IR 05000272/2003004
| ML031320802 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 05/12/2003 |
| From: | Ray Lorson Division of Nuclear Materials Safety I |
| To: | Richard Anderson Public Service Enterprise Group |
| References | |
| IR-03-004 | |
| Download: ML031320802 (17) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-272/03-004, 50-311/03-004
Dear Mr. Anderson:
On March 28, 2003, the NRC completed a team inspection at the Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactor facilities. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on March 28, 2003 with Mr. OConnor, Mr. Carlin, Mr. Garchow and other members of your staff.
This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observation of activities, and interviews with personnel.
On the basis of the samples selected for review, the team concluded that in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated and corrected. However, the findings identified by this team supported the conclusion in the Annual Assessment Letter (NRC Inspection Report 50-272, 311/2003-01) of the existence of a substantive cross cutting issue in the problem identification and resolution area. The team identified one Green finding, with two examples, concerning the failure to promptly correct conditions adverse to quality. Specifically, PSEG failed to implement corrective actions for deficiencies associated with the protection of wires inside of control room cabinets from an over-current condition and a component cooling water system pipe support.
These findings were determined to be violations of NRC requirements. However, because of their very low safety significance and because they were entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these findings as non-cited violations, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. If you deny these non-cited violations, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the U. S. Nuclear Regulator Commission, ATTN. Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulator Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Salem Facility.
Mr. Roy Anderson 2 Several examples of minor violations were identified involving conditions adverse to quality that were not entered into the corrective action program. Additionally, examples were identified of narrowly focused problem evaluations and corrective actions that were either ineffective or not performed.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Raymond K. Lorson, Chief Performance Evaluation Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-272, 50-311 License Nos. DPR-70, DPR-75
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 50-272/03-004, 50-311/03-004 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION I==
Docket Nos: 50-272, 50-311 License Nos: DPR-70, DPR-75 Report No: 50-272/03-004, 50-311/03-004 Licensee: PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG)
Facility: Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 and 2 Location: P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Dates: March 10-14 and March 24-28, 2003 Inspectors: Randall A. Musser, Senior Resident Inspector (Team Leader)
Christopher Cahill, Senior Reactor Inspector Thomas Hipschman, Reactor Inspector George Morris, Reactor Inspector Approved by: Raymond K. Lorson, Chief Performance Evaluation Branch Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000272/2003-004, IR 05000311/2003-004; 3/10 - 3/14 and 3/24 - 3/28/03; Salem Units 1 and 2; biennial baseline inspection of the identification and resolution of problems; problem identification and resolution.
This inspection was conducted by three regional inspectors and a senior resident inspector from another site. The inspection identified one Green finding which was a non-cited violation.
The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
Identification and Resolution of Problems The team determined that PSEG was generally effective at identifying discrepant conditions and entering them into the corrective action system. However, the findings identified by this team supported the conclusion in the Annual Assessment Letter (NRC Inspection Report 50-272, 311/2003-01) of the existence of a substantive cross cutting issue in the area of problem identification and resolution. The team identified four examples where conditions adverse to quality were not entered into the corrective action system. The team determined that PSEG was generally effective at classifying and performing operability evaluations for discrepant conditions, however, some examples were noted where problem evaluations did not contain sufficient detail to support the conclusions. The team identified a finding with two examples where PSEG failed to correct conditions adverse to quality. The team noted that PSEG performed a root cause evaluation to identify areas to improve the corrective action program.
The team was not able to assess the effectiveness of this effort since the corrective actions had not been completed. On the basis of interviews conducted during the inspection, workers at the site felt free to input safety findings into the corrective action program.
A. NRC Identified and Self-Revealing Findings Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems Green. The team identified a non-cited violation involving two examples where PSEG failed to correct conditions adverse to quality as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions. Specifically, PSEG failed to evaluate and correct an adverse condition involving the protection of wires located inside of control room panels from an over-current condition, and also failed to correct an adverse condition involving a degraded component cooling water system pipe support. These findings were evaluated using the Phase 1 worksheet of the significance determination process and found to be of very low significance (Green) since they did not result in the actual loss of a mitigating system (Section 4OA2c).
ii
Report Details 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution a. Effectiveness of Problem Identification (1) Inspection Scope The team reviewed PSEGs corrective action program and noted that problems were formally identified through the initiation of notifications (NOTFs). Team members attended the daily review and management meetings, where NOTFs were reviewed for screening and assignment, and also attended corrective action review board (CARB)
meetings to understand the threshold for identifying problems and to assess management involvement with the corrective action process.
The team reviewed selected NOTFs to determine whether PSEG was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and entering problems into the corrective action process.
The team reviewed NOTFs initiated subsequent to the last NRC problem identification inspection that was completed in March 2001. The team selected NOTFs to cover the seven cornerstones of safety identified in the NRC Reactor Oversight Process (ROP).
In addition, the team considered risk insights from the individual plant examination (IPE)
report and the probabilistic risk assessment to focus the NOTF sample selection and system walkdowns on risk significant components. Attachment 1 lists the NOTFs selected for review.
The team also interviewed selected plant staff to determine whether other processes were used to address problems. The team conducted walkdowns of control room panels and selected plant equipment to independently assess whether problems were being adequately identified and addressed.
The team selected items from PSEGs maintenance, operations, engineering, and oversight processes to verify that PSEG appropriately considered problems identified in these processes for entry into the corrective action program. Specifically, the team reviewed a sample of control room deficiency and operator work-around lists, maintenance orders, operability determinations, engineering system health reports, quality assessment reports, and departmental self-assessments. The team reviewed issues identified in these documents to ensure that underlying problems associated with each issue were appropriately evaluated and resolved.
(2) Findings and Observations The team determined that PSEG was generally effective at identifying discrepant conditions and initiating NOTFs where appropriate. Notwithstanding, the team identified four examples where PSEG failed to identify conditions adverse to quality and enter them into the corrective action program. These examples involved: the failure to identify that the 2B battery rack end rail had been improperly installed (notification 20135334); the failure to identify that the alarm response procedure had not been correctly implemented for an elevated service water pressure condition (notifications
20135358 and 20135360); the failure to identify that an improper tank calibration curve was included in a chemistry procedure, and the failure to formally identify the use of an improper analytical laboratory standard (notification 20135531). These problem identification deficiencies were not considered findings since they did not affect the operability of the associated mitigating systems.
b. Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues (1) Inspection Scope The team reviewed the NOTFs listed in Attachment 1 to determine whether PSEG adequately evaluated and prioritized problems. The review included the appropriateness of the assigned significance, the timeliness of resolutions, and the scope and depth of the root cause analyses. The NOTFs reviewed encompassed the full range of PSEG evaluations, including root and apparent cause evaluations. The team selected the NOTFs to cover the seven cornerstones of safety identified in the NRC revised oversight program (ROP). The team also considered risk insights from PSEGs probabilistic risk assessment to help focus the NOTF sample. Additionally, the team attended the work integration and management meetings to observe the review process and to understand the basis for assigned significance levels (i.e., Category I, II, or III).
The team also selected a sample of NOTFs associated with previous NRC NCVs to determine whether PSEG evaluated and resolved problems associated with compliance to applicable regulatory requirements. The team reviewed PSEGs evaluation of industry operating experience (OE) information for applicability to their facility. The team also reviewed PSEGs assessment of equipment operability, reportability requirements, and the potential extent of the problem.
The team reviewed PSEGs response to two items identified by the team where PSEG failed to document the basis for their operability determinations for identified problems.
The first example was a recurring problem with 4 kV undervoltage relays associated with the service water (SW) accumulator control circuits. The second example was a recurring problem with ground water leaking through the 4 kV switchgear room wall and wetting the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) cooling fan backup circuit breaker panels and panel supports.
The team reviewed the organizational support and ownership of the corrective action program, in light of PSEGs recognition (as discussed during a level 1 root cause evaluation (70027584) presentation to the correction action review board (CARB)) of weak accountability for implementation of the corrective action program.
(2) Findings and Observations The team determined that PSEG was generally effective at classifying and performing operability evaluations and reportability determinations for discrepant conditions.
However, the team noted some examples where problem evaluations did not contain sufficient detail to support the conclusions. During this assessment period (January 2001 to March 2003) PSEG implemented several new corrective action program implementing procedures which may have contributed to the corrective action program accountability issues identified during a PSEG self-assessment. The team also noted that administrative procedure NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0002(Q), Organization, assigned responsibility for the corrective action program to multiple organizations which may have also contributed to the accountability issues identified by PSEG. PSEG completed a root cause evaluation of the corrective action program on March 18, 2003. The team was not able to assess the effectiveness of this review since the corrective actions for the self-identified issues had not been completed.
c. Effectiveness of Corrective Actions (1) Inspection Scope The team reviewed PSEGs corrective actions associated with selected NOTFs from Attachment 1 to determine whether the actions addressed the identified causes of the problems. The team also reviewed PSEGs timeliness in implementing corrective actions and their effectiveness in preventing recurrence of significant conditions adverse to quality. Furthermore, the team assessed the backlog of corrective actions to determine, if any, individually or collectively, represented an increased risk due to the delay in implementation. The team reviewed the root cause evaluation for the level one condition identified by PSEG associated with the effectiveness of the corrective action program.
(2) Findings and Observations The team identified four examples where PSEG failed to develop appropriate corrective actions for conditions adverse to quality. The first example was associated with the failure to adequately correct the root cause for operational problems that led to the multiple failures of the 12 residual heat removal (RHR) pump breaker to operate during post-maintenance testing (notification 20135327). This deficient corrective action was not considered a finding since the problem was identified during post-maintenance testing and considered unlikely to impact the RHR system following completion of testing. The second example involved the failure to ensure that leakage into an electrical switchgear room, which corroded the supports and external panel for the control rod drive mechanism cooling fan backup circuit breaker panels, would not adversely impact operation of the breakers to protect the associated containment electrical penetrations (notification 20136848. This problem was not considered a finding since the panel internals were inspected and found to be in an acceptable condition.
The two remaining observations were considered findings since they had the potential to affect the operation of mitigating systems. These findings included the failure to
implement adequate corrective actions for damaged wires in a control circuit cabinet and for a broken component cooling water system spring can hangar.
.1 Failure to Properly Evaluate a Failed Wire Inside a Control Room Cabinet Introduction. A Green NCV was identified for the failure to evaluate and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with the protection of wires utilized inside of control room relay control panels.
Description. The team identified that PSEG failed to evaluate the acceptability of continued use of American Wire Gauge (AWG) number 22 wire inside a Unit 2 relay control panel. The wire was protected by a 15 ampere circuit breaker and was damaged by an over-current condition in September 2001 (notification 20077969). In April 2002, PSEG identified the need to evaluate this condition, however, the team determined that PSEG did not perform an evaluation and failed to prevent a subsequent occurrence at Unit 1 in March 2003.
During the recent event, several wires inside of the cabinet were damaged, including a wire integral to the 13 auxiliary feedwater pump speed control and indication circuit.
PSEG tested the 13 auxiliary feedwater pump and indicated that it remained functional in the as found degraded condition. PSEG indicated that the load on the Unit 1 circuit was approximately 2 amperes but was unable to provide the original design basis for use of the 15 ampere circuit breaker.
Analysis. PSEG failed to evaluate and correct an adverse condition associated with ensuring adequate over-current protection for wires utilized in control room relay panels.
The team determined that this finding was greater than minor since a recent over-current event resulted in damage to the insulation of wires for several systems including the speed control and indication circuit for the 13 auxiliary feedwater pump. The team reviewed this finding using the Phase 1 SDP worksheet and determined that the issue was of very low significance (Green) since the recent condition did not result in the loss of any mitigating equipment.
Enforcement. Title 10 to CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, requires that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, PSEG failed to evaluate the adequacy of a condition where a 15 ampere circuit protective device was used to protect AWG number 22 wires in control panel applications. Because the failure to evaluate and correct this condition adverse to quality is of very low significance and has been entered into the corrective action program (notification 20137270), this violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 50-272,311/2003-04-01, Example 1, Failure to Correct Conditions Adverse to Quality.
.2 Failure to Repair a Problem with a Component Cooling Water Spring Can Hanger Introduction. A Green NCV was identified for failure to properly investigate a degraded component cooling water spring can hanger condition.
Description. During a plant walkdown the team identified that a spring can hanger supporting a component cooling water line attached to the 12 residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger was coated with a calcified substance consistent with the residual debris from long term ground water in-leakage. The problem with the calcium deposits had been previously identified by PSEG in March 2001 (notification 20060667),
however no corrective actions had been implemented. Subsequent to this recent finding, PSEG performed an additional inspection of the spring can and identified that the hangar spring was broken. PSEG initiated notification 20134299 to re-document the calcified deposit condition and also to document the untimely and ineffective corrective action associated with the degraded spring can.
Analysis. The deficiency associated with this matter was PSEGs failure to investigate a degraded component cooling water spring can hanger condition which apparently delayed identification that the hangar spring was broken. The finding was greater than minor since it resulted in operation of the component cooling water system with a degraded spring can hangar. The team reviewed this finding using the Phase 1 SDP worksheet for mitigating systems and determined that the finding was of very low significance (Green) since it did not result in the loss of any mitigating system.
Enforcement. Title 10 to CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, requires that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, PSEG failed to promptly evaluate and correct a degraded spring can hangar on the component cooling water system. Because the failure to correct this condition adverse to quality is of very low significance and has been entered into the corrective action program (notification 20134299), this violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 50-272, 50-311/03-004-01, Example 2, Failure to Correct Conditions Adverse to Quality.
d. Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment (1) Inspection Scope Team members interviewed plant staff, observed various activities throughout the plant, and attended a cross section of meetings to determine if conditions existed that would result in personnel being hesitant to raise safety concerns to their management and/or the NRC.
(2) Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit The team presented the inspection results to Mr. OConnor, Mr. Carlin, Mr. Garchow and other members of PSEG management on March 28, 2003. PSEG management acknowledged the results presented. No proprietary information was identified during the inspection.
ATTACHMENT 1 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee Personnel K. Augustine Reliability Engineer C. Banner Emergency Preparedness Supervisor K. Berger Licensing Engineer N. Bergh Quality Assurance Manager B. Bingelli Operations Supervisor D. Booz Operations SAP Coordinator B. Bower Production Engineer H. Berrick Response Team Member - Licensing B. Bowen Production Engineer C. Buckley Work Management Superintendent W. Buirch Fire Department Superintendent J. Cardona Controls Electrician J. Carlin Vice President - Engineering V. Chandra Principal Engineer M. Chastain Work Management J. Cichello Reliability Engineer D. Coleman Valve Engineer J. Corbett Design Engineering - Electrical S. Corman Operations M. Dammann Maintenance D. Davis Reliability Engineer J. DeFebo Quality Assurance Supervisor J. Deyton Work Management Cycle Lead J. Dierick Chemistry CAP J. Duffy Senior Nuclear Engineer K. Fleischer Electrical/I&C Design Engineering Supervisor C. Fricker Response Team Member - Operations G. Greer Reliability Engineer R. Henriksen Corrective Action Program Manager F. Hummel Reliability Engineer R. Hurd Maintenance CAP M. Ivanick Security Operations Superintendent T. Lake Employee Concerns J. Lopez Reliability Engineer J. Louch Controls Superintendent P. Koppel Design Engineering - Mechanical D. Lyons IST Implementation Engineer T. Mohoney Controls M. McCabe Operating Experience D. McCollum Valve Engineering G. Mellott Operations Supervisor K. Miller Design Engineer
G. Modi Design Engineering - Electrical K. Moore Operations Support Manager R. Morgan Quality Assurance Engineer G. Morrison Supervisor, Mechanical Design Engineering M. Morroni Production Engineer M. Mosier Response Team Member - Licensing G. Nagy Engineering Manager J. OConner Engineering Manager R. Olsen Operations Superintendent D. Parfitt Chemistry K. Petroff Reliability Engineer M. Pfizenmaier Primary System Supervisor, Reliability Engineering M. Rahmani Reliability Engineer G. Rich Chemistry R. Sambuca Controls Supervisor B. Sbroat Reliability Engineer B. Schuster Work Management R. Shindel Operations CAP C. Smyth Licensing Projects Supervisor F. Soens Assistant Operations Manager G. Salamon Nuclear Licensing Manager B. Thomas Senior Licensing Engineer L. Wagner Director Work Management, CARB Chairman P. Walsh Manager, Reliability Engineering W. Wikoff ISI Engineer F. Wiltsee Response Team Member - Engineering J. Zambuto Maintenance CAP Supervisor LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened and Closed 50-272, 50-311/03-004-01 NCV Failure to Implement Corrective Actions (Section 4OA2.c.2)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Procedures NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0002(Q), Rev. 8, Organization NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0004(Q), Rev. 10, Station Operations Review Committee NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0006(Z), Rev. 13, Corrective Action Review Board Process NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0088(Q), Rev. 0, Performance Improvement Process NC.CA-TM.ZZ-0003(Z), Rev.4, Root Cause Manual NC.CA-TM.ZZ-0004(Z), Rev.1, Root Cause Evaluation Template NC.CA-TM.ZZ-0005(Z), Rev. 2, Apparent Cause Evaluation Template NC.DE-AP.ZZ-0030(Q), Rev. 0 Control of Temporary Modifications NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0009(Q), Rev. 16, Work Management Program NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0016(Q), Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0074(Z), Differing Professional Opinion (DPO) Resolution NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0078(Z), Employee Concerns Program NC.WM-AP.ZZ-0000(Q), Rev. 5, Notification Process NC.WM-AP.ZZ-0001(Q), Rev 7, Work Management Process NC.WM-AP.ZZ-0002(Q), Rev. 6, Performance Improvement Process NC.WM-AP.ZZ-0003(Q), Rev. 2, Regular Maintenance Process S1.OP-AB.CW-0001, Rev. 13, Circulating Water System Malfunction S1.OP-PT.SW-0004 (Q), Rev. 5, Service Water Biofouling Monitoring Safety Injection and Charging Pumps S1.OP-PT.SW-0007 (Q), Rev. 7, Service Water Biofouling Monitoring Containment Fan Coil Units S1.OP-SY.4KV-0001(Q), Rev. 11, Electrical Power Systems 4 KV Vital Bus Transfer S2.OP-PT.SW-0004 (Q), Rev. 6, Service Water Biofouling Monitoring Safety Injection and Charging Pumps SC.CH-AD.CS-0415(Q), Rev. 8, Adjusting Spray Additive Tank Concentration SC.DE-TS.ZZ-2032(Q), Rev. 2, Physical Separation Requirements (Electrical)
SC.MD-ST.ZZ-0003(Q), Rev. 21, Inspection and Preventive Maintenance of Unit 1,2 and 3 Batteries SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0003 (Q), Rev. 6, Component Biofouling SE.MR.SA.01, Rev 11, Maintenance Rule System Function and Risk Significant Guide (Salem)
SH.ER-DG.ZZ-0002, Rev. 0, Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Evaluations and Goal Monitoring Calculations S-C-VAR-CDC-0095, Rev. 4, Spray Additive Tank (Deleted)
S-C-VAR-MDC-1429, Rev. 0, Section 8.11, Minimum Usable Volume for Spray Additive Tank S-C-RC-MDC-1928, Determination of Effective Degradation Years S-C-SW-MDC-1500, Rev. 0, Biofouling Monitoring and Trending
Audits and Self-Assessments Radiation Protection Corrective Action Evaluations, Report Number 80026116/0020 Radiation Protection Corrective Action Evaluations, Report Number 80030976/0020 Radiation Protection Corrective Action Evaluations, Report Number 80038318/0020 Radiation Protection Corrective Action Evaluations, Report Number 80043789/0020 Radiation Protection Corrective Action Evaluations, Report Number 80047782/0020 Radiation Protection Corrective Action Evaluations, Report Number 80051804/0020 QA Assessment Report 2002-0018, Performance Engineering Program Administration QA Assessment Report 2002-0243, Service Water and Circulating Water Systems Preparation for Grassing Operations, Maintenance, Engineering Self Assessments 2001-2003 QA Quarterly Reports, 2001-2002 QA Assessments 2001-0008, 2002-0370, 2003-0027, 2001-0150, 2001-0302, 2001-0452, 2001-0471, Component Cooling Water System Health Reports 125 Vdc System Health Report 4 kV System Health Report CARB Meeting Minutes February 5, 2002 March 18, 2003 March 25, 2003 Non-Cited Violations 50-272/01-03-01 50-272/01-06-001 50-311/01-08-01 50-272/01-09-02 50-272/01-10-01 50-311/01-10-02 50-311/01-11-01 50-311/01-11-02 50-311/01-11-03 50-272,311/01-11-04 50-272,311/01-12-02 50-311/01-12-03 50-311/01-12-04 50-272,311/02-04-01 50-311/02-06-01 50-272/02-06-03 50-311/02-07-03 50-311/02-07-04 50-272/02-09-02 50-272,311/02-09-03 50-272/311/02-09-04 50-272/02-09-05 Notifications/Orders Reviewed as part of this Inspection
20035462, 20052181, 20052185, 20054038, 20056547, 20056723, 20058260, 20058293, 20058414, 20060667, 20061052, 20061162, 20061427, 20061659, 20062936, 20063076, 20058401, 20063850, 20064349, 20064417, 20065263, 20065366, 20066033, 20066514, 20066963, 20067333, 20067334, 20067340, 20068791, 20068963, 20070005, 20070410, 20071724, 20073729, 20074837, 20075914, 20076230, 20076547, 20078047, 20078117, 20078141, 20078709, 20079293, 20080286, 20082037, 20083003, 20083427, 20084063, 20084738, 20086085, 20086179, 20086203, 20087747, 20089109, 20089888, 20090573, 20090923, 20091973, 20092708, 20093161, 20093656, 20094258, 20095284, 20095802, 20096933, 20097022, 20099546, 20099566, 20101499, 20101777, 20101881, 20103950, 20104986, 20108950, 20110575, 20111363, 20111986, 20113054, 20116935, 20117001, 20117389, 20117622, 20117627, 20117696, 20118327, 20118336, 20118564, 20122943, 20123564, 20124754, 20124847, 20125507, 20125915, 20127190, 20127259, 20127330, 20127821, 20128238, 20128289, 20128290, 20128291, 20128476, 20131319, 20132727, 20133894, 20134052, 20135147, 20135178, 20135151, 20137354, 20135790, 20135832, 20135981, 20135990 20136253, 20136471, 30057961, 30081881, 30084678, 60020583, 60020590, 60026421, 60027725, 60034582, 70004741, 70013999, 70021131, 70022789, 70022987, 70023302, 70023341, 70025551, 70028631, 80034819, 80043339, 70023583, 70024304, 80042873, 80057382, 70027584, 70023651, 70015001, 60010836, 60013642, 60011367, 60011203, 70015673 Notifications Written as a Result of This Inspection 20130305 Biennial PIR Inspection 20134299 Broken Coil in Spring Can Hanger 20134599 CSAT NaOH Acid Standard Error 20135133 11 RHR Pump Seal Boron Accumulation 20135134 11 RHR Motor Oil Leak 20135138 Material Condition of 11 RHR Pump Room 20135140 Material Condition of 12 RHR Pump Room 20135211 Notification Not Processed IAW WMAP-0 20135303 Tight Radius on Control Cable SW-17 Valve 20135327 Insufficient Corrective Actions (re. Breaker Operation)
20135334 Evaluate the Existing Gap on (Battery) 2BTR2BDC 20135358 Calibrate Pressure Setpoint Indicator 20135360 Alarm Locked In Reduces Vigilance 20135383 Operability Screening Less than Adequate 20135423 Relay Cover Glass Cracked 20135426 Review Orders For 2B 125 VDC for Closure 20135531 Chemistry Procedure Graph 20135550 Bus UV Transfer Relay Pickup Setting 20135589 Procedure Revision to S1.OP-ST.4KV-0001 20135634 CC Heat Ex Slide Plate Discrepancy 20135638 Needle on Pressure Gage is Broken 20135917 Less Than Adequate Evaluation Documentation and Corrective Actions 20136432 12 RHR Pump Room Material Condition 20136586 Water Weeping Through Wall - S1 Switchgear room.
20136848 Ground Water Leaks into Breaker Panel 20136863 Revise NC.NP-AP.ZZ-0002(Q), Rev. 8 20136903 Replace Styrofoam (Spacers) and Bus Bar Fasteners
20136988 Untimely Notification Initiation (CSAT Unexpected Analytical Results)
20137270 Less Than Adequate Documentation of Request to Evaluate Wire Size 20137356 CARB Members Experience and Knowledge not Documented 20137381 Chemistry Procedure Graph Out of Date 20137267 Discrepancy in Calc. ES-4.006 20137492 SW Valve Metal Tag Data Drawings 203001 A 8789-29 Unit 1 4160 Volt Group Buses One Line Diagram 203002 A 8789-34 Unit 1 4160 Volt Vital Buses One Line Diagram 203007 A 8789-28 Unit 1 125 V.D.C. One Line Diagram 203008 A 8789-12 Unit 1 250 V.D.C. One Line Diagram 203047 A 8789-33 Unit 1 1A 4160 Volt Vital Bus Undervoltage Transfer Relay Schematic 203061 A 8789-32 Unit 2 4160 Volt Vital Buses One Line Diagram 203062 A 8789-27 Unit 2 4160 Volt Group Buses One Line Diagram 203103 A 8789-24 Units 1 and 2, 1A and 2A 4160 Volt Vital Buses Bus Feeder CB 13ACD and 23ASD Schematic 203105 A 8789-23 Units 1 and 2, 1A and 2A 4160 Volt Vital Buses Bus Feeder CB 12ASD and 24ASD Schematic 203117 B 497-0 4160 V Vital Buses Relay Settings, Sheet 9 203242 B 9489-7 No. 1 Relay Room Relay Cabinet RC16-6 Arrangement 203552 B 9776-13 Auxiliary Building Ventilation Exhaust Filter Units Schematic 221410 B 9545-24 Unit 1 1CCDC 125V>D>C Distribution Cabinet Wiring Diagram 223720 A 1404-31 Unit 2 125 V.D.C. One Line Diagram 205331 A 8763-35 Unit 2 Component Cooling 205231 A 8761-43 Unit 1 Component Cooling 205232 A 8761-36 Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal 205332 A 8763-30 Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal 111008-08 Component Cooling Heat Exchangers 108724-05 Component Cooling Heat Exchangers Miscellaneous 2003 NBU Grassing Readiness Assessment Chemistry DataBase Analysis Results, CSAT, January 2002 - March 2003, Units 1 and 2 Configuration Baseline Document for Containment Spray, DE-CB.CS-0035(Q), Rev. 4 Detritus Risk Assessment, March 11, 2003 Evaluation S-1-CAN-SEE-1519, Rev. 0, SGS Containment, Liner Insulation Studs, 1RF14 Maintenance Department - CM Backlog Breakdown, Period Ending 3/23/2003 Salem Service Water and Circulating Water Systems Reliability Improvement Project, Rev. 0 Salem CWIS Impingement Daily Average, 3/13/2003 Salem CWIS Impingement Rolling Weekly Average, week ending 3/15/03 Salem Unit 1 Service Water, System Health Report, Period 07/01/02 to 11/30/02 Salem Unit 2 Service Water, System Health Report, Period 06/01/02 to 11/30/02 Salem Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal, System Health Report, Period 10/01/02 to 12/31/02 Salem Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal, System Health Report, Period 10/01/02 to 12/31/02 Salem Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal Pump 22 Vibration Date Report, Period 9/28/99 to 12/19/02
SGS Unit 1 PSA Risk Evaluation Form, Work Week 113(05)
SGS Unit 1 PSA Risk Evaluation Form, Work Week 114(06)
SGS Unit 2 PSA Risk Evaluation Form, Work Week 113(05)
SGS Unit 2 PSA Risk Evaluation Form, Work Week 114(06)
Vendor Information VTM 309448, Rev. 7, Standby Battery Vented Cell Installation and Operating Instructions LIST OF ACRONYMS USED AWG American Wire Gauge CARB Corrective Action Review Board CFR Code of Federal Regulations CRDM Control Rod Drive Mechanism IPE Individual Plant Examination NCV Non-Cited Violation NOTF Notification (PSEG input into their CAP)
OE Operating Experience PSEG Public Service Electric Gas Nuclear, LLC RHR Residual Heat Removal ROP Reactor Oversight Process SAT Spray Additive Tank SDP Significant Determination Process SW Service Water