IR 05000285/1980009

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IE Insp Rept 50-285/80-09 on 800505-08,12-15 & 22-23.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Progress on IE Bulletin 79-14,startup Preparation,Reactor Coolant Pump Cover Stud Deterioration & Followup Insp
ML19320B871
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 06/04/1980
From: Kelley D, Westerman T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML19320B869 List:
References
50-285-80-09, 50-285-80-9, IEB-79-14, NUDOCS 8007150171
Download: ML19320B871 (4)


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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION IV

Report No. 50-285/80-09 Docket No. 50-285 License No. DPR-40 Licensee: Omaha Public Power District 1623 Harney Street Omaha, Nebraska 68102 Facility Name: Fort Calhoun Station - Unit I

Inspection at: Fort Calhoun Station, Blair, Nebraska Inspection Conducted: May 5-8 and 12-15 and 22-23, 1980 Inspector:

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h/9/N T. F. Westerman, Chief, Reactor Projects Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on May 5-8, and 12-15 and 22-23, 1980 (Report No. 50-285/80-09)

Areas Inspected:

Routine unannounced inspection of the licensee's (1)

?rogress on IEB 79-14; (2) Preparation for startup after refueling; (3)

Follow-up on an allegation; (4) Follow-up on items of noncompliance and deviations; (5) Follow-up on unresolved items; and (6) Reactor coolant pump cover stud deterioration. The inspection consisted of sixty-two hours on site

by one NRC inspector.

Results: Of the six areas inspected no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted

  • S. C. Stevens, Manager, Fort Calhoun Station W. G. Gates, Supervisor, Operations

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G. R. Peterson, Supervisor, Maintenance B. Eidem, Engineer

  • Denotes those attending exit interview.

The inspector also talked with and interviewed other licensee employees during,the inspection.

These included reactor operators and office personnel.

2.

IE Bulletin 79-14 The licensee is committed to inspect and upgrade where aceessary those seismic restraints that are inaccessable during normal plant operation.

The inspector discussed the progress with licensee engineers and contract personnel. The inspector als~o reviewed the schedules and observed work in progress.

The results of the review and discussions were that the licensee's commitment to complete the work prior to plant startup has been satisfied.

The remainirg restraints are accessable during normal plant operations and will be completed after plant startup subject to Technical Specification operability requirements.

No items of noncompliance or deviation were idtatified.

3.

Preparation for Startup The inspector reviewed the licensee schedule and preparation for plant startup. The following is the planned schedule of events:

System Line ups

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Cold Hydro

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Heat up

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' Operational Hydro

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Criticality / Low pcwer physics testing

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Power escalation

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At.this time all systems outside of containment have been lined up.

Certain systems identified.in Standing Order 0-37, RO, April 18, 1980, require independent valve line up verification. These systems are:

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Reactor Coolant System

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Containment Isolation

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Diesel Generators

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Auxiliary Feedwater

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Containment Spray

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Safety Injection, LPSI and HPSI

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Engineered Safeguards

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Chemical and Volume Control System

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The inspector, using.the licensee's procedures and valve Itne up sheets, walked down the Auxiliary Feedwater System and High Pressure Safety Injec-tion System.

When work in containment is completed, the final velve line ups and independent verification will be done.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4.

Follow-up on an Allegation i

i The inspector assisted the regional investigator in following up an l

allegation concerning the licensee. Detail of this investigation may be found in Investigative Report 80-10.

5.

Follow-up on Item of Noncompliance In IE Inspection Report 50-285/80-03, an item of noncompliance (Infractus Item A) was identified. During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action concerning this item.

The inspector has no further questions concerning this item of noncompliance. This item is considered closed.

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6.

Follow-up on Unresolved Items (Closed) 8003-01.

Surveillance Test ST-ESF-2-F3 was performed to verify that the identified valves, pumps and fans go to their accident position.

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Various components were tagged out or did not go to their correct position.

These were identfied by the licensee on the test p.?ocedure.

The concern expressed by the inspect 9e ass that on retest, sufficient overlap of the test be made to ensure signal source to final actuator actt ation.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's-retest of the identified components

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and determined that sufficient overlap had been accomplished.

This item is considered closed.

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7.

Reactor Coolant Pump Cover Stud Deterioration On May 22, 1980, the inspector was dispatched to Fort Calhoun Station at the resuest of IE Headquarters.

During the cold hydro test, prior to heat up, the licensee observed leakage from the area of the RCP cover flange.

Further investigation by the licensee revealed deterioration of some of the studs holding the pump cover and motor stand to the pump casing. All RCP's were promptly inspected by the licensee and three of the pumps (A, B & C) were observed to have some deterioration of the studs varying from miner to major in nature.

The studs are 3k inches nominal diameter.

The most damaged stud diameter had been reduced, at its smallest point, to approximately 1.3 inches in diameter. Three studs on the B pump and three studs on the A pump had suffered substantial deterioration.

The licensee initiated a testing program to select those studs that could be reused and verify that the spare studs were acceptable for use.

The specific cause of the deterioration has not been determined, but it is suspected that water containing Boric Acid and heat over a period of years corroded the studs.

Laberatory analysis of a stud and thorough review of the data and circumstances will be made to specifically identify the cause.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7.

Exit Interview On May 15, 1980 and on May 23, 1980, the inspector met with the station manager and summarized the scope and results of the inspections.

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