IR 05000285/1993016
| ML20057A581 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 09/09/1993 |
| From: | Harrell P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057A580 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-285-93-16, NUDOCS 9309150007 | |
| Download: ML20057A581 (16) | |
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1 APPENDIX l
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
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Inspection Report:
50-285/93-16
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i License: DPR-40 i
e Licensee: Omaha Public Power District i
Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm.
j P.O. Box 399, Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun i
Fort Calhoun, Nebraska l
Facility Name:
Fort Calhoun Station Inspection At: Blair, Nebraska
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Inspection Conducted: July 18 through August 28, 1993 Inspectors:
R. Mullikin, Senior Resident Inspector _
l R. Azua, Resident Inspector
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V. Gaddy, Reactor Engineer
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Approved:
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/P. H. Harrell, Chip Te cal Support Staff Dite'
Inspec ion Summary
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Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of operational safety.
i verification, maintenance and surveillance observations, Temporary Instruction 2500/028, followup on an inspection item, and onsite-followup of a licensee event report.
Results:
A deficient calibration procedure did not alert operators of erratic
indications on the source and power range indications used for alternate shutdown. This resulted in a noncited violation-(Section 2.2).
The health physics and security programs were properly implemented
(Sections 2.3 and 2.4).
Security staff response to an invalid access level and intrusion alarm
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was found to be very good (Section 2.4.1).
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-2-Overall plant condition, including housekeeping, was found to be good
(Section 2.2).
Actions were in progress to provide positive centrol over switchyard
activities (Section 2.6).
Maintenance personnel were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and
implemented good procedural campliance (Section 3).
System engineering scheduling efforts related to maintenance activities
was found to be very good (Section 3.2).
Licensee personnel communications and procedural compliance was found to
be good during surveillance activities (Section 4).
Summary of InSDection Findings:
A noncited violation was identified (Section 2.2).
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Inspection Followup Item 285/9304-01 was closed (Section 6).
- l Licensee Event Report 93-006 was closed (Section 7).
- Attachments:
Attachment 1 - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
Attachment 2 - Employee Concerns Program Survey l
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-3-DETAILS 1 PLANT STATUS
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The licensee operated the Fort Calhoun Station at 100 percent power throughout this inspection period.
2 OPEPATIONAL SAFETY VERIFICATION (71707)
2.1 Routine Control Room Observations The inspectors observed operational activities throughout this inspection period to verify that proper control room staffing and control room professionalism were maintained. Shift turnover meetings were conducted in a manner that provided for proper communication of plant status from one shift
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to the other. Discussions with operators indicated that they were aware of plant and equipment status and reasons for lit annunciators. The inspectors observed that Technical Specification limiting conditions for operation were
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properly documented and tracked. Operators were observed to properly control
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access into the control room operating area.
Plant management was observed in the control room on a daily basis.
2.2 Plant Tours
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The inspectors routinely toured various areas of the plant to assess the safety conditions and adequacy of plant equipment. The inspectors verified that various valve and switch positions were correct for the current plant
conditions.
Personnel were observed obeying rules for personnel safety and
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rules for escorts, visitors, entry, and exits into and out of vital areas.
Plant housekeeping was considered good and found to have improved since the last inspection period.
2.2.1 Alternate Shutdown Panel Erratic Indications On July 19, 1993, the inspectors were touring the upper electrical penetration room and noted on Panel AI-212 (Wide Range Neutron Flux Channel D Signal Processor) that the source and power range indications were erratic.
l Panel AI-212 is part of the auxiliary shutdown system required in case the
control room becomes uninhabitable. The source and power range channels have both logarithmic and count rate meters and all four meters were alternating
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i between minimum and maximum.
The inspectors contacted the control room and were told that a calibration was in progress on Wide Range Nuclear Instrumentation Channel D, which probably l
affected the indication on Panel AI-212.
The calibration was performed using
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Procedure IC-CP-01-004, " Calibration of Wide Range Logarithmic Channel D."
Calibration Procedure IC-CP-01-004, Section 5.13, listed indications and alarms that would be erratic and/or unreliable during the performance of the calibration. The procedure did not indicate that the source and power range indications on Panel AI-212 would be affected.
The instrumentation and
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-4-control technician completed the calibration and he and the inspector went to Panel AI-212 and found all indications back to normal.
Operators normally would not enter the appropriate Technical Specification action statement when a calibration results in erratic indications. However, since the operators were unaware that the performance of the calibration would
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affect indications on Panel AI-212, they declared the instrumentation inoperable and entered Technical Specification 2.15(4).
The action statement associated with the Technical Specification required a plant shutdown after 7 days of inoperability of the Panel AI-212 instrumentation. The Panel AI-212 instrumentation was inoperable for less than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> during the performance of the calibration.
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The system engineer initiated Incident Report 930173 to review the event.
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licensee determined that the performance of the calibratien had always i
affected the source range indication at Panel Al-212 but had not been noticed previously.
In addition, Temporary Modification 92-041 instailed in 1992,
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resulted in the calibraticn also affecting the power range indication at Panel AI-212. The temporary modification procedure required that-affected drawings and procedures be listed in the package.
Procedure IC-CP-01-004 was not listed in the temporary modification package since it was not determined
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that the procedure would be affected. Although Procedure IC-CP-01-004 was deficient in that it did not indicate that Panel AI-212 instrumentation would be affected, it had only minor safety significance since the duration of the calibration was significantly less than the 7-day shutdown requirement.
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addition, the licensee will add the Panel AI-212 instrumentation to the procedure before the next quarterly calibration.
The inspector discussed with the licensee whether the Panel AI-212 l
instrumentation and its temporary modification would be affected by a fire in j
the control room or cable spreading room. Alternate shutdown capability is required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, to be unaffected by a fire that would require a shutdown from outside of the control room. The inspector and the system engineer reviewed the logic diagram for the Panel AI-212
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instrumentation.
Based upon this review, it appeared that isolation of the
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circuitry was available to allow operability of Panel AI-212 in the event of a
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control room or cable spreading room fire. However, the system engineer initiated an engineering assistance request to review the fire protection
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aspects of Panel AI-212 instrumentation. The inspector determined that,
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although the procedure was deficient, it had only minor safety significance.
Therefore, this violation for failing to implement a procedure appropriate to the circumstances will not be cited because the criteria specified in Section VII.B.1 of Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 2 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice" were satisfied.
2.2.2 Tour with Shift Supervisor On August 2 the inspectors toured the radiologically controlled area with a shift supervisor.
During the tour, the shift supervisor examined the overall material condition of the plant.
In addition, he inspected components for i
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signs of degradation, such as oil, steam, and water leaks and the buildup of boric acid crystals.
The inspectors also observed the shift supervisor reviewing the status of equipment deficiency tags and verifying that
individuals working in the plant were obeying posted radiological areas. No j
adverse findings were noted.
Based on the results of the tour, it appeared that the shift supervisor exhibited an excellent attention for detail and knowledge of plant components.
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2.2.3 Broken Electrical Conductor Strands for Emergency Diesel Generator 1 l
On August 3 the inspectors observed that one of the electrical conductors for a brush on Emergency Diesel Generator I had some of the conductor strands
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broken. The inspectors notified the system engineer who inspected the
conductor and made a determination that diesel generator operability was
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unaffected based upon the small number of strands broken. The system engineer i
decided to perform a thermography examination of the conductors during the next scheduled emergency diesel generator monthly test on August 17.
i This test showed no difference in heat load among the conductors and no
individual hot spots at the point where the conductor strands were separated.
l If the broken strands had affected the current carrying capability of the
conductor, it would have created a higher resistance and a temperature
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increase. The system engineer initiated Maintenance Work Order 9302311, which i
required that a closer inspection of the conductor be performed. The
successful performance of the emergency diesel generator surveillance test and
the negative thermography results addressed the inspectors' concern on diesel
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operability. The inspectors noted during the diesel run that the conductor was not vibrating which indicated that additional strands would probably not break during subsequent runs.
2.2.4 Access to Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms On August 5 the inspectors were unable to enter the main door that leads to both emergency diesel generator rooms. The key card reader for the door accepted the inspectors' card on three attempts but the door would~not open.
On the way to the control room to notify the shift supervisor, the inspectors met a security guard. The guard was also unsuccessful in opening the door.
The guard called for assistance while the inspectors notified the control-room. Within a few minutes the shift supervisor,.an auxiliary operator and another security guard were present. The door was successfully opened using force. The door was able to be opened on subsequent attempts but was sticking slightly. The shift supervisor initiated a maintenance work order to repair the door latch mechanism. The inspectors' concern was that if operators needed to perform an emergency function, such as a local start of the emergency diesel generators, they would be prevented from doing so in a timely manner. There is another entrance to the emergency diesel generator rooms, but it is located outside of the building through a rollup door in the equipment hatch area. Operator access through this alternate entrance could not be performed in a very timely manner. The inspectors were satisfied that l
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the door could be opened if necessary. The inspectors inspected the door on l
August 6 and found that it had been repaired.
l 2.3 Radiological Protection Program Observations
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During this inspection period, the inspectors verified that selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection program were properly j
implemented. Radiation and contaminated areas were properly posted and
controlled. Health physics personnel were observed routinely touring the
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controlled areas.
l The licensee, during this inspection period, continued to clean the overhead l
spaces of the radiological controlled areas. Health physics personnel efforts j
to maintain the accessible portions of the corridors free of contamination
through continuous wiping and mopping of the floors was found to be _ good.
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2.4 Security Program Observations j
i The inspectors observed various aspects of the licensee's security program.
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Personnel and packages entering the protected' area were observed to be l
properly searched. Vehicles were properly controlled'or escorted within the i
protected area. Designated vehicles parked and unattended within the
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protected area were found to be locked and the keys removed. The inspectors j
routinely toured the protected area perimeter and found it maintained at an
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j excellent level.
Proper compensatory measures were observed taken when a security barrier was inoperable.
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On August 17, while the inspector was touring the t.entral alarm station, an i
l invalid access level alarm was received for an administratively controlled l
l door, followed by an intrusion alarm. The inspectors noted that the central
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l alarm station duty officer promptly dispatched a security guard to the l
l location of the intrusion alarm. The security guard arrived in the area of i
l the intrusion in a timely manner and intercepted the individual in question.
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l Following some inquiries, it was determined that the individual believed that
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he had received a green light when he had passed his identification badge I
through the card reader.
Further inquiries by the security staff identified that the individual was supposed to have the access level for the door in question but that his management inadvertently omitted it from the access authorization request that had been submitted to security. The security staff also identified that the individual was able to open the door by turning the door knob because he was exiting from a vital area (this feature is available for personnel safety for those occasions, such as fires, where people may need to exit the area in a hurry). Finally, a security guard tested the key card reader and verified that it was working properly. Security Incident j
Report L93-266 was written describing this event. The inspectors determined-that the licensee's actions in response to this incident were proper.
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-7-2.5 New Fuel Receipt and Inspection The inspectors observed portions of a new fuel receipt inspection. The fuel shipping container and fuel assembly were inspected in accordance with Procedure NMA-A-2, " Container Inspection Report," and Procedure NMA-B, " Fuel
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Assembly Inspection Report." The shipping container was removed from the flat
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bed truck to the fuel inspection area via the overhead crane. The crane.
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operator manipulated the shipping container in a safe mar.ner. -The crane operator was assisted by additional personnel who acted as spotters. The spotters and crane operator maintained constant eye contact throughout the
evolution and utilized hand signals to mancuver the shipping container.
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Once the fuel assembly was removed from the shipping container, it was
surveyed and visually inspected for evidence of damage and debris.
No debris i
was noted and all components were free of damage.
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I 2.6 Switchyard Inspection On August 18 the inspectors toured the switchyard.to. inspect the corrective actions taken as a result of the inadvertent plant trip on September 24. The
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details of the plant trip are documented in NRC Inspection l
Report 50-285/93-12. The inspectors noted that a new switchyard gate had been
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installed with a card reader for access. The gate had a padlock since the
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card reader system was not yet operational at the time of the inspection. An l
inspection of the building that housed the relay equipment, which resulted in i
the plant trip, identified that applicable relay cabinets were caution tagged.
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These actions were considered a positive step over the control of switchyard i
activities. The review of all licensee corrective actions resulting from the i
l plant trip will be performed during the review of Violation 285/9312-01.
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I 2.7 Verification of Ecuipment Taquing On August 26 the inspectors reviewed the equipment danger tag sheet for a
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l tagout to be performed on the following day. The tagout was to isolate a raw l
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water to component caeling water interface valve (HCV-400F) for repair. The l
l inspectors reviewed the applicable drawing and performed a walkdown of the
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system.
It was concluded that the proposed tagout properly isolated l
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Valve HCV-400F and would present no danger to personnel or plant components.
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l 2.8 Conclusions
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A deficient calibration procedure did not alert operators of erratic
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indications on the source and power range indications used for alternate
l shutdown. Licensee responses-to inspector identified concerns were timely and j
effective. The health physics and security programs were properly
implemented.
Security staff response to the invalid level alarm incident was
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very good. Overall plant condition, including housekeeping, was.found to be l
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good.
Fuel assembly inspection was well coordinated and performed in.a safe manner. Actions were in progress to provide positive control over' switchyard activities.
Equipment tagging was found to be properly planned.
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3 MAINTENANCE OBSERVATIONS (62703)
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3.1 Chargina Pump CH-lC Preventive Maintenance
On July 28 the inspectors observed portions of the preventive maintenance i
activities that were being performed on Charging Pump CH-1C. Activities
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performed on the pump included taking oil samples; the disassembly, l
lubrication, and reassembly of the motor / pump coupling; and the changing of l
the pump oil and oil filters. The maintenance activity was conducted in
accordance with Preventive Maintenance Order 9306488.
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The inspectors reviewed the preventive maintenance order and verified that it had been reviewed and approved as noted by the appropriate signatures..The i
guidance given in the work package was detailed in nature and technically l
adequate.
j During the maintenance activity, the inspectors noted that maintenance
personnel exhibited good mechanical work practices. Maintenance personnel i
disassembled the gearbox-to-reducer coupling and the reducer-to-motor coupling i
for inspection. The couplings and their associated parts were inspected for j
corrosion and mechanical wear. None was noted.
Following the inspection, t
mechanical maintenance replaced the lubrication grease for each coupling.
After the preventive maintenance was completed, the gear box was reassembled.
l Since the maintenance activity was conducted in a contaminated area, the
inspectors verified that the workers utilized good radiation protection
practices.
l The inspectors verified the qualifications of the workers performing-the maintenance. The inspectors also verified that the lead maintenance worker j
had completed the licensee certification process for performing charging pump
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maintenance.
3.2 Installation of New Radiation Monitors RM-062/RM-063
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The inspectors, throughout this inspection period, reviewed and observed j
selected portions of the licensee's efforts to remove Postaccident Noble Gas i
Monitors RM-063L, -063M, and -063H and install new Radiation
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Monitors RM-062/RM-063. This activity was being performed as part of an l
overall effort to upgrade the existing equipment.
j The inspectors focus was primarily on the mechanical aspects of this
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installation. This effort was being performed under Construction Work-
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Order 93-0073 and Modification Request MR-FC-84-155C. The inspectors reviewed portions of the construction work order and the modification request and
determined that these documents had been reviewed and approved by the
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licensee, as noted by the appropriate signatures. The procedures were technically adequate to control this activity, providing sufficient
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information in the form of instructions and drawings.
Prior to initiating this effort and removing Radiation Monitors RM-063L, -063M, and -063H'from
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service, the licensee took the appropriate precautions, as-delineated in
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the offsite dose calculation manual, and entered the appropriate Technical l
Specification limiting condition for operation.
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The inspectors witnessed the installation of piping supports for the sample
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piping for Radiation Monitors RM-062/RM-063 and verified that the licensee -
j adhered to the requirements of Civil Standard Specification CSS-5, " Standard
Specification for Concrete Expansion Anchor Work." The contract personnel
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performing this effort were found to be knowledgeable of their
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responsibilities.
Procedural compliance was noted. Also noted was licensee personnel compliance with personnel safety requirements, such as proper use of
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safety belts and correct use of ladders and scaffolding.
I Quality control personnel were also observed inspecting the field run sample i
piping to verify internal cleanliness to Level D requirements per Standing
Order 50-M-103, " System Cleanliness."
In addition, licensee provided proper
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postings of impaired fire barriers.
The inspectors reviewed the results of the postinstallation pmmatic test
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that was performed on the sample line leading from the vent stack to Radiation j
Monitor RM-062. The test results indicated that' the sample line was tested to
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1.1 times design pressure (25 psi) per ASME B31.1, 1967. No anomalies were l
noted.
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Following discussions with the system engineer,-it was noted that the
licensee's schedule for the overall modification effort was. designed to i
minimize the impact of removing selected radiation monitors from service.. As l
a result, system engineering scheduling efforts were found to be notable.
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j Maintenance personnel were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and
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l maintained good procedur6 compliance. System engineering. scheduling efforts i
i was found to be very good.
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a 4 SURVEILLANCE OBSERVATIONS (61726)
C_harging Pump CH-1C Postmaintenance Testina h
4.1 The inspectors observed a postmaintenance surveillance of Charging Pump CH-10.
The test verified suction and discharge pressures, flow rate, and vibration amplitude of the pump. The surveillance was ' conducted in accordance with Procedure OP-ST-CH-3003, " Chemical & Volume Control System Pump / Check Valve Inservice Test." The inspectors verified that the licensee had completed all test precautions and limitations prior to beginning the surveillance. 'The inspectors also verified that personnel had conducted a pretest briefing to
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ensure everyone involved understood the test and had completed.the
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surveillance test signature sheet.
The inspectors observed operator performance throughout the evolution,.both inside the control room and locally at the pump. Operations personnel l
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successfully completed the test as delineated by the test procedure. The
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inspectors also verified that good communications existed between both groups involved in testing.
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Additionally, the inspectors verified that the vibration meter used to record-j l
pump vibration had been calibrated as noted by the attached _ calibration l
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l sticker. This was further verified through review of the instruments
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o calibration documentation.
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4.2 Conclusions j
Licensee personnel communications and procedural compliance was found to be:
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i 5 TEMPORARY INSTR 4r. TION - EMPLOYEE Cu' ' S PROGRAM (2500/028)
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This temporary instruction was issued to determine the characteristics of'
l employee concerns program that licensees have implemented to provide-
-i employees, who wish to raise safety issues, an alternate path from their j
supervisor or normal line management to express these concerns without fear of
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retribution, j
t The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for handling employee concerns.
The licensee generally resolves their employees' safety issue concerns through l
the employee's supervision. This progran has not been proceduralized.
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However, the licensee does have a human performance enhancement system i
program, which is controlled through Quality Procedure N0D-QP-20, " Human Performance Enhancement System Program." The scope of this program.is to
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improve overall plant performance through the identification and correction of
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human performance deficiencies as it relates to inappropriate actions, near
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misses, or potential problems. Although this program is narrow in scope,
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employees are not prevented from using this vehicle for raising any safety
issues they deem important. These concerns can be raised confidentially with no retribution. The results of the inspectors review are documented in Attachment 2 of this rep rt.
6 FOLLOWUP (92701)
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item 285/9304-01:
Review of Licensee's Actions to Provide Positive Control Over Individuals Enterina the-
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Radiologically Controlled Area This item resulted from licensee personnel entering the radiologically controlled area without stupping at the entry point to be logged into the computer and receive self-reading dosimeters..The entry point was-such that-individuals could enter the controlled area without~being seen by health
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I physics personnel. The licensee committed to provide positive control over (
the entry point.
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-11-The licensee performed a modification of the controlled access point, which included a barrier gate (exit point), radiation work permit counter, and the
entrance path. The entrance path is designed to funnel individuals past the onshift health physics personnel. The inspectors reviewed this modification and concluded that it should prevent individuals from entering the controlled area without health physics personnel being aware.
l Another area of concern was through Door 1011-29, which was the access point to the controlled area before the chemistry and radiation protection building was completed. An individual could have entered the controlled area through this door without being seen by health physics personnel at the normal access point. The licensee made a change to their security computer, which allowed access through this door to only individuals performing shift duties. The inspectors reviewed the list of individuals that were granted access to this door and found the list to contain only those individuals with a need to l
enter. These actions taken by the licensee were sufficient to provide
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positive control over the entry into the radiologically controlled area.
l 7 ONSITE REVIEW OF LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (92700)
(Closed) Licensee Event Report 93-006:
" Failure to Maintain a Continuous Fire Watch for Impaired Halon System"
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This licensee event report addressed an event in which a temporary contract employee, assigned to maintain a contiiuous fire watch in the switchgear l
l rooms, knowingly left his post unattended. The licensee concluded that the
root cause of this event was personnel error and that the problem was isolated to this individual.
The corrective action taken, as a result of this event, was to relieve the
individual of his responsibilities, block his access to the protected area of the plant, and terminate his services.
Following a review of the licensee's actions, the inspector concurred with licensee's conclusions that this event was not an indication of a programmatic problem. The licensee's corrective actions were sufficient to preclude a recurrence of this event.
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ATTACHMENT 1 1 PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee Personnel R. Andrews, Division Manager, Nuclear Services J. Chase, Manager, Fort Calhoun Station G. Cook, Supervisor, Station Licensing S. Gambhir, Division Manager, Production Engineering J. Gasper, Manager, Training W. Gates, Vice President, Nuclear J. Herman, Acting Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Industry Affairs R. Jaworski, Manager, Station Engineering W. Jones, Senior Vice President
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L. Kusek, Manager, Nuclear Safety Review Group W. Orr, Manager, Quality Assurance and Quality Control
T. Patterson, Division Manager, Nuclear Operations R. Phelps, Manager, Design Engineering J. Sefick, Manager, Security Services C. Simmons, Station Licensing Engineer The above personnel attended the exit meeting.
In addition to the personnel listed above, the inspectors contacted other personnel during this inspection period.
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2 EXIT MEETING An exit meeting was conducted on August 30, 1993.
During this meeting, the
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inspector reviewed the scope and findings of the report.
The licensee did not
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identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors.
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ATTACHMENT 2 EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAMS
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PLANT NAME:
Fort Calhoun Station LICENSEE: OPPD DOCKET:
50-285 A.
PROGRAM 1.
Does the licensee, have an employee concerns program?
(Yes or__No/Coments) YES The licensee has a formal program as part of their human performance evaluation system (HPES) which identifies human performance deficiencies. However, it can cover any concern.
Employee concerns are generally handled through their individual supervision.
2.
Has NRC inspected the program? Report # NA No B.
SCOPE 1.
Is it for:
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Technical? (Yes, No/Coments)
YES b.
Administrative? (Yes, No/ Comments) YES
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c.
Personnel issues? (Yes, No/Coments) YES 2.
Does it cover safety-as well as non-safety issues?
(Yes or No/Coments)
YES
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Is it designed for:
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Nuclear safety? (Yes, No/Coments) YES
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b.
Personal safety? (Yes, No/Coments) YES
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c.
Personnel issues - including union grievances?
(Yes or No/Coments) YES i
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4.
Does the program apply to all licensee employees?
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YES l
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Contractors? (Yes or No/Coments)
YES 6.
Does the licensee require its contractors and their subs to have a similar program?
(Yes or No/Coments) N0 l
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Does the licensee conduct an exit interview upon terminating
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employees asking if they have any safety concerns? (Yes or
No/ Comments) YES C.
INDEPENDENCE l
1.
What is the title of the person in charge?
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The HPES supervisor for the HPES.
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Who do they report to?
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The Assistant Plant Manager for the HPES.
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3.
Are they independent of line management? No j
4.
Does the ECP use third party consultants? No
5.
How is a concern about a manager or vice president followed up?
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Through their management.
D.
RESOURCES
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1.
What is the size of the staff devoted to this program?
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Two individuals in the HPES.
2.
What are ECP staff qualifications (technical training, l
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l interviewing training, investigator training, other)?
t Training in HPES and root cause analysis techniques for the HPES
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employees.
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E.
REFERRALS 1.
Who has followup on concerns (ECP staff, line management, other)?
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l HPES staff and line manegement.
F.
CONFIDENTIALITY 1.
Are the reports confidential? (Yes or No/ Comments)
YES 2.
Who is the identity of the alleger made known to (senior management, ECP staff, line management, other)?-
(Circle, if other explain)
If the concern is raised to the HPES staff then only they know the alleger's identity.
If the concern is raised to their own st.pervisor, then other management may be informed of the identity of the alleger.
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-3-3.
Can employees be:
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a.
Anonymous? (Yes, No/ Comments) YES b.
Report by phone? (Yes, No/ Comments) YES
G.
FEEDBACK 1.
Is feedback given to the alleger upon completion of the followup?
(Yes or No - If so, how?) YES For concerns raised to the HPES, feedback is either in writing or j
verbally.
Concerns raised to their supervisor is verbally fed
back.
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2.
Does program reward good ideas?
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No, except for token items with safety slogans on them (pens, key
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chains, etc.)
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Who, or at what level, makes the final decision of resolution?
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Generally the decision is made by the supervisor of the accused.
l However, based upon the type of allegation the decision may be
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made by upper management.
I For concerns raised through the HPES, the Assistant Plant Manager makes the final decision.
4.
Are the resolutions of anonymous concerns disseminated?
No.
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5.
Are resolutions of valid concerns publicized (newsletter, bulletin board, all hands meeting, other)?
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t Selected concerns are published in the biweekly newsletter.
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H.
EFFECTIVENESS 1.
How does the licensee measure the effectiveness of the program?
No measure at this time.
2.
Are concerns:
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Trended? (Yes or No/ Comments) N0 b.
Used? (Yes or No/ Comments) YES 3.
In the last three years how many concerns were raised?
of the concerns raised, how may were closed?
What percentage were substantiated?
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-4-There is no tabulation of overall concerns.
4.
How are followup techniques used to measure effectiveness (random survey, interviews,other)?
The HPES supervisor and evaluator interviews individuals in the field on the program.
5.
How frequently are internal audits of the ECP conducted and by
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whom?
Annually by QA for the HPES.
I.
ADMINISTRATION / TRAINING 1.
Is ECP prescribed by a procedure? (Yes or No/ Comments) YES l
Only the HPES portion.
2.
How are employees, as well as contractors, made aware of this program (training, newsletter, bulletin board, other)?
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The HPEF
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"isor talks to employees at plant safety meetings.
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS: NONE I
I NAME:
R. P. Mullikin TITLE:
Senior Resident Inspector PHONE #:
(402) 426-9611 DATE COMPLETED: 8/27/93
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