IR 05000293/1980009
| ML19331E347 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1980 |
| From: | Kehoe D, Martin T, Roberts K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19331E346 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-293-80-09, 50-293-80-9, NUDOCS 8009100038 | |
| Download: ML19331E347 (9) | |
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V U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-293/80-09 Docket No. 50-293 License No. DPR-35 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Boston Edison Company 800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199 Facility Name:
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Inspection at:
Plymouth, Massachusetts Inspection conducted:
March 3-21, 1980 Inspectors:
)su /. b A 6//2 /FO D.'Kehoe,Qteactor Insllector d' ate ' signed
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h b//*/80 K.L(tobertsVReactor Inhpector date signed date signed Approved by:
d//AMd T. T. Martin, Chief, RPS #3, RO&NS date signed Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on March 3-21, 1980 (Report No. 50-293/80-09)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by two region bassd in-spectors (240 hours0.00278 days <br />0.0667 hours <br />3.968254e-4 weeks <br />9.132e-5 months <br />) of Plant Operations, Short Term Lessons Learned Imple-mentation and Followup to the Fuel Handling Event of March 8, 1980.
Plant tours were conducted.
Noncompliances: Of the three areas inspected, r.a items of noncompliance were identified in two areas and four items,of noncompliance in one area.
(Violation -
movement of irradiated fuel without secondary containment integrity; Infraction -
l failure to implement the requirements of the station fuel handling procedure; Infraction - failure to operate the emergency electrical power systems with an approved procedure; Deficiency - failure ~to log plant evolutions as required by station procedures - Paragraph 3).
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
.8009100 O 5E
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted J. Aboltin, Reactor Engineer G. Andognini, Manager Nuclear Operations Departnent R. Atkins, Chief Electrical Engineer
- E. Cobb, Chief Operating Engineer M. Hensch, Chief Radiological Engineer E. Kearney, Operations and Construction Quality Control Group Leader R. Machon, Assistant Station Manager
- C. Mathis, Methods, Training and Compliance Group Leader
- P. McGuire, Station Manager W. Olsen, Training Supervisor W. Sides, Quality Assurance Manager R. Silva, Chief Maintenance Engineer
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- G. Whitney, Plant Engineer Other Persons F. Archibald, Canmonwealth of Massachusetts Industrial Radiation Control Supervisor The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees including members of the technical, engineering, and operations staff.
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- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Procedure and Training Reviews a.
References:
5.3.16, Loss of Coolant Accident with no Pipe. Break, Revision 1,
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October 10, 1979
5.4.2, Pipe Break Inside the Primary Containment, Revision 5,
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December 20, 1979
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l 5.4.4, Pipe Break Inside the Reactor Building, Revision 5,
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December 20, 1979 5.4.5, Pipe Break Outside Secondary Containment, Revision 6,
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December 20, 1979
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b.
Procedure' Review
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The inspector reviewed the procedures referenced in paragraph 2.a against the General Electric guidelines which had been approved by tho-Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). The following portions of the procedures were reviewed for clarity with respect to operator actions and precautions, flow with respect to the initiation of those actions and consistancy with the guidelines.
Symptoms
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Automatic Actions
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Immediate Actions
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Subsequent Actions
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Precautions
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The following comments represents the inspector's concerns relative to the above review.
(1) Procedure 5.3.16 was considered by the licensee not to be a small
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. Break Toss of coolant accident (LOCA) procedure. The inspector j
stated that the symptoms which would cause this procedure to be
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used were very similiar to that of his small break LOCA procedures and could lead to confusion.- Further, the subsequent actions of
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this procedure contained a discussion of how to vent the torus air space to the Augmented Off Gas (A0G) System which was not in sufficient detail for reliable perfonnance.
The licensee acknow-ledged the inspectors comments and stated that he felt a need to have a procedure for venting the air space of the torus to the A0G. The licensee further stated that the procedure would be-revised to specify ORC chairman approval to use the venting procedure and that this procedure would be reviewed in conjunc-tion with the small break LOCA procedures and during this review it would be emphasized when to use this procedure. The inspector had no further comments.
(2) The inspectors noted that three (3) of the required precautions from the guidelines were not included in the small break LOCA procedures (5.4.2, 5.4.4 and 5.4.5).
The licensee acknowledged the inspectors comments and stated that these procedures would be
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Prior to the end of the inspection, the inspector did review draft revisions of the above procedures with the specified changes. The inspectors had no further comments.
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c.
Training Review The inspectors reviewed the training program utilized by the licensee to train the operations personnel to the small break LOCA procedures.
The inspector noted that training relative to the small break LOCA procedures was to be conducted in two phases.
Phase I a s a walk through of the procedures by the shift supervisor with the operations personnel on that shift. The inspectors reviewed documentation ar.d held discussions with operators to verify that this had occurred. The adequacy of this training will be discussed in paragraph 2.d.
The second phase of this training is to be fomal classroom training between the Chief Operating Engineer or his designate and the opera-tions personnel. This classroom training would be conducted during the next requalification training for the operators and would be completed prior to January 1,1981.
d.
Operator Interviews The inspectors interviewed five (5) licensed operators (one staff SRO, one Watch Engineer SRO, one Operations Supervisor SRO, and, two Con-trol Room Operators R0's) to detemine the effectiveness of the walk through training by virtue of the extent of the operators knowledge and comprehension of the procedures; and, to determine the oper.stors professional opinion concerning the training received and the use-ability of the procedures.
The inspectors r.oted that the individuals interviewed demonstrated a good knowledge of the procedures including procedure selection, immediate actions, and subsequent actior.s.
The inspectors did note several areas where additional emphasis would be warranted.
The licensee acknowledged the inspectors comments and stated that t h e areas would be reemphasized in t special training session between the shift supervisors and the operations personnel prior to startup.
Feedback from the operators relative to training on the small break LOCA procedures and to their useability was favorable.
The indivi-duals considered the procedures to be clear, concise and comprehensive.
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Plant' Specific Review The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation had approved the GE Guide-lines for dealing with a small break LOCA.
The inspector reviewed plant specifics such as systems, logic, and instrumentation to ensure that the requirements of the guidelines could be implemented with the plant specifics associated with Pilgrim Nuclear Power Statio _
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The inspectors reviewed the following:
The instrumentation required by the guidelines against the
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instrumentation available or planned to be available at the
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plant.
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Redundancy of instrumentation such that there would always be
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sufficient instrumentation to comply with the guidelines, even if a total loss of offsite power concurrent with the loss of a diesel were to occur.
The logic associated with drywell and torus sumps on a contain-
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ment isolation such that these sumps would not auto-start on a containment isolation signal reset.
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Procedures for switchover between condensate storage tank and the
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suppression pool were in place and adequate to preclude a loss of
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a source of water to the safety systems.
Based upon the above review, the inspectors found the plant specifics at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station to be consistent with the GE Guide-line requirements.
3.
Fuel Handling Event On March 8, 1980, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station commenced irradiated fuel movement within the spent fuel pool without secondary containment and with the auto close feature of both diesel generator output breakers bypassed.
At approximately 3:00 PM on March 8,1980,.the licensee realized that irradiated fuel movement had occurred in violation of. Technical Specifica-tion 3.7.C.l.
At this time, the NRC was notified of the event via the Emergency Notification System telephone and the licensee placed an admini-strative hold on further fuel movement.
On March 10, 1980, the project inspector arrived onsite to evaluate the conditions which led to the above event; at this time the hold on fuel movement was still in place.
After a preliminary evaluation, the inspector determined that the refueling floor SR0 had accomplished the fuel movement without being fully knowledge-
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able of plant conditions, without informing the "on-duty" Watch Engineer and without the associated procedure, he inspector interviewed the two involved licensed individuals, who confirmed these facts.
Upon completion of fuel movement, the "on-duty" Watch Engineer had been notified of the occurrence.
The "on-duty" Watch Engineer did not realize that the technical specifications and the procedure (4.3, Fuel Handling)
had been violated. The inspector also noted that neither the movement of fuel nor the NRC notification had been logged in the station operating log.
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The inspector determined that Secondary Containment Integrity had been
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demonstrated at the beginning of the refueling outage, prior to off-loading the core to the spent fuel pool.
Subsequently, holes were drilled through the Secondary Containment wall for the installation of new piping, Secondary t
Containment isolation valves were repaired, Reactor Building sumps providing
loop seals were drained, and Secondary containment seams were re-caulked.
Secondary Containment Integrity was not verified following these activities, prior to irradiated fuel movement on March 8,1980.
Further, it took the
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" licensee until March 21, 1980, to find and repair all leaks which prevented demonstration _ of Secondary Containment Integrity.
The inspector determined that at the time of the event all four 4160v busses were cross connected and being supplied from the 23 Ky line; in lieu of the 345 Kv offsite power lines, which were down for maintenance.
In support of this lineup, the auto close feature on both diesel generator output breakers were bypassed to prevent their closing on the bus out of phase with the 23 KV lines, which had no under voltage protection.
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there was no procedure for the existing electrical lineup.
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Based upon the above information the licensee was issued an immediate
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j action letter, which required the following prior to recommencing fuel
movement.-
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The electrical lineup be returned to normal and the auto close feature
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of the diesel generator output breakers be verified.
Secondary Containment be established and verified.
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All operations personnel be trained in the event and those actions
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taken to preclude recurrence.
hRC confirmation that the above had been accomplished.
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The inspect 3rs physically observed the satisfactory completion of the above
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o items and tien with concurrence of Region I, released the licensee from the j
NRC hold on fuel movement.
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Technical Spacification 3.7.C.1 requires that secondary containment integrity
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be maintained when moving irradiated fuel.
The movement of irradiated fuel
without secondary containment is a violation level item of noncompliance.
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(50-293/80-09-01)
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Technical Specification 6.8.A requires that procedures shall be established
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and implemented.
Procedure 1.3.4, " Procedures", states that procedures shall be used.
Contrary to the above, the station electrical lineup was i
not covered by procedure and procedure 4.3, " Fuel Handling," was not used
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to move the irradiated fuel.
These are infraction level items of noncompliance.
(50-293/80-09-02 and 80-09-03)
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- Procedure 1.3.7, " Records", requires the Operating Supervisor and Control Room Operator to-log in the Station Operations Log a minute by minute account of the operation of the plant and that this should include every-thing that is' happening _in the plant. 'The failure to log the movement of-irradiated fuel'in the spent. fuel-pool on March 8.1980, once the Reactor c
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Building Refueling Floor Senior Licensed Operator notified the "on-duty" Watch Engineer of the completed operation, and the additional failures to log the recognized violation of T.S. 3.7.C.1 and the notification of NRC, later that day, is a deficiency level item of noncompliance.
(50-293/80-09-04)
4.
Review of' Plant Operations a.
Plant Tours The inspectors conducted tours of the accessible plant areas listed below at various times to observe the status of plant systems and the activities in progress. The plant areas toured included the control room, the secondary alarm station, the 4160v switchgear room, the battery rooms, the cable spreading room, the chemistry lab, the turbine building, the auxiliary bay, the transverse incore probe room, the torus and torus room, the reactor building, refueling floor, the pumphouse, and the protected area perimeter.
The following were among the items observed.
Radiation controls properly established;
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Housekeeping, including attention to the elimination of fire
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hazards; No fluid leaks of significance;
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The condition of hangers and seismic restraints;
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Status of preselected jumpers;
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Equipment tagging for compliance with administrati"e require-
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ments; Control room and refueling floor manning in accordance with
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technical specification requirements; Inspection tags on fire extinguishers, no obstruction of fire
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hoses, etc.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
b.
Review of Operating Records The inspector reviewed the following logs and records:
Chief Operating Engineers Log, February 15, 1980 to March 20,
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Station Operations Log, December 15, 1979 to March 20, 1980.
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Jumper and Lifted Leads Log, all active entries.
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Watch Engineers Tagout Log, all active entries and all tags
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cleared between February 15, 1980 and March 15, 1980.
Plant Tagout Log, all active entires and all cleared tagouts
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between February 15, 1980 and March 15, 1980.
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Refueling Floor Log, January 10, 1980 to March 20, 1980.
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- Failure and Malfunction Reports, December 1,1979 to March 10,
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1980.
The logs and records were reviewed to verify that:
Log sheet entries were properly filled out.
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Operating orders do not conflict with the intent of technical
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specifications.
Log reviews were being conducted by the staff.
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Jumper log entries to not conflict with technical specifications.
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NRC reporting requirements are being satisfied.
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Plant operations are in conformance with the Limiting Conditions
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for Operations (LC0's) of the technical specifications.
The failure to comply with several of the requirements listed above were identified in conjunction with the fuel handling event and are discussed in Paragraph 3; other than these, no items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Short Term Lessons Learned Implementation Meeting During the course of the inspection, a meeting was held at the station between the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Boston Edison Company to discuss the plans for implementing the category A requirements of NUREG-0578, Short Term Lessons Learned, at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. The l
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inspector did attend the meeting and provided plant specific infomation to the NRC staff. The tentative conclusion reached by the NRC staff as a result of the meeting was, that BECo's implementation of NUREG-0578 as proposed was acceptable with the exception of containment isolation reset and post accident sampling. The inspector was informed subsequent to the inspection that BEco and the NRC staff had.tenatively determined an accept-able proposal for containment isolation reset and post accident sampling.
Further, the BECo staff agreed to provide a written submittal of the pro-posal for implementing NUREG-0578 approximately two weeks prior to start'up.
6.
Jet Pump Holddown Bar Ultrasonic Testing On March 3, 1980 the inspector informed the licensee of a reported jet pump failure at Dresden Unit 3.
The licensee was already aware of the failure and the conditions which led to its identification. The inspector further stated that the failure was a result of a fractured holddown bar. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors statement.
On March 18, 1980, the inspector was informed that Dresden Unit 3 had completed an Ultrasonic Test (UT) of their jet pump holddown bars and had identified indications of up'to 20 mils in six of the nineteen jet pumps, Quad City Unit 2 which had similiar results also had a through wall crack.
It was further noted that a visual examination would not have identified these cracks. The inspector was requested to obtain a schedule for UT of jet pump holddown bars at Pilgrim.
The inspector presented the above infomation to the licensee and requested the licensee's position relative to performing the UT. The licensee stated that he had performed a 100% visual inspection during the existing outage and in his opinion that was sufficient. The licensee was subsequently informed that there would be a bulletin forthcoming which would require all jet pump plants in the refueling mode to perform this UT. The licensee acknowledged the statement and stated that he would perform the UT prior to startup.
On March 27, 1980 the licensee completed the above testing and stated that there were three holddown bars with indications and the plant had four holddown bars on order and intended to replace these three prior to start-up. The inspector had no further questions at this time.
7.
Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on March 21, 1980. The inspector summarized the purpose, scope and findings of the inspection.
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