50-329; 50-330 License Nos. CPPR-81; CPPR-82 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 1945 West Parnall Road
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Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name: Midland Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Midland Site, Midland, MI
Inspection Conducted: February 1-29, 1980 Inspector:
R. J.
4 8r Ww
.t Approved by:
R. C. Knop, Chief
Projects Section No. 1 Inspection Summary Inspection on February 1-29, 1t380 (Report No. 50-329/80-10; 50-330/80-10 Areas Inspected: Assembly of Unit I reactor vessel internals, settlement of diesel generator foundations and structures and associated soil settle-ment, Class 1E battery rack seismic braces, failures of Unit I reactor vessel anchor bolts, 10 CFR Part 21 notifications associated with Ruskin fire dampers and American Warming and Ventilating milliampere hydramotor actuators, NDE associated with fabrication of the borated water storage tank, and peaceful anti-nuclear demonstration conducted at the Midland Site. This inspection effort involved a total of 72 inspector-hours by one NRC inspector.
Results: One item of noncompliance (deficiency, failure to sequentially proceed the Field Construction Procedure for trial fit-up of internal core support assembly as written) was identified in one area of the eight areas reviewed.
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Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company Personnel D. Miller, Site Manager T. Cooke, Project Superintendent
- J. Corley, QA Section Head, IE&TV
- B. Peck, Construction Supervisor B. Marguglio, Director, Quality Assurance W. Bird, Manager, Quality Assurance B. Keating, QA Group Supervisor R. Ostrowski, QA NDE Supervisor M. Shaeffer, Group Supervisor QAE M. BeWitt, QA I&C Mechanical H. Allen, QA Mechanical B. Martin, QA Mechanical
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Bechtel Power Corporation Personnel
- R. Shope, QC Supervisor
- W. Willman, QC Engineer Numerous other principal staff and personnel were contacted during the reporting period.
- Denotes those present during the exit interview conducted during the reporting period.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Open) Unresolved Item No. (329/80-08-01): This unresolved matter is escalated to an item of noncompliance as follows: B&W Quality Control Procedure No. 9-QPP-102, Field Construction Procedures, paragraph 2.2 states in part that, "Each sequence of a Field Construction Procedure shall be signed and dated by the supervisory personnel responsible for the work activity accomplished at a given sequence." B&W Field Con-struction Procedure No. 132, Trial Fit-Up of Internals Core Support Assembly makes reference to maintaining a 0.003 inch total levelness during core support assembly lifts in steps 260, 310, and 360 (which refers to steps 260 through 290 and 310). Procedure No. 132 as written making reference to the 0.003 inch total levelness requirements was being used during assembly of Unit I reactor vessel internals.
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was determined that the total level lift requirements of 0.003 inch as stated in the procedure being used (Field Construction Procedure No.
132) could not physically be maintained during core support assembly lifts when the reactor vessel alignment keys were engaged. Procedure sequential work continued for the fit-up of the core support assembly without formal relief from the 0.003 inch level lift requirements re-ferenced in the procedure being used. Response to Site Problem Report (SPR) No. 13-12-144-00,.which addresses the out of alignment condition, states that the 0.005 to 0.006 inch measured alignment was acceptable.
However, this was not reflected in the procedure being used. Consumere Power Company generated Nonconformance Report No. M-03-4-0-004 which addressed the inability of maintaining the 0.003 inch levelness require-ments referenced in step 230 of Field Construction Procedure No. 132 and were continuing through step 310 pending a written response to SPR No. 13-12-144-00.
Failure to comply with Quality Control Procedure No. 9-QPP-102, Field Construction Procedures, by sequentially proceeding through Field Con-struction Procedure No. 132, Trial Fit-Up of Internals Core Support Assembly, as written, when the requirements of preceding steps as written could not be met is considered an item of noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Critetion V.
This item of noncompliance is identified in Appendix A (329/80-10-01).
Reportable Deficiencies 50.55(e) Items Settlement of Diesel Generator Foundations and Structures (Open) Item No. (329/78-13-03; 330/78-13-03): On February 27 and 28, 1980, members of the NRC and consultants to the NRC met with members of the licensee and their consultants to discuss site soil settlement and to orientate the NRC consultants. Consultants retained by the NRC were representatives of U.S. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Navy Surface Weapons Center, and Energy Technology Engineering Center. Underpinning of valve pits at the auxiliary building, installation of pile supports at the surface water building, installation of permanent dewatering system, and settlemena of the diesel generator building were discussed during the meeting. The Resident Inspector attended selected portions of these meetings.
Class 1E Battery Racks, Seismic Braces During the report period, the Resident Inspector was informed that some of the Class IE battery racks had been modified to limit horizontal momentum during a seismic event. However, plans are in the offing to change the mounting of the Class 1E battery racks. This may necessitate further seismic analysis and perhaps modifications to the racks.
Failure of Reactor Vessel Anchor Bolts-3-
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-During the reporting period, Regional Base Inspectors performed as special inspection at the Midland Site to review the causes associated with Unit I reactor vessel anchor bolt failures. While this inspection was in process, another bolt was discovered broken. This bolt wzz on the outer periphery of the Unit I vessel skirt and in close proximity to the necond failed bolt discovered in December 1979. During the special-inspections pertaining to the failed bolts, the NRC determined from their review that an investigation was necessary te determine the root.causes for the use of bolting with questionable mechanical proper-
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ties. A portion of this investigation was conducted at the site during the reporting period. The results of these inspections / investigations will be documented in separate NRC Inspection Reports.
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The licensee has decided to detension the reactor vessel holddown bolts in Unit 1.
Procedures are being developed to control this process.
Because of the large potential energy exhibited by the tension' bolts, a significant portion of the procedures pertains to personnel safety and protection in an attempt to preclude any injuries.
Functional or Program Areas Inspected 1.
Ruskin Fire Dampers-10 CFR Part 21 During the reporting period the Resident Inspector was informed by the Regional Office that Ruskin Manufacturira Co. had issued a 10
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CFR Part 21 notification to the NRC on January 21, 1980. This Part 21 notification applied to negator type closure springs slipping from a spring holding bracket which is used in vertical NIBD23 Fire Dampers manufactured after June 1979. The Zack Co. has responsibility for installation of HVAC equipment at the Midland Site under subcontract to the Bechtel Power Corp. A portion of this work entailed installing 113 Ruskin Fire Dampers of the type
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referenced in the Part 21 notification.
The Resident Inspector inquired of the licensee the issuance of a 10 CFR 50.55(e) reportable deficiency had been considered in this matter. The licensee and Zack Co. personnel on site did not appear to have any prior knowledge of the Ruskin Manufacturing Co.
Part 21 notification to the NRC and recipients of questionable fire dampers.
Additional review revealed that Bechtel Power Corp.
Gaithersburg Power Division had knowledge of the defective fire dampers and had notified the San Fransisco office who ultimately had notified the Bechtel Ann Arbor office. The Bechtel Ann Arbor office was in the process of generating a Quality Action Request for the Midland Site to address this item. Bechtel Power Corp. Quality Assurance Pro-cedures require that a Management Corrective Action Report be gen-erated for all 50.55(e) reportable items which occurred in the Bechtel system for dissemination throughout the Bechtel system.
The licensee is in the prccess of identifying and locating the-4-
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Ruskin NIBD23 Fire Dampers so that an evaluation can be made to determine whether this item is reportable under the provision of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
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American Warming and Ventilating,Inc.
Milliampere Hydramotor Actuators - 10 CFR Part 21 During the reporting period the Resident Inspector was informed by the Regional Office that American Warming and Ventilating, Inc. had informed the Bechtel Corp. that ITT Grinnel Controls had submitted a Part 21 notification to the NRC pertaining to springs of an in-correct material being supplied for mil 11 ampere hydramotor actuators.
Ultimately, this incorrect material results in reduced output force which can prevent HVAC control dampers supplied by American Warming and Ventilating, Inc. from fully reaching their failure load posi-tion. An analysis has been performed for each of the " questionable" control dampers to determine the imr*ct on plant safety. The re-sults of this analysis has revealed that the inability of the
" questionable" HVAC control dampers to fully reach the full position does not adversely effect the safety of operations of the plant and is therefore not reportable under the provision of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
3.
NDE-Borated Water Storage Tanks During the reporting period the Resident Inspector became aware that the radiographs for the borated water storage tanks had shown enigmatic linear indications with a mottled appearance. Pacause of the nature of these linear indications and because the NRC had re-ceived allegations pertaining to questionable construction prac-tices during fabrication of the borated water storage tanks, an investigation into these matters was initiated. The investigation occurred in the next reporting period and included a Regional Based Investigator and a Technical Construction Branch Inspector with copious experience in NDE. The results of this investigation are documented in a separate NRC Inspection Report.
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Peaceful Demonstration at the Midland Site On February 23, 1980 a peaceful anti-nuclear demonstration was con-ducted at the Midland Site. The demonstration was organized by the Huron Alliance and involved an estimated 100 to 125 persons. The protest was staged to demonstrate that anti-nuclear commitments are not " seasonal" and run strong during the " coldest time of the year".
The Resident Inspector was on site during this demonstration to ob-serve the protestors and licensee.
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Exit Interview The Resident Inspector attended the Exit Interviews conducted by T. Vandel and K. Naidu, Region III Reactor Inspectors on February 5 and 28, 1980 respectively. The Resident Inspector attended a site departure meeting (the investigation was not completed) conducted by J. Foster and C. Erb on February 29, 1980.
The Resident Inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted under Persons Contacted) on February 22, 1980. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection effort to date. The licensee acknowledged the findings reported herein.
Attachment: Preliminary Inspection Findings-6-
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