IR 05000289/1972012
| ML20101S370 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/19/1972 |
| From: | Burzi A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Howard E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20099A192 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-96-207 NUDOCS 9609030205 | |
| Download: ML20101S370 (2) | |
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UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
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.G D4 RECTOR A TE OP' REG U LA TO RY OPE R A TaONS
REGION 9
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY 07102 SEP is 1972
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e E. M. Howard, Senior Reactor Inspector Directorate'of Regulatory Operations, Region I INSPECTOR'S EVALUATION METROPOLITAN EDISON CO.
THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 1 RO REPORT NO. 289/72-12 We inspected slorage areas, quarantine areas, flood damage, work performed and records, all pertinent to the electrical and instrumentation portion of the installation.
It was hoped that work in progress relating to safety-related cable pulling might be observed, but none was scheduled during the inspection.
The Applicant did promise to alert RO when safety-related ca-ble pulling was-to be performed.
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The Applicant, presently, does not verify cable pulled. They say they plan to, and have procured a H-P beeper, but need to develop procedures for its use and acquire a satisfactory probe.
i From a population of safety-related cables pulled, connected, inspected, but not energized, we selected some for RO inspection and tried to verify these h'
in the field.
It was a very unsatisfactory operation.
- They seem to have all cables tied down every six feet or so.
Cables are identified by tags at critical points in their journey (i.e. when entering trays or when entering or leaving cabinets). These tags are fragile (their new tags are hardier) and are easily torn off. Since the cables are tied, you can't pull, jiggle or otherwise vibrate a cable to locate it at both ends of a tray or at a junction. Many ties had to be cut to seek out the cable's tag and more often than not the tag was missing. We urged the Applicant to firm up the electronic means for cable verification since RO had to ver-ify a suitable sample and we didn't want to rip out half the plant in order to do so.
They seemed to have slackened off a bit on their vigilance in regard to quarantined storage.
Their terminal array design below the control room leaves much to be desired.
I've never seen such a chintzy set up.
The terminal strips are mounted on uni-struts alongside cable t. rays just below the ceiling in the cable spread-9609030205 960815 PDR FOIA i
DEKOK96-207 PDR
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-2-ing room. The terminals are all exposed, subject to all sorts of hazards
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during construction and also during maintenance operations.
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Record keeping seems to be better organized now. New records are also in-stantly retrievable whereas those over a year old require considerable
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search. New records are serially numbered and recorded whereas the old
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records are searched by date and subject and subject matter.
5 Licensing should be asked'for their view of the following:
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Is the loss of a three-light display (only two of which are on at all times) adjacent to a circuit breaker switch mounted on the
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console sufficient.information for the control room operator to'in-fer that he has lost control de on vital circuit breakers?
Is not
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i a window on the annunciator preferable?
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2.
The Applicant has decided to leave uncovered a series of terminal
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arrays located in the cable spreading room below the console. This
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j action would expose the terminals to whatever hazards remain to the
end of construction and to additional hazards encountered during l
_-troubleshooting and maintenance. They feel that the arrays are (
i high enough off the floor to put them out of reach of meandering
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personnel. We feel that exposed terminals are never out of reach.
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We should ask the Applicant to clarify his separations criteria. He a
feels that the terminal array is an extension of the console even
though located in the room below and that, therefore, he need not sa-tisfy criteria established for trays. However, even his redundant ~
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tray criteria is fuzzy. Paragraph 8.2.2.12e gives several different figures with the implication that if the separation between redundant f
channels is 12 inches or less then a barrier is used. This paragraph t
is not specific enough.
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The U-shaped control console's interior (about 25 feet long) is
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without barriers, baffles or fire detectors. It is completely open from one end to the other.
It would seem that a small fire could i
wipe out the entire console.
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A. Vincent rzi
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Reactor Ins tor I
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