IR 05000302/1977025
| ML19308D543 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 01/06/1978 |
| From: | Burnett P, Dance H, Wessman R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19308D536 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-77-25, NUDOCS 8002280977 | |
| Download: ML19308D543 (10) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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Report No.: 50-302/77-25 Docket No.: 50-302 License No.: DPR-72 Licensee: Florida Power Corporation 3201 34th Street, South P. O. Box 14042 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Facility Name: Crystal River 3 Inspection at: Crystal River site, Crystal River, Florida Inspection conducted: December 12-16, 1977 Inspectors:
R. H. Wessman
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P. T. Burnet
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Reviewed by:
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H. C. Dance, Chief
'Date Reactor Projects Section No.1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Inspection immary Inspectior. an December 12-16, 1977:
(Report No. 50-302/77-25)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee planning for coping with strikes; review of license event reports; followup on
outstanding and unresolved items; review of startup report and core monitoring procedures; and facility tour. The inspection involved 62 inspector-hours on site by two NRC personnel.
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Results: Of the five areas inspected no items of noncompliance were identified.
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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/77-25
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DETAILS I Prepared by:
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R. H. Wessman, Reactor Inspector Date~
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Reactor Projects Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Dates of Inspecti n: December 12-16, 1977 Reviewed by:
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Dance, Chief
'Date Reactor Projects Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Florida Power Corporation (FPC)
- G. P. Beatty, Jr., Nuclear Plant Manager
- W. R. Nichols, Operations Supervisor
- P. F. McKee, Assistant Nuclear Plant Manager
- G. F. Westafer, Technical Support Engineer T. C. Luckehaus, Maintenance Engineer j
- D. W. Pedrick, IV, Compliance Engineer C. G. Goering, Compliance Auditor L. C. Kelley, Compliance Auditor
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J. Cooper, Compliance Auditor
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b.
Babcock and Wilcox
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- S. P. Melancon, Site Representative
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- denotes those present at the Exit Interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
.l Procedure Change to OP-417, Containment Operating Procedure a.
As committed to in IE Report 77-17 (paragraph I.10.b), OP-417
has been revised to assure operability of RM-Al - Containment
Radiation Monitor prior to containment purge or equalization.
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This item is closed, b.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item 77-6/2, Loss of Power to the ICS a
The licensee has initiated MAR 77-10-09 to provide a more flexible backup power supply to the ICS. This unresolved item will remain open pending issue / implementation of this modification.
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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/77-25 I-2
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3.
Unresolved Items
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I No new unresolved items were identified.
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Exit Interview
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i A meeting was held by R. H. Wessman and P. T. Burnett with G. P. Beatty, Jr.
and members of his staff on December 16, 1977.
Items discussed included areas inspected, as described in these Details.
5.
Licensee Planning for Coping With Strikes The inspector reviewed the licensee's contingency planning for coping with a strike. The inspector examined the licensee's planning for consistency with regulatory requirements, 10 CFF 55,_and Section 6
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of the Technical Specifications. Activities reviewed included the following:
- Plant staffing and use of augmenting personnel for various plant staff positions, including licensed positions.
- Specific " refresher" or additional training for plant-staff.
- Offsite support arrangements for onsite personnel should a strike occur.
- Onsite and offsite arrangements and capabilities to support
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emergency situations.
Within the areas inspected no discrepancies were iden'tified.
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6.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
The inspector reviewed selected LER's for consistency with the requirements of the Technical Specifications and Regulatory Guide
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1.16 (Reporting of Operating information - Appendix A Technical Specifications). The inspector examined the licensee's analysis of the event and the corrective action taken, and discussed the LER i
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with licensee representatives. The following LER's were reviewed:
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LER 77-118, Core Flood Tank "A" Boron Concentration Low The licensee believes that the tank's boron concentration may
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be subject to stratification during addition of borated water-
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(for tank makeup) or during sampling. A modification is being l
considered which would allow " bubbling" of the core flood tank
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to assure mixing. This LER remains open pending the results of that modification proposal.
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RII Rpt. Nos. 50-302/77-25 I-4
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LER 77-135, Group 7 Rods Out of Specified Limits The cause of this Group 7 ratchet trip has not been identified.
This problem is under review by Babock and Wilcox and Florida
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Power Corporation. This LER remains open.
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LER 77-136, Feedwater Flow Transmitter Inoperative
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i This LER is closed without comment.
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LER 77-137, 3A Inverter Inoperative The inspector confirmed the licensee's compliance with Technical Specification ACTION statements. Repair of the inverter is awaiting receipt of parts. The LER implies a reactor trip (which accompanied the inverter failure) was initiated by one RPS channel. A supplemental LER clarifying the details of the trip will be submitted. This LEA remains open.
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LER 77-138, Missed Source Range Surveillance During Reactor Startup The inspector reviewed applicable portions of the operator's log and the executed surveillance procedure SP-110 (RPS Functional Test). Reactor startup procedures were determined to be adequate and this event was due to a personnel mistake.
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The licensee's corrective action was appropriate. This LER is l
closed.
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LER 77-140, Inoperable RCS Leakage Detectors The design of radiation monitor RM-A6 is such that a sample pump failure (which occurred in this event) renders two of the
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three RCS leakage detection systems inoperable. Recognizing
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this design problem in June 1977, site personnel initiated REI No. 542 to modify this system. This request remains under corporate office review. The inspector noted that this is the second occurrence of this type of failure (See LER 77-57) and encouraged the licensee to complete modifications to this
system. This LER remains open.
7.
Controls For Plant Setpoints Changes q
I The inspector reviewed the licensee's controls for making changes to plant setpoints. These controls were reviewed for consistency with Section 6 of the Technical Specifications and ANSI N18.7-1976, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance for the Operational p
Phase of Nuclear Power Plants.
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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/77-25 I-3
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LER 77-119, Missed Surveillance on Containment Personnel Lock The inspector confirmed the adequacy of SP-430, Containment Entry..in requiring this surveillance.
Additionally, the licensee has included reference to this surveillance requirement
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in SP-443, Master Surveillance Plan.
This LER is closed.
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LER 77-122, Containment Isolation Valve CAV-126 Inoperative The inspector reviewed the completed work request, documenting maintenance on this valve. This LER is closed.
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LER 77-123 Main Steam Safety Valve MSV-42 Setpoint Drift i
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This LER was reviewed and closed without comment.
LER 77-125, Absolute Position Indication (API) Tube Misalignment e.
The inspector confirmed, by review of reactor nyerator logs, that Technical Specification ACTION requirements were met. The licensee has experienced one other case of API tube misalignment
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(LER 77-71). By design, gross misalignment of API tubes
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cannot occur and there is insufficient evidence as to how this misalignment occurred. This LER is closed.
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LER 77-127, High Primary Containment Temperature This event was caused by a loss of water level in the Industrial Cooling Tower. The licensee has issued MAR 77-6-28 which will provide an automatic fill capability for the industrial cooling tower and field installation is imminent. This LER is closed.
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LER 77-128, Diesel Generator 3B Inoperative The inspector confirmed licensee records documenting compliance with the Technical Specification ACTION statement. This LER is closed.
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LER 77-132, Units 1 and 2 Batteries Inoperable The licensee's proposed corrective action to raise the battery float voltage has been taken. Review of logs and executed surveillance procedures confirmed the licensee's compliance with the Technical Specification ACTION statement. This LER
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is closed.
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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/77-25 I-5
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Changes to setpoints are governed by CP-114, Procedure for Permanent Modifications, Temporary Modifications'and Deviations. Additionally, plant or system operating procedures establish operational setpoints or limits that are conservative with respect to technical specification values. Changes to operational setpoints or limits are controlled by formal chan; s to the procedure.
The inspector concluded that adequate controls have been established for plant setpoints changes.
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IE Circular 77-13 - Reactor Safety Signals Negated During Testing The inspector determined that this circular had been received and reviewed by licensee personnel.
It was determined that procedural controls, training programs, and management practices in existance i
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at Crystal River 3 provide adequate assurance that events such as the one described by Circular 77-13 should not occur. The licensee noted that the addition of an assistant shift supervisor (effected September 1, 1977) to the normal shift complement has eased the administrative burden of on-shift activities. This circular is closed.
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9.
Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine In response to a 10 CFR 21 report submitted by Toledo Edison Company, the inspector examined the Crystal River 3 auxiliary feed pump turbine specifications and physical configuration for generic applicability.
It was determined that the Crystal River 3 turbine was identical to the Davis-Besse Station machine identified in the
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Toledo Edison report. However, the Crystal River 3 machine is not installed in a similar physical environment as the Davis-Besse machine.
(The Davis-Besse turbine is installed adjacent to a
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startup feed pump which has caused vibration induced closure of the emergency feed pump governor.)
Crystal River 3 personnel report no such vibration induced failures for the auxiliary feed pump governor. Based on this report and the determination of the different operating environment for the Crystal River turbine, the inspector considered this item closed.
10.
Review of October 1977 Monthly Operating Report The inspector reviewed the October 1977 Monthly Operating Report to determine the licensee's method for deriving selected report data and to confirm log entries supporting unit shutdown information.
Within the areas inspected no discrepancies were identified.
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Facility Tour The inspector toured various portions of the control complex, auxiliary building, and turbine building. Inspector comments, of a minor nature, were discussed with the licensee.
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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/77-25 II-l
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DETAILS II Prepared by:
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P. T. Burnett,jseactor Inspector Da(e Nuclear Support Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear j
Support Branch j
Dates of Inspecti December 12-16, 1977
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Reviewed by:
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R.' D. Martin,~ Chief
' Date Nuclear Support Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch 1.
Persons Contacted
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Florida Power Corporation (FPC)
- G. P. Beatty, Jr., Nuclear Plant Manager
- W. R. Nichols, Operations Supervisor
- P. F. McKee, Assistant Nuclear Plant Manager
- G. F. Westafer, Technical Support Engineer
- D. W. Pedrick, IV, Compliance Engineer C. G. Goering, Compliance Auditor W. R. Klein, Reactor Engineer K. O. Vogel, Computer and Controls Engineer b.
Babcock and Wilcox Company
- S. P. Melancon, Site Representative
- Indicates presence at exit interview.
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2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
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Not addressed.
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Unresolved Items None 4.
Management Interview On Friday, December 16, 1977, a meeting was held with those persons indicated by asterisks in paragraph 1.
The scope and findings of
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5.
Startup Report
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The zero power physics tests and power escalation tests for Crystal River Unit 3, as reported in the Startup Report dated July 27, 1977, were reviewed in the Region II office. This review was extended on-site to include inspection of the raw and reduced data obtained in determining the moderator temperature coefficient and in performing group-wise calibration of the control rods. These tests were also discussed with licensee and NSSS vendor personnel on site. No questions remained open on the two subjects addressed at the conclusion of the inspection.
6.
Quadrant Power Tilt During the afternoon of December 12, 1977, the inspectors on site t
were informed by members of the plant management staff that a
reportable event had occurred, and was identified and corrected on l
that day.
Unit 3 had scrammed early that morning. During the return to power, at about the fifty-percent level, routine surveillance O
indicated a higher than expected quadrant power tilt. That quantity had been hand-calculated using the power range nuclear instrument displays on the console. The result, a positive 7.08% tilt for NI6, was compared with table 3.2-2 of Technical Specifications and j
interpreted to be acceptable for the existing transient condition.
Power escalation was continued to a level in excess of 70% power.
The operating staff then realized that the quadrant tilt had been compared with the measurement independent value on table 3.2-2 and not with the value based upon excore detectors as should have been
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done.
Since reactor power was in excess of 60 percent with a quadrant power tilt in excess of the transient limit, the operation was contrary to Technical Specification 3.2.4.
Upon identifying the noncompliance the licensee promptly complied with Action Statement C.1 of that technical specification. That is, power was reduced to less than 60 percent and the power trip setpoints reduced to less than 65.5 percent.
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The licensee obtained one in-core flux map which indicated a magnitude of flux tilt which was between the steady state and transient limits for flux tilt determinations using those detectors. Failure of the plant computer prevented the licensee from obtaining additional, reliable power maps until late on the afternoon of December 15, 1977.
In the interim the licensee performed surveillance to confirm that the control rods were in the proper zones, power was held to less
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RII Rpt. No. 50-302/77-25 II-3
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than 60 percent, and hourly determinations of the quadrant power tilt derived from the power range instruments were performed. All of the tilts determined subsequent to the first determination gave values between the ste'ady state and transient limits. In all cases NI-6 gave the high reading. Throughout this event the inspectors made several randomly scheduled inspections of control room activities to confirm compliance with Action Statement 3.2.4.c.? and to review the surveillance of the tilt.
Once the computer was returned to service, no evidence of a power tilt was detected.
The licensee reported by telephone that in the following week power was escalated to 100%.
Incore power distribution was monitored frequently during the escalation. The data obtained will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection.
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