IR 05000293/1997009

Informs That on 970904,insp Rept for 50-293/97-09 Was Issued to Util Describing Recent Reactive Insp of Plant Access Authorization Program.Final Rept on Incident Involving CC Drega Encl

ML20236F191
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	06/26/1998
From:	Rosano R NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	Boulette E BOSTON EDISON CO.
References
50-293-97-09, 50-293-97-9, NUDOCS 9807020070
Download: ML20236F191 (7)

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June 26, 1998 E. Thomas Bouletta, PhD Senior Vice Presidsnt - Nucirr Boston Edison Company Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

'- 600 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360-5599 l SUBJECT: FINAL REPORT ON INCIDENT INVOLVING CARL C. DREGA l

Dear Dr. Boulette:

On September 4,1997, inspection Report 50-293/97-09 was issued to Boston Edison Company, describing a recent reactive inspection of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station's access authonzation program. This inspection was prompted by an August 1997 incident in which Carl C. Droga, an individual who had worked at and had unescorted access to Pilgrim, shot and killed several people before being killed by police. The inspection concluded that your access authorization

.. program met the applicable regulatory requirements.

l L Enclosed is the Final Report on incident involving Carl C. Droga, including the staffs summary of

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programmatic implications of the incident. The Commission reviewed the Report and determined that it should be released to the Public Document Room. Since you were one of the licensees  !

whose facilities were inspected due to this incident, a copy of the report is forwarded for your information.

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In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its

. enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).

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Sincerely,

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Original signed by Richard P. Rosano, Acting Chief Safeguards Branch

' Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation j/

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Enclosure: ' As stated

/ir cc: See next page Uf /

QillDhution'

File Center G. Smith, RI PDR T. J. Carter, YT 0980136 PSGB r/f J. Roe D. Matthews A. Chaffee l R. Rosano DOCUMENT: G:\ROSANO\DREGA To ,eeelve a espy of (Je deessment, lasseste in the ben: "C" = Copy with sut 4Atochment/ enclosure "E* = Copy with

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OFFICE A/BC:PSGB:DRPM lE I l l l NAME RPRosanoN DATE 06 M /98 (% 06/ /98 0"/ /98

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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY -

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9907020070 990626

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y E. Thomas Boulette Boston Edison Company  : I cc: '

Mr. Ron Ledgett Executive Vice President Ms. Nancy Desmond 800 Boyleston Street Manager, Reg. Affairs Dept.

Boston, MA 02199 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

. RFD #1 Rocky Hill Road Resident inspector . Plymouth, MA 02360 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Mr. David F. Tarantino Post Office Box 867 Nuclear information Manager Plymouth, MA 02360 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station RFD #1, Rocky Hilllioad -

Chairman, Board of Selectmen Plymouth, MA 02360 11 Lincoln Street Plymouth, MA 02360 Ms. Kathleen M. O'Toole Secretary of Public Safety Chairman, Duxbury Board of Selectmen Exccutive Office of Public Safety Town Hall One Ashburton Place 878 Tremont Street' Boston, MA 02108 Duxbury, MA 02332 Mr. Peter LaPorte, Director Office or the Commissioner Attn: James Muckerheide Massachusetts Department of Massachusetts Emergency Management Environmental Protection Agency-l One Winter Street 400 Worcester Road Boston, MA 02108 P.O. Box 1496

. Framingham, MA 01701-0317 Office of the Attomey General One Ashburto:1 Place Chairman, Citizens Urging 20th Floor Responsible Energy

' Boston, MA 02108 P.O. Box 2621 Duxbury, MA 02331 Mr. Robert M. Hallisey, Director Radiation Control Program Citizens at Risk Massachusetts Department of P.O. Box 3803 1 Public Health Plymouth, MA 02361 -'

305 South Street Boston, MA 02130 W.S. Stowe, Esquire j- .

Boston Edison Company Regional Administrator, Region 1 800 Doyleston St.,36th Floor U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Boston, MA 02199 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Chairman Nuclear Matters Committee Ms. Jane Fleming Town Hall  !

8 Oceanwood Drive 11 Lincoln Street l Duxbury,MA 0233 Plymouth, MA 02360

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Mr. Jeffery Keene Mr. William D. Meinert Licensing Division Manager Nuclear Engineer Boston Edison Company Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale 600 Rocky Hill Road Electric Company Plymouth, MA 02360-5599 P.O. Box 426 Ludlow, MA 010 5 0426 l

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s Final Report on incident involvina Carl C. Dreca 1. 2MIDdtE. . .

On August 19,1997, Cari C. Droga was involved in shootings in New Hampshire and Vermont that left four people dead. Droga was subsequently killed in a confrontation with Vermont law enforcement officers.'

When it was discovered that Droga had been granted unescorted access to Vermont Yankee (1992 and 1995), Pilgrim (1997), and indian Point 3 (1997) as a temporary employee, NRC dispatched an inspection team composed of a senior inspector from Region I and a senior program manager from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's (NRR's) Safeguards Branch (PSGB), Division of Reactor Program Manag investigations' (Ol's) Field Office in Region 1.,ement, The objective assisted of the bytoan visits was investigator determine from the Of through inspection, interviews, and records checks whether (a) the licensees' access authorization programs were property implemented and administered, (b) the !!censees' access

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control equipment was property installed and operated and the appropriate procedures were l

implemented, (c) the licensees' fitness-for-duty (FFD) programs were property implemented and l administered, and (d) the licensees conducted adequate background investigations of Droga, considered the information developed during that investigation, and acted proper 9 in granting him unescorted access.

The inspections did not identify violations of regulations or licensee commitments with respect to i

the access authorization programs, access control equipment, or FFD programs. Furthermore, i the inspectors concluded through interviews and records checks that the individual had not j

' exhibited aberrant behavior that would have warranted a denial of unescorted access authorization by any of the three licensees for which he worked.

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Following review of the inspection findings, PSGB initiated a study of the pccntial programmatic implications of the incident. Specifically, in light of the finding that there were no violations, the staff considered the two programmatic components of access control, that is, access authorization and entry controls, to determine whether additional requirements might reduce the

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l ' in earty reports of the investigation into this matter, comments made concoming the possibility that Droga had been stockpiling explosives, or components useful in constructing explosives, at his house. In a search of his residence, bomb-making materials were found.

l According to comments made to NRC's Office of Investigations Field Office in Region I, the l Federal Bureau of Investigation did not find any indication of what Droga had planned to do with the explosive devices. 1

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During the inspection effort, it was reported that Droga had worked at Seabrook. The

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inspectors determined that although Droga had applied for employment at Seabrook, he was asked to leave the property and was ultimately not hired after he attempted to live in his trailer on company grounds. The licensee did conclude, however, after completing the access authorization process that it had begun, that Droga would have been granted authorization for unescorted access at Seabrook but for the incident involving living in his trailer on company grounds.

ENCLOSURE

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Ikeishood that a person who might pose a threat to the public health and safety could gain unescorted access to licensed facilities.

al. Reaulatory Basis Since Droga worked as a temporary employee, the regulations concoming granting of unescorted access authorization to temporary employees were examined. Regulations in 10 CFR 73.56(c)(2) allow licensees' access authorization programs to specify conditions for permitting temporary access. Regulatory Guide 5.66 (RG), Section B, incorporates the guidelines for temporary access in the appended NUMARC 89-01, " Guidelines for Access Authorization Programs," to which all commercial power reactor licensees have committed, as discussed in Section 111.8.2, below.

111. EjGdDRE inspections were conducted at the three facilities at which Droga worked: Vermont Yankee (Inspection Report [lR) 50-271/9707, August 26,1997), Pilgrim (IR 50 293/9709, August 27-28, 1997), and Indian Point 3 (lR 50-296/9708, August 29,1997). With respect to licensee commitments at each site, the inspection team -

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reviewed the access authorization program commitments and procedures,

- - tested the access control equipment (metals and explosives detectors, x-ray machines)

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reviewed the FFD and behavioral observation programs and procedures, and

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au:lited the training program records for supervisors (to ensure that required FFD and behavioral observation training had been conducted).

With respect to Droga, the inspection team -

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interviewed his former supervisors and co workers,

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reviewed the licensees' records of background screening conducted before granting unescorted access authorization to Droga, and

. reviewed Droga's general employee training records and FFD chemical testing records.

A. Inspection and Compliance issues 1. Access Authorization Program The inspectors examined components of the licensees' access authorization programs, includin0 Procedures for background screening, psychological evaluation, processing of criminal history information, and decisionmaking. Special attention was paid to the processing of Droga's application for unescorted access authorization. No violations were found in the implementation of the access authorization programs at the three licensed facilities at which Droga had been employed.

. 2. Access Control Equipment and Procedures The ir spectors reviewed the licensees' installation instructions, operating procedures, and testing procedures for access control equipment in place at the prifnary access

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3 l portals through which personnel are processed onto the site. Security force members were interviewed and observed carrying out tests of the equipment. The inspectors found no violations in the installation or operation of the access control equipment and found adequate testing procedures and schedules of testing at each of the licensed facilities at which Droga had been employed.

3. Fitness-for-Duty Program The inspectors reviewed procedures for chemical testing and also reviewed general employee and supervisory training for fitness for duty. Special attention was paid to Droga's experience (for general employee training) and to his supervisors (for

. supervisory training). The inspectors found no violations in the implementation or management of the FFD programs or in the conduct of training at the three licensed facilities at which Droga had been employed.

4. Granting of Unescorted Access Authorization

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in reviewing the information found by the licensees in conducting background screening l for Droga, the inspectors did not find sufficient reason to expect a licensee to deny !

unescorted access for him. Furthermore, after reviewing records of Droga's  !

performance and interviewing his supervisors, the inspectors concluded that there was j no basis for a licensee to revoke Droga's unescorted access authonzation.

B. Programmaticissues 1. Current Requirements Current NRC requirements would not have prevented Dregs from gaining authorization !

for unescorted access. This conclusion is bome out by the fact that licensees that complied with their commitments and the NRC's expectations concoming the granting '

of access authorization appear to have had an adequate basis to grant Droga unescorted access.

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The decision to grant unescorted access is intertwined with the decision to employ an individual. Consequently, the NRC has established no disqualifying criteria for licensees to use in deciding whether to grant unescorted access and expects the licensees to rely on required information in making their own decisions. The staff is satisfied that the three licensees did what would be expected and complied with wrent requirements and commitments in their physical security plans. The staff is also sailsfied that the licensees made reasonable decisions in deciding to grant Droga unescorted access, considering the information available to the licensees when the decisions were made.

2. New Requirements The staff considered whether additiona! background checks would provide a higher level of assurance as to an individual's integrity, such as contacts with locallaw enforcement, review of d iving records, and telephone interviews withthe applicant's

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neighbors or associates. These additional checks could uncover personal data not found in more formal records (such as employment records, psychological evaluations, and existing criminal records) and could provide the hiring licensee with new tools for evaluating personal traits and judging the appropriateness of granting unescorted access to an individual. The sta# decided that such additional checks would require the expenditure of additional resources by the licensees with no resulting quantifiable increase in assurance concoming the individual's integrity. The staff also determined that licensees might face complex legal challenges in using such information to deny access, an action that, in practical terms, would effectively deny employment.

Therefore, requiring such additional checks would not be appropriate at this time.

The staff also considered whether the conditions for granting kmporary unescorted access should be changed. The granting of temporary access, that is, authorization for )

unescorted access before a complete background investigation is completed, carries )

with it certain implied risks. However, licensees experience periodic fluctuations in site i population, including large-and short-term-increases in the site workforce during outages that necessitate quick tumaround in granting access, a need that is satisfied by the granting of temporary access by the licensees to the new hires. NUMARC 89-01, the appendix to RG 5.66, states that temporary access authorizadon will be based on (a) verification of identity, (b) psychological evaluation, (c) credit ched, (d) one developed reference, (e) the initiation of a criminal history check, and (f) a check of the applicant's employment history for the past year. When the licenses has completed those steps and considered the information obtained, it may grant temporary authorization for unescorted access to the applicant for not more than 180 days pending completion of the checks required by the access authorization program.

The staff met with Nuclear Energy institute officials to discuss the Personnel Access Data System (PADS), a computer-based system for recording background information on employees who have worked with temporary access authorization at one or more nuclear power facilities. PADS provides a corps of " pro-approved" nuclear employees whose unescorted access authorization can be granted by sucassive licensee employers who subscribe to PADS and who access it for a record of the applicant's history in the industry. This system, when it is futy operational and reaches 100 j percent subscription by the nucisar power industry, could provide substantial savings in

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time and morte/ ni the access authorization program, as well as an increase in the overall assurance that temporary employees are trustworthy and reliable.

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Considering the progress being made to implement PADS, the staff recommends no l. changes to the agency's approach to grants of temporary unescorted access at this i time. If PADS does not reach full subscription, if future incidents in temporary acesss l warrant, or if conditions in the industry's appi cation of access authorization change, the I staff will reconsider this position and determine whether new requirements are t necessary.

IV. Recommendations A. Current Requirements

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The sta# recommends no changes to current requirements at this time.

B. New Requirements The sta# recommends no new requirements at this time.

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