IR 05000285/1993004
| ML20044D363 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 05/09/1993 |
| From: | Harrell P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20044D353 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-285-93-04, 50-285-93-4, NUDOCS 9305190046 | |
| Download: ML20044D363 (13) | |
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APPENDlX
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-285/93-04 l
Operating License: DPR-40 t
Licensee: Omaha Public Power District (OPPD)
444 South 16th Street Mall l
Omaha, Nebraska 68102-2247 Facility Name:
Fort Calhoun Station inspection At: Blair, Nebraska
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Inspection Conducted: March 14 through April 24, 1993 Inspectors:
R. Mullikin, Senior Resident Inspector R. Azua, Resident Inspector
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Approved:
i P. H. HarrM I%9rfeY,"T& tin 1cdf Support Staff Date
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Divis n of Reactor ProjL:ts Inspection Summary Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of onsite followup of events, operational safety verification, safety system walkdown, maintenance and surveillance observations, and onsite followup of licensee event reports.
Results:
An accident involving a crane indicated that better job preplanning was
needed.
However, the response to the accident by affected plant personnel was very good (Section 2.1).
The failure to follow procedures by plant personnel entering the
radiation controlled area resulted in a noncited violation (Section 3.3).
Maintenance personnel efforts in prestaging equipment to minimize i
exposure time in the radiation controlled area was excellent
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(Section 4.1).
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Surveillance activities were properly performed with very good adherence
to the procedure, and communication and coordination among the participants was good (Section 5.1).
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9305190046 930513 PDR ADDCK 050002B5 O
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C-2-The licensee maintained the physical plant in the proper alignment for
the operating conditions. Discrepancies noted during walkdown of a safety system were considered minor in nature and had no safety significance (Section 6).
Summary of Inspection findings:
Licensee Event Reports91-011 and 92-020 were closed (Section 6).
- Inspection followup Item 285/9304-01 was opened (Section 3.3).
- Attachment:
Attachment - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
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DETAILS
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i 1 PLANT STATUS i
At the beginning of this inspection period, the fort Calhoun Station was operating at 98 percent power to ensure that peak linear heat rate was maintained within the limits specified in the Technical Specifications.
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plant was maintained at that level until March 20, 1993, when power was
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reduced to 77 percent for fuel conservation purposes. This power level
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continued until April 23, when the licensee started reducing power for a mini-outage that was expected to last until May 1.
On April 24, the plant reached
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hot shutdown.
i 2 ONSITE RESPONSE TO EVENTS (93702)
2.1 Loss of Security Camera Tower On March 19, 1993, while attempting to remove the ice deflector from the Missouri River, a crane fell over and partially entered the river. The ice
i deflector is a group of wooden poles that are tied together and are annually placed in the river to deflect ice away from the intake structure. This
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deflector is removed each year at the beginning of the navigation season.
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At the time of the accident, the crane was between the river and the plant l
isolation zone. The crane fell onto and toppled a security camera tower.
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licensee's security force responded to the loss of the cameras and the plant
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fire brigade was summoned due to the potential for a fire from the flammable
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liquids within the crane.
In addition, the licensee noted an hydraulic fluid
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leak but was able to contain the spill before it reached the river.
Security compensatory measures were subsequently taken by redirecting other security I
cameras in order to cover the lost area.
I The inspector toured the central alarm station and found that existing cameras
were able to sufficiently cover the entire area. On March 22, tne licensee brought a contractor to the site who was able to remove the crane and the security tower. All the work was performed outside of the protected area i
fence.
During the accident, the protected area fence was not damaged.
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licensee performed an investigation of the accident. The investigation concluded that the accident was a culmination of procedural, planning, and
judgement errors, as well as management and work crew oversights.
The licensee's review of this incident was still ongoing at the end of the inspection period.
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2.2 Depressurization of the Instrument Air S_ystem i
On April 16, 1993, the control room operators received a low pressure alarm on
the instrument air system.
Upon inspection, the control room pressure indicator showed that the system pressure had dropped slightly below 84 psi, l
from a nominal pressure of a 100 psi.
The control room operators reviewed
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-4-Alarm Response Procedure ARP-CB-10,ll/A21, " Loss of Instrument Air," which directed the operators to enter Abnormal Operating Procedure AOP-17 " Loss of Instrument Air," because the instrument air system pressure had dropped below 84 psi. As directed by Procedure A0P-11, the shift supervisor dispatched an operator to inspect Air Dryer CA-12.
Upon inspection, the operator noted that an instrument air dryer exhaust isolation valve (PCV-1717) was closed, which was consistent with the fact that the valve is designed to close when the system pressure drops below 84 psi. Operations personnel then proceeded to start standby Air Dryer CA-31 and remove Air Dryer CA-12 from service. Within approximately 15 minutes, the instrument air system pressure increased above 90 psi and the operators exited Procedure AOP-17.
The licensee inspected the instrument air dryer system piping and identified the presence of desiccant particles, which the licensee believed were introduced into the system when the desiccant was recently replaced.
Upon further review of this event, the licensee made an initial determination that the probable cause was the presence of desiccant in the air dryer system piping. The licensee believed that desiccant in the piping may have prevented one of three switching valves, located in the air dryer system, from closing j
properly, thus creating a venting path to the system exhaust line.
The licensee was unable to confirm this due to the fact that all the alves in question appeared to be operating correctly at that time and no desiccant material was identified in the valves when they were dismantled for inspection. The licensee was continuing to review the cause of this event at the end of the inspection period. One item the licensee planned to address was the methodology used to replace the desiccant to prevent future potential introduction of desiccant particles into the air dryer system.
The safety significance of this event was minor due to several factors. The 0.9 micron filters located downstream from the air dryer system were inspected i
and found to be in good condition with no apparent degradation. Thus, the licensee was confident that no desiccant particles or any other foreign materials were introduced into the rest of the instrument air system.
Al so, the instrument air system pressure did not drop below 80 psi and the licensee determined that this was sufficient pressure for the system to perform its function.
Finally, even though the exhaust line for the air dryer system was isolated, the system was still operational and continued to dry the air (instrument air dew monitor did not indicate any change).
The only detriment caused to the dryer by the isolation of the exhaust line was the inability for the instrument air dryer system to regenerate the desiccant. This would eventually cause the desiccant to become saturated, but this evolution would take more than 3 days to occur.
2.3 Safety injection and Refueling Water Tank Piping Qualification On April 22, 1993, the licensee reported that some piping that was used between 1985 to 1992 to recirculate the safety injection and refueling water tank was not seismically qualified.
In 1985, the licensee installed a plant modification to add a filter, piping, and valves to filter the borated water in the safety injection and refueling water tank.
The tank provides borated ij
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water for the safety injection and containment spray systems.
The filter was l
isolated and never put into service due to radiological concerns with l
replacing the filter.
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The licensee, in order to complete the modification, performed a piping
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analysis in 1990. The system was modified in 1992 to incorporate changes from the piping analysis.
The licensee determined that, between 1985 to 1992, some l
I parts of the modified system were used and were not seismically qualified, and that some loss of inventory from the tank could have occurred during a seismic event. The probability of f ailure of this system is low since the system
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would hive to be in service when a seismic event occurred.
The system I
historically has been operated 3-4 hours per month.
The inspectors will review this item during routine review of Licensee Event Report 93-005.
2.4 Loss of Long-Distance Communications On April 23, 1993, the Fort Calhoun Station lost the onsite capability for long-distance communications.
This condition resulted when a communication cable, which carried the area's long-distance telephone traffic, was accidentally severed in the area of a local community during the installation of sewer pipes.
This condition was identified by a member of the plant's administrative staff, who notified the control room. The operations personnel in the control room verified that they did not have the capability to make long-distance calls outside the Fort Calhoun Station area code.
They were able, though,'to verify that they had the capability of contacting state and local officials in the event that it was necessary. The operations personnel then proceeded to develop a temporary method for obtaining long-distance communication until the normal method was recovered.
The operations personnel, using the OPPD microwave line, contacted the OPPD system operations group located in Omaha.
System operations had the capability of making long-distance calls.
As a result, a conference call capability was set up and the fort Calhoun Station was able to contact the NRC operations duty officer to make the appropriate notifications.
The normal long-distance system was returned to service within approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
The licensee was reviewing this event at the end of this inspection period.
2.5 Conclusions Operator performance during plant events was found to be excellent. The crane accident indicated that better job preplanning was needed.
However, the response to the accident by affected plant personnel was very good.
3 OPERATIONAL SAFETY VERIFICATION (71707)
3.1 Routine Control Room Observations The inspectors observed operational activities throughout this inspection period to verify that proper control room staffing and control room
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professionalism were maintained.
Shift turnover meetings were conducted in a
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manner that provided for proper communication of plant status from one shift
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to the other.
Discussions with operators indicated that they were aware of
plant and equipment status and reasons for lit annunciators.
The inspectors
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observed that Technical Specification limiting conditions for operation were
properly documented and tracked. Operators were observed to properly control
access into the control. room operating area.
Plant management was observed in
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the control room on a daily basis.
The inspectors routinely reviewed control room valve and switch indications
for proper alignment of systems such as safety injection, containment l
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integrity, normal and emergency power supplies, and auxiliary feedwater.
The operators' and shif t supervisor's logs were reviewed and found to properly
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document plant status.
L 3.2 Plant Tours The inspectors reviewed the control room equipment tag log and selected one
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i tagout for review.
The tagout sheet had the required documentation for approval, hanging of the tags, and independent verification.
The tagout (
inspected was 93-0500 for the isolation of Diesel Driven Fire Pump FP-18.
The inspectors noted that all the tags were hung on tht correct piece of equipment and that the valves and switches were in the designated positions.
The only
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discrepancy noted was that, for the fire pump discharge strainer (FP-6B), the
motor control center breaker label indicated that Strainer FP-6B was the L
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strainer for the motor-driven fire pump (FP-1A). The inspector notified the licensee of this observation.
The inspector concluded that it would not be
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likely that the wrong breaker would be tagged out by this labeling discrepancy.
3.3 Radiological Protection Program Observations
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The inspectors verified that selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection program were properly implemented.
Radiation and
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contaminated areas were properly posted and generally controlled.
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physis.s personnel were observed routinely touring the controlled areas.
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On April 1,1993, four individuals entered the radiologically controlled area without proper dosimetry. Three of the individuals were licensee personnel,
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while the other was a contractor. The individuals stopped at the control l
point and asked health physics personnel what radiation work permit they should enter on. The individuals then read and signed the correct radiation l
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work permit but entered the radiologically controlled area without obtaining
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I self-reading dosimetry, discussing with a health physics technician the current radiological conditions, and being logged in on the licensee's computer system. This was contrary to Radiation Protection Procedure RP-214,
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" Access Control Radiologically Controlled Area."
t The individuals toured the spent fuel pool area, which was posted as a contaminated area.
The lack of dosimetry was not discovered until the I
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individuals were removing their protective clothing and realized that they i
were missing the required dosimetry.
They exited the radiologically
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controlled area and reported the problem to health physics.
The duration of t
the inspection totalled approximately 30 minutes, which included dressout time.
The work in the spent fuel pool area was limited to a visual nature.
Although the individuals did not have self-reading dosimeters, they did have l
thermoluminescent dosimeters.
These were sent away for reading and the
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results were that no exposures had occurred.
The licensee's immediate
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corrective action was to restrict access to the radiologically controlled area
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for the individuals.
Incident Report 930075 was written to document the event
and presented to the Plant Review Committee for review. Action was assigned l
to system engineering to look at a way to redesign the radiologically j
controlled area entry point for more positive control over individuals l
entering. The Division Manager, Nuclear Operations, at the exit meeting, i
committed to providing for more positive control of this area.
The inspector i
determined that the violation of Procedure RP-214 violated Technical
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Specification 5.8.1 but had only minor safety significance. Therefore, the i
violation will not be cited because the criteria specified in Section Vll.B.1 l
of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied. The inspector's review of the i
licensee's actions to provide positive control over individuals entering the j
radiologically controlled area will be an inspection followup item (285/9304-01).
J 3.4 Security Program Observations l
The inspectors observed various aspects of the licensee's security program.
Personnel and packages entering the protected area were observed to be
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Vehicles were properly controlled or escorted within the
protected area. Designated vehicles parked and unattended within the
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protected area were found to be locked and the keys removed. The inspectors
routinely toured the protected area perimeter and found it maintained at an
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excellent level..Also noted was that proper compensatory measures were-taken
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when a security barrier was inoperable. The response and compensatory actions
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taken during the loss of security cameras (Section 2.1) was notable.
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3.5 Mini-Outage Planning Meetinq
On April 20, 1993, the inspector attended the planning meeting for those
personnel that were to have oversight responsibilities during the mini-outage
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that was scheduled to run from April 24 through May 1,1993. This meeting i
defined the outage organization, presented the latest schedule, and defined
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organizational responsibilities.
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The inspector noted good communication among the individuals at the meeting.
Safe shutdown risk considerations were apparent throughout the briefing.
It was made clear that deviations from the schedule would not be allowed
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unless approval was received from the outage manager.
Routine surveillances
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were included on the overall outage schedule, which should prevent
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surveillances from bypassing outage management.
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3.6 Plant Shutdown On April 23, 1993, at approximately 8 p.m.,
the licensee began reducing power from 77 percent in order to began a 1-week mini-outage.
The inspector l
witnessed the control room activities from initiation until the turbine was
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tripped.
The inspector witnessed good adherence to procedures during the
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shutdown and good performance by the operating crew. The shutdown overlapped i
two operating crews, and present for both were operator trainees.
The
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trainees were there to obtain experience on reactivity changes.
The inspector i
observed that the trainees were under direct control of a licensed operator l
during all control board manipulations.
i 3.7 Conclusions i
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Operations personnel performed their duties in a profe;sional manner.
Failure I
to follow procedures by plant personnel entering the radiologically controlled l
area indicated a need for more positive controls for personnel entering the
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area.
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4 MAINTENANCE OBSERVATIONS (62703)
4.1 Preventive Maintenance on High Pressure Safety Injection Pump 51-2C i
On April 20, 1993, the inspector witnessed preventive maintenance activities
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being performed on High Pressure Safety Injection Pump SI-2C. These
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maintenance activities were controlled by Preventive Maintenance
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Orders 9207415, 9300045, and 9300216, and their associated work instructions
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and procedures. The preventive maintenance orders had been reviewed and approved, as noted by the appropriate signatures. The inspector reviewed the
I preventive maintenance orders and determined that the information provided was accurate in identifying the item to be worked on.
Procedures PE-PM-CCW-0100, l
" Cleaning and flushing of Coolers Supplied by the CCW System," EM-PM-EX-1000,
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"480 Volt Motor Inspection," and OP-ST-SI-3008, " Safety Injection and
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Containment Spray Pump Inservice Test and Valve Exercise Test," were reviewed l
for technical adequacy and were found to be within the skill of the craft.
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The work effort was performed in the west safety injection pump room (Room 21), which is within the radiologically controlled area of the plant.
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The inspector verified that the licensee personnel performing this work effort t
had read and signed the appropriate radiation work permit.
The inspector noted that the maintenance personnel's efforts to prestage all the equipment
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necessary to perform this effort was excellent.
Personnel knowledge and experience in performing this effort was also noted to be very good.
The
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maintenance personnel adhered to good radiation protection practices throughout this effort.
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The inspector interviewed the licensee personnel and found them to be cognizant of their responsibilities.
Valve and equipment tagouts were
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verified to be accurate and complete.
In addition, postmaintenance test
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results were reviewed for verification that the acceptance criteria set forth
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for operability had been met.
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4.2 Conclusions
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Maintenance personnel efforts in prestaging equipment to minimize exposure time in the radiation controlled area was excellent.
Knowledge displayed by
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I the maintenance personnel in performing this effort clearly indicated that this activity was within the skill of the craft.
5 SURVEILLANCE OBSERVATIONS (61726)
5.1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operability Test On March 24, 1993, the inspector witnessed the performance of surveillance activities on both the steam-driven and motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps.
The activity was performed using Surveillance Test Procedure OP-ST-AFW-004, " Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operability Test." This test is performed monthly to satisfy the requirements of Technical Specifications 3.9(2) and 3.9(4). The inspector reviewed the procedure and found it to have the proper approvals before the test began.
The inspector observed good communication and coordination between the control room and the auxiliary operator performing the test.
The inspector independently took pressure readings and they matched those taken by the operator performing the test. The inspector reviewed the completed surveillance test and found all licensee reviews were performed, as indicated by the appropriate signatures.
The inspector reviewed the proceduralized acceptance criteria to determine whether it was appropriate to determine operability of the auxiliary feedwater pumps. The system engineer provided the analysis for the acceptance criteria and the inspector found that the criteria specified in the test was correct.
5.2 Conclusions Surveillance activities were properly performed with very good adherence to the procedure and communication and coordination among the participants.
6 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE SYSTEM WALKDOWN (71710)
6.1 Auxiliary Feedwater System - Normal Alignment The inspector verified the system valve alignment for the auxiliary feedwater system using Surveillance Test Procedure OP-ST-AFW-0001, " Auxiliary feedwater System Valve Alignment Check," Checklist OP-ST-AFW-001-CL-A.
In addition, the inspector used Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P& ids) Il405-M-253,
" Composite Flow Diagram - Steam Generator, Feedwater, and Blowdown," and ll405-M-254, " Flow Diagram - Condensate," to walk down the system.
The inspector found that all valves and switches noted in the procedure were in the proper position.
However, the inspector noted lock-closed Valve FW-340 (emergency feedwater tank discharge isolation valve) was not on the
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-10-surveillance procedure. The inspector referred this to the licensee to determine whether this valve should be included in the valve alignment checklist.
6.2 Main Steam System - Normal Operation The inspector walked down the accessible portions of the main steam system to verify normal operating valve alignments. The valve alignments were verified using positions indicated in Operating Instruction 01-MS-1, Checklist I-MS-1-CL-A, " Main Steam System Normal Operation."
In addition, P&!D 11405-252, " Flow Diagram - Steam," was used in the walkdown.
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f inspector noted that all valves were in the correct position per the procedure, with the exception of Valves MS-Ill and MS-ll3, which were the-steam header sample tap isolation valves.
The procedure listed these valves
as normally open, but the valves were closed as part of a tagout.
The inspector observed these two valves and the equipment tags that were visibly i
attached. Valve MS-Ill appeared closed based upon the valve stem position.
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However, the stem on Valve MS-Il3 was positioned such that it appeared that
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the valve was open instead of closed as required by the equipment tag.
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inspector contacted the shift supervisor, who physically verified that Valve MS-Il3 was closed.
Also, during the walkdown it was noted that
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PalD 11405-M-252, Sheet 1, was incorrect as to where Valve MS-100 (pressure
test line isolation valve) connected to Main Steam Line B.
The PalD showed
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Valve MS-100 connected to the main steam line downstream of Safety
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Valve MS-292, where physically it was connected upstream. The inspector determined that no safety concern existed, but this was turned over to the
licensee.
6.3 Feedwater System - Normal Operation The inspector verified the system valve alignment for the accessible portions t
of the main feedwater system using Operating Instruction OI-FW-2, i
Checklist 01-FW-2-CL-A, "Feedwater (FW) System Normal Operation."
P&lDs ll405-M-253, " Flow Diagram - Steam Generator-Feedwater and Blowdown,"
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and 11405-M-254, " Flow Diagram - Condensate," were also used in the verification process.
The only discrepancies noted during the walkdown were
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minor valve labeling differences between the procedure and the control room l
panel for Valves HCV-Il50A, -B, and -C.
These observations were referred to
the licensee.
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6.4 Conclusions l
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The licensee maintained the physical plant in the proper alignment for the operating conditions. Discrepancies noted were considered minor in nature and had no safety significance.
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l 7 ONSITE REVIEW 0F LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (92700)
7.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 91-011:
Pressurizer Pressure Low i
Signal Setpoints
This licensee event report discussed the licensee's determination that the l
potential existed for the pressurizer pressure instrument loops to be i
calibrated in a manner which could have resulted in the inability to trip the l
plant on low pressurizer pressure within the design analysis limit.
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upon instrument uncertainties, the licensee determined that the trip setpoints
could have been as low as 1559 psia. The Technical Specification requirement and Updated Safety Analysis Report limit was 1578 psia.
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The licensee determined that the root cause of this event was the lack of an established program to ensure that the calibration procedures vere written to i
meet the assumption / inputs used in the setpoint calculations.
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The immediate corrective actions taken by the licensee following this
determination included:
performing an evaluation to ensure that the existing
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pressurizer pressure low signal trip setpoint (as calibrated) met the l
Technical Specification requirements; and revising the pressurizer pressure l
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low signal loop calibration procedures to eliminate the potential for error prior to their next expected use.
In addition, the licensee established a i
program to evaluate remaining safety significant setpoints. This program was aimed at identifying other safety significant instrument loops that could have had a problem similar to that identified in the pressurizer pressure low
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signal circuitry. This program was completed on April 9,1993.
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The inspector reviewed documentation for the completion of the corrective actions taken by the licensee.
Based on the review performed by the
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inspector, the licensee had taken appropriate actions to preclude repetition l
of this event.
j 7.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 92-020:
Failure to Obtain Appropriate j
Grab Samples During Radiation Monitor Inoperabilit y i
This event occurred when the auxiliary building stack effluent radiation
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monitor (PM-061) was removed from service for calibration. Radiation
Monitor RM-061 is the particulate monitor.
The performance of this
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calibration also made the noble gas monitor (RM-062) inoperable.
The licensee subsequently failed to take the appropriate Technical Specification required grab samples every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
The licensee determined the root cause of this event to be inadequate controls in Procedures IC-ST-RM-055, " Electronic and Secondary Calibration of Auxiliary Building Exhaust Stack Radiation Monitor RM-061," and 01-RM-1, " Radiation Monitors - Normal and Accident Operation." Both procedures lacked adequate precautions or prerequisites to ensure that grab sampling would be properly
performed when the monitors were removed from service.
In addition, a j
contributing cause in the event was a breakdown in communication.
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I failure involved several groups in that it occurred between instrumentation and controls and operations personnel and between operations and chemistry
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The licensee, upon discovery of this event, perfonned a review and determined that this event did not present a significant danger to the public.
The licensee determined that, throughout the event. Radiation Monitors RM-061 and-062 were capable of providing a signal to activate the ventilation isolation
actuation signal relay if the stack gas activity had increased to the alarm j
setpoint. Additionally, during the period Radiation Monitors RM-061 and -062 j
were inoperable, no unexpected increases in the auxiliary building activity were detected on the area monitors. No releases from the gas decay tanks or j
containment atmosphere were in progress while the monitors were inoperable.
The licensee's corrective actions included:
Procedure Ol-RM-1 was revised to provide appropriate precautions and
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prerequisites to ensure valid grab sampling when radiation monitors are l
removed from operation.
Procedure IC-ST-RM-0055 was evaluated and revised to ensure that it
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contained appropriate precautions and prerequisites for declaring radiation monitoring equipment inoperable.
A formal method for communicating to operations personnel that required l
grab samples, per Procedure 01-RM-1, had been obtained, was developed.
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A training hotline (HL92-211. " Failure to Obtain Appropriate Grab j
Samples During Radiation Monitor Inoperability") was issued to licensed j
t operators and shift chemistry personnel regarding this event.
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Training of chemistry and operations personnel with respect to this
event regarding radiation monitors and backup sampling _ methods was completed by November 1, 1992.
The inspector reviewed documentation for the completion of the corrective
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actions taken by the licensee. Based on the review performed by the
inspector, the licensee had taken appropriate actions to preclude repetition l
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1 PERSONS CONTACTED i
1.1 Licensee personnel i
- R. Andrews, Division Manager, Nuclear Services
- J. Chase, Manager, fort Calhoun Station t
- G. Cook, Supervisor, Station Licensing i
1. Dailey, Engineer, System Engineering
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- S. Gambhir, Division Manager, Production Engineering
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- W. Gates, Vice President, Nuclear
- R. Jaworski, Manager, Station Engineering
- W.
Jones, Senior Vice President
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- L. Kusek, Manager, Nuclear Safety Review Group M. Nay, Engineer, System Engineering
- W. Orr, Manager, Quality Assurance and Quality Control
- T. Patterson, Division Manager Nuclear Operations
- R. Phelps, Manager, Design Engineering
- R. Short, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Industry Affairs i
- C. Simmons, Station Licensing Engineer
- J.
Tills, Operations Supervisor
- Denotes personnel that attended the exit meeting.
In addition.to the personnel listed above, the inspectors contacted other personnel during this inspection period.
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2 EXIT MEETING
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An exit meeting was conducted on April 26, 1993. During this meeting, the inspector reviewed the scope and findings of the report.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors.
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