IR 05000285/1993020
| ML20059H184 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 11/01/1993 |
| From: | Stetka T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059H181 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-285-93-20, NUDOCS 9311100002 | |
| Download: ML20059H184 (14) | |
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APPEWIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report: 50-285/93-20 License:
DPR-40 Licensee:
Omaha Public Power District
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Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm.
P.O. Box 399, Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun Fort Calhoun, Nebraska Facility Name:
Fort Calhoun Station Inspection At:
Blair, Nebraska Inspection Conducted:
August 29 through October 9, 1993 Inspectors:
R. Mullikin, Senior Resident Inspector R. Azua, Resident Inspector Approved:
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/////93 uu Thorias F. Stetka, Chief, Project Section D Dat'e Inspection Summary Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of operational safety I
verification, maintenance and surveillance observations, preparation for refueling, refueling activities, and spent fuel pool activities.
Results:
Operator performance was very good during routine control room
activities, plant shutdown, and midloop operation (Sections 2.1 and 2.6).
j Plant management's prejob briefing for midlorp operation was considered
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excellent (Section 2.6).
The security program was properly implemented (Section 2.4).
- The health physics program was properly implemented, with the exception
of several instances of individuals in the radiologically controlled area without proper dosimetry (Section 2.3).
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-2-Maintenance activities indicated very good attention to detail.
System
engineer knowledge of the affected system and involvement in a maintenance activity was found to be excellent (Section 3.1).
Surveillance procedural compliance and operator knowledge of
responsibilities were found to be good (Section 4.1).
Personnel error resulted in the inadvertent opening of a power operated
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relief valve prior to surveillance testing. However, a questioning attitude by plant personnel resulted in the further inspection of both valves and the discovery that valve damage may have existed for a considerable period (Section 4.2).
The licensee's refueling outage preplanning and organizational alignment
was good. An excellent awareness of shutdown risk was apparent (Section 5).
The licensee's defueling performance was considered good (Sections 6 and
7).
Summary of Inspection Findings:
None Attachments:
Attac,hment - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
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-3-DETAILS 1 PLANT STATUS At the beginning of this inspection period, the Fort Calhoun Station was operating at 100 percent power. On September 17 and 22, 1993, the licensee
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reduced power to 70 and 65 percent, respectively, for fuel conservation purposes. The plant remained at that level until 7 p.m. on September 24 when power reduction was commenced for the start of the 14th refueling outage.
Plant output breakers were opened at 1:48 a.m. on September 25. Mode 5 (refueling mode) was reached at 7:55 a.m. on September 28. A complete offload of the reactor core started at 5:45 p.m. on October 6 and was completed at 7:47 a.m. on October 9.
The plant remained in the refueling outage at the end of the inspection period.
2 OPERATIONAL SAFETY VERIFICATION (71707)
2.1 Routine Control Room Observations The inspectors observed operational activities throughout this inspection period to verify that proper control room staffing and control room professionalism were maintained. Shift turnover meetings were conducted in a manner that provided for proper communication of plant status from one shift to the other. Discussions with operators indicated that they were aware of plant and equipment status and reasons for lit annunciators. The inspectors observed that Technical Specification limiting conditions for operation were properly documented and tracked. Operators were observed to properly control access into the control room operating area.
Plant management was observed in the control room on a daily basis.
The inspector also observed control room activities during the plant shutdown initiated on September 24, 1993. The shutdown was performed using Operating Procedure OP-3A, " Plant Shutdown." Operators were observed performing in a professional manner and following the procedure.
Plant management had set a target time of 2 a.m. on September 25 for the plant output breakers to be opened. However, the inspector saw no evidence to indicate that the operators were hurrying to meet this goal. The plant was shut down in a controlled manner and breakers were opened at 1:48 a.m.
2.2 Plant Tours The inspectors routinely toured various areas of the plant to assess the safety conditions and adequacy of plant equipment. The inspectors verified that various valve and switch positions were correct for the current plant conditions.
Personnel were observed obeying rules for personnel safety, escort of visitors, and entry and exit into and out of vital areas.
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-4-2.2.1 Missing U-Bolt Pipe Support on Component Cooling Water Lines On September 21, 1993, the inspectors noted that three U-bolt pipe supports were missing from component cooling water lines in the west safety injection pump room. These lines supply bearing cooling water to Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump SI-1A ar.d High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps SI-2A and SI-2C.
The inspectors informed the licensee of the observation. The licensee reinstalled the missing supports on September 23, 1993, and initiated Incident '
Report 930217 to inver.tigate the issue. Design engineering performed an evaluation and concluded that the safety injection pumps were operable with the missing U-bolts. The licensee determined that the U-bolts had not been replaced following maintenance to flush the bearing coolers. The inspectors will monitor any proposed corrective actions resulting from the incident report.
2.2.2 Response to Personnel Injury On September 20, 1993, a contract ele-trician was injured when a chain to a The in 9 ctor witnessed the licensee's response cable pulling machine broke.
to this event.
Emergency medical team personnel responded quickly and effectively, diagnosed the injury, administered first aid, and requested an ambulance. Security personnel were prompt in escorting emergency personnel onsite, maintained positive control of these individuals, and facilitated the exit of the injured employee and one of the emergency medical team personnel.
2.3 Radiological Protection Program Observations l
During this inspection period, the inspectors verified that selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection program were properly implemented. Health physics personnel were observed routinely touring the controlled areas.
However, during this inspection period there were several instances of individuals working or touring in the radiologically controlled area without the dosimetry required by the radiation work permit.
In all cases the individuals wore backup dosimetry such as a thermal luminescent or self-reading dosimeters. The exposure these individuals received were accounted for and were below regulatory limits. Although there was limited personnel safety consequences involved, the number of incidents represented an area of concern.
Further discussion regarding these incidents are documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-283/93-23.
On October 6, 1993, during the removal of the upper guide structure from the reactor vessel, instrumentation and control personnel were required to install nitrogen supply lines to the structure's bullet noses prior to lowering it into the refueling cavity. To perform this evolution the instrumentation and control personnel had to board the upper guide structure lift rig platform.
This area was considered to be a hot particle zone and the technicians were working under the appropriate radiation work permit.
The original plan called for the technicians to board the platform from Fuel Handling Machine FH-1,
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-5-install the appropriate tubing, and exit onto the fuel handling machine.
The fuel handling machine was appropriately posted and a step-off pad established where technicians would exit and discard one set of protective clothing.
Due to the actual positioning of the lift rig with respect to the location where the nitrogen tubing originated, it was determined at the last minute that the technicians would enter and egress the platform from the north side of the refueling cavity.
This would be less cumbersome than working off of the fuel handling machine. As a result, the area on the north side of the refueling cavity deck became part of the hot particle zone. The health physics technician, in the interest of time, did not repost the area but quickly posted himself as a barrier between the instrumentation and control personnel and other personnel on the same side of the refueling cavity deck.
From there he warned other personnel to maintain their distance and to not approach the affected area.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions and determined that the health pnysics technician's activities were in accordance with the licensee's (
procedures. The inspector determined that this condition could have been avoided had better preplanning efforts anticipated the possibility that entry and egress via the fuel handling bridge may not have been possible and, thus, that a larger area may have been needed to be posted.
2.4 Security Program Observations The inspectors observed various aspects of the licensee's security program.
Personnel and packages entering the protected area were observed to be properly searched. Vehicles were properly controlled or escorted within the protected area. Designated vehicles parked and unattended within the protected area were found to be locked and the keys removed. The inspectors routinely toured the protected area perimeter and found it maintained at an excellent level.
Proper compensatory measures were observed when a security barrier was inoperable.
2.5 Housekeeping The inspectors have reported over several inspection periods that the quality l
of plant housekeeping had declined from the excellent level of the past.
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licensee developed a " Housekeeping Action Plan" as described in a plant-wide memorandum dated September 20, 1993, from the Plant Manager. This plan reinforced existing housekeeping requirements and added housekeeping reminder signs in the protected area. The memorandum reminded personnel that housekeeping was everyone's responsibility.
The refueling outage began shortly after this memorandum was issued.
The inspectors noted some improvement in housekeeping conditions but not a marked improvement during this inspection period.
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Reduced inventory operation ceased at 7:14 a.m. on October 3 when the reactor coolant level was raised to within I foot of the reactor vessel
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flange. The elevation of the steam generators is above the flange and they, therefore, remained in a drained condition.
The inspector was present for the prejob briefing given to the operating crew as required by Standing Order G-92, " Conduct of Infrequently Performed Procedures." The briefing was considered excellent, with a detailed description of what was to be performed, expected results, and actions to take if anomalies occurred. The Plant Manager, safe shutdown advisor, and the shift supervisor gave the briefing.
The reactor coolant system draining was performed using Operating Instruction 01-RC-2A, "RCS Fill and Drain Operations," Attachment 3.
The licensee maintained four independent power supplies during the evolution:
i both emergency diesel generators; the 161-kV offsite power supply; and the temporary emergency diesel generator installed for the outage.
In addition, the licensee administrative 1y controlled access to the switchgear rooms and the emergency diesel generator rooms to minimize the possibility of a loss of a power source.
Control room traffic was minimized during the evolution and operators continuously monitored reactor coolant sevel.
2.7 Incorrect Sizing of Motor Operated Valve Cables On September 23, 1993, the licensee reported that a condition existed that was outside the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, design basis.
Engineering Analysis EA-FC-93-070 determined that the 480-volt power cables to five motor-operated valves were undersized for continuous locked rotor current. The analysis indicated that the cables could ignite if one or more of the valves were to stick in its midposition and draw continuous locked rotor current.
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Since the cables traverse more than one fire area, this was outside of the l
fire safe shutdown design basis which assumed a fire in only one area.
The licensee had previously disabled the thermal overload protection devices for the valve motors to ensure that a spurious motor overload trip did not
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occur. This was done in accordance with the guidance specified in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.106, " Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor-0perated Valves." Subsequently, the licensee performed an engineering evaluation to support the reinstallation of the thermal overload devices. The thermal overload devices were reinstalled on September 23, 1993, by use of a key switch at the motor control center. The inspector verified that the overload devices were enabled by the key switch and that the switches were
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-7-cautioned tagged by operations. The inspectors will perform further review of this issue during routine review of Licensee Event Report 93-012, which will be reporting this event.
2.8 Postino of Revised NRC Form 3 The inspector verified that the licensee had posted the latest revision
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(June 1993) of NRC Form 3, " Notice to Employees." The NRC Form 3 postings were located in both protected access points, the training center, and the administration building.
2.9 Conclusions Operator performance was very good during routine activities, plant shutdown, and midloop operation.
Plant management's prejob briefing for midloop operation was considered excellent. The security program was properly implemented. The licensee health physics program was properly implemented with the exception of several instances of individuals in the radiologically controlled area without proper dosimetry.
Plant housekeeping was considered good, but marked improvement was not noted.
3 MAINTENANCE OBSERVATIONS (62703)
3.1 Repair and Reinstallation of Raw Water Interface Valve HCV-400F On September 16, 1993, the inspector observed portions of the licensee's effort to repair and replace Raw Water Interface Valve HCV-400F. The valve, which is normally locked closed, had been previously removed and replaced with a blank flange when it was identified that it was allowing component cooling water to back leak into the raw water system. The licensee's efforts were covered under Maintenance Work Orders 932231 and 932294.
The inspector reviewed the maintenance work orders, including their associated procedures, and found them to be technically accurate and within the skill of the craft. The inspector also verified that the maintenance work orders had been reviewed and approved by the licensee as noted by the appropriate signatures.
The licensee identified that the valve liner was damaged at the top and bottom of the seal area. The licensee replaced the valve liner and the primary 0-rings.
Following reassembly of the valve and prior to its reinstallation, the licensee performed a stroke test and verified that the valve functioned appropriately and that the valve disc properly seated against the valve liner.
The inspector noted that the system engineer was present throughout most of the effort, verifying the adequacy of the maintenance activity, and providing any support that was necessary. The inspector spoke with the system engineer and found him to be cognizant of the problems associated with this valve and how it may affect the system for which he is responsible. The inspector found the system engineer's overall knowledge of the system to be excellen r
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-8-The inspector observed the licensee's efforts to reinstall the valve.
It was noted that the licensee had taken additional precautions prior to removing the blank flange from the system, such as placing mechanical blocks on the valves being used to isolate that portion of the system.
Quality control personnel were observed inspecting the system for cleanliness. Throughout this effort the inspector noted that the maintenance personnel's attention to detail was very good. A postmaintenance test was successfully performed.
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3.2 Conclusions The maintenance work order procedures were technically accurate and within the skill of the craft.
System engineer knowledge of the affected system and involvement in the maintenance activity was found to be excellent.
Maintenance personnel attention to detail during this activity was very good.
4 SURVEILLANCE OBSERVATIONS (61726)
4.1 Channel
"B" Safety injection. Containment Spray. and Recirculation Actuation Signal Test On September 17, 1993, the inspector observed the licensee perform Surveillance Test Procedure OP-ST-ESF-0010, " Channel
"B" Safety Injection, Containment Spray and Recirculation Actuation Signal Test." The inspector reviewed the surveillance procedure and found it to be very detailed and prescriptive in nature.
In addition, the procedure was found to meet the requirements set forth in the plant Technical Specifications.
The inspector verified that the licensee had addressed all of the precautions
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and limitations set forth in the procedure prior to conducting the
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surveillance. The licensed operator performing the surveillance was found to I
be very knowledgeable of his responsibilities. When questioned as to the
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purpose of this particular surveillance, the operator provided a detailed
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description of both the purpose and the method being used to perform the surveillance. The operator was observed to comply with the procedural guidance, performing a double verification of his actions by touching each switch and repeating the switch number out loud prior to operating the switch.
This method of verification to preclude inadvertent manipulation of a wrong switch was found to be notable. The licensed operator maintained clear communications with the turbine building operator during the performance of the surveillance test.
The inspector performed a review of the test procedure following the completion of the surveillance test and verified that all the steps had been addressed as noted by the operators initials and that the posttest review had been performed as noted by the appropriate signatures.
4.2 Failure of Power-Operated Relief Valve During Surveillance Testing On September 26, 1993, maintenance personnel were installing test equipment in the valve actuation circuit for Power-0perated Relief Valve PCV-102-1. The L
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-9-equipment was being installed to test the valve in accordance with Surveillance Procedure OP-ST-RC-3004, " Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)
Low Pressure - Low Pressure Exercise Test (PCV-102-1 and PCV-102-2)."
While installing electrical jumpers, personnel inadvertently contacted adjacent terminals, causing the valve to stroke open twice before the actual initiation of the test. Subsequently, during the test, the valve only partially opened during stroke testing, which did not satisfy the test acceptance criteria. A repeat of the test resulted in a failure of the valve to stroke on two
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subsequent attempts. These tests were conducted without a loop seal upstream of the valve, as would be the case during normal operation of the valve.
Valve PCV-102-1 was declared inoperable and the associated block valve was closed in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
The licensee repeated the test after allowing the valve to cool for approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and the loop seal to be re-established. Both power-operated relief valves satisfied the test acceptance criteria. Although the valves successfully passed their surveillance test based on actual operating conditions, i.e., with loop seals, the licensee was not convinced that the valves were operable. The licensee removed both valves and sent them to Wyle Laboratory for inspection and testing, in addition to scheduled maintenance.
The inspection of the valves revealed a cracked disc on both valves and a cage guide alignment problem with Valve PCV-102-1. The alignment problem apparently occurred during installation of new valve internals in_ a previous refueling outage. The licensee speculated that the cracked disc and cage
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alignment problem may have existed for some time. The licensee will repair i
and test both valves before reinstallation in the plant. The-inspectors will perform further review of this event during routine review of Licensee Event Report 93-014.
4.3 Conclusions Procedural compliance and operator knowledge of responsibilities was found to be good. The operator's efforts to prevent the inadvertent manipulation of the wrong switches was considered to be notable.
Personnel error resulted in the inadvertent opening of a power-operated relief valve prior to. testing.
However, a questioning attitude by plant personnel resulted in the further inspection of both valves and the discovery that valve damage may have existed for a considerable period.
5 Preparation for Refueling (60705)
5.1 Review of Licensee's Refuelina Preparation The inspectors reviewed the licensee's preparation for the refueling outage.
This included a review of the following selected procedures and changes to them since the last refueling outage:
Operating Procedure OP-11, Revision 7, " Reactor Core Refueling"
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-10-Operating Instruction 01-SFP-2, Revision 1, " Spent Fuel Pool Cooling
Makeup" Operating nstruction 0I-SFP-4A, Revision 1, " Spent Fuel Pool Cooling
Emergency Cross Tie with Shutdown Cooling Already in Service" Operating Instruction 01-SFP-48, Revision 1, " Spent Fuel Pool Cooling
Emergency Cross Tie with Shutdown Cooling Not in Service'
Operating Instruction 01-SFP-6, Revision 0, " Spent Fuel Pool Heat-Up
Rate" The inspectors found the procedures to be accurate and to properly reflect Technical Specification requirements.
The scheduled duration of the refueling outage was 56 days.
Preplanning included the formation of outage process enhancement teams and high impact teams, which were tasked to review outage activities and provide recommendations so that these activities are performed more efficiently and safely. Another enhancement was a shutdown safety advisor who had senior reactor operator training. This individual acted as an onshift advisor to the shift outage manager and performed independent evaluation of safety issues.
The inspectors have observed good performance by the shutdown safety advisors during prejob briefings, control room evolutions, and daily outage plan-of-the-day meetings.
The licensee utilized an outage control center (OCC) for the second straight refueling outage. The OCC is designed to coordinate refueling activities by becoming the focal point where all maintenance, surveillance, and other outage i
activities are coordinated.
In addition, there is one outage director who is
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the single point of authority for the overall planning, scheduling, and conduct of the outage. The inspectors noted, through interviews with personnel and observations, that plant personnel were aware that the OCC is the controlling organization for outage activities. Observations of the OCC and outage meetings showed good coordination among the various disciplines, l
with an excellent awareness of shutdown risk.
5.2 Conclusions l
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The licensee's refueling outage preplanning and organizational alignment was good. An excellent awareness of shutdown risk was apparent.
6 REFUELING ACTIVITIES (60710)
6.1 Review of Refuelina Activities The licensee's efforts during this refueling outage included completely defueling the core and storing the fuel in the spent fuel pool. The inspectors reviewed and observed the licensee's efforts prior to and during j
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-11-reactor core defueling, verifying that the licensee met the requirements set a
forth in the Technical Specifications. The inspectors noted that, in specific
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instances, the licensee exceeded the Technical Specification requirements.
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One such instance involved the requirement that a least one shutdown cooling-pump and heat exchanger be in operation.
The licensee required that an additional pump and heat exchanger be available while fuel was in the reactor
vessel. Such decisions increased system redundancy and were found to be
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conservative.
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Prior to removing the reactor vessel head, the inspectors reviewed the documentation and observed portions of the licensee efforts to meet the
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prerequisites listed in Maintenance Procedure MM-RR-RC-0305, " Removal of Reactor Vessel Closure Head." These efforts included the disconnection of the control element assemblies from the control element drive mechanisms; verifying that the reactor coolant level was below the level of the reactor i
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vessel flange and that the reactor coolant system pressure was zero; that the i
polar crane had been inspected per Maintenance Procedure PM-RI-HE-0550,
" Inspection of Polar Crane;" that at least two nuclear instrumentation system ex-core wide-range channels were operational; and the establishment of
containment integrity in accordance with Operating Instruction 01-00-4,
" Establishing Modified Containment Integrity." The inspectors noted that these items were addressed and properly documented.
In addition, the inspectors attended the prejob briefing held to discuss the removal of the a
reactor vessel head. The inspectors noted that all the specific groups and
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crafts involved in this evolution were present.
The information provided was detailed in nature with proper emphasis on personnel and plant safety. The briefing also allowed for constructive discussions, which resulted in some l
changes being made to how the work activity would be performed. One such change involved the need to combine two radiation work permits into one, when
it was identified that the work being performed under the two radiation work permits was being performed by the same personnel. This change allowed the craft personnel to move from one activity to another without having to exit containment, which would have caused an extension to the duration of the
activity and would have subjected the personnel remaining in containment to needless added exposure. The inspectors determined that the overall i
performance of the licensee in this area was good.
On October 6,1993, the inspectors witnessed the removal of the upper guide
structure from the reactor vessel and its placement in the lower cavity of the refueling pool. The inspectors observed that there was proper coordination between the signalman and the crane operator, noting that they were both in clear view of each other. The evolution was performed slowly, with care being taken to prevent the inadvertent removal of a fuel assembly.
In the event that this had occurred, a load cell, which was attached to the crane and
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monitored by the crane operator, would have registered the additional weight (the inspectors verified that the instrument had been calibrated).
The inspectors observed that a foreign material exclusion area for the refueling cavity had been established in accordance with the requirements of Standing Order 50-M-10, " Foreign Material Exclusion." A foreign material
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-12-exclusion coordinator was stationed at the only access to the refueling cavity. The coordinator was responsible for logging in any material or equipment that was entered into the area and for making sure that this material or equipment was properly secured or controlled to prevent its inadvertent introduction into the reactor cavity.
The inspectors observed that material entering and exiting the refueling cavity was properly controlled. Personnel were observed to use lanyards wherever possiDie, and
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items such as flashlights were properly taped to prevent their inadvertent disassembly. The inspectors raised a concern with the licensee regarding an item located within the foreign material exclusion area. The item in question was a wooden board which displayed a map of the core and provided a visual indication to the operators running the refueling bridge as to which fuel assemblies had been removed from the core and which remained. Although the board was properly secured, colored plastic squares representing specific fuel assemblies hung from hooks on the board, creating a source of uncontrolled material that had the potential for accidentally being introduced into the reactor cavity. The licensee stated that they had originally considered this when setting up the foreign material exclusion area, but that they had made the determination that the risk was minimal due to the location of the board and that the benefits for the operators performing the refueling activity had been the overriding factor.
Following a review of the inspectors concerns, the licensee made the determination that placing the board in a location slightly outside the foreign material exclusion area would not unduly hamper the refueling process. The board was promptly relocated. Overall, the licensee's efforts in this area were found to be good.
l On October 7,1993, the inspectors observed portions of the licensee's defueling activities. Three shifts of operators involved in operating Fuel Handling Machine FH-1 during the defueling process were questioned by the inspectors. The overall knowledge of the operators was found to be excellent, with regard to operating the fuel handling machine and their responsibilities in the defueling process. Good procedural compliance by the operators was also noted. The inspectors reviewed training records and verified that the operators interviewed had the proper qualifications to operate the fuel handling machine.
In addition, the inspectors verified that Fuel Handling Machine FH-1 had been properly tested in accordance with Surveillance Test Procedure OP-ST-FH-0001, " Refueling System Fuel Handling Machine (FH-1)
Interlocks Test."
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6.2 Conclusions The licensee's decision to increase the redundancy of required systems was found to be conservative.
Prejob briefings were observed to be good in providing detailed instruction and an opportunity for productive discussion.
In the area of foreign material exclusion, the licensee's overall performance
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was also considered to be good. Operator knowledge of the defueling
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activities was found to be excellent.
In addition, good procedural compliance was note.
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7 SPENT FUEL POOL ACTIVITIES (86700)
j 7.1 Review of Spent Fuel Pool Activities
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l On October 7 and 8, 1993, the inspectors observed defueling activities in the i
spent fuel pool area. The activities were inspected against the requirements of Operating Instruction 01-FH-1, " Fuel Handling Equipment Operation." The
inspectors noted that a foreign inaterials exclusion coordinator was assigned
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to the spent fuel pool area and a review of his actions and the log indicated
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that control of foreign materials was being maintained. The inspectors l
questioned the refueling operr..s while awaiting the arrival of a fuel i
bundle. The operators were kn dledgeable of their procedural duties and performed these duties in a careful and professional manner. The water i
clarity and the lighting in the spent fuel pool were very good.
In addition, the inspectors verified that the licensee had performed appropriate tests on the spent fuel handling machine prior to placing it in use. The inspectors reviewed the results of Surveillance Test Procedure OP-ST-FH-0005, " Refueling System Spent fuel Handling Machine Refueling Interlocks Test," and no problems
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7.2 Conclusions Operators were found to be -knowledgeable of their responsibility. Overall, licensee effort in this area was found to be good.
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ATTACHMENT 1 1 PERSONS CONTACTED 1.1 Licensee Personnel
- R. Andrews, Division Manager, Nuciear Services
- G. Cavanaugh, Station Licensee Engineer
- J. Chase, Manager, Fort Calhoun Station
R. Clemens, Outage Director l
- G. Cook, Supervisor, Station Licensing
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- S. Gambhir, Division Manager, Production Engineering
- J. Gasper, Manager, Training
- W. Gates, Vice President, Nuclear
- J. Herman, Acting Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Industry Affairs
- R. Jaworski, Manager, Station Engineering
- L. Kusek, Manager, Nuclear Safety Review Group
- D. Lovett, Supervisor, Radiation Protection
- W. Orr, Manager, Quality Assurance and Quality Control T. Patterson, Division Manager, Nuclear Operations
- R. Phelps, Manager, Design Engineering A. Richard, Assistant Manager, Fort Calhoun Station J
- J. Sefick, Manager, Security Services J. Skiles, Shift Outage Manager R. Short, Shift Outage Manager J. Tills, Supervisor Operations j
- Denotes personnel that attended the exit meeting.
In addition to the personnel listed above, the inspectors contacted other personnel during this inspection period.
2 EXIT MEETING An exit meeting was conducted on October 15, 1993. During this meeting, the inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the report. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not express a position on the inspection findings documented in this report. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors.
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