IR 05000282/1989023
| ML19327B463 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 10/12/1989 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19327B461 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-282-89-23, 50-306-89-23, NUDOCS 8910310239 | |
| Download: ML19327B463 (11) | |
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. U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION L
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REGION III
- Reports No. 50-282/89023(DRP); 50-306/89023(DRP)' . Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 License Nos.'DPR-42; DPR-60 Licensee: Northern States Power Company . 414 Nicollet Mall . Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant , Inspection At: Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, MN . Inspection. Conducted: August 13 through September 25, 1989 Inspectors: P. L. Hartmann J. E. Hard T. J. O'Connor {o lv T Approved By p*B. L. 3u gess, Chief
Reactor Projects Section 2A Date Inspection Summary Inspection on August 13 through September 25,1989 (Reports No. 50-282/89023(DRP): 50-306/89023(DRP)) Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of plant operational safety, maintenance, surveillance, radiological protection I and industrial safety.
Results: During this inspection period, Unit 1 operated continuously at 100% { except for a minor power reduction associated with the replacement of a gasket ! on MD-18-1, the shell side relief valve for the 15A feedwater heater. As , noted in previous reports, reactor coolant system radiochemistry continues to ' indicate the presence of a failed fuel' rod in the Unit I core. Associated I activity levels remain less than 1% of Technical Specification (TS) limits.
At.the end of the inspection period, Unit I had operated continuously for 56 days.
Unit 2 continued to operate at 100% power throughout this inspection period. Unit 2 has reached 121 days of,contjnuous operation at the end of the inspection period. The licensee continues to be plagued by unplanned starts of the control room emergency ventilation system which have been initiated by 8910310239 89101n Q PDR ADOCK 05000282 F - , G PNU 6! !
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Regional management.
- -is in'olved in the issue and the licenseo is aggressively pursuing corrective ': v i'-, action.- l ' Of the five areas inspected, two violations of NRC requirements were ' identified.
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. ( > I DETAILS ' , 1.
Persons Contacted l L Licensee Employees
- J. Howard, President and CEO L. Eliason, General Manager, Nuclear Plants
- E, Watzl, Plant Manager
R. Lindsey, Assistant to the Plant Manager D. Mendele, General Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection
- M. Wadley, Shift Manager
- M. Sellman, General Superintendent, Operations g
- G. Lenertz, General Superintendent, Maintenance A. Smith, General Superintendent, Planning and Services D. Schuelke, Superintendent, Radiation Protection G. Miller, Superintendent, Operations Engineering K. Beadell, Superintendent, Technical Engineering S. Schaefer, Superintendent, Technical Engineering + M. Klee, Superintendent, Quality Engineering R. Conklin, Supervisor, Security nnd Services
- G. Eckholt, Nuclear Support Services
- A. Hunstad,. Staff Engineer J. Karr, Stone and Webster G. Quinn, Stone and Webster P. Nelson, Stone and Webster
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- K. Albrecht, Director, Power Supply Quality Assurance
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- F. Tierney, General Manager, Nuclear Engineering _ and Construction
- L. Waldinger, Production Training Manager
- G. Ortler, Manager Corporate Security Denotes those present at the exit interview of September.?7, 1989.
- Denotes those contacted on August 24, 1989 Corporate office visit.
2.
Operational Safety Verification (71707, 93702] a.
Routine Inspection The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, conducted discussions with control room operators and observed shift turnovers. The inspector verified operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed equipment control records, and verified the proper return to service of affected components, conducted tours of the auxiliary building, turbine building and external areas of the plant to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, and to verify that maintenance work requests had been initiated for the equipment in need of maintenance.
On August 15, 1989, the Senior Resident Inspector was interviewed by three Stone and Webster employees as part of an audit of the Power Supply QA program which was being conducted at the request of the Senior Vice President, Power Supply.
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. . v ? , [ b ', Control Room Special Ventilation Auto Starts . The inspection period records an increase in the number of licensee reportable events (LERs) due most notably to the Chlorine Monitoring System. On August 15, 1989, at 2:15 p.m. and again at 2:58 p.m. the licensee experienced an auto. start of the 121 control room special ventilation system due to spikes received on the 111 chlorine monitor. On September 5, 1989, at 11:04 a.m., the 122 control room cleanup system auto started as a result of a spike on the 122 chlorine monitor. On September 23, the 112 chlorine monitor spiked and resulted in an auto start of the 121 control room cleanup system.
The August 4, 6, and 15 reportable events will be followed by LER 282/89012.
The September 5 and 23 reportable events will be followed by l.ER 282/89015.
Extensive maintenance and investigation activities have been undertaken by the licensee regarding these monitors during the inspection period.
The inspectors and Regional management are closely following these efforts.
c.
Rod Control Circuit Failure On August 16, 1989, Unit 2 received a rod control system urgent failure alarm. The licensee performed a flux map and thermocouple map of the core and determined that shutdown roc I-3 in shutdown Bank B had slipped 6 steps.
(Each rod step equals 5/8 of an inch, with the total slippage equaling approximately 4 inches). The rod slipped from Step 228 to Step 222, noting that the top of core active core starts at Step 225.
l The licensee's trouble shooting identified the need for new regulator, firing and phase control cards for the affected power cabinets. The inspector monitored the licensee's investigative and corrective actions including the recovery of the slipped rod.
The licensee had conducted, as part of the monthly surveillance, a flux map on August 15, 1989. A flux map performed af ter the recovery was compared to the maps conducted before and after the rod slipping and no discernible effect was noted.
. d.
Emergency Communication Affected by Weather On August 22, 1989, numerous lightning strikes at the site resulted in a major disruption of the plant's radio and telephone communication systems. The disruption did not affect the plant's ability to provide offsite notification, to recall licensee personnel to the plant or to provide notification to the surrounding communities of a need for evacuation. All communications systems were returned to service by 3:30 p.m. on August 22, 1989.
e.
Fire protection On August 29, 1989, at 5:52 p.m. the licensee conducted a fire drill in Zone 74, located in the screenhouse.
The drill was terminated at 6:11 p.m.
During the course of the drill, the Zone /4 fire detector was placed in bypass, which renders the fire detection instrumentation in Zone 74 inoperable.
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Zone 74 was not' returned to normal upon completion of the drill and the fire detector was discovered in the bypass position during the - course of the midnight to day shift turnover.at 6:50 p.m. on , August 30, 1989.. Technical Specification (T.S.) 3.14. A.2.a requires that within one hour, a fire watch is to be established to inspect- 'the zone with the inoperable instruments at least once per hour.
Contrary to TS 3.14. A.2.a a fire watch was not established during the 12 hour period the Zone 74 detector was inoperable.
Failure to establish a fire watch in accordance with TS 3.14. A.2.a is identified as a' Violation (282/89023-01; 306/89023-01(DRP)). This violation raises an " operator attention to detail"' concern to the inspectors in that the bypass position of Zone 74 was not detected by the oncoming midnight shift. A contributing cause to-this event was a f ailure to log lone 74 inoperable as required by' annunciator procedure 47022-305.
The licensee identified a fire protection Appendix R concern during the inspection period.
Specifically, the concern involved the-routing path of Emergency Diesel Generator No. 2 (EDG-2) 125 VDC control power which was modified during the inspection period. The licensee will submit LER 282/89017 for this finding.
Regional specialists are reviewing the information supplied by the licensee thus far and will review the LER when received. This matter is < unresolved pending inspector review. Unresolved Item 306/89023-02 (DRS).
, f.
Reactor Makeup Tank Overfill On August 25, 1989, water was added to the Unit I reactor makeup tanks (RMU). After completing the fill of the RMU tank, filling commenced on 12 RMU tank.
It should be noted that the precautions contained in Operations Procedure C13.1, Reactor Makeup System, Rev. 3, specifically states that "the reactor makeup tank level must not go above 12 1/2 feet to prevent overflowing the tank."
Overfilling the tank may cause the floating roof to collapse thereby exposing water in the tank to air.
Sufficient attention was not directed to the filling of the 12 RMU tank which caused the tank to overflow.
The overflow water is directly piped to the aerated system sump tank which was not able to keep up with the flow and caused some floor drains on the 695 ft.
elevation of the auxiliary building to back up and flood the floor.
This incident also causes the inspector to question the operator's attention to detail.
Review of the R.O. or 3.5. control room log books makes no mention of the overfilling and flooding.
The areas
contaminated from the flooding were promptly decontaminated. The l licensee has classified this event as a "near miss" which requires " evaluation by the Error Reduction Task Force (ERTF), #89-18. The inspectors will review the cause classification and corrective actions identified.
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g, Missed Technical Specification Surveillance C - On' September 5, 1989, it was discovered that surveillance Procedure, e SP 1093.2, D-1 Diesel Generator Manual Test - Bus 26, Rev. 36, was F not performed during the month of August. Although SP 1093.1 D-1 [ Diesel Generator Manual Test - Bus 15 and SP 1093.2 both test the
operability of D-1, SP 1093.1 and S.P. 1093.2 respectively test the loss of voltage logic associated with the 4ky safeguard busses 15 and 26, as required by'T.S. 4.1.A.
S.P. 1093.2 was scheduled to be m ! performed on August 22, 1989 and was required to be performed by ) August 29.
By error,'S.P. 1093.1 was performed rather than the scheduled S.P. 1093.2.
Upon discovery of this missed surveillance, , the surveillance was conducted and successfully completed.
Failure f to perform the monthly testing of the logic associated with safeguards Bus 26 in accordance with T.S. 4.1.A is identified as , a Violation (282/89023-02 (DRP)).
! h.
Plant Airborne Activity Levels The Nuclear Engineering Department's preliminary analysis has determined that a leaking fuel rod is contained in an assembly which will remain in the core for the next fuel cycle.
Accordingly, plans are being developed to perform fuel sipping to locate the effected assembly, and removal of the subject fuel rod prior to reuse.
Minor complications have arisen as a result of the activity levels associated with this failed rod. Monthly at power containment inspections for Unit I result in minor gas contaminations to those performing the inspection which require the individuals to wait until the gas decays to passable levels. Additionally on September 14, 1709, while venting the gas header which calls for ' utilizing hydrogen from the VCT, coupled with minor leaks in the
system, increated airborne levels in the auxiliary building were ] experienced.
lne licensee has pursued the identification of leakage points, and has isolated the most probable locations. Work requests have been initiated to repair the suspected leakage peints.
1.
Operational Concerns During this inspection period the Unit i redundant heat tracing for the boric acid storage tank to blender line has been out of service.
The operators are cognizant of the operability considerations that failure of the normal heat tracing would cause.
This situation is documented by a Unit 2 Operations Note.
Restoration of the < redundant heat tracing circuit is scheduled for the upcoming Unit 1 outage. One additional area of operational concern pertains to the failure of the Unit 2 ATWS mitigating system actuation circuitry ' (AMSAC).
Trouble shooting identified that a failed card needed replacement.
As of September 25, 1989, the repaired card has not been received from the vendor.
Operators a N cognizant of AMSAC functions and its effects when inoperable. The inspectors will follow replacement of this circuitry as an Open Item 306/89023-04(DRP).
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.On August 31, 1989, in conjunction with review of IE Notice 89-32, -Surveillance Testing of Low Temperature Overpressure Protection - Systems, issued March 23, 1989, the licensee identified actual valve stroke times greater than that assumed in the analysis.
. Pending final analysis by the licensee, this item will be identified .as an Unresolved -Item (282/89023-03(DRP)). i j.
Cooling Water Pump Manual Start On September 14, 1989, while both units were at 100% power, cor, trol room operators manually started the 22 cooling water pump as a conservative precaution, in response to decreasing cooling water pressure. The cooling water pressure perturbation occurred during a c surveillance which tests operability of the turbine building cooling water header valves, which isolate non-essential loads from the cooling water system. Prior to closing valve MV-32031 at power, the test requires a flew path to be established by opening two lc chiller system supply valves (CV-39449 and MV-32032). These valves were verified as opened.
Later in the surveillance the valves were found closed, as evidenced by rising turbine generator-temperature parameters.
In response, in plant operators reopened the chiller isolation valves.
This reopening of the chiller isolation valves caused a drop in cooling water pressure and flow.
The unit two shift supervisor directed an additional cooling water pump to be' started.
An operator started the 22 (diesel driven) cooling water pump. With the system verified as stable, the 22 cooling water pump was secured at 5:31 a.m.
The licensee has not identified the cause of the valve closure.
Regional management and the inspectors have discussed cause identification with the licensee.
This matter is unresolved pending inspector review.
Unresolved Item 282/89023-04 (DRP).
k.
Auxiliary Buildirg Special Ventilation (ABSVS) Auto Start On September 8, 1989, the licensee reported an automatic start of the 122 ABSVS caused by a high radiation signal from Radiation Monitor 2R-30. The licensee determined that this was a false reading and the initiation resulted from a spurious spike. The licensee has initiated actions to reduce the number of Radiation Monitor spikes through hardware improvements. The inspectors will follow the licensees corrective actions through the LER to be submitted, LER 282/89-12.
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1.
Inaustrial Safety Review l On September 12, 1989, electrical damage occurred to a V-1 Motor Control Center - MCC 1E2. The damage occurred when an electrician installed a grounding jumper and inadvertently contacted an energized phase contaL. A phase fault occurred and the associated breaker i tripped as designed. The electrician did not suffer any injury, but equipment damage did occur.
On September 13, 1989, during the grinding of an access hole on the l sulfuric acid storage tank, a small explosion occurred.
The cause
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g[ ll was attributed to sparks generated from grinding which ignited vapors j
vithin the tank. The licensee suspects the explosion was based on an - explosive presence of hydrogen within the tank. No injuries occurred.
- The licensee's Industry Safety Group is investigating these events.
The inspector will review the root cause analysis and the corrective actions identified.
This review will be tracked as an Open Item 282/89023-05(DRP).
< , 3.
Maintenance Observation (71707, 37700, 62703) e Routine, preventive, and corrective maintenance activities were observed . to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, inoustry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specifications. The following items were considered during this review: adherence to limiting conditions for operation while components or systems were removed from service, approvals.were obtained prior to initiating the work, activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service, quality control records were maintained, activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, radiological controls were implemented, and fire prevention controls were implemented, t Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed during the inspection period: Reconditioning of Non-Safety Related Foxboro Controllers - Calibration of the CVCS ;old-Up Tank Level Indicators - Trouble Shooting of Chlorine Monitors - Replacement of 22 Boric Acid Transfer Pump Seals.
- Repccking Seals on the #21 Ctarging Pump.
- The inspector also monitored activities associated with the relocation of the 22 condensate storage tank which is being moved to accommodate the new diesel generator building. Observed activities included foundation preparation, concrete pouring and sampling. Activities of QC were also observed in regards to the courete sampling and break test of specimons.
The inspector will continue to monitor the progress of new diesel generator project.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Surveillance (61726, 71707) The inspector witnessed portions of surveillance testing of safety-related systems and components. The inspection included verifying that the tests were scheduled and performed within Technical Specification requirements, by observing that procedures were being followed by qualified operators, that Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) were not violated, that system and equipment restoration was completed, and that test results were acceptable to test and Technical Specification requirements.
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- Portions of-the following surveillances were observed / reviewed during the inspection period include:
' .SP-1093-2, D1 Diesel Generator Manual and 4kv Voltage - Rejection-Restoration Scheme Test, Bus 26, Rev. 36 SP-1706a, 12 Diesel Cooling Water Pump Test, Rev. 23.
- No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
RegionalRequests(92701) [ In response to questions from regional management, the following answers L were provided by the Senior Resident. Inspector.
1.
In general, how do you view your licensee's check valve maintenance / surveillance program (ISI and IST)? This program is satisfactory, 2.
Have there been occurrences of repeat problems with a specific check , valve (valves) that the licensee's program did not appear to correct? There have been no repeat problems of significance of which the inspectors are aware.
3.
Provida a listing of other check valve problems and what actions (main /surv) the licensee took to correct these problems.
Check valve maintenance records back to 1979 were reviewed.
Following are the results of this review.
2FW-1-1
- 21 Feedwater Pump Discharge Valve
'l 1988 Disc did not seem to have been seating. New disc ( installed. Minor internal modifications made.
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l' l 2RH-6-1 Two Inch Letdown Line Bypass ' ' 1978-79 Check valve leaks by.
Repaired.
2VC-10-1 21 Charging Pump Discharge Check Valve ! 1984 Valve spring found missing.
Replaced.
AF-15-3 Aux FW to Steam Generator #11 i L 1986 Seat lapped because of pressure buildup upstream.
i ' AF-16-1 Aux FW to Steam Generator #11 1988 Replaced valve because of pressure buildup upstream.
AF-16-3 Aux FW to Steam Generator #22 i 1980 Lapped seat and disc because of pressure buildup l upstream.
i l 1989 Replaced valve.
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f ~ AF-28-1 1~1 Aux FW Pump Recirculation-Line 1988 Valve replaced. Worn out.
- CL-43-1 11 Cooling Water Pump Discharge . 1984 Replace butterfly check valve - worn out.
Inspect ' every three years.
CL-43-2 12 Cooling Water Pump Discharge ' ' 1988 Repair normal wear and corrosion.
.RS-19-2 Steam Generator #12 MSIV 1988' Valve making rattling noue. To be inspected next i outage.
SF-27-1 121 Spent Fuel Pool Pump Discharge
1986 Found clapper pin under yoke arm.
Rebuilt valve.
i SF-27-2 122 Spent Fuel Pool Pump Discharge 1986 Found clapper pin under yoke arm.
Rebuilt valve.
' , This is a brief summary of the significant failures experienced in the last 10 years of plant operation.
Generic or repetitive check' valve failures seem not to be a significant problem at Prairie Island.
P 6.
Commissioner Visit On September. 7,1989, Commissioner Kenneth Rogers visited the Prairie Island Nuclear Plant. The Commissioner met with plant staff, toured the facility and in an exit meeting provided the licensee with his positive impression of the facility. The topics the Commissioner discussed included plant cleanliness and housekeeping, the strong plant staff, low turnover of staff, the need for continued good chemistry, the excellent college degree program and the need to guard against complacency.
7.
Meeting with Corporate Officials (30702) On August 24, 1989, the senior resident inspector (J.E. Hard) met with the individuals listed above in paragraph 1 at the licensee's corporate i offices in Minneapolis.
P. Hartmann attended the meeting with Mr. J. Howard. Subjects discussed included: Monticello security program - Corporate Quality Assurance activities - NRC and NSP organizational changes - Transfer of SRIs between Monticello and Prairie Island - NSP's actions in response to the recent SALP reports - Status of proposed Maintenance Rule - Upcoming licensed operator requalification exams -
.- .. -- [lt; ' ' (* V . ^ \\ 8.. * Exit (30703) ' L , e I The. inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph I' .at the conclusion of the' inspection on September 27, 1989. The inspectors , i discussed the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings.
The . inspectors also discussed'the likely information content of the inspection ' ! report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any documents or - processes as proprietary.
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'c SUMMARY LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS (cont.)
I J . p' ' Goodhue' County / City of. Red Wing ' , , !. 1.
Deficiencies page 75
,; s' 2.. Areas Requiring Corrective Action page 76 i L 3. ' Areas Recommonded for Improvement page 78 , ' b ' Dakota County ' [' 1.
Deficiencies page 79 [' 2.
Areas Requiring Correctivo Action page 80 . [..,. 3.
Areas Recommended for Improvement page 81 l .. t- ' L State of Wisconsin 1.
Deficiencies page 82 I 2.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action page 83 i L 3.
Areas Recommended for Improvement page 85 . ; y Pierce County ' r 1.
Deficiencies page 86 2.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action page 87 3.
Areas Recommended for Improveme6% page 88 . e .. !.I ... I , . r , e
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4 "., i , facsimile opsrator(u).seemed unaware of this exercise and the ' ' - j ~ simulated priority that should be - given to EBS messages.
The , resolution of this issue must be reexamined by both parties before L< the next exercise.
i The Minnesota State Eoc in the basement of the Capital building is . I a: facility that has been in existence for several years.
It has .i received FEMA funds and approval.
It has sufficient space,
(, furniture, lighting, map displays, etc. to support emergency operations.
It is recommended that color overlays depicting , subarea evacuation or sheltering be developed for the EPZ map.
i This EOC has proven to be adequate dur;,ng several previous l exercises and actual disaster operations.
Back-up power, although ! available was not demonstrated.
l , ' i The physical space used by the Minnesota Oepartment of Health (MDH)
staff to perform dose assessment activities during an exercise or emergency consists of a single room off of the main Eoc.
The work
i area layout is poor, with work areas segmented, insufficient desk top space, and emergency telephones located separately from the , L general staff work areas.- Noise levels in the room were extreme ' at times due to the ?resence of the other non-nuclear power plant emergency equipment.,n the room and the presence of main EOC staff discussing icsues with the MDH staff.
At one point fifteen EOC staff were present in the room discussing the emergency.
Corrective actions are required to be taken by the State to reorganize the physical layout of the room, to ensure that critical communication links are located immediately adjacent to work areas, ' _. and to eliminate or minimize those factors involved in the extreme noise levels in the room.
It is recommended that a system be developed to ensure important information is posted in the dose assessment area in a timely manner.
7,', The MDH field teams partially demonstrated their ability to . continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
The . field teams carried TLD dosimeters and two ranges of self-reading r pocket dosimeters.
They filled in an exposure control log when they were deployed to the field, and checked their self-reading dosimeters periodically in the field.
However, because the team members were unclear of their exposure limit, and because they were not carrying mid-range self-reading dosimeters, this objective was partially met.
It is required that the field teams are trained and ', briefed before deployment on their exposure limits in the field, and that a reference of the exposure limits be included in the written instructions that they carry in the field.
It is also required that the field teams carry medium range self-reading dosimeters (0-20R) since this range is crucial for determining their exposure limits accurately.
The MDH field teams correctly used Eberline Geiger-Mueller counters and ionization chambers to obtain ambient field measurements.
However, it is required that radioactive check sources be placed
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? in the kits. to enable them to check the operation of these L . instruments in the field.- It is also required that the State il Highway Patrol participate with the field teams during full-participation exercises, to enable the teams to practice their r.
required duties fully and accurately.
f i The field tsams demonstrated the appropriate equipment.and procedures for the measurement of airborne radioiodine i concentrations as low as 10E-7 microcurie per cc in the presence g of noble gases.
The field teams used a calibrated RADEco air pump l for tir measurements.
They ran the pumps with' silver zeolite cartridges for at least 15 minutes, recorded the measurement times i and flow rates to accurately measure low concentrations of airborne radioiodine in the presence of noble gases.
They have the capability and instrunnntation to obtain these concentrations in the field as a quick check and then to transport them to the State Laboratory.
The State of Minnesota also demonstrated the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity in the airborne plume and promptly ! E perform laboratory analyses.
The Radiochemistry Laboratory adequately demonstrated appropriate operations and procedures for measurement and analysis of radioactivity on air particulate filters and air iodine cartridges.
Offsite exposure levels and potential integrated population doses, for the expected duration of the emergency, were calculated by the MDH Dose Assessment staff for the plume exposure pathway.
Calculations were made throughout the exercise using both computer programs and manual calculation methods. Calculations results were compared to field readings received from Min'nesota, Wisconsin and utility field teams and with calculations inade by the utility and . Wisconsin.
Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) were made by the MDH Dose Assessment staff at each stage of the emergency.
Initial PARS were based upon plant conditions and the potential for degradation in the plant's status.
PARS made at the start of the General Emergency classification were based upon scenario releases and projected offsite doses.
An excellent level of coordination was displayed by MDH, Wisconsin and the utility staffs during the formulation of uniform PARS for the general public.
PARS made by the MDH staff were not routinely approved by the Governor, or his representative, as required by the Minnesota Emergency Plan.
MDH recommended PARS were distributed outside the State EOC by EOC staff without Governor approval of the recommendations.
Corrective actions should be taken by the State to ensure that the Governor's approval of PARS is received prior to the distribution of the PARS to the EOC or others This information should be provided to the MDH Dose Assessment staff to ensure continued coordination of PARS
f, o y a% Dh J , kb$ l ' l R, with the State of Wisconsin and the utility.
h ' Thw State of Minnesota partially demonstrated the ability to d' initially alert the public within.the 10-mile EPZ and begin to J f L" ' disseminate an instructional message within 15 minutes of a @ decision by appropriate State Officials.
The State faxes all EBS " ,#o messages to NOAA for broadcasting over EBS.
Delays were observed in faxing these EDS messages to NOAA.
In addition, there were also i , delays of several minutes between tho sounding of the siren system M.
.and.the activation of the EBS system.
Future exercises will be < required to better demonstrate the procedure for obtaining the j Governor's approval of protective action recommendations and the > sounding of the sirens and activation of the EBS system.
' ' The ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of , accurate information and instructions to the public in a. timely - manner after the initial alert and notification occurred was not demonstrated.
This was primarily due to EBS message #3 (General Emergency).
The. emergency public instructions were drafted, , however, part of the EBS message describerl the shelter and . ' evacuation ~ area as the same area.
Absence of information also
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' existed, e.g. locations '.there transients can go for help, location of reception / congregate care facilitiles and guidance on sheltering methods.
The message was also confusing and difficult to understand.
The State did not take action to provide corrected information to the public.
No one approved the quality and content of EBS messages prior to faxing to NOAA.
No confirmation of receipt exists at the NOAA facsimile station.
,. Space for Press briefings is established in room G-15 of the State Capital Building.
Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) workspace for JPIC staff is located in thb' TOC.
Activities in the JPIC, - though, are controlled by the,' Governor's PIO who is located in the EOC.
The Governor's PIO is responsible for coordinating information prior to the briefings given to the media . at ' the JPIC.
This is done by the Governor's pIO holding a pre-briefing with the various JPIC spokespersons (Utility, State, Local).- These pre-briefings were conducted in the office of the Director, Minnesota Division of Emergency Government.
Each department represented in the EOC also had a PIO who was responsible for development of news releases and bulletins.
The EOC staffing pattern includes a person who is responsible for controlling rumors in a timelyefashion.
This person, when a rumor was received, coordinated the rumor with the appropriate EOC staff person for an answer.
The answer would then be called back to the originator, and significant rumors would be given to the appropriate JPIC spokesperson to be included in the next media briefing or included in a written news release / bulletin.
Federal evaluators question the ability of this system to handle a large , I volume of incoming calls.
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. _ . _ _ _ _ _ '. .. , ' ! . The need for distribution of potassium iodide (KI) to emergency ' Workers was discussed by the MDH staff at numerous times during
. i the exercise.
The decision to distribute KI to emergency workers ' was made at 1155.
The recommendation was immediately communicated to the main EOC staf f and the MDH field staff.
This recommendation was not. coordinated with either the utility or the State of Wisconsin.
Although this decision effects only emergency workers in the State of Minnesota, it is recommended that it be coordinated with the other emergency organizations involved in the response to ., the emergency.
. The sensitivity of emergency workers to KY has not been evaluated by the MDH since the most recent Prairic Island exercise.
This was an item recommended for improvement during that exercise.
However, during this exercise, an individual team member identified herself as being allergic to iodines after the recommendation on .KI was made.
This individual was " rotated" out of the evacuated and sheltered areas after an evaluation by tho MDH Dose Assessment staff.
This spontaneous event was handled effectively by the MDH staff.
The previous recommendation for improvement, to evaluate the sensitivity of emergency workers to KI, is being reissued as a result of this exercise.
The State of Minnesota EOC staff demonstrated their ability to determine the Shelter / evacuation areas and the EOC planning to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to the shelter / evacuation area.
The EOC staff monitored the action taken by Dakota and Goodhue Counties and provided State evacuation assistance requested by the Counties.
Two contacts were made (simulated) by the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) Dose Assessment staff with'the U.S.
Department of Energy, Chicago operations Office's Radiological Assistance Program during the exercise.
A request for assistance was made.
The request for assistance was based upon the increasing potential for offsite consequences due to the emergency at the Prairic Island facility.
The Minnesota Department of Health field teams used correct equipment and procedures for collection of vegetation, water, and soil samples.
These sampics were representative of the area and were properly labelled, bagged, and transported to the hot line.
The Minnesota Department of Health Radiochemistry Laboratory adequately demonstrated appropriate operations and procedures for measurement and analysis of radioactivity in a variety of environmental samples.
Sample intake, scanning, log in and identification, bagging, preparation and analysis were adequately demonstrated or discussed for air iodine cartridge, milk, soil, vegetation, water and animal feed samples.
Equipment and quality assurance measures are sufficient, however, a proolem could develop if the digital equipment computer which controls the gamma analysis fails.
It is recommended that staff be trained in manual operation
l l _
-. ' . U\\ > ! \\ ' of multichannel analyzers as a back-up.
! .. Staffing of the lab is adequate with a staff of one director and ' two assistants and a backup staff of six additional assistants.
However, there is only one individual who can function as the - director and so around-the-clock operation is doubtful.
It is recommended, as a corrective action, that a back-up director be l trained and available.
l Several weaknesses were observed in the sample intake procer.s and the sample storage process.
The sample exchange pad was located y near an operating abr conditioner exhaust stream and there are no I plans or necessary materials available to rope off and post the sample storage area.
Required corrective actions include revision of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS) for exchange pad location l " and storage area posting; training of staff in these procedures;
the development of an inventory list of accessory materials; the l addition of a variety of plastic bags of various sizes (so large ! and small samples can be compactly bagged); a spill absorption and decontamination kit; and rope and " radioactive material" signs for posting the storage area.
Finally, the sample preparation and 6ounting procedures which werc ! demonstrated for soil, milk, and other environmental samples,
although appropriate to the situation, are different from the SOPS ! for routine sample analysis and are not written down.
Additional i required corrective actions include the development of SOPS for f sample preparation and counting in support of State response to a i . radiological emergency, and the updating of the list of laboratory
equipment in the State Plan.
{ The total population dose received by the,' general public, as a result of the emergency, was estimated by the MDH during the exercise.
Results of field measurements, previous computer calculations of exposure levels, and a manual calculation sheet i f were used to perfortu the calculations.
Reentry and recovery PARS were made by the MDH Doce Assessment i staff.
PARS were based upon field team measurements and results ! of laboratory analysis of environmental samples.
All PARS, previously issued during the course of the exercise, were not
relaxed at the end of the exercise due to the levels of ' radioactivity present in the analyzed samples.
Long term PARS were coordinated with the State (of Wisconsin, and the utility.
' Reclassification of the emergency by the utility to " Recovery Phase" was required by both States prior to the issuing of final PARS.
, Limited recovery and reentry procedures were effectively demonstrated during this exercise.
This was done through a table top discussion in the EOC.
Protective action recommendations were ' not relaxed until monitored field data showed safe radiation levels
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q , ' for reentry.
A public health information bulletin with i.
instructions to the evacuees was issued in conjunction with ! advisories from the Minnesota Department of Agriculture.
The ' instructions included restrictions on crop harvesting and the " consumption of garden vegetables and raw milk.
I coedhue Countv/ City of Red Wina The city of Red Wing /Goodhue County activated the Emergency ., ' Operation Center (EOC) at the County Public Safety Building. Thu call initiating activation of the Eoc facilities and mobilization of staff were received in the dispatch center of the County Sheriff's Department. However, the County EOC was never fully - staffed as reflected in the County plan, nor did the City of Red I Wing /Goodhue County fully demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing on a continuous 24-hour basis by an actual shift change of 4 all positions represented in the County EOC.
Further, evaluators observed that first shift staff in several positions represented in the EOC, remained in the EOC and continued to control or prompt their second shift counterparto on their respensibilities and involvement in the exercise.
The EOC management staff did not fully demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities. Eoc briefings, staff involvement in decision-making and direction and control deteriorated during the advent of the second shift. The Chiaf of Staff reflected dependency on his first shif t counterpart (who had remained in the operations area after the shift change) regarding his responsibilities and what to do next.
The required maps were posted in the Eoc and the staff effectively used the map displays to enhance the EOC operationF.
Although there is a status board in the EOC, the staff chose to use a flip chart to record the sequence of events and other important information. The status board contained only marginal information, much of which was incomplete. The flip chart was difficult to read , without walking up to the chart.
The EOC vas noisy, due to ' extraneous conversations being carried on during briefings, the State Police radio and staff movement into and out of the area.
To assist in reducing the noise level, it is recommended that the State Police radio be relocated outside the operations area or be operated with a headphone, and management controls be instituted to reduca private conversations during briefings.
The EOC and Red Wing Fire Department staff demonstrated primary and backup means of communications by use of commercial telephone and radio to the State EOC, Dakota and Pierce Counties, State and County field teams, and the JPIC. Present in the EOC and the Red Wing Fire Department were amateur radio operators from the Hiawatha Valley Amateur Radio Club and the Civil Air Patrol. The CAP and Hiawatha Valley Amateur Radio Club, which are fully equipped,
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l- . '. , serves as additional backup means of communications to the City of Red Wing /Goodhue County. The Eoc is also equipped with a data fax ' capability to the State EOC and the JPIC.
The EOC staff responded to initiate the activation of the siren systems (2 separate systems) for the City of Red Wing and Goodhue County during the Site Area Emergency classlfication when the protective action recommendation (PAR) notification came from the State EOC.
The State had informed the County, via telephone, when ,,, the EBS would be activated and the time to sound the sirens in the County.
To insure that siren systems were activated simultaneously, the Sheriff's dispatchers coordinated the information with the Red Wing Fire Department and Dakota and Pierce Counties. The initial sounding of the sirens was at 1101 and at 15-minute intervals thereaf ter.
The initial siren activation was implemented in accordance with the emergency plan operations procedures.
' The EOC staff of the County Sheriff's Department and Red Wing police and Fire Departments coordinated to demonstrate the capability to control evacuation traffic flow and access to evacuated and sheltered areas; to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure; and the ability to implement appropriate protective actions for special needs population, handicapped and institutionalized persons.
s Beginning at the Site Area Emergency notification, the County Sheriff and Red Wing Police Dapartments simulated in the EOC the staffing of traffic and access control points and actually dispatched patrols for route alerting in the 0-2 mile radius of the plant. Subsequent route alerting and staffing of traffic and access control points were implemented uponl receipt of protective actions by the City / County after the General Emergency notification. A traffic and access control point was manned at U.S.
61 and County Route 7 and the intersection in the Village of Welch by personnel of the Goodhue County Sheriff's Department. Federal evaluators determined that the patrolman at U.S.
61 and County Route 7 had been issued dosimetry, potassium iodide and the necessary record keeping and instruction cards.
While on assignment, the patrolman received radio instructions to ingest the KI which had been issued to him prior to his departure for the traffic and access control assignment. The patrolman was aware of the evacuation routes, the location of the Reception and Congregate care and Decontamination Centers. He had radio capabilities with his counterparts at other traffic and access control points, and the County EOC. The patrolmen were polled by radio on the need to read and report their respective dosimeter readings to the Sheriff's dispatch center.
The County has a room designated for media briefings in the EOC.
However, the area was not set up for that purpose and there are no mapa nor displays in the room to enhance briefings.
Upon inquiry
s.. :l r[[. [ _ __ ., '. ' ' ' ^ '' ' f ' ' '.. _ _
= _ , ' i \\ . p < , !. by evaluators near the end of the exercise the Mayor and Chief of
Staff stated they were prepared to brief media representatives, i , however no media came to the Eoc. The county did not demonstrate the ability to brief the media and to establish and operate rumor i control.
) i The county's failure to brief the media is a repeated weakness identified in Goodhue County from the last exercise June 17, 1986.
, The objective must be demonstrated during the next exercise.
, ! The EOC staff also did not entertain the reentry and recovery objective, although they were provided the information by the State EOC and posted it on the flip chart in the EOC. Upon notification that the exercise was terminated the Chief of Staff announced the termination and dismissed the EOC staff.
l 2, ' nakota county > , Dakota County clearly demonstrated the ability to utilize the appropriate emergency classification levels and fully activated the Dakota County EOC in the Dakota County Government Center, following receipt of the Alcrt notification.
The County Administrator, supported by the Operations Chief, effectively managed the emergency response activities within Dakota County and coordinated these activities with the State of Minnesota and Goodhue County,llowever, on several occasions County requests to the State for supplementary emergency information did not receive a prompt response.
': The demonstration of decision-making and einergency activities was met.
The Dakota County Eoc utilized the dedicated telephone line as its primary communication system, and employed commercial telephones, telef ax nnd radios as "back-up" systems. These systems operated adequately.
Despite this, hard copy message delays did . occur when the telefax system at other locations malfunctioned.
The Eoc operations area was situated in a temporary basement location in the Dakota County Government Center.
This location and the associated maps and graphics were sufficient to support emergency operatiores.
The ability to continuously monitor emergency worker exposure was to be demonstrated by the Dakota County EOC and Dakota County traffic control point personnel.
Greater familiarity with radiological monitoring instruments and concepts would have , enhanced the exposure control function.
Emergency workers staffing ' traffic control points wore only low-range dosimeters (0-200 mR).
High-range dosimeters (0-200 R) were available to those staffing
k
' e ' j .c } L ' j - the TCPs, but were not actually worn.
There was insufficient ', knowledge displayed as to when or by whom the high-range dosimeters j , were to be used.
There was also a failure to issue (or to simulate
issuance of) TLDs to emergency workers.
The workers themselves i were unaware that TLDs existed.
Confusion regarding the location ' of, and procedures for reporting to decontamination f acilities was also in evidence among the TCP staff.
This is a repeat weakness ' from the previous exercise.
EOC radiological staff were not aware of stay times for emergency workers in evacuated areas (e.g., i , [ security patrols). This objective was not fully net.
The ability of the Dakota County EOC to initially alert the public
within the 10-mile EPZ and to begin dissemination of an instructional message within
ninutes of stato decisions regarding PARS was demonstrated.
In the case of the two emergency
PARS, siren activation was achieved within 5-8 minutes of PAR ' ' notification from the State EOC.
' , Objectives involving the coordination of public information, , briefing the media in a timely manner and the coordinated operation ! of rumor control required demonstrations performed by a Dakota
County representative to the JPIC.
During this exercise, the i representation of Dakota County at the JPIC was simulated because ! the appointed representative was unavailable for duty.
This simulation was not sufficient to meet these objectives, nor can it ' correct two ARCAs identified during a previous exercise, given that l no alternate County reprnsentative to the JPIC had been designated ! to compensate for the missing staff member.
l The Dakota County EOC demonstrated that it possessed the ability i and resources necessary to implement appropriate' protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient pluine EPZ population. The ability and resources were specifically demonstrated by the Dakota County Sheriff's Department (handling route alerting and traffic control) and the Hastings Fire Department (handling the evacuation
of special needs populations, rescue operations and emergoney
medical transportation).
The Dakota County EOC demonstrated that it possessed the i organizational ability and resources necessary to control j evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas.
The lead in this process was taken by the Dakota County Sheriff's Department, which established two of its Traffic Control Points in Sectors P and Q on the very perimeter of the 10-mile EPZ.
The Radiological Officer handled all requests for access to restricted areas based on State-issued PARS and forwarded { this information via the Sheriff's dispatcher to the traffic control points.
A tabletop diccussion held by the staff of the Dakota County EOC demonstrated the ability to determine appropriate measures for controlled reentry and recovery, based on total population
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, ,d.
. ' ! , , ! exposure, available PARS and other relevant factors. The table-top
' discussion included considerations of population distribution and ' ' , , size within areas still on restricted status during recovery, l environmental radiation assessments provided to the Eoc by the MDH and-MDH PARS regarding food and water consumption.
On this basis I a strategy for handling the reentry of the evacuated population to
restricted areas was developed.
, With the exception of a shift change performed by the Hastings Fire , , Department Eoc staff member, the objective involving 24-hour l staffing was partially demonstrated through the presentation of a i roster and by double staffing of positions at the Eoc itself.
State of Wisconsin
j The State Division of Emergency Government (DEG) demonstrated their ' ability to use emergency classification levels and for each level.
This was accomplished in a timely and efficient manner.
j i The Emergency operations Center (EOC) was fully activated and I staffed for a full-participation exercise.
Several State ! government agencies were represented and carried out emergency response activities.
Personnel call-up procedures were initiated [ by the operations officer in accordance to the plan.
The r Department of Health and Social Services, Section of Radiation , Protection staff handled the radiological control / dose assessment
function in the State Eoc and carried out field sampling and l monitoring activities in the vicinity of the plant.
t The Wisconsin DEG participated in coordination with the field ' activities in Wisconsin and Minnesota.
t , , ! Several communications methods were utilized to accomplish the I dissemination of information to field offices and field personnel, i Used were commercial telephone, NAWAS, DATAFAX, RACES, TIME and ' State radio bands.
The State DEG demonstrated the capability of facilities to support ' the emergency response operations.
Maps, displays and message ! status boards were utilized.
The message status boards were not kept up-to-date nor were they accurate, timely or graphically displayed. Many key emergency response messages did not get posted t
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i or were excessively late in being posted. The message distribution system needs specific attention to improve the message flow.
. Improvement can be achieved by designating and training an individual to post key emergency response information.
t Field team monitors reported their exposure at every sampling point.
This included pocket dosimeters.
l-The field procedures and equipment were demonstrated for taking ' j ' direct air measurements, particulata and Iodine 131 samples and
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! ' ' j , ' , .
., i soil and vegetation samples.
Gamma spectroscopy is available in the field to make the measurement of airborne radiciodine , ' concentrations following the collection of samples.
These procedures.were demonstrated in accordance with the SOPS.
' The dose assessment group using the projected dosage assessment in the plume made protective action recommendations and disseminated s the information to the field through the State officer in Charge.
I " The State DEG supported Pierce County in their decision-making and notification as to the appropriate protective actions when notified by the utility.
- The recommendation to use potassium iodide (KI) for emergency workers in the EpZ was made at 1206 and then disseminated to the i field.
The decision for this was predicated on the evaluation of
the exposure expected in the plume.
, The Wisbonsin DEG demonstrated the requesting of Federal assistance ' in two forms; 1) that FEMA by the central point of contact for the , Federal response and, 2) that additional assistance was requested for livestock feed.
The radiation assessment group utilizing their equipment and expertise demonstrated the estimated total population exposure in the evacuated areas using both plant and field data.
e The SRC and staff discussed the reentry and recovery procedures ! with the State Department of Agriculture in the EOC and made recommendations to be implemented by the State.
The recommendations pertained to food, dairy animal. products and water in the evacuated area.
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, Nearly all Departments demonstrated the a'bility to perform a 24 hour continuous operation by a shift change with the exception of the State pios in the State EOC.
They presented a roster of personnel. The Wisconsin Department of Transportation did not make provisions for a shift change.
Pierce Count;y Pierce County effectively demonstrated its capabilities for taking, in a timely manner, appropriate emergency response actions to , protect the public upon receipt of the ECLs; including alerting and ' mobilizing personnel, activating and staffing of the EOC, as well as managing, coordinating, and controlling emergency operations.
" Leadership and supporting personnel were assigned to the EOC including two full shifts.
All participants appeared very t knowledgeable of their responsibilities and demonstrated their coupetence by taking appropriate actions as required throughout the simulated emergency. The Pierce County EOC f acility, together with its communications, displays, and amenities proved to be fully
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. adequate to enable the carrying out of necessary emergency actions by the staff.
, The initial protective action recommendation of sheltering people and livestock in a two-mile radius was received in the Pierce County EOC during the Site Area Emergency.
The simulated siren i sounding and issuing of an EBS message was accomplished in 11 minutes.
After the simulated accident escalated to the General Emergency, the protective action recommendations were incrnased to j ", evacuation of the two-mile radius and 2 to 5 miles in the downwind
sectors with sheltering in the remainder of the EPZ.
The second simulated siren sounding and issuing of an EBS message was accomplished in 10 minutes.
< Although the instructions to the public were timely, the conversion from the sector designation to geopolitical boundary descriptions ! for the second set of emergency instructions for the public was not i accurate.
The prescripted sub-area designations were not used.
l The 10-mile radius for sheltering was not defined by geopolitical descriptions familiar to the public. The City of Prescott not in 'the EPZ was included.
Clarification of procedures and additional training will be required to insure that the accurtte description , of the affected area will be contained in the EDS messages.
t Since Pierce County also provides information direct to the local , media (in addition to the State JPICs), this function was demonstrated by the preparation and conduct of three media briefings during the exercise.
The State PIO assigned to the , Pierce County EOC conducted the briefings following preparation of t the materials in coordination with the Pierce County PIO and the State EOC at Madison.
The briefings were sketchy and the presentor was unaware of fundamental information.* l Improvements to this ! function are needed to essentially enhance the County capability . to handle an expanded local media.
This w'ould involve providing appropriate displays and providing f acilities to support the media staff.
Specific rumor control activities were not observed to have occurred at the Pierce County EOC.
However, constant coordination between the EOC and the JPIC was maintained primarily by using the '; FAX equipment thereby providing the capability for rumor control coordination should it be needed.
To fully demonstrate rumor control in future exercises, specific rumors should be inserted into the exercise play.
The EOC staff demonstrated the implementation of the protective , action recommendations (PARS) of sheltering and evacuation by effectively simulating their responses.
The County Highway Department and the Sheriff's office coordinated the location and maintenance of the traffic access control points.
A thorough procedural discussion of assisting the evacuation of the mobility impaired was given by the Social Service representatives.
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> , ! [t . ., t Activation and staffing of the Plum City congregate care facility j was sinulated.
The Social Service, American Red cross and Health ' Services representatives discussed each of tneir roles in t , i supporting congregate care.
Even though school was not in session, ! the arrangements for notifying and coordinatinel evacuation of l schools was reviewed with the evaluator.
j L An excellent demonstration of emergency worker Lxposure control ! was given by the County Radiological Officer.
When the Site Area
'y Emergency classification was received, he distr.ibuted dosineters and TLDs to all energency workers in the EPZ together with written
instructions and registration cards.
Periodically, throughout the
exercise, the radiological officer asked the Department ' representatives to obtain dosineter readings from their personnel - in the field. When XI was recommended for emergency workers in the EPZ, instructions were given for the distribution of the initial dose. Sufficient quantities and types of dosimeters, TLDs, KI, and nonitoring equipment are stockpiled in a room adjacent to the EOC.
Arrangements for identifying evacuated f armers as emergency workers and establishing a pass system to allow their reentry into the evacuated area for' feeding livestoch have been developed.
, When the sheltering and evacuation protective actions were lifted, i residents of the area that had been evacuated were advised not to r eat garden produce until samples could be tested.
This precaution
was communicated to the public in a news release.
An orderly ! reentry process was discussed which included closing of the congregate care center, transportation coordination, and traffic , control.
& Both shifts of the Pierce County EOC staff demonstrated a positive cooperative attitude and accomplished their tasks in a professional ' manner.
An open dialogue between the agency representatives was
naintained throughout the exercise.
, Joint Public Information Center (JP7C) i The Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) was established and i activated in two locations in the State capitol Building.
One,
the primary working JPIC was collocated with the State EOC, and two, the press briefing area was in the Senate Hearing Room.
The
center was activated and staffed in accordance with the plan with ' all representatives present in the JPIC within 1 hour of alert, with the exception of a Dakota County representative.
The JPIC staff included representatives from Northern States Power (NSP), States of Minnesota and Wisconsin and from Goodhue County.
Dakota County did not send a representative to the JPIC.
The Press . , ! Briefing room was equipped and staffed to assist the media du. ring s I l periods between briefings.
l The JPIC immediately began operations following activation,
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r - J' .. C ', collecting information on the situation and scheduling briefings for the media to make them aware of the situation.
i . Throughout the exercise, timely briefings were held and information was distributed to the media to keep the public informed as to actions taken to protect lives and property.
Conditions at the ' plant were described in detail by NSP representatives and measures taken to protect the public were discussed and described by state and local officials.
Press briefings were videotaped to provide a permanent record of the proceedings and to be available for
review for media who were not at the briefings.
'- , The purpose of the JPIC is to provide a central point for the media to receive information about a Huclear Power Plant accident or in ' this case, an exercise.
Although the JPIC net the required u objectives for the exercise, there are a number of problems relating to the location, operations and staff training that should
be addressed to improve the overall functioning of the JPIC.' The Dakota County representative did not attend the exercise.
His attendance at this exercise was the solution to an Area Requiring
Correctivo Action raised in a past exercise.
The JPIC is physically located in EOC space and among the EOC staff.
Because of this physical location, the DEM Director assumes , a measure of control over JPIC activities even though he is not a ! nember of the JPIC.
Finally, the location of the JPIC causes ' operational and organi:ational problems that would not occur if the l JPIC were in a separate location from the EOC.
! , Arrangements for the media should be improved.to provide better , facilities for their coverage of future event;s. These improvements < should include sufficient telaphones, adequate work space for interviews and taping sessions, as well as better lighting and a . minimum number of desks and/or tables and chairs.
The present rumor control operations of both Wisconsin and [ Minnesota cannot begin to handle the types or number of calls that can reasonably be expected in a real emergency.
One man for the , Minnesota JPIC and an answering machine for Wisconsin in the JPIC i would be overwhelmed by the calls that can be expected.
Additional training and facilities will have to be made available for future events in order to provide a credible resource.
i !
- y ! i i t ! ' p EXERCISE REPORT , ! Introduction l '1.
Exercise Background ! This was the sixth exarcise resulting from a simulated accident at > i the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, operated by Northern States Power Company.
The first exercise was October 14, 1880.
! The second exercise was December 8, 1981, with full participation by the State of Minnesota, Goodhue County / City of Red Wing, Dakota ] County and Pierce County.
The State of Wisconsin chose partial participation in the second exercise because they had demonstrated '
full activity in an earlier exercise involving a different power " plant.
The third exercise was conducted October 14, 1982, with partial participation for the States of Minnesota and Wisconsin and l full participation for Goodhue county / City of Red Wing, Dakota < ' county and Pierce County.
The fourth exercise was conducted March 13, 1984, with the two States again partially participating and the , three local jurisdictions fully participating.
The fif th exercise l was conducted June 17, 1986, with partial participation for the ! State of Wisconsin and full participation for the State of
Minnesota, Goodhue County / City of Red Wing, Dakota County and l Pierce County.
Exercises have been conducted during each of the four seasons.
2.
Participating and Non-participating State and Local , Governments , , The 10-mile Plume Exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of the ' Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Pladtl impacts on Goodhue ! County / City of Red Wing and Dakota County in the State of Minnesota f and Pierce County in the State of Wisconsin.
The June 22, 1988, l exercise was a full-?articipation exercise for the States of , , Minnesota and Wiscons;.n and the Counties of Goodhue/ Red Wing, Dakota and Pierce.
' 3.
List of Evaluators For this exercise, there was a total of nineteen evaluators observing offsite exercise activities.
Onsite activities were evaluated by a separate team from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
Of the offsite evaluators, six, including the offsite , Exercise Director, were Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) , Region V staff.
RAC member agencies were represented by one evaluator from the Department of Energy (DOE) two from the i ,. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), one from the Fed 3ral Highway Administration and one from the Department of Health and Human Services (FDA).
The balance of the team was composed of three contract evaluators from the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and five contract evaluators from the Center for Planning and Research
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., . ~, ' ' . ., , '(CPR).
The evaluator assignments were as follows: F i l L Exercise Director Wallace Weaver (FEMA) f - ' State of Minnesota Dan Benent, Team Leader (FEMA) H Paul Pudacz (FEMA)
L Ken O'Brien (DOE) i Jim Benetti (EPA)
Debra Arenberg (EPA) j , [. ' Dakota County Sue Ann Curtis, Team Leader (ANL) l Jonnsthon Elias ( ANL) ! ' \\ Goodhue County / City of Red Wing Woodie Curtis, Team Leader (FEMA) - Bill Knoerzer (ANL)
- ' Roge:' Stokes (DOT) ! - I State of Wisconsin Gorden Wenger, Team Leader (FEMA)
Marthe Willis (CPR) i Edward Sears (CPR) ! Jim Kraeger (FDA) { Pierce County Jandt Quissell, Team Leader (FEMA) George Barber (CPR)
Joint Public Information Center James Sutch, Team Leader (CPR)
Bill Small (CPR) { ' . 4.
Evaluation Criteria f
I The State and County plans being evaluated during this exercise
were developed using the " Criteria for Prep 6 ration and Evaluation j of Radiological Emergency Response Plan.s and Preparedness in
Support of Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-0654, FEMA REPal, Revision { 1).
Therefore, these criteria, and the modules based on theso
criteria, " Modular Format for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency j Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluation", dated June
1983,-were used for exercise evaluation.
> 5.. Exercise Objectives . . Objectives for this exercise were selected from among the thirty-six (36) identified in the FEMA Guidance Memorandum EX-3 { dated February 26, 1988. The State of Minnesota, Goodhue County / , City of Red Wing and Dakota County selected objectives are listed in ATTACHMENT 1. The State of Wisconsin and Pierce County selected objectives are listed in ATTACHMENT 2.
t In addition, objectives 23 and 24 refer to Emergency Medical Drills.
In both Minnesota and Wisconsin, Emergency Medical Drills are conducted separate from the exercise.
Objectives 23 and 24 L were demonstrated during the annual Emergency Medical Drill l
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tw . I-t i ' i j . , . b conducted and federally evaluated on July 19, 1988.
l ' 6.
Summary of the Scenario The Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Radiological emergency preparedness exercise objectives and scenario for the June 22,
1988, joint exercise were developed by exercise planners from the
Northern States Power Company, the State of Minnesota Division of i Emergency Management and the State of Wisconsin Division of . Emergency Government.
FEMA Region V reviewed and approved the
objectives selected by each governmental jurisdiction prior to scenario development.
The utility scenario primarily addressed ' activities within the plant.
A separate scenario developed by the Minnesota DEM, included as ATTACHMENT 3, and a scenario timeline developed by Wisconsin DEG, included as ATTACHMENT 4, complimented l ' the basic scenario to encompass offsite activities.
Submission of the scenario was according to daadlines outlined in . ! NRC and FEMA guidelines.
Westinghouse Idr.ho Nuclear Company Incorporated reviewed the scenario for FEMA and found it to be , . adequate to exercise the objectives selected by the two States and j three Counties.
It was recognized that exercise radiation intensities offsite would be low End that. downwind evacuation actions would have to be driven by conservative interpretations of ? field data or upon plant status.
[ ! Synopsis of Exercise Events
'
Dttring the June 22, 1988, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Exercise the following emergency classification levels (ECLs) were , declared by the plant: Alert at 0901, Site Area at 0944 and General j Emergency at 1106.
At 1331, a 24-hour titnei step was implemented that gave the current status of the plant as in a Site Area ECL with releases terminated and plant stable.' The plant lifted their , emergency classification and entered the recovery phase at 1405.
he exercise was terminated at 1530.
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i ' 7. Description of State and Local Resources Planned To Be Used l In The Exercise ! During the exercise the State of Minnesota planned to activate and staff their EOC in the State Capitol Building in St. Paul; the Joint Pubdc I'1 formation Center, which is also in the State Capitol Building, the analytical laboratory in the Department of Health Building and; propositioned field monitoring teams in Hastings, Minnesota.
The reception center at the State Fair Grounds was to be simulated as open.
l In Dakota County, the EOC was to be activated and one traffic and , access control point actually staffed.
Sirens were to be simulated being sounded.
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, '. '. - In Goodhue County / City of Red Wing, the joint EOC was to be ' activated and one truffic and access control point actually ,_ staffed.
Sirens within the County were to be simulated but actually sounded within the City of Red Wing.
Route alerting was to be partially demonstrated.
The State of Wisconsin planned to fully activate and staff their EOC in the DEG's offices, spokespersons were to participate at the JPIC. The State radiological function was to be exercised through the Department of Health and Social Services, Section of Radiation Protection accident assessment in the State EOC, the nobile laboratory located in Ellsworth, Wisconsin and the prepositioned field teams.
> Pierce County was to activate and staff their Eoc for participation " in the exercise.
Sirens were to be simulated being sounded.
8.
Findings Noted In Past Exercises ' There were two deficiencies identified in the area of public alerting during the June 17, 1986, exercise.
One of these was for Coodhue County / City of Red Wing and the other for Pierce County.
As corrective action for these defici'encies, the two States and the three EPZ Counties (including the. City of Red WR.9) net and established coordinated alerting procedures to preclude the disjointed public alerting which occurred during the 1986 exercise.
On February 10, 1987, a joint meeting to review-the procedures and to conduct a remedial table top session was held which corrected , the deficiencies.
The State of Minnesota received eleven (11) areas requiring ' corrective action during the June 17, 1986, exercise, six (6) addressing ingestion pathway and recovery / reentry planning, procedures and training.
These were corre'cted the following year during the September 29, 1987, Monticello full scale ingestion , exercise.
The Goodhue County / City of Red Wing two areas requiring corrective action indentified in the June 17, 1986, exercise involved coordination of EBS messages and representation at the JPIC. These were corrected during this exercise.
The Dakota County area requiring corrective action of providing a representative to the JPIC was not demonstrated during this exercise and remains.
Emergency worker decontamination was not an objective for this exercise.
Demonstration of this remains as an
area requiring corrective action.
The State of Wisconsin two areas requiring corrective action included demonstration of rumor control and consistent protective actions. These were successfully corrected during the June 26, 1987, Zion exercise.
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, The Pierce County previous area requiring correction of logging , and disseminating the PIO messages was corrected this exercise.
- Although a school evacuation demonstration was not an objective there was a procedural discussion during the exerciso.
This corrects the past area requiring corrective action.
9.
Exercise Objectives Still to be Effectively Achieved j Six Year Exercise Cycle I ' The FEMA Guidance Memorandum PR-1: POLICY ON NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 AND 44 CFR 350 PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS dated October 1, 1985 established a six-year biennial exercise cycle and revised and/or
clarified exercise requirements. Applying PR-1, the Juno 22, 1988, Prairie Island Exercise was the first exercise of the second six
(6) year exercise cycle for all affected political jurisdictions.
This is also the first exercise using the revised objectives as l issued in FEMA GM EX-3, dated February 26, 1988.
j The following Table A depicts the objectives demonstrated this
exercise by the State of Minnesota, Goodhue County / City of Red Wing l and Dakota County.
Table B depicts the objectives demonstrated this exercise by the State of Wisconsin and Pierce County.
With the exception of the previously identified remaining areas to be corrected all jurisdictions have met the first six year cycle objective requirements. The new objective 36 involves the periodic requirement of off-hours / unannounced drills or exercises.
By conducting off-hours / unannounced drills in October 1988, all periodic requirements for the first six year cycle were accomplished by the jurisdictions in the Prairie Island area. This objective will need to be demonstrated again in the current six year cycle.
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