IR 05000282/1989001
| ML20246F678 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 08/23/1989 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20246F419 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-282-89-01, 50-282-89-1, 50-306-89-01, 50-306-89-1, NUDOCS 8908310105 | |
| Download: ML20246F678 (5) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _---_ _-_ -_ _, . . . ' ,.. Enclosure 2 , ERRATA SHEET PAGE .LINE NOW READS SHOULD READ
4-5 ... schedule... ... schedule.
, Basis: By letter dated December 29, 1987, the licensee notified hRR cf the schedule change prior to exceeding the commitment date of December 31, 1987.
9' ... identified by ... identified by the the vendor... licensee... ' Basis: The statement was in error.
10' ...USAS B.31.1.0.
...USAS B.31.1.0 1976... 1967... Basis: Typographical error.
G 'M ,
-- . . . . Information Notices were comprehensive. However, the SAS issue identified by the Regulatory Effectiveness Review (REP team has remained open since 1965. Although extensive, ppojecthas gone beyond the established schedule and the licens e f iled to notify the NRC of having exceeded the commitment _ Additionally, . the computer replacement project has continued o years.
The licensee is in the early stage of developin Performance monitoring program, which should improve li e;j / response in this area.
/ Security staffing levels are adequate nsure a level of performance that meets regulatory requirements. The site security staff was increased in order toddress a problem similartoaprcblemidentifiedatMontjcello. Although the contractor providing uniformed security' services was changed during the assessment period, the ransition was smooth and without impediments as a rest 1 f close coordination with various levels of license rr emtht. Security force training continues to be good. The tigel contingency training drill involving FBI, local a or ent and site security exceeded the licensee's commitnen 2.
Performance RatincO The licensee' Aped rma e is rated Category 2 in this aree.. The licensee' s per-rm was rated Category 1 in the previous SALP assessme
p ye 1 This decline in performance was due to ' . lack of mel W rre tive action to address ecuipment aging proble a d a dec ne in enforcement history.
> 3.
Recomme.atipns None.
F.
Engineering / ech ical Support 1.
Nialysis is i a new functional area and consequently was not rated in /, previ s SALPs. Evaluation of this functional area was based i G on t results of eight routine inspections, including an E0P ! ins ection by regional inspectors, a procurement inspection by ' th Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and several i.spections by the resident inspectors.
Enforcement history during this SALP period included three l severity level IV violations. Since this area was not rattd i during previous assessment periods, no prior enforcement ! history is available for comparison. Confirmatory Action i Letter (CAL) RIII-87-013 relating to operator licensing issues l in the previous SALP period was satisfactorily closed curing this period.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . ' as'sessment of 17 Colt /FMED Services Information Letters (SILs) for their applicability to the emergency diesel generators.
The licensee's resolution of technical issues was mixed. The backlog of safety-related plant modifications remained manageable.
About 150 modifications were in process at the end of the period. Of this amount, 47 were considered significant b ed on/ cost or regulatory impact. Reevaluations of as-built sa ety-related piping systems, performed by the licensee as a result disct'epancies identified by the vendor regarding weight and center f ravity with Copes Vulcan valves, in some cases exceeded U B.
'l.0 1967 allowable stresses. As a result, the licens pequested to submit to the NRC a justification for continued i6n (JCO) ircluding acceptance criteria when encountering ijirstress level discrepancies. The licensee's initi 1 p nz'e was found to be unacceptable, and revised criteri erd groposedand ultimately accepted by the NRC. All p t-fir a spfe shutdown capability (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R) nichi issues were ^ resolved during this period. Technical s ort for those resolved issues was excellent. One nont chpTeal issue remains open.
/
, During the SALP period, many examp s of good quality engineering work were evident le psnagement and resolution of licensing issues. A licens ubfittal in response to 10 CFR 50.62 anticipated tr i nt Without scram requirements, a Technical Specifications ) nge request based on the new 10 CFR Part 50, Appendi K . tion model for upper plenum , ' injection, a submittal in lvi the periodic surveillance requirement for tur ne e esting, and the high flux range monitor icw setpoin? ub it 1 were all examples of high quality engineering i The licensee' q n iv ness to NRC initiatives was generally good. Resi nt' spec r questions related to the plant design maximum coo g ater inlet temperatures raised during the 1988 g summer droug ee esearched and satisfactorily answered in just a few c rairie Island was one of the first plants to . N'C E0P inspection team that had incorporated be audited t th R the psting)ous Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines lA (erg-A). ILn anticipation of this inspection, the licensee c/nt ed in pril 1988 an audit of their E0P program, pr c ures nd activities. An action plan to correct the n rous ogram and operations deficiencies was developed.
l A tio concerns identified during the NRC E0P inspections ere s sequently added to those licensee items identified for A so tion. The licensee has implemented a very thorough and (fec ically sound approach to resolve the recent IEB 79-14 r ated issues. Major wecknesses in the requalification aminations results were addressed during this SALP period
- _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
. . . ' In~ formation Notices were comprehensive. However, the SAS issue identified by the Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER) team has remained open since 1985. Although extensive, the project has gone beyond the established schedule. Additionally, the computer replacement project has continued for two years. The licensee is in the early stage of developing a performance monitorin5 program, which should improve licensee response in this area.
Security staffing levels are adequate to ensure a level of performance that meets regulatory requirements. The site security staff was increased in order to address a aroblem similar to a problem identified at Monticello. Altlough the contractor providing uniformed security services was changed during the assessment period, the transition was smooth and without impediments as a rcsult of close coordination with various levels of licensee management. Security force training continues to be good. The tactical contingency training crill irvolving FBI, local law enforcement and site security exceeded the licensee's ce=4tment.
2.
Performance Rating The licensee's performance is rated Category 2 in this area.
The licensee's performance was rated Category 1 in the previous SALP assessment period. This decline in performance was due to lack of timely corrective action to address equipment aging problems and a decline in enforcement history.
3.
Recommendations None.
F.
Engineering / Technical Support 1.
Analysis This is a new functional area and consequently was not rated in previous SALPs.
Evaluation of this functional area was based on the results of eight routine inspections, including an E0P inspection by regional inspectors, a procurement inspection by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and several inspections by the resident inspectors.
Enforcement history during this SALP period includcd three severity level IV violations. Since this area was not rated L during previous assessment periods, no prior enforcement is available for comparison. Confirmatory Action history (CAL) RIII-87-013 relating to operator licensing issues Letter in the previous SALP period was satisfactorily closed during this period.
I _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
m , . L -{ p . .
e l - assessment of 17 Colt /FMED Services Information Letters (SILs) ' .for their applicability to the emergency diesel generators.
The licensee's resolution of technical issues was mixed. The backlog of safety-related plant modifications remained manageable. About 150 modifications were in process at the end
of the. period. Of this amount, 47 were considered significant based on cost or regulatory impact. Reevaluations of as-built safety-related piping systems, performed by the licensee as a result of discrepancies identified by the licensee regarding weight and center of gravity with Copes Vulcan valves, in some , cases exceeded USAS B.31.1.0 1967 allowable stresses. As a j result, the licensee was requested to submit to the NRC a justification for continued operation (JCO) including acceptance criteria when encountering similar stress level , discrepancies. The licensee's initial response was found to be unacceptable, and revised criteria were proposed and . ultimately accepted by the NRC. All post-fire safe shutdown
capability (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R) technical issues were resolved during this period. Technical support for those resolved issues was excellent. One nontechnical issue remains open.
During the SALP period, many examples of good quality engineering work were evident in the management and resolution of licensing issues. A licensee submittal in response to 10 CFR 50.62 anticipated transient without scram requirements, a Technical Specifications (TS) change request based on the new 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix K evaluation model for upper plenum injection, a submittal involving the periodic surveillance requirement for turbine valve testing, and the high flux rrnge monitor low setpoint submittal were all examples of high quality engineering.
l The licensee's responsiveness to NRC initiatives was generally 'l good. Resident inspector questions related to the plant design maximum cooling water inlet temperatures raised during the 1988 summer drought were researched and satisfactorily answered in just a few days. Prairie Island was one of the first plants to be audited by the NRC E0P inspection team that had incorporated the Westinghouse Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines 1A (ERG-1A).
In anticipation of this inspection, the licensee conducted in April 1988 an audit of their E0P program, procedures and activities. An action plan to correct the numerous program and operations deficiencies was developed.
Additional concerns identified during the NRC E0P inspections were subsequently added to those licensee items identified fer resolution. The licensee has implemented a very thorough and technically sound approach to resolve the recent IEB 79-14 related issues. Ma,ior weaknesses in the requalification examinations results were addressed during this SALP period i
l ___ }}