IR 05000293/1980018
| ML19330A467 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 05/22/1980 |
| From: | Jerrica Johnson, Martin T, Roberts K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19330A463 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-293-80-18, NUDOCS 8007280262 | |
| Download: ML19330A467 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No.
50-293/80-18 Docket No.
50-293 License.'o.
DPR-35 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Boston Edison Company
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800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199 Facility Name:
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection at:
Plymouth, Massachusetts Inspection conducte -
April 22-30, 1980 Inspectors:
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M nson d eactor Inspe6t'or date signed M4av
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date signed f/ 2 /g-t)
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T. T. Martin, Chief, Reactor Projects date signed Section #3, RO&NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on Aoril 22-30, 1980 (Report No. 50-293/80-18)
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Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of Refueling Maintenance, licensee plans for coping with strikes, and High Energy pipe break analysis (HPCI).
The inspection involved 58 inspector-hours onsite by one region based and one resident inspector.
Results: One item of noncompliance was identified (Deficiency - failure to control foreign material in accordance with maintenance procedure requirements, paragraph 2).
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted E. Cobb, Chief Operating Engineer R. Cox, Sr., Engineer (Private Consultant)
J. Fulton, Licensing Engineer (Corporate)
R. Machon, Assistant Station Manager
- C. Mathis, Methods, Training, and Compliance Group Leaa r
- P. McGuire, Station Manager
- R. Sevigny, Chief Maintenance Engineer R. Silva, Staff Engineer-Mechanical T. Smith, Staff Engineer (Crouse Company)
The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel including members of the maintenance, QC, health physics, security, and operations staff.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Refueling Maintenance a.
Scope. The licensee's activities in the area of refueling maintenance were reviewed to determine compliance with regulatory requirements including Technical Specifications and the Licensee's administrative and maintenance procedures. The inspection included tours and witness-ing of maintenance activities at selected work areas.
This review was performed to verify that maintenance activities included
the following items:
administrative approvals for work and assurance that LC0's are
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provisions for QC inspections and control of material quality;
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provisions for testing following maintenance;
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requirements for special authorization /firewatch for hot work;
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provisions for control of housekeeping / foreign material exclusion;
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provisions for realigning systems following maintenance, and
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provisions for assuring the qualification of personnel perform-
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ing the work.
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The specific items subject to this review are listed below.
1.
Reactor Vessel Drain Line Modification PDCR 79-22, Reactor Vessel Drain Line Modification,
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February 29, 1980 QC Receipt Inspection P.O. 19212/QC Inspection Report
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1-80-78 Material certification
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Maintenance Request 80-4534
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Weld / welder qualifications
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Safety Evaluation No. 698
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Safety - Relief Valves (SRVs)
PDCR 80-4, SRV Top Works Modification, March 7, 1980
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Maintenance Request 80-2; maintenance summary sheets
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6.E. Field Disposition Instruction 172-78003, January 23,
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1980 Target Rock Corp. - SRV Retrofit Instructions, December 11,
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1979 Material certifications /QC receipt inspection reports
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Safety Evaluation
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Feed Water Check Valves PDCR 77-47, Feed Water Check Valve Overhaul, August 11, 1977
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Safety Evaluation
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Material Test Report
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Welder qualifications
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T.P. 80-38, Feed Water Check Valve Overhaul, March 27, 1980
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b.
Acceptance Criteria. The items above were reviewed with respect to the following requirements:
Technical Specifications
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Facility Procedures
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1.5.3, Maintenance Requests, January 25, 1980 1.3.13, Plant Design Changes, February 28, 1980 1.3.4, Procedures, May 2, 1979 ANSI N18.7-1972
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Findings. One item of noncompliance and one item to be reviewed in a future inspection are described below.
(1) The licensee used TP 80-38, Feed Water Check Valve Overhaul, March 27, 1980, to overhaul the two outboard valves (62N, 628)
and add a soft seal to improve leakage characteristics. The inboard valves (58A, 58B) were also opened and the internals (which were similarly modified during the last refueling outage)
were inspected.
The inspectors toured the work area on April 24, 1980, at which time the four check valves were in various stages of reassembly.
The inspectors observed that.there were no covers placed over openings in the valves and there was no tool control log in effect.
The maintenance supervisor stated that procedure TP 80-38 required visual inspections and signature verification that the valve internals and conditions were satisfactory prior to closing the system boundaries.
The inspector determined that the required inspections had been performed prior to closing the system boundaries by reviewing signature verifications on the maintenance procedures for each check valve.
The inspector stated that, although there was no evidence of foreign material in the valve internals inspected and the required visual inspections were performed prior to closing the system, i
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Proceduie TP 80-38,Section VI, Precautions B and J, required that valve openings be covered and a tool control log be maintained.
This failure to follow procedure is considered an item of noncom-pliance at the deficiency level (50-293/80-18-01).
(2) The inspectors observed that the four Main Steam SRV's were wait-ing to be reinstalled after being modified to accept 2-stage top works.
At the completion of this inspection the licensee had not prepared /
approved procedures for the reinstallation of the top works / solenoid, electrical testing for continuity / grounds, and any necessary QC inspections required by the station QC staff or the vendor instruc-tions included in the approved PDCR package.
The inspector stated that the completion of this maintenance item will be reviewed in a future inspection (50-293/80-18-02).
3.
Licensee Plans for Cooing With Strikes a.
Scope. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's plans for coping with strikes to determine whether adequate preparations had been made.
Items reviewed included the following:
number and type of personnel affected
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plant staffing in the areas of management, operations, mainte-
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nance, chemistry, health physics, and security refresher training for licensed and non-licensed personnel
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arrangements.with local support activities for consumable and
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medical treatment arrangments with local law enforcement agencies
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availability of on-site and off-site personnel to implement
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the emergency plan and operate necessary comunications and survey equipment, b.
Acceptance Criteria. This review was performed eith respect to the criteria in thf70Tiowing:
Technical Specifications
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10 CFR 55
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Findings. No items of noncompliance were identified.
The inspectors determined that the licensee had begun to make contin-gency assignments for plant staffing in the event of a strike of non-management personnel (with the exception of security guards) on or about May 15, 1980.
The inspectors determined that adequate plans had been made in the area of plant staffing.
Refresher training was in progress in various areas for both licensed and non-licensed personnel.
Arrangements had been made with off-site support agencies with the exception of medical ambulance services.
The licensee stated that the appropriate agency would be contacted to ensure that ambulance services would be available.
The inspector had no further questions.
4.
High Energy Steam Line Break Analysis a.
Scope. On April 18, 1980, the inspector informed the licensee of notification by Bechtel to Philadelphia Electric Company (Peach Bottom, Units 2 and 3) of a possible overpressure transient in the HPCI valve isolation rooms that could be caused by a HPCI steam line break.
The inspectors reviewed this potential problem with the licensee management and included the following items:
Actions taken in response to LER 79-19, dated July 18, 1979,
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in which Boston Edison Company reported a similar notification by Bechtel of a possible overpressure condition in the torus compartment if the HPCI steam line should break.
Licensee plans for protection against failure of concrete block
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walls subsequent to overpressurization due to a HPCI steam line pipe break.
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Acceptance Criteria.
This review was performed with respect to the requirements of the following:
Facility License and Technical Specifications
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Station Procedures
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8.5.4.1, HPCI Pump Operation and Flow Test at 1000 psig.,
February 11, 1979 8.5.4.3, HPCI Flow Rate Test at 150 psig., February 11, 1979 2.2.21, HPCI System, March 31, 1980 c.
Findings. No items of noncompliance were identified, however, two unresolved items are described below.
(1) LER 79-19 reported that one of the actions taken to resolve the issue of a possible overpressure condition on the torus compart-ment was to " maintain the HPCI inboard steam supply valve at 90%
closed position."
The inspectors reviewed monthly HPCI surveillance test 8.5.4.1 results from July,1979 to December,1979 and determined that the outboard HPCI steam supply valve no. 2301-5 (D.C. power) was being maintained at the 10% open position instead of the inboard valve no. 2301-4 (A.C. powered). The inspectors also observed a caution tag on the outboard valve no. 2301-5 control switch in the control room which stated to leave the valve at the 10% open position. The HPCI system normal operating procedure 2.2.21, March 31, 1980, had not been revised to reflect this condition.
The licensee stated that a revision to LER 79-19 would be issued to clarify that the outboard steam supply valve was to be kept at the 10% open position and that procedure 2.2.21 would be revised to reflect this normal position.
Pending review by NRC personnel of the above actions, this item is unresolved (50-293/80-18-03).
(2) The licensee stated that protection for possible overpressurization of rooms / areas with concrete block walls was being investigated in conjunction with the response to IEB 79-01B.
The licensee stated that action would be taken prior to plant startup following refueling to prevent the possibility of con-crete block walls from becoming missile hazards and may include the installation of wire mesh doors inplace of the existing solid louvered doors. The licensee's actions will include a review of fire protection, health physics, and security aspects of any chang.. _ _ _
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Pending review by NRC personnel of the licensee's actions as described above, this item is unresolved (50-293/80-18-04).
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Unresolved Items Unresolved items are items about which more information is needed to determine acceptability.
Paragraphs 2.c and 4.c contain unresolved items.
6.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on April 30, 1980.
The inspectors sum-marized the purpose, scope, and inspection findings.
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