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Category:Inspection Report
MONTHYEARIR 05000269/20243012024-09-23023 September 2024 NRC Operator License Examination Report 05000269/2024301, 05000270/2024301, and 05000287/2024301 IR 05000269/20240052024-08-26026 August 2024 Updated Inspection Plan for Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 (Report 05000269/2024005, 05000270/2024005, and 05000287-2024005) IR 05000269/20240102024-08-0101 August 2024 Focused Engineering Inspection - Age-Related Degradation Report 05000269/2024010 and 05000270/2024010 and 05000287/2024010 IR 05000269/20240022024-07-25025 July 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2024002 and 05000270/2024002 and 05000287/2024002 IR 05000269/20240012024-05-0303 May 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2024001, 05000270/2024001 and 05000287/2024001 IR 05000269/20244022024-04-24024 April 2024 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000269/2024402 and 05000270/2024402 and 05000287/2024402 IR 05000269/20244012024-03-28028 March 2024 – Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000269-2024401 and 05000270-2024401 and 05000287-2024401 IR 05000269/20230062024-02-28028 February 2024 Annual Assessment Letter for Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2 and 3 - (NRC Inspection Report 05000269/2023006, 05000270/2023006, and 05000287/2023006) IR 05000269/20230042024-02-13013 February 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2023004, 05000270/2023004, and 05000287/2023004; and Inspection Report 07200040/2023001 ML23331A7982023-12-14014 December 2023 Review of the Fall 2022 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report (01R32) IR 05000269/20230032023-11-14014 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2023003, 05000270/2023003, and 05000287/2023003; and IR 07200040/2023001; and Exercise of Enforcement Discretion IR 05000269/20230112023-08-25025 August 2023 Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection Report 05000269/2023011 and 05000270/2023011 and 05000287/2023011 IR 05000269/20230052023-08-25025 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2 and 3 (Report 05000269/2023005, 05000270/2023005, and 05000287/2023005) IR 05000269/20230022023-07-28028 July 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2023002, 05000270/2023002 and 05000287/2023002 IR 05000269/20230102023-07-19019 July 2023 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000269/2023010 and 05000270/2023010 and 05000287/2023010 and Notice of Violation RA-23-0128, Refuel 32 (O1R32) Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report2023-05-18018 May 2023 Refuel 32 (O1R32) Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report IR 05000269/20230012023-05-12012 May 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2023001 and 05000270/2023001 and 05000287/2023001 IR 05000269/20234012023-04-14014 April 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000269 2023401 and 05000270 2023401 and 05000287 2023401 IR 05000269/20220062023-03-0101 March 2023 Annual Assessment Letter for Oconee Nuclear Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 (NRC Inspection Report 05000269/2022006, 05000270/2022006, and 05000287/2022006) ML23037A0772023-02-0606 February 2023 402 Cyber Notification and RFI Letter Final IR 05000269/20220042023-02-0202 February 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269 2022004 and 05000270/2022004 and 05000287/2022004 IR 05000269/20220032022-11-0707 November 2022 Integrated Inspection Station 05000269/2022003 and 05000270/2022003 and 05000287/2022003 IR 05000269/20220112022-09-26026 September 2022 NRC Inspection Report 05000269/2022011 and 05000270/2022011 and 05000287/2022011 IR 05000269/20224012022-08-26026 August 2022 Material Control and Accounting Program Inspection Report 05000269/2022401 and 05000270/2022401 and 05000287/2022401 (OUO Removed) IR 05000269/20220052022-08-26026 August 2022 Updated Inspection Plan for Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 - NRC Inspection Report 05000269/2022005, 05000270/2022005, and 05000287/2022005 IR 05000270/20220022022-07-29029 July 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/ 2022002 and 05000270/2022002 and 05000287/2022002 IR 05000269/20220102022-06-30030 June 2022 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000269/2022010 and 05000270/2022010 and 05000287/2022010 IR 05000269/20224032022-05-0404 May 2022 Security Baseline Target Set Inspection Report 05000269/2022403 and 05000270/2022403 and 05000287/2022403 IR 05000269/20220012022-05-0404 May 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2022001, 05000270/2022001 and 05000287/2022001 IR 05000269/20224042022-04-27027 April 2022 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000269/2022404 and 05000270/2022404 and 05000287/2022404 IR 05000269/20223012022-03-0707 March 2022 Notification of Licensed Operator Initial Examination 05000269/2022301, 05000270/2022301 and 05000287/2022301 IR 05000269/20210062022-03-0202 March 2022 Annual Assessment Letter for Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (Report 05000269/2021006, 05000270/2021006, and 05000287/2021006) IR 05000269/20220122022-02-24024 February 2022 Safety Conscious Work Environment Issue of Concern Followup Report 05000269/2022012 and 05000270/2022012 and 05000287/2022012 IR 05000269/20224022022-02-16016 February 2022 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000269/2022402 and 05000270/2022402 and 05000287/2022402 IR 05000269/20210042022-02-14014 February 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2021004 and 05000270/2021004 and 05000287/2021004 and Apparent Violation IR 05000269/20210032021-10-28028 October 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2021003 and 05000270/2021003 and 05000287/2021003 IR 05000269/20210102021-09-17017 September 2021 Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Programs) Inspection Report 05000269/2021010 and 05000270/2021010 and 05000287/2021010 IR 05000269/20210052021-08-26026 August 2021 Updated Inspection Plan for Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 (NRC Inspection Report 05000269/2021005, 05000270/2021005, and 05000287/2021005) IR 07200004/20210012021-08-26026 August 2021 Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Report 07200004/2021001 IR 05000269/20210022021-08-0404 August 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2021002 and 05000270/2021002 and 05000287/2021002 IR 05000269/20213012021-07-0606 July 2021 NRC Operator License Examination Report 05000269/2021301, 05000270/2021301, and 05000287/2021301 IR 05000269/20210112021-06-0202 June 2021 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000269/2021011 and 05000270/2021011 and 05000287/2021011 IR 05000269/20210012021-04-23023 April 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2021001 and 05000270/2021001 and 05000287/2021001 IR 05000269/20214012021-04-22022 April 2021 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000269/2021401, 05000270/2021401 and 05000287/2021401 (U) IR 05000269/20200062021-03-0303 March 2021 Annual Assessment Letter for Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, & 3 NRC Inspection Report 05000269/2020006, 05000270/2020006, & 05000287/2020006 IR 05000269/20200042021-02-22022 February 2021 Reissue- Oconee Nuclear Station Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2020004, 05000270/2020004, 05000287/2020004 ML21036A0012021-02-0404 February 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2020004 and 05000270/2020004 and 05000287/2020004 IR 05000269/20200102021-01-22022 January 2021 NRC Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Team) Report 05000269/2020010 and 05000270/2020010 and 05000287/2020010 and Notice of Violation IR 05000269/20204012020-11-13013 November 2020 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000269/2020401 and 05000270/2020401 and 05000287/2020401 IR 05000269/20200032020-11-0404 November 2020 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2020003, 05000270/2020003, 05000287/2020003, and 07200004/2020002 2024-09-23
[Table view] Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 05000269/20243012024-09-23023 September 2024 NRC Operator License Examination Report 05000269/2024301, 05000270/2024301, and 05000287/2024301 IR 05000269/20240052024-08-26026 August 2024 Updated Inspection Plan for Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 (Report 05000269/2024005, 05000270/2024005, and 05000287-2024005) ML24145A1782024-08-26026 August 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 430, 432, and 431, to TS 5.5.2, Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program for a one-time Extension of the Type a Leak Rate Test Frequency ML24220A1092024-08-0808 August 2024 – Operator Licensing Examination Approval 05000269/2024301, 05000270/2024301, and 05000287/2024301 05000287/LER-2024-001, Procedure Deficiency Results in Inadvertent Automatic Feedwater Isolation and Automatic Emergency Feedwater Actuation2024-08-0202 August 2024 Procedure Deficiency Results in Inadvertent Automatic Feedwater Isolation and Automatic Emergency Feedwater Actuation IR 05000269/20240102024-08-0101 August 2024 Focused Engineering Inspection - Age-Related Degradation Report 05000269/2024010 and 05000270/2024010 and 05000287/2024010 IR 05000269/20240022024-07-25025 July 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2024002 and 05000270/2024002 and 05000287/2024002 ML24192A1312024-07-15015 July 2024 Licensed Operator Positive Fitness-For-Duty Test ML24183A0972024-07-12012 July 2024 ISFSI; Catawba 1, 2 & ISFSI; McGuire 1, 2 & ISFSI; Oconee 1, 2, 3 & ISFSI; Shearon Harris 1; H. B. Robinson 2 & ISFSI; and Radioactive Package Shipping Under 10 CFR 71 (71-266 & 71-345) – Review of QA Program Changes EPID L-2024-LLQ-0002 ML24183A2352024-06-29029 June 2024 Update 3 to Interim Report Regarding a Potential Defect with Schneider Electric Medium Voltage Vr Type Circuit Breaker Part Number V5D4133Y000 ML24179A1102024-06-27027 June 2024 Submittal of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Revision 30, Technical Specifications Bases Revisions, Selected Licensee Commitment Revisions, 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation Summary Report, and 10 CFR 54.37 Update, and Notification ML24141A0482024-05-17017 May 2024 EN 56958_1 Ametek Solidstate Controls, Inc IR 05000269/20240012024-05-0303 May 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2024001, 05000270/2024001 and 05000287/2024001 IR 05000269/20244022024-04-24024 April 2024 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000269/2024402 and 05000270/2024402 and 05000287/2024402 ML24108A0792024-04-16016 April 2024 EN 57079 Paragon Energy Solutions Email Forwarding Part 21 Interim Report Re Potential Defect with Schneider Electric Medium Voltage Vr Type Circuit Breaker Part Number V5D4133Y000 IR 05000269/20244012024-03-28028 March 2024 – Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000269-2024401 and 05000270-2024401 and 05000287-2024401 ML24088A3052024-03-25025 March 2024 Fws to NRC, Agreement with Nlaa Determination for Tricolored Bat for Oconee Lr IR 05000269/20230062024-02-28028 February 2024 Annual Assessment Letter for Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2 and 3 - (NRC Inspection Report 05000269/2023006, 05000270/2023006, and 05000287/2023006) ML24045A3082024-02-16016 February 2024 Ltr. to Ralph Oxendine Chief Sumter Tribe of Cheraw Indians Re Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Section 106 ML24045A2962024-02-16016 February 2024 Ltr. to David Hill Principal Chief Muscogee Creek Nation Re Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Section 106 ML24045A2972024-02-16016 February 2024 Ltr. to Dexter Sharp Chief Piedmont American Indian Assoc Re Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Section 106 ML24045A3012024-02-16016 February 2024 Ltr. to Harold Hatcher Chief the Waccamaw Indian People Re Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Section 106 ML24045A3052024-02-16016 February 2024 Ltr. to Louis Chavis Chief Beaver Creek Indians Re Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Section 106 ML24045A3022024-02-16016 February 2024 Ltr. to Joe Bunch United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Ok Re Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Section 106 ML24045A3032024-02-16016 February 2024 Ltr. to John Creel Chief Edisto Natchez-Kusso Tribe of Sc Re Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Section 106 ML24045A3042024-02-16016 February 2024 Ltr. to Lisa M. Collins Chief the Wassamasaw Tribe of Varnertown Indians Re Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Section 106 ML24045A2952024-02-16016 February 2024 Ltr. to Chuck Hoskin, Jr, Principal Chief Cherokee Nation Re Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Section 106 ML24030A0052024-02-16016 February 2024 Ltr. to Brian Harris, Chief, Catawba Indian Nation; Re., Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Section 106 ML24045A2942024-02-16016 February 2024 Ltr. to Carolyn Chavis Bolton Chief Pee Dee Indian Nation of Upper Sc Re Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Section 106 ML24045A2992024-02-16016 February 2024 Ltr. to Eric Pratt Chief the Santee Indian Organization Re Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Section 106 ML24045A3062024-02-16016 February 2024 Ltr. to Michell Hicks, Principal Chief Eastern Band of Cherokee Re Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1,2, and 3 Section 106 ML24045A3072024-02-16016 February 2024 Ltr. to Pete Parr Chief Pee Dee Indian Tribe Re Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Section 106 ML24011A1482024-02-13013 February 2024 Letter to Steven M. Snider-Oconee Nuclear Sta, Unites 1,2 & 3 Notice of Avail of the Draft Site-Specific Supp. 2, 2nd Renewal to the Generic EIS for Lic. Renew of Nuclear Plants IR 05000269/20230042024-02-13013 February 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2023004, 05000270/2023004, and 05000287/2023004; and Inspection Report 07200040/2023001 ML24011A1532024-02-13013 February 2024 Letter to Tracy Watson EPA-Oconee Nuclear Sta, Unites 1, 2 & 3 Notice of Avail of the Draft Site-Specific Supp. 2, 2nd Renewal to the Generic EIS for Lic. Renew of Nuclear Plants ML24030A5212024-02-13013 February 2024 Letter to Elizabeth Johnson, Director, SHPO; Re Oconee Nuclear Stations Units 1, 2, and 3 Section 106 ML24019A1442024-02-13013 February 2024 Letter to Reid Nelson, Executive Director, Achp; Re Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Section 106 ML23304A1422024-02-0101 February 2024 Issuance of Environmental Scoping Summary Report Associated with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staffs Review of the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, & 3, Subsequent License Renewal Application ML24005A2492024-01-24024 January 2024 Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 (Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping and Suspicious Activity Reporting) ML23331A7982023-12-14014 December 2023 Review of the Fall 2022 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report (01R32) ML23262A9672023-12-13013 December 2023 Alternative to Use RR-22-0174, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment for Repair/Replacement Activities in Class 2 and 3 Systems Section XI, Division 1 IR 05000269/20230032023-11-14014 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2023003, 05000270/2023003, and 05000287/2023003; and IR 07200040/2023001; and Exercise of Enforcement Discretion ML23317A3462023-11-14014 November 2023 Duke Fleet - Correction Letter to License Amendment Nos. 312 & 340 Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-554, Revision 1 ML23219A1402023-10-10010 October 2023 Audit Report Proposed Alternative to Use ASME Code Case N-752, Risk Informed Categorization and Treatment for Repair/Replacement Activities in Class 2 and 3 Systems XI, Division 1 ML23269A1102023-10-0606 October 2023 Letter to Steven Snider-Revised Schedule for the Environmental Review of the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1, 2, and 3, Subsequent License Renewal Application ML23256A0882023-09-25025 September 2023 Issuance of Alternative to Steam Generator Welds ML23195A0782023-08-29029 August 2023 Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-554, Revision 1 IR 05000269/20230112023-08-25025 August 2023 Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection Report 05000269/2023011 and 05000270/2023011 and 05000287/2023011 IR 05000269/20230052023-08-25025 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2 and 3 (Report 05000269/2023005, 05000270/2023005, and 05000287/2023005) IR 05000269/20230022023-07-28028 July 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2023002, 05000270/2023002 and 05000287/2023002 2024-09-23
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Inspection Report - Oconee - 2004010 |
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rch 9, 2004
SUBJECT:
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION (FOLLOW UP) REPORT 05000269/2004010, 05000270/2004010 AND 05000287/2004010
Dear Mr. Jones:
On February 18, 2004, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Oconee Nuclear Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on February 18, 2004, with Mr. Graham Davenport and other members of your staff. Following completion of additional review in the Region II office, a final exit was held by telephone with Mr. Graham Davenport and other members of your staff on March 1, 2004.
This inspection was an in-office and on-site examination of Unresolved Item 05000269, 270, 287/2002003-02, An Operator Action That Was Required by the Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis Was Not Included in the Operating Procedures. The issue involved a concern with procedures not addressing all the required operator actions for response to a fire. This issue was left unresolved pending further NRC review regarding the risk significance.
This report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low significance (Green). The finding was determined to be a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and because it was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC, 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Oconee Nuclear Station.
DEC 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Charles R. Ogle, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55
Enclosure:
NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection (Follow Up) Report 05000269,270,287/2004010 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55 Report No.: 05000269/2004010, 05000270/2004010, and 05000287/2004010 Licensee: Duke Energy Corporation Facility: Oconee Nuclear Station Location: 7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, SC 29672 Dates: February 17 - 18, 2004 Inspectors: K. ODonohue, Fire Protection Team Leader W. Rogers, Senior Reactor Analyst Approved by: Charles R. Ogle, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000269/2004-010, 05000270/2004-010, and 05000287/2004-010; 02/17 - 18/2004; Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, & 3; Triennial baseline fire protection inspection -
Unresolved Item Significance Determination Review.
The inspection was an in-office and on-site follow up inspection of Unresolved Item 05000269, 270, 287/2002003-02, conducted by a regional inspector and a senior reactor analyst. The inspection identified one Green non-cited violation (NCV). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609 Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems C Green. The inspector and analyst identified an NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.L.3 and Technical Specification 5.4.1. During a severe fire in the control room, the procedures implemented for control room evacuation and Safe Shutdown Facility activation were inadequate, in that, operator action to close valve FDW-315, steam generator (S/G) emergency feedwater (EFDW) control valve, was not directed as required to prevent an overcooling event due to spurious actuation of an EFDW pump.
The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with procedure quality and degraded the reactor safety mitigating system cornerstone objective. The finding is of very low significance because the fire ignition frequency of the affected cables is low, thereby reducing the likelihood of an EFDW pump start and the need to close valve FDW-315.
B. Licensee-Identified Violations None
Report Details 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA5 Other
.01 (Closed) URI 05000269, 270, 287/2002003-02: An Operator Action That Was Required by the Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis Was Not Included in the Operating Procedures Introduction: A non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.L.3 and Technical Specification 5.4.1 was identified, in that, during a severe fire in the control room, the procedures implemented for control room evacuation and Safe Shutdown Facility (SSF) activation were inadequate. This inspection finding was assessed using the SDP, Phase 3 evaluation which determined this finding to be of very low significance (Green).
Description: The Safe Shutdown Analysis stated that when activating the SSF to mitigate a fire, operators must manually close valve FDW-315, S/G EFDW control valve, in the east penetration room. This action was designed to prevent the spurious actuation of an EFDW pump from disabling the SSF by causing an overcooling event which would be beyond the capability of the SSF reactor coolant makeup pump (RCMUP). However, this operator action was not included in the SSF operating procedures. In some scenarios, this could result in a plant condition that was beyond the restoration capability of the equipment credited for the safe shutdown of the plant following a fire.
The inspectors confirmed that FDW-315 needed to be closed to prevent an overcooling event resulting from a spurious actuation of an EFDW pump. Direction to close FDW-315 was included in other procedures, normally available to the control room operators.
However, in the event of a fire that required evacuation of the control room, the procedures that would be applicable (AP/0/A/1700/025, Standby Shutdown Facility Emergency Operating Procedure, and AP/1/A/1700/008, Loss of Control Room) did not include adequate direction to ensure FDW-315 was closed.
Review of procedure history documents indicated that the action was included in previous revisions of AP/0/A/1700/025. However, the step to close FDW-315 was removed during a procedure revision that took place in 1994. Following the NRCs identification of this issue, the licensee revised AP/0/1700/008 to include an operator action to close FDW-315.
Analysis:
The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with procedure quality and degraded the reactor safety mitigating system cornerstone objective. The performance deficiency was assumed to degrade the defense in depth for fire protection. Since the Phase 2 SDP worksheets did not clearly address this performance deficiency, a Phase 3 SDP analysis was performed. A regional Senior Reactor Analyst performed the Phase 3 evaluation using an exposure time of one year. The dominant accident sequence involving the performance deficiency was a fully developed fire in the main control room that does not affect the main feedwater system but causes two hot shorts in the EFDW
such that overcooling of the reactor coolant system (RCS) occurs. Operators evacuate the main control room and transfer command and control to the SSF. While using the SSF to maintain the facility in safe shutdown, operators perform an unspecified set of actions that lead to core damage. The assumptions used in the Phase 3 SDP were:
C After main feedwater increases once thru steam generator (OTSG) secondary side level and is secured by high level controls, hot shorts due to the fire, result in FDW-315 opening and an EFDW pump starting. This induces an overcooling of the RCS. This situation can result in a reactor criticality but is self-limiting and the SSF will continue to provide adequate decay heat removal, keeping the core covered unless an operator commits an error of commission.
C Two hot shorts in the EFDW system provide cooling flow to the OTSGs to induce the overcooling. For non-armored cable, a 0.3 hot short probability for the FDW-315 valve failing open and a 0.6 hot short probability for a pump to operate for an extended time will be used when the fire is in the main control room (non-armored cable).
C A partition of 0.1 will be used for fires that leave the main feedwater system unaffected and damage the EFDW system (this is very conservative since both systems reside side-by-side in the open main control boards).
C When operators in the SSF are faced with the overcooling event they commit an operator error by commission that causes core damage. For screening purposes a 0.5 will be used for this value. Also, based upon probabilistic risk analysis modeling, a success probability of 0.7 will be assigned to the SSF function.
Since this sequence of unlikely events (involving the performance deficiency) was necessary to cause core damage, this performance deficiency was characterized as very low safety significance (Green).
Enforcement: TS 5.4.1 requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering activities recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Rev 2, Appendix A, of February 1978. This regulatory guide requires that the events of a fire in the control room or a forced evacuation of the control room be covered by written procedures. Additionally, Oconee License Condition D, Fire Protection, requires a fire protection program in accordance with listed NRC SERs, which in turn require compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.L.3, Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown Capability.Section III.L.3 requires that procedures be in effect to implement the alternative and dedicated SSD capability (the SSF at Oconee). Contrary to the above, on March 20, 2002, the NRC identified that the licensees procedures were inadequate to mitigate a fire that required control room evacuation and activation of the SSF. This condition was in place for approximately ten years. Because this example of failure to maintain adequate procedures is of very low safety significance, was documented in the corrective action program (PIP O-00-04076) (and adequately corrected), this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000269, 270, 287/2004010-01: Inadequate Maintenance of Fire Safe Shutdown Procedures.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit The inspector presented the inspection results to Mr. Graham Davenport, and other members of licensee management and staff on February 18, 2004. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
Subsequent to the onsite inspection a follow-up exit by telephone was held with Mr. Graham Davenport and other members of licensee management on March 1, 2004, to update the licensee on changes to the preliminary inspection findings. The licensee acknowledged the findings. No proprietary information is included in this inspection report.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee Personnel G. Davenport, Compliance Manager (ONS)
D. Garland, Sr. Engineer J. Smith, Regulatory Compliance J. Weast, Regulatory Compliance H. Barrett, Sr. Engineer (Design Basis Engineering)
N. Constance, Operations Training NRC Personnel M. Shannon, Senior Resident Inspector LIST OF ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Opened and Closed 05000269, 270, 287/2004010-01 NCV Inadequate Maintenance of Fire Safe Shutdown Procedures (Section 4OA5.01)
Closed 05000269,270,287/2002003-02 URI An Operator Action that was Required by the Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis was Not Included in the Operating Procedures (Section 4OA5.01)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED PROCEDURES Standby Shutdown Facility Emergency Operating Procedure, AP/0/A/1700/025, Rev 25 Standby Shutdown Facility Emergency Operating Procedure, AP/0/A/1700/025, Rev 25 Loss of Control Room, AP/1/A/1700/008, Rev 6 Loss of Control Room, AP/1/A/1700/008, Rev 9 OTHER DOCUMENTS Calculation C-OSA-SA-85-006-0, Evaluation of Spurious Pump Actuation During an Appendix R Event Calculation C-OSC-3770, EFW Isolation During 10CFR50 Appendix R Event PIP-O-02-00609, Response To NRC Audit Questions During Inspection (IR-02-03)
PIP-O-02-0529, Calculation OSC - 2310 Does Not Determine the Bounding Cooldown Rate for SSF Operability PIP-O-04-00857, Enhancement needed in Loss of Control Room AP When Fire Requires Evacuation of the Main Control Room and Evacuation of the SSF PIP-O-00-04076, Valve FDW-315 Had Been Removed From SSF procedure Design Basis Specification For the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel, Spec 055-0254.00-00-40094009 Appendix R EFW Overfeed Event Sequence of Events Training Records for Topic AP/1/A/1700/025, Rev 26 OP-OC-AP/25 Rev 26 Training Package, Rev 00, AP/0/A/1700/025 Standby Shutdown Facility EOP, Rev 26