IR 05000282/1989026
| ML19332D515 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 11/14/1989 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19332D508 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-282-89-26, 50-306-89-26, IEIN-87-024, IEIN-87-24, NUDOCS 8912040072 | |
| Download: ML19332D515 (9) | |
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O. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
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Reports No. 50-282/80026(DRP); 50-306/89026(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 Licenses No. DPR-42; DPR-60
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Licensee: Northern States Power Company 434 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility.Name:
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
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. Inspection At:
Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, Minnesota Inspection Conducted: September 26 through October 30, 1989 Inspectors:
P. L. Hartmann
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T. J. O'Connor-E. R. Schweibinz
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Approved By:
////VIr9 Reactor Projects Se'etion 2A Dat'e
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Inspection Summary Inspection on September 26 through October 30. 1989 (Reports No. 50-282/89026(DRP);
No. 50-306/89026(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of plant operational safety, maintenance, surveillance, radiological protection and industrial safety.
Results: During this inspection period, Unit 1 operated continuously at 100%
power except for a power reduction to facilitate the cleaning of the condenser
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screens and the addition of oil to the reactor coolant pumps.
This power reduction did not exasperate the failed fuel rod. Associated activity levels remain less than 1% of technical specifications (TS) limits. At the end of the inspection period, Unit I had operated continuously for 86 days, Unit 2 operated continuously at 100% power except for a power reduction to facilitate the cleaning of the condeneer screens and perform quarterly turbine generator valve testing. Unit 2 has reached 151 days of continuous operation. Overall good plant performante during this inspection period has been mitigated by a number of inattention to detail events and the unplanned automatic starts of the aur.111ary building special ventilation system.
Of the four areas inspected, one violation of NRC requirements was identified.
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8912040072 891114 PDR ADOCK 05000282
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DETAILS 1..
Persons Contacted
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E. Watzl, Plant Manager H
- D. Mendele, General Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection M. Se11 man, General Superintendent, Operations
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G. Lenertz, General Superintendent, Maintenance A. Smith, General Superintendent, Planning and-Services R. Lindsey, Assistant to the Plant Manager D. Schuelke, Superintendent, Radiation Protection G. Miller, Superintendent, Operations Engineering L
K. Beadell, -Superintendent, Technical Engineering r
S. Schaefer, Superintendent, Technical Engineering M. Klee, Superintendent, Quality Engineering
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R. Conklin, Supervisor, Security and Services L
M. Wadley, Shift Manager p
G.'Eckholt, Nuclear Support Services
- J. Leve111e, Nuclear Support Services
- A. Hunstad, Staff Engineer
-Denotes those present at the exit interview of November 1, 1989.
I 2.-
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
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(Closed) 282/87024-IN: 306/87024-IN Information Notice 87-24:
L Operatior.a1 Experience Involving Losses of Electrical Inverters, r
L The subject of this Information Notice is the adequacy of the maintenance and surveillanct performed on the electrical inverters.
The licensee's preventive maintenance (PM) program, performed every
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refueling outage, examines the static transfer switch, over current protection, over voltage trip,,and output amps, frequency and volts.
The PM also calibrates the inverter meters, verifies peripheral equipment operability and performs a tolerance-check on component capacitors. Additionally, the plant equipment operators take meter readings and verify correct inverter operation every four hours.
-The pl:.nt electricians and system engineers have recently completed a one week training course conducted by the inverter manufacturer.
As a result of the training, the PM's will be revised to include additional recommendations made by the vendor.
Based on this i
information, the item 1s closed.
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(Closed) 282/87005-01; 306/87005-01(DRP) Open Item:
L Doors-This open item. documents the plants corrective actions associated
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with the shield building doors maintenance and surveillance testing.
The licensee has scheduled a semi annual surveillance which checks the functional operation of the shield building doors.
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surveillance is also scheduled prior to the beginning of an outage.
Preventive Maintenance (PM) procedure PM 3122-3, Shield Building.
. Category I Vent Zone and Fire Door Mechanical Inspection, Rev. 4 performs a semi annual PM to verity that self-closing mechanisms, latches and hinges are in good. working order. Based on this information, the item is closed.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item 282/89023-04(DRP): Cause Identification for Inadvertent Valve Closure The licensee had not identified a root cause for the closure of the
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two chiller condenser supply valves. The licensee has completed an l
investigation of the event and was unable to identify a specific cause for the valve closure.
The investigation included ~ extensive-
efforts to duplicate the valve closures and a review of control
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logic and flow diagrams. As a result of this review being inconclusive, the licensee performed a tampering analysis. The licensee, utilizing security records accounted for personnel onsite and examined worker location and activities for the surveillance test time period. The licensee also performed a valve lineup for
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the cooling water system and found no anomalies.
Supervisors conducted tours of the plant foJ evidence of tampering and none were f our.d.
The licensee discussed their actions with Region III Security Personnel. Based on this information, this item is closed.
Surveillance procedure improvements were recommended for the in l
plant valve position verification because of problems identified during the investigation.
Performance of the surveillance test was delayed due to discrepancies discovered in the revised procedure (See paragraph 3.d. below).
The inspectors will continue to follow performance of. Surveillance Procedure SP 1110.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707. 93702)
a.
Routine Inspection The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, conducted discussions with control room operators and observed shift turnovers. The inspector verified operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed equipment control records, and verified the proper return to service of affected componerts, conducted tours of the auxiliary building, turbine building and external areas of the plant to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, and to verify that maintenance work requests had been l
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initiated for the equipment in need of maintenance.
It was observed
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b that the Plant Manager, the General Superintendent of Plant i
Engineering and Radiation Protection and the Operations General
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Superintendent were well informed on the overall status of the plant
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and that they made frequent visits to the control room and regularly
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toured the plant.
b.
Control Room Activities On October 20, 1969, the licensee commenced a power reduction to 30*i; on Unit One to facilitate the cleaning of the condenser screens and the addition of lubricating oil to the reactor coolant pumps, i
The inspector monitored control room and plant activities. All
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individuals were cognizant of their responsibilities and operated the plant in an informed and controlled manner.
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On October 24, 1989, the inspector observed 2R22 Unit 2 Shield Building Vent, Gas Monitor out of service with Secure tags attached to the monitor. The shield building vent gas monitors the Shield
Building Ventilation filtered effluent for gaseous activity. The
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Secure tags on 2R22 referenced IR22, Unit 1 Shield Building Vent Gas Monitor. Additionally, the Secure tags should have been placed on the IR22 pump Switch and on the IR22 Low Flow Alarm Bypass Switch.
These discrepancies were t'rought to the attention of the shif t supervisor and promptly corrected.
No release of gas effluent occurred while 2R22 was incorrectly removed from service.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires activities affecting quality to be accomplished in accordance with documented instructions and procedures. Technical
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Specification 6.5.C.3 requires that detailed written procedures to be prepared and followed for activities which include preventive or corrective maintenance of plant equipment and systems that could have an effect on nuclear safety.
Administrative Work Instruction 5AWI 3.10.1, Use of NSP Safety Tags, Rev. 3, Step 6.5.3 reauires operators to place switches and valves in the required tagout position, then complete and install the caution tag.
Contrary to the above, the operator failed to place the spectfied secure tags on the required equipment switches and proper radiation monitor.
This is identified as Violation 282/89026-01; 306/89026-01(DRP)
Example 1.
On October 25, 1989, the initial steps of preventive maintenance (PM) procedure PM 3155-1, Rad Monitor Sample Pump Quarterly PM, Rev. 7, were being performed.
This PM checks the operation of the sample pumps associated with process radiation monitors.
Step 6.1.A.2 requires the pump switch to be turned off.
The licensed operator incorrectly turned the detector power off rather than the pump switch for the IR37 radiation monitor. This action resulted in an automatic initiation of 121 the auxiliary building special ventilation system.
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10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and h
Drawings require activities affecting quality to be accomplished in
L accordance with documented instructions and procedures. Technical Specification 6.5.C.3 requires that detailed written procedures to be prepared _and followed for activities which include preventive or corrective maintenance of plant equipment and systems that could have an effect on nuclear safety.
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C Contrary to the above, the operator failed to follow the requirements of PM 3155-1. This is identified as the second example of Violation 282/89026-01; 306/89026-01(DRP).
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Chlorine Monitors
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As a result of the numerous spikes on the chlorine monitors noted in Inspection Report Nos. 282/89023; 306/89023 (DRP), increased
maintenance and investigation activities have been undertaken by the
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L licentee. The inspector monitored work request (WR) N6181-ZN-Q and r
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the performance of surveillance procedure SP-1698, Chlorine Monitors
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Weekly Check, Rev. 2.
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The WR specified the replacement of the optics block and an overall
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cleaning of chlorine monitor 122. While monitoring the performance of SP 1698, the inspector noted that the serial number on chlorine monitor-131 did not match the calibration card's serial number.
l Precaution 3.3 of SP 1698. states that each chlorine monitor has a
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unique calibration card assigned to it, by serial number, and that
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the appropriate card is to be used in the calibration of that unit.
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Information provided by the licensee indicates that the calibration card was not changed when the monitor was replaced on Au' gust 23, 1989.
Subsequent recalibration of chlorine monitor 111 using the correct card verified the monitor to be properly calibrated.
Although the technician followed all steps in the body of the procedure, the inspector questioned the adherence to procedure precautions noting that the routine surveillance had been performed i
several times using the wrong serial number calibration card.
The inspector will continue to monitor the licensee's performance of
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routine surveillances.
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Cooling Water Isolation Testing In response to problems documented in Inspection Report Nos. 282/89023; 306/89023(DRP), Surveillance Procedure SP 1110, Isolation Testing of Turbine Cooling Water Header Valves Test No. 1110, was revised.
Revision 17 inserted steps to provide additional verification that
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the chiller condenser supply valves were open.
During the
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performance of SP 1110, the operators were forced to discontinue the i
test due to a number of incorrect steps.
Steps 4.11, 4.12, 8.11 and 8.12 required the operator to verify a valve in the open position by confirming that the correct color light was illuminated.
The procedure listed the wrong color light. Additionally, several steps
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p jf for independent verification incorrectly referenced previous steps.
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Revision 18 of SP 1110 issued to correct the problems associated
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with Revision 17 also contained minor errors forcing the operators
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to issue a document deviation form in order to perform the test.
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'n spite of the inattention to detail exhibited during the revision and review process to this procedure, a positive observation j
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Plant
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equipment operators recognized multiple procedural inconsistencies L
and contacted the control room for further instruction. The shift supervisor determined that a thorough review of procedure was required and terminated the test and returned the system to normal lineup.-
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Industrial Safety I
On October 18, 1989, while Unit I was operating at 100% power, a n'
maintenance worker received second degree burns to both legs during maintenance activities. The burn resulted from an inadequate steam
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. piping isolation for a control valve removal. When the control valve was removed, steam emitted from the valve connection flange.
The licensee has investigated the incident and is considering corrective actions. The inspectors will follow the actions to prevent a similar recurrence, f.
Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation System (ABSVS) Auto Starts
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Four automatic starts of the ABSVS occurred during the inspection
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period.
The first on October 24, 1989, when radiation monitor 2R37 spiked and auto started the 121 ABSVS.
The second occurred on October 25 at 7:40 a.m. when the operator performing a preventive I
maintenance procedure improperly deenergized the IR37 monitor which auto started the 121 ABSVS.
The third autostart of 121 ABSVS occurred on October 25,1989, at 4:27 p.m. due to a spike on monitor 2R37.
The fourth autostart of 122 ABSVS occurred on October 31, 1989, due to a high activity level on monitor 2R30.
Operator response to the first three events showed no increase in radiation levels, and the applicable train of the ABSVS was shut down. The October 31, 1989, g'
l autostart was due to a legitimate high activity level.
The licensee is investigating the significance of this autostart.
The licensee continues to pursue corrective actions to prevent radiation monitor spiking.
Several LERs will be submitted in response to these events.
4.
' Maintenance Observation (71707, 37700, 62703)
Routine, preventive, and corrective maintenance activities were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or standards, and in l
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conformance with Technical Specifications. The following items were
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considered during this review:
adherence to limiting conditions for operation while components or systems were removed from ' service, approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work, activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable,
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functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service, quality control records were maintained, c
activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, radiological controls p
were implemented, and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Portions of'the following maintenance activities were observed during the inspection period:
Replacement of the 11 Charging Pump Desurger
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Replacement of Lights in the Spent Fuel Pool
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Activities Associated with the Sluicing and Shipment of High
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Radiation Resins
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preventive Maintenance on the New Fuel Crane
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Rework of the Packing on the Maintenance Airlock Outer Door
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o Modifications to the Fuel Sipper Equipment
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It should be noted that the licensee's radiation protection staff continues to closely monitor work activities, constantly assesses and minimizes contamination levels and provides reminders to the plant staff concerning proper radiation protection practices.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance (61726, 71707)
The inspector witnessed portions of surveillance testing of safety-related systems and components. The inspection included verifying that the tests were scheduled and performed within Technical Specification requirements, by observing tnat procedures were being followed by qualified operators, that Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) were not violated, that system and equipment restoration was completed, and that test results were acceptable to test and Technical Specification requirements.
On October 23, 1989, the licensee conducted SP 2136, Volumetric Leakage Rate Test of Containment Airlocks, Rev.17 on the Unit 2 maintenance airlock.
The surveillance requires the average leak rate for the airlock l-to be less than 12,900 sec/ min. Once the test pressure of 46 psig stabilized, 4 readings were taken over the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> test duration. After the first reading of 12,000 sec/ min, the system engineer notified the l
inspector and expressed concern over the pending final test results.
The inspector witnessed additional readings and the calculation which determined that the airlock failed the surveillance. The inspector then accompanied the system engineer and maintenance per w.el into the containment to examine the maintenance a4 M :nner door for leakage using leak detection fluid (" snoop"). The airlock was maintained at the test pressure during this examination. This examination determined that
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i the inner door was not leaking and therefore containment integrity was n
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maintained.
The inspector monitored the inspection and corrective action on the outer door. Upon completion of the outer door work, the surveillance was performed and successfully completed. The licensee plans to submit LER No. PRE-89-03 regarding this surveillance.
L In conjunction with the installation of D5/06 Emergency diesel generators, i
the inspector has continued to monitor the activities associated with the relocation of the 21 and 22 condensate storage tanks-Recent changes in
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the condensate supply line warranted the-performance of surveillance tests on the auxiliary feedwater pumps.
The inspector monitored the performance of SP 1100, No.12 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
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Surveillance Test, Rev. 26, from the control room and the performance of
SP 2102, No. 22 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Test, Rev. 33,
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from,the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room.
Both surveillances were j'
successfully completed, noting good communications between involved personnel and a good knowledge of surveillance requirements and equipment operation.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Management Meeting (30702)
The Branch Chief, Reactor Projects, Branch 2, DRP, visited the site on October 27, 1989, and toured various plant areas including the new emergency diesel generator construction area and the receipt / inspection area.
Further, the inspectors attended the routine morning meeting and an onsite review committee meeting. The inspectors met with General Superintendent of Plant Engineering and Radiation Protection, Mr. Mendele, and obtained a status briefing relevant to several recent auto-starts of the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation System.
The licensee indicated they were working with the vendor to obtain an electronic board modification which would provide a longer time delay in the circuitry and thus eliminate the numerous false starts.
Since September 9, 1989, the licensee has experienced four auto-starts of the sytem.
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The inspectors expressed concern that ongoing work wi n the vendor appeared slow and final solutions did not appear to be well defined.
Subsequent to the October 27, 1989 meeting, the licensee has agreed to meet with the Region III staff to discuss this issue. During the inspection, the inspectors also met with Mr. Don Fricke, Superir.tendent, Material Management, and inspected the licensee's receipt / inspection area and discussed some recent corrective measures to the commercial grade parts dedication process. The licensee demonstrated the use of a metal analyzer used for spot checking material to generally determine chemical composition of the metal.
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Exit (30703)
The inspect 6Es met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the report period on November 1, 1989.
The inspectors discussed the purpose and scope of the inspection and the l
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' findings;:. (The' inspectors also, discussed the-likely:information. content'.
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of. the inspection report-with regard to: documents' or processes reviewed
by the inspector.during the inspection.;.The: licensee did not identify.
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.any documents or processes,as proprietary, s,
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