IR 05000282/1989031

Safety Insp Repts 50-282/89-31 & 50-306/89-31 on 891212-900116.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operational Safety,Maint,Surveillance,Radiological Protection & Industrial Safety

ML20011E821
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	01/31/1990
From:	Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20011E812	List: IR 05000282/1989031 ML20011E811 ML20011E815
References
50-282-89-31, 50-306-89-31, NUDOCS 9002220532
Download: ML20011E821 (11)

Text

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s._ j U.S.. NUCLEAR < REGULATORY. COMMISSION.

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REGION IIIL

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. Reports No.1 50-282/89031(DRP); 50-306/89031(ORP)

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Docket'Nos. 50-282; 50-306.

. Licenses No. DPR-42; DPR-60; y

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l Licensee:

Northern States Power Company

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-414 Nicollet-Mall g.(

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Minneapolis,-MN' 55401

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Facility,Name

Prairie: Island Nuclear Generating Plant-

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I" lnsp'ection At:

Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, Minnesota j

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In' pecti$n Conducted: becember. 12, 1989 through January 16, 1990 j

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(b Inspectors:

P.

L. Hartmann

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.T. J. O'Connor.

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J.'M. Ulie-

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' Approved By:'

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. Reactor Projects'Section 2A Date

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Inspection Summary

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Inspectionon' December 12, 1989 through January 16, 1990 (Reports No. 50-282/89031(DRP); No. 50-306/89031(DRP)).

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< Areas <Inspectd:

Routine: unannounced inspection ~ byj resident. inspectors.of

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. plant operationalesafety,_ maintenance, surveillance, radiological protection a

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Results:' Unit 1-entered-theiinspection period at_81% power,. coasting down

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to the cycleJ13 to214; refueling outage.l At 10:13 p.m. om January 16, 1990,.

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!UnitL1-came-off line.

Planned outage activities include. steam generator. eddy current' testing,otube plugging and sleeving and the installation:of..the

, - (digital:feedwater control system.

Associated activity levels remain.less

<tnen 1%.of Technical: Specification (TS) limits.

No_ additional' degradation-

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in the pressurizer manway steam leak has occurred.

In preparation for the Q

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refueling outage,;the licensee has taken steps to-minimize activity levels -

o a in the reactor. coolant system and inside containment.

Unit 1 has~ operated-

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icontinuouslyt for 179 days.

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-Unitl2l experienced a reactor trip on December 21, 1989'from a negative flux'

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' rate.

Trouble shooting activities were completed and the unit returned to :

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service on DecemberJ22, 1989.

On December 26, 1989,, Unit 2 again tripped from H

a' negative ~ flux rate.

Both reactor trips were complicated by an accompanying

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' loss: of power to the Unit 2 reserve station transformers.

An NRC Augmented o

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_InspectioniTeam.(AIT)Lwasidispatched to the site to monitor the licensee's

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Linvestigative and' corrective actions.- Details of these reactor trips and AIT'.

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inspection results can be foundlin Inspection' Reports No. 50-282/89032(DRP);-

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,No'. ;50-306/89032(DRP).. Unit 2 w'as returned to service on January 10, 1990.

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t Of the'six areas; inspected : one violation of NRCl requirements was identified.

'This violationiinvolved the failure to~ comply with'Technica1' Specification-

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requirements concerning the chlorine. detection system.. The. root cause.has

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beentidentified as inadequate. training and miscommunication between' operations personnel,

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OETAILS'

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11.L Persons Contacted.

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1. E.-Watzl, Plant Manager

'#D.'Mendele, General. Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation

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~#M.' Sellman, General Superintendent, Operations G.'Lenertz, General Superintendent, Maintenance ci O

. A. Smith, General Superintendent, Planning and-Services g

1. R.iLindsey, Assistant:to the Plant Manager

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D. Schuelke, Superintendent, Radiation Protection

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1. G. Miller, Superintendent,L0perations Engineering

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-K._Beadell, Superintendent, Technical-Engineering S.'Schaefer,. Superintendent, Technical Engineering

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M. Klee, Superintendent, Quality Engineering.

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R. Conklin, Supervisor, Security and' Services

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~#M. Wadley, Shift Manager

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1. P.: Valtakis, Shift Manager

-#J.'Sorensen, Shift Manager

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.#L. Dahlman, Senior Materials & Special Process Engineer

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-#J.-.Leveille, Nuclear Support Services

1. A. Hunstad, Staff Engineer

1. Denotes those present at the exit interview of January 19', 1990.

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2.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings.(92701)

i (Closed) Unresolved Item (282/89028-01;'306/89028-01(DRP)):- The inspectors questioned the method and frequency, calibration, and i

surveillance of the Hot Shutdown Panel's equipment.

As a result,-the-licensee determined that the source range detector indication was not part of a calibration surveillance program.

However,-the licensee

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promptly incorporated the source range detector into.the Instrumentation and Calibration = Surveillance Test Procedure numbered SP1734[2734],

Neutron Flux Monitor Calibration.

The inspectors. confirmed at the' Train-

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A and B Hot Shutdown Panels'that the gamma-metric instrumentation ~ meters numbered-1[2]NI51 C/B and 1[2]NI52 C/B are identified in the procedure-

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as NI-51B and NI-51C for each train and have been placed on an outage

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-frequency surveillance schedule.

The inspectors also questioned the

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licensee's testing ~' program of the other remote controls in the Hot Shutdown Panels.

Consequently, the licensee informed the inspectors;

'that-the other Hot Shutdown Panel remote controls are in the surveillance

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. program.

Based on the above information, this item is considered closed.

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Operational Safety Verification (71707, 93702, 60705)

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Routine Inspection

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The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, conducted discussions with control room operators and observed

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The inspector 1 verified operability of selected

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shift turnovers.

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emergency systems,1 reviewed' equipment control records, and verified K

the proper return to service of-affected components;, conducted tours

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of the auxiliary building, turbine building and external areu of i

the plant to_ observe plant equipment conditions, including potential F

. fire hazards,-and to verify that maintenance _ work requests had been

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initiated:for the equipment in need of maintenance.-

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Unit Operation L

Unit-1 coasted'down to a level of 50% power.until its removal from service on~ January 16, 1990, The inspectors verified-the Unit 1

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coastdown to be in accordance'with.the_ restrictions imposed by_'

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Figure:Cl-29, Tave Restrictions During End of' Life Coastdown,

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Revision-2.

Other than the shutdown for refueling,-Unit 1 operated

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uneventfully during the' inspection period.

Thc Unit 2 reactor tripped from 100% power on December 21, 1989.

The suspected cause was the dropping of two shutdown bank rods

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which-caused a negative flux rate trip.

When the generator output

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breakers (8H-13 and 8H-14) opened, 8H-13 opened slowly (<10 cycles).

,This slow opening is treated as a breaker fault and results in a

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Bus:1 (345kv substation bus) lockout.

The lockout removed = normal-and alternate power to the nonessential buses (21, 22, 23 and 24).

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The plant was stabilized using natural circulation.

Following_

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testing and-repairs to the reactor protection motor generator sets, t

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the unit was restarted on December 22 with the turbine placed back on the_' grid at 12:09 a.m. December 23, 1989.

Unit 2 operated until 12:32 p.m. on December 26, 1989, when the unit tripped again as a result of a negative flux rate.

The sequence

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of; events was~nearly identical to the December 21, 1989 event, and the plant was promptly stabilized using natural circulation..In

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respo_nse to the December 26 event, an NRC Augmented Inspection Team (AIT)~was formed-and dispatched to the-site.

The AIT report

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. discusses ~these two events, equipment failures-and root cause.

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investigation in detail-(ref. Inspection Reports No. 282/89032; l

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No. 306/89032).

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c Following regional administrator concurrence-(ref. CAL RIII-89-027),-

unit restart commenced at 3:55 p.m. on January 9, 1990.

At 5: 30 p.m.,

j step 220 on control bank D was reached without criticality being achieved.

The control rods were reinserted and recalculation of the

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estimated critical position (ECP) was commenced.

The inspector was

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present during this criticality attempt and considers the actions

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taken by the licensee to be conservative.

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The licensee determined several factors, which resulted in more

' negative ~ reactivity (which keeps the reactor shutdown), were present

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than what the= original ECP had taken into account.

These factors included:

reactivity curves which were not fusi cycle specific; the unaccounting of negative reactivity associated with samarium after J.

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y 14 days:following,a trip from 100% power, and; a more' accurate calculation-for preshutdown boron calculation.- The unit was.

restarted _at 12:37 'a.m. on January:10,:1990 and criticality was'

achieved within 150 percent millitho (pcm) of the" revised ECP. The-

' licensee ~is' investigating the cause of the'ECP being calculated with b

less actual negative reactivity than what was actually present in

'the reactor.

The original ECP calculation missed criticality by n

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638~pcm.' The' licensee's' procedural limit is-750 pcm.- The ECP calculation procedure ~will-be revised to improve accuracy pending the outcome of the licensee's investigation. -The inspectors.were s'

satisfied'with the explanation of the ECP calculation prior to the restart of Unit 1.

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Scaffolding

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,During.the inspectors' plant' tours, scaffolding erected for the

c Unit 1 refueling outage was observed utilizing portions of the-containment spray piping for support.

This situation was immediately corrected.

Subsequent discussions with the licensee o

revealed an absence of a procedure to govern the erection of scaffolding.

The' licensee: stated the intention to establish a plant procedure to govern the erection of. scaffolding.

The inspector.

expressed concerns.that such a procedure should include provisions for access to.saf_ety related components, attachment to related

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components and the accompanying 50.59 review and fire protection tunsiderations.: The inspectors will continue to monito'r the

' licensee's use of scaffolding.

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Emergency Lighting

[0 During the inspectors' plant tours, a walkdown of the emergency lighting was conducted.

All inspected batteries had' proper J

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electrolyte levels,' appropriate voltage and working lights.-

However,. Emergency Light No. - 63' located in the Unit:2 "porkchop area" was identified as being 75% discharged with low electrolyte levels.. Review of the work requests'(WR)' associated with this-

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. emergency ligit revealed.WRs, being written on a monthly' basis -to correct defic ent electrolyte levels.' This item will be further pursued by the maintenance team inspection under. Inspection Reports

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No. 50-282/90001; No. 50-306/90001(DRS).

It should be noted that

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two " Work Requested" tags, dated November 30,'1989 and December 26,-

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,1989.were' affixed to the emergency light.

No work request form was

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generated.in conjunction-with the tag dated November 30, 1989.

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and the use of " Work Requested" tags.

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. Chlorine Monitor Inoperability

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On December 11, 1989, with chlorine detector 121 in bypass, a

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h computer alarm indicated a problem with chlorine detector 122.

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7:00 p.m., the operators placed the 122 chlorine detector in bypass

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which placed the plant into Technical Specification (TS) 3.13.E.2.

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' TS 3.13.E.2 requires the. licensee, within-6. hours, to restore either.

" the 121: or.122. chlorine detector to service or operate the redundant

- ventilation system in the normal (non-recirculation) mode and close:

.the outs de air supply dampers for the affected-train of vent lat on.

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. After monitoring the 122 chlorine detector:for approximately one.

. hour, the decision.was made to return this detector to service.. Due to miscommunication between the licensed operator and'the outplantL

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operator, the licensed operator thought that the 122 chlorine ~

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detector. had been returned to service when in fact it had not.

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Approximately 11: hours-later, (6:15 a.m., December 12, 1989) it

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- was discovered that-both chlorine monitors were in bypass.

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122 chlorine monitor was then returned to normal.

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Technical Specification (TS) 3.13.E.2.15 states "if both chlorine-

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' detection channels for one train of. ventilation are inoperable:then within six hoursi (1) restore at least one channel to operable status, or:(b)' operate the redundant ventilation system in the normal (non-recirculation) mode and close the outside air supply dampers for_the affected train of ventilation." Contrary to the above,. both chlorine detection channels for the 122 Control Room Ventilation train were placed in bypass for approximately 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br />,

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without'the outside air supply dampers being placed in the closed

position.

This is identified as Violation 50-282/89031-01.

10 CFR i. Appendix C., G.1., states that violations may not be-issued if the violation:

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was identified by the licensee

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(2)

is norma 11y' classified as a severity Level IV or V.

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wasLreported, if required (4) was or will be corrected, including measures to prevent

recurrence, within a reasonable time; and

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(5) was not a willful violation or a violation that' could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective' action for a previous violation.

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The inspector concluded, based on item five above, this violation warrants issuance of a Notice of Violation when viewed in conjunction with previous instances of inattention to detail documented in recent inspection reports (ref. Inspection Reports No. 50-282/89-026; No. 50-306/89-026).

Licensee-Event ~ Report (LER) 282/89021 has been received by the

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NRC which discusses this event.

Following review, the inspectors y

requested further information to determine the chlorine detector setpoint for automatic actuation of the control room ventilation system, and consideration of the setpoint necessary to allow an

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. operator adequate time' tol manually initiate isolation.of;the control-j

room ventilation.systemh This question has been brought to the j

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C attention.of the licensee,

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Chlorine Monitor System Modification g

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'In response to the large numberfspurious actuations of the control

'-room ventilation system,.the licensee has implemented a plant:

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modification and revised the' ventilation system lineup.

Previously, a spike'on.a chlorine monitor completed the necessary one out of-

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.one logic and caused the automatic.' actuation of the appropriate

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. portion of control room ventilation.-

Ej As an interim me'asure, the licensee has placed the outside' air g

intake dampers. associated with-the 121 control room ventilation

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system:in_the closed position and the chlorine detectors in bypass.

'The-licensee has added additional chlorine detectors to the No. 122

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control room: ventilation system so that a two' out of:two actuation-K logic is required for automatic actuation.

The licensee is currently

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investigating 1the availability of qualified chlorine detectors with

. higher reliability than those presently installed..

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Maintenance Observation (71707, 37700, 62703)

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Routine Inspection

- Routine, preventive, and corrective maintenance, activities were observed.to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance'with approved procedures, regulatory guides,-industry codes or standards,

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The following

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items were considered during this review; adherence to limiting-

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' conditions for operation while components or systemsfwere removed

from~ service,. approvals were obtained prior to initiating-the work, o

activities:were accomplished using-approved procedures'and were

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inspected as; applicable, functional. testing and/or calibrations

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were performed ' prior to returning-components or systems to ' service,.

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quality control records were maintained, activities were accomplished

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3'J by. qualified personnel, radiological controls were implemented, and -

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fire prevention controls'were implemented.

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Charging Pump Maintenance

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-During the inspection period, the licensee experienced trouble with the'21 and-22 charging pumps.

Initial problems with the 22 charging-

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pump were_ associated with control of the pump's speed which required

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replacement of the pulley sheaves, and belts and recalibration of

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the speed controller.

These items masked an additional problem

which prevented proper flow.

The remaining problem was attributed-L E

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a cracked "0" ring valve seat.

The cracks, internal to the outer surface of the seat, were discovered only upon pump manifold-

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P, Nisassembly.- - Typical indication of a cracked "0" ring:. valve seat 1 j'

iL s: visual leakage, because the crack generally penetrates the outer-'

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surface.t A crack which penetrated the outer surface'of'the,"0" ring:

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valve seat was the cause of flow problems on the 21-charging pump.

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.The licensee' is examining the replacement of-the "0" ring ~ valve C ~~

' seats _as partfof yearly preventive maintenance.

The inspectors i

confirmed minimum pump operability requirements and compliance with ll

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'In Service Inspection

During the Unit 1 outage,.approximately 437.In Service Inspection (

(ISI) examinations will be performed.

During implementation of the-t ISI program, hangar RHR H-32, a dead load pipe clamp,.was' discovered--

a to have a= 1oose bolt.

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l This hangar was identified for_ inspection this outage due to' drawing

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discrepancies discovered'during~the previous outage. -The ISI

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p program requires components with discrepancies to be inspected-

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during the next' outage.

The bolt was tightened and reinspected.

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.No discrepancies were identified during this reinspection.

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'The inspector asked the licensee if this bolt-became loose as a i

j result.of excessive pump or flow vibration.

In response, the'

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licensee. examined the' hangar while the pump was operating;under

full - flow conditions.

This examination confirmed that-no abnormal vibration condit' ions exist during system operation.

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Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System

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At.approximately 2100 hours0.0243 days <br />0.583 hours <br />0.00347 weeks <br />7.9905e-4 months <br /> on December 22, 1989, Unit 2 had

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commenced reactor-start up and reached the point of adding heat.

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approxima.tely 2106 hours0.0244 days <br />0.585 hours <br />0.00348 weeks <br />8.01333e-4 months <br />, _while shutting down the 22 turbineidriven :

t auxiliary feedwater pump (22 TDAFWP), the turbine tripped.on

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overspeed.

TDAFWP procedures require the operator to close the' flow

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. control valves and then stop the pump.

Plant operators-reset the

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trip' mechanism and restarted the. pump.

Full pump flow was verified

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(3 and the pump was shut'down at approximately 2139 hours0.0248 days <br />0.594 hours <br />0.00354 weeks <br />8.138895e-4 months <br />.

The system M~

. engineer was notified of the'overspeed. trip.

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On December 26, 1989, Unit 2 had reached plant conditions which allowed the 22 TDAFWP to be shut down.

At.approximately 1354-hours,

-while shutting down the 22 TDAFWP down, the turbine -again tripped on

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overspeed.

Plant' operators reset the trip mechanism and restarted P

the pump.

Full pump flow was verified'and the pump shut down. The

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system engineer initiated a work request to investigate and repair

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the 22 TDAFWP.

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On December 27, 1989, the 22 TDAFWP was removed from service for i

troubleshooting.

Troubleshooting included closing the flow control. valves from various flow rates (200,150,100 and 50 gpm)

and monitor the maximum rpm's after closure.

The overspeed trip

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setpoint and governor linkage were also checked.

Although the

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22 TDAFWP was able to deliver various flows, the p' ump was unable to j

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maintain a steady speed, constantly." hunting." The 22 TDAFWP was'

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returned to service at approximately 1754 hours0.0203 days <br />0.487 hours <br />0.0029 weeks <br />6.67397e-4 months <br />. -The system 4,

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engineer concluded that-the governor was responsible for,the pump's-

. inability to maintain steady speed.

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-On December 28, 1989,.the 22.TDAFWP was removed from service for?.

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replacement of. the governor and additional trouble shooting.

Af.ter :

. the, governor was replaced, the pump was still. unable: to maintain.

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y-steady, speed.

The 22 TDAFWP was declared inoperable when it tripped

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on overspeed during startup for the operability. surveillance, p

SP 2102, 22 ' Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater. Pump Test, Revision 34.'.

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0n' December 29, 1989, the pump's operating speed was lowered, the speed,at which the overspeed trip occurs was increased and

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additional' adjustments to the governor. linkage were made.

Although

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these adjustments enabled the pump to start without tripping and T

deliver the' required flows, the pump was still unable to maintain a

' steady speed.

The 22 TDAFWP was returned to service at

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-approximately 6:33 p.m.

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On December 30, 1989, the 22 TDAFWP was taken out of service to work on the: governor linkage and for internal examination of the governor

c valve.

The results of this effort revealed a bent governor. valve

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L stem, galled surfaces on the valve stem and plug, and a bent:section

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of horizontal governor linkage.

These anomalies prevented proper-

governor valve motion.

Correction of these anomalies. improved.the governor valve operation; however, the pump was still unable to.

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maintain.a steady speed.' During overspeed testing,. the pump failed-

to trip at the required setpoint.

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On December 31, 1989, the licensee replaced the overspeed trigger-I and then verified the proper tripisetpoint.

The 22 TDAFWP remained V

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- out of service.

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On January 1,1990, with the' assistance of the governor manufacturer.'s.

representative, the old' govern'or was reinstalled and the pump

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restarted.

The 22 TDAFWP tested satisfactory and the pump was

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returned to service at approximately 1942 hours0.0225 days <br />0.539 hours <br />0.00321 weeks <br />7.38931e-4 months <br />.

The root cause was l

determined to be the bent governor valve stem and linkage and the

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galled surfaces on-the governor valve plug and valve stem.

The

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y-manufacturer's representative recommended modifying the governor

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in order to test the overspeed trip mechanism rather than the

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licensee's current practice of using a crowbar to override the

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governor.

The defective spare governor which was installed will be

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returned to the. vendor for examination.

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p A1though the pump was operable between the overspeed trips on

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December 22, 1989, and December 26, 1989, the inspector considers i

the-lack of trouble shooting efforts during this time period to be non conservative.

The inspector also considers the adjustments to the pump speed and the overspeed trip setpoint on December 29, 1989 h

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..to:be non~ conservative.' These actions only compensated for the

- hunting" and did not' rectify the problem.- Additionally, these--

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P actions delayed the examination of the governor valve as the sourcel e

- of the hunting. -

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-No; violations or deviations'were identified.

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Surveillance:(61726, 71707)

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h The inspector witnessed portions of surveillance testing of safety-related.

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systems and components.

The inspection included verifying that the tests-were scheduled and performed within Technical Specification requirements,

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by> observing that procedures were being followed'by qualified operators, that Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs).were not violated, that i

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system and' equipment-restoration was completed,-and that test results were' acceptable to test and Technical Specification requirements.

I LPortions of the following surveillances were observed / reviewed during the inspection period:

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SP.1089 Residual Heat Removal Pumps and Suction Valves from Refueling Water Storage Tank, Revision 25

SP 1102 11 Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Test, l

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. Revision 25

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.SP 2102 22 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Test (

SP 2016.

RCP Breakers Test, Revision 10

No viol'ations or deviations were identified.

6.

Cold Weather Preparations (71714)

[

In conjunction with the requirements NRC Inspection Procedure 71714,. Cold Weather Preparations, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's surveillance procedure, SP-1637, Winter Plant 0peration, Revision 7 and performed tours l

during extreme cold temperatures-(-20 degrees F.) to determine the

adequacy of the licensee's program.

Tours of the turbine building,

> auxi.11ary building, and radiation waste buildings and screenhouse revealed temperatures.well above freezing with safety related fluid systems. appearing properly heat traced or contained within heated

S structures.

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7.

Fitness-for-Duty Training

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(Closed) Temporary Instruction 2515/104 L-Following a discussion with Regional management, the inspectors chose to attend a portion of the Prairie Island Fitness of Duty (FFD) training.

This. decision was. based on higher priority inspection activities of the

resident inspectors and the full FFD training that was attended by c

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inspectors' at the Monticello Nuclear Generating l Plant, (ref.>Insp'ection

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Report-263/89031(DRP)),land the' training.is' generic for,both' Prairie

'

'

1. '

Island and Monticello.

The training was developed in the licensee corporate security group.

Based on attending the escort training, theJ l

s

' inspectors have closed this: effort.--The questionnaire. associated with

'

' escort FFD training was forwarded-to P.

H.~ McKee, NRR and J. R. Creed,

>

Region III.-

'

~ 8.

-Offsite Meetings with Local and Corporate Officials-LThe' inspectors met with several. offsite groups during the inspection

period.

A discussion of each-is contained below.

,

a.

The inspectors visited the State'of Minnesota Emergency Operations Center on December 20, 1989..-The inspectors toured the facilities

'

-and discussed matters of mutual interest regarding emergency-

i

. preparedness, with L. Lund, Deputy Director, Division of Emergency

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' Management, b.

-The inspectors toured the licensee's corporate facilities on i

December 20, 1989.

Specifically.the-corporate emergency operations-

.

center was. visited.

Its functions and purpose were discussed with i

-.M. Offerdahl, Corporate Emergency Planning.

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c.

'The inspectors met with the Goodhue County Commissioners on.

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December.-17, 1989.

The inspectors briefly discussed; the function

.,_

and purpose of the resident inspector program, current activities at Prairie Island, NRC inspection responsibilities for emergency J

'

planning.

The inspectors answered several questions regarding

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nuclear power in general.

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9.

Exit'(30703)

The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph-1 at_ the conclusion of-the report period on January 19,1990.

,

The inspectors discussed the purpose'and' scope of the inspection and the

^ findings.

The' inspectors also discussed-the'likely information content of the inspection; report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by. the ' inspector' during the inspection.

The licensee did not identify

^

any documents or processes as proprietary.

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