IR 05000302/1977013
| ML19319C959 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 09/26/1977 |
| From: | Martin R, Whitener H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19319C953 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-77-13, NUDOCS 8003040895 | |
| Download: ML19319C959 (6) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y
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230 PEACHTREE STREET, N.W. SUITE 1217 k
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
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Report No.:
77-13 Docket No.:
50-302
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L. cense No.: DPR-72 Licensee: Florida Power Corporation Facility Name:
Crystal River Unit 3 Inspection at: Crystal River
Inspection conducted: July 20-22 and August 2-5, 1977
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Inspectors:
H. L. Whitener
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Accompanying Personne - None Reviewed by:
24!77 R. D.1%artin, Chief Nuclear Support Section
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. Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch -
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Inspection Sunitary
. Inspection on Ju.'y 20-22 and August 2-5, 1977:
(Report No. 50-302/77-13)
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Areas Inspected: ?outine, unannounced inspection of; fire prevention /
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protection system ine.luding inspection of selected equipment and adminis-trative controls; hydraulic shock suppressors, pipe supports and,
restraints including adherence to Technical Specifications, surveillance tests, and inspection of selected hardware; review of a previously identified unresolved item; and, independent inspection areas. This inspection involved 44 inspector hours on site by the IE inspector.
Results: Of.the areas inspected, one item of noncompliance was identified concerning the tag out of fire equipment temporarily removed from service.
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Rll Rpt. No. 50-302/77-13 I-l
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DETAILS I Prepared by:
N ebu&
/8/ 7J H.' L. Whitener, Reactor' Inspector
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Nuclear Support Section Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch I
~ July 20-22 and August 2-5, 1977 Dates of Inspectio -
Reviewed by:
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//71 R. 0[. Martin, Chief D(te
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Nuclear Support Section
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Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support
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Branch
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1..' Persons Contacted,
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- G.
P. Beatty, Jr., Nuclear Plant Manager
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F. McKee, Assistant Nuclear Plant Manager W. R. Nichols, Operations Supervisor
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- D. W. ~Pedrick, IV, Compliance Engineer ~
- L.
C. Kelley, Compliance Auditor
- J.
Cooper, Compliance Auditor
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E. Barrett, Plant Engineer S. W. Johnson, II, Plant Engineer W. W. Surrency, Chief Nuclear Operator
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- Denotes those present at the Exit Interview.
2.
Licensee A tion on Previous Inspection Findings
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(Closed) Unresolved item (50-302/77-6 item 77-6/1):
failure to install all fire stops required by Gilbert drawing E 214-032, Rev.
12 and commitment to review the need for procedures to control combustible material in cable spreading room.
During a plant tour, the inspector verified that fire stops had been installed in wall penetrations in ES equipment rooms on elevation 108 of the auxiliary building. Documentation showed that the work was performed in accordance with Gilbert original design specifications and-drawings
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E214-032 and that other plant areas were inspected to ensure that fire stops were installed in accordance to the Gilbert drawing.
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The plant Review Committee reviewed the results of this work on
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June 9, 1977. During the p,lant tour the inspec' tor n'ted that the o
cable spreading room was free of'miscellsneous combustible material.
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The licensee stated that the posting of signs had been effective in j
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maintaining the cleanliness of this area. This item is considered resolved.
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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/77-13 I-2
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3.
Unresolved Items
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None 4.
Exit Interview i
The inspector met with licensee personnel (denoted in paragraph 1)
on July 22 and August 5, 1977 to review the inspection findings.
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The following items were discussed:
a.
Scope of inspection b.
Items of noncompliance (See paragraph 5)
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Open items?(See paragraph 5 and 6)
c.
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FirePreventiod/ Protection The inspector reviewed selected work control, administrative and quality procedures to verify that the licensee has established a program for fire prevention, detection and control.
Procedures examined either in part or totally during this review included:
AI-500 Conduct of Operations
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AI-600 Conduct of, Maintenance
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AI-900 Conduct of Technical Support AI-1000 Conduct of Compliance CP-101 Procurement of Material, Equipment and Service CP-110 Procedure for Compliance Audit,of Plant Functions CP 112 Activity Review of Plant Functions
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CP 113 Procedure for Handling Discrepancies and Corrective Actions CP 114 Procedure for Control of* Permanent Modifications, Temporary Modificatons, and Deviations CP-115 In-Plant Equipment clearance and Switching Orders
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CP 118 Fire Prevention Work Permit Procedure
'QPP 3.1 Control of Activities Affecting Design QP 3.51 Control of Modifications QP 5.51 Plant Maintenance Control The inspector concluded that the lic~ensee has established.adminis-
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trative and quality controls over those activities involving potential
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fire hazards.
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' The inspector' toured the plant to inspect safety related areas, ~
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aw==ine portions of the fire system and observe activities reisted
to fire prevention. One item of noncompliance was identified
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RII Rpt. Wo. 50-302/77-13 I-3
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during the plant tour concerning the automatic halon (freon 1301)
fire suppressant system in the cable spreading room.,This system consists of eleven freon bottles distributed throughout the room which are actuated by combustion ionization type detectors.. Cables
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from the detectors to the halon bottles were found temporarily disconnec'ted to prevent inadvertent actuation due to smoke filtering into the room from welding setivities in a near by satellite machine shop. The inspector found that the halon system was not tagged out of service in accordance with the In-Plant Equipment Clearance and Switching Orders procedure CP-115 Section 2.4.4, which requires that any portion of the fire system removed from service be tagged with a Fire Insurance Association Tag.
Failure to use the' tag was identified as noncompliance with Technical Specification 6.8.1.a.
Review of the welding activity showed that.
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appropriate fire prevention procedures had been implemented including a fire prevention work permit and fire patrol.
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The inspector noted that in the event of a fire in the cable spreading room with the freon bottles disconnected, the first bottle reconnected
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would discharge the freon into the room, forcing evacuation of the room with the remainder of the bottles disconnected. Self contained breathing equipment is available to the fire brigade but may result in a delay from the time of fire detector activation until the
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halon system is activated. The inspector dis' cussed this matter with licensee who agreed to evaluate the alternatives available to correct this situation.
Additional matters observed during the inspection and discussed at the exit interview included:
a.
Fire Dampers in Cable Spreading Room
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Automatic closure devices are installed on the ventilation supply and exhaust vents which close the dampers on activation of the halon system. Functional tests have been performed on the dampers in accordance with SP-501, Halon Fire Protection System Checks.
The inspe'etor,had no further questions on this matter.
b.
Sprinkler System in Radiation Control Area
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Draining of FS valve 91 revealed that water in the line was
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dirty. This line was flushed clean prior to the completion of
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this inspection. The licensee stated that the water had.
contained only a fine grit which would not plug the sprinkler
, heads. The inspector has no further-questions on this matter.
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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/77-13 I-4
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c.
Modifications of Wet Fire Suppressant Systems A portion of the wet pipe fire suppressant system was modified to a dry system by the installation of deluge valve 240 betwaen the fire pumps and sprinkler system.' In that the piping was
j intended to be water filled, the lines were not designed to'
i drain completely. The licensee made a commitment to evaluate
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the corrosive effect of water trapped in low spots and the
possible need to purge these lines dry.
The licensee's evalua-tion will-be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
d.
Emergency Lightina
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l Emergency lighting is not provided in,the, cable spreading
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room. The licensee made a commitment to evaluate this condition.
e.
Manual Valves in Fire' Suppressant Systems Two manual' valves are located in the water supply line upstream
of four automatic actuating deluge valves for the charcoal
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filter fire suppressant system.
Inadvertent closure of these manual valves'would render the charcoal filter deluge system
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i inoperable. The licensee made a com:itment to evaluate means
of positive control for these valves.
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Hose Station Adi: cent to Cable Spreading Room The inspector et~ ermined that the hose station at the cable spreading room is dry as a result of the system modification
from wet to dry discussed in item 3 above. Prior to the end
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,of this inspection the licensee verified that a pull boM adjacent to the hose station activates valve 240 and provides water to the station. The licensee plans to post instructions to activate the pull box at the hose station.
6.
Pipe Snubbers and Restraints
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l The inspector reviewed selected ad.mMmative, surveillance and
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maintenance procedures to determine that the licensee has established
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and implemented an inspection program for hydraulic snubbers and piping restraints which incorporates and meets the requirements of the Technical Specifications. Procedures which were examined
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during thi,s review included:
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Al - 500 Conduct of Operations
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Al - 500. Conduct of Maintenance
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l Al - 900 Conduct of Technical Support
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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/77-13 I-5
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SP - 201 Hydraulic Snubbers Inspection
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MP - 130 Pipe Snubber Mkintenance PM - 111 Inspection of Hydraulic Pipe Snubbers SP - 443 Nkster Surveillance Plan
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- The inspector concluded that the licensee has developed a program and procedures for _ inspection, surveillance testing and preventive maintenance to meet _ Technical Specification requirements.
Imple-mentation of this program was verified by examination of snubber surveillance testing performed in May - June 1977 and the master surveillance schedule. Visual snubber inspections were completed
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in the 4 - 6 month time frame af ter initial critical as required by Technical Specifications.
One snubber was found inoperable and the subsequent snubber inspection interval was reduced to 12 months in accordance with Table 4.7-4 of the Technical Specifications.
At the exit interview the inspector mad s several comments on the snubber surveillance procedure.s which licensee management agreed to evaluate. These comments included:
a.
Include verification of hydraulic fluid viscosity in the
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18 month functional test of snubbers.
b.
Measure the es found - as left piston rod position in the 18 month fun,ctional test.
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c.
Make sn'ubber installation base-line data available during visual inspections to permit identification of any gross changes in snubber position.
During this inspection the inspec. tor toured the plant and examined selected piping snubbers, restraints and supports on the main steam, emergency feedwater, make up and. purification, and decay heat removal lines.
Since the reactor was operating, the tour was
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limited to snubbers and restraints accessible during power operation.
The inspector found no inoperable components during the inspection.
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