IR 05000275/1985014
| ML20205A224 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 04/03/1985 |
| From: | Burdoin J, Dodds R, Kanow L, Thomas Young NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205A195 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.D.2, TASK-2.E.3.1, TASK-2.F.2, TASK-TM 50-275-85-14, 50-323-85-02, 50-323-85-2, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-13, IEB-79-2, IEB-79-28, NUDOCS 8504250458 | |
| Download: ML20205A224 (11) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
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Report No.
50-275/85-14,50-323/85-02 Docket No.
50-275,50-323 License No.
DPR-76 and CPPR-69 Licensee :
Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street, Room 1435 San Francisco, California 94106 Facility Name: Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California Inspection conduc bd:
ia h 4-8, 19 Inspector:
fdf F. Butdoi'nf leaEtor Inspector Date Signed
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L. R. Kanow, Keact Inspec r
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Date Signed Approved By:
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T. Young, Jr., Chie, Engineefin Section Date Signed b
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Rf Dodds7Cliief, Reactor Projects, Section 1 D/tYpfSigned Summary:
Inspection during period of March 4-8, 1985 (Report Nos. 50-275/85-14 and 50-323/85-02.
Areas Inspected: Unannounced inspection by three regional inspectors of construction and modification activities including:
an area inspection, licensee actions on previously identified items, IE Bulletins, 50.55(e) Items, and TMI task action items.
The inspection involved 80 inspection hours by three inspectors.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8504250458 850404 PDR ADOCK 05000275 G
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DETAILS 1.
Individuals Contacted Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E)/ Project Team General Construction (PTGC)
- R. R. Lieber, Field Construction Manager
- B. R. Tinkle, Technical Assistart to the Project Superintendent R. A. Hobgood, QC Supervisor J. B. Maysey, QC Inspection (Mechanical)
R. P. Gilbreath, Instrumentation and Control Supervisor K. A. Nilson, Mechanical Field Engineer
- J. C. Walker, QA Auditor M. E. Leppke, Onsite Engineering Group Supervisor G. E. Backman, I&C Installation Supervisor
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R. Harris, QA Auditor G. T. Glasscock, Resident Electrical Engineer W. K. Glenn, Startup Engineer V. R. Foster, Senior Power Production Engineer R. Johnson, Licensing Representative R. W. Johnson, Field Inspector, Civil S. J. Foat, Power Production Engineer D. R. Bell, QC Inspector Various other engineering and QC personnel.
- Denotes attendees at exit management meeting on March 8, 1985.
In addition, Mr. T. J. Polich, NRC Resident Inspector attended the exit management meeting.
2.
Area Inspection An independent inspection was made in Unit 2, auxiliary building at elevations 64 ft. and 73 ft.
The equipment spaces inspected included two
containment spray pump areas, three component cooling pump areas, three charging pump rooms, two RHR pump rooms.
Considerable upgrading had taken place in these areas since the last inspection. There was evidence t'nat a limited amount of construction (completion) work was still in process in these areas, o
No violations of NRC requirements were identified.
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3.
TMI Task Action Plan Items for Unit 2 a.
Item II.E.3.1 " Emergency Power Supply for Pressurizer Heaters".
NUREG 0737 requires that all applicants for an operating license shall implement a pressurizer heater power supply to satisfy the requirements of General Design Criteria 10, 14, 15, 17, and 20 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 for the event of loss of offsite power.
The inspection of this TMI item was continued as a followup to inspection report 50-323/84-28 for the inspection period December 10-21, 1984. To verify implementation of the system, the inspectors reviewed startup Test Procedure No.,37.14 " Pressurizer Heaters Initial Energization".
Based on this review the inspectors determined the following:
Startup testing had been performed
Applicable heater groups operated properly off their vital power sources.
- The test report was reviewed and signed by the appropriate licensee personnel.
This item is considered closed.
b.
Item I.D.2 " Plant Safety Parameter Display Console" This task item requires the addition of a safety parameter display system (SPDS) in the control rocm to display for operating personnel a minimum set of plant parameters which define the safety status of the plant.
The inspectors reviewed the Quality Control records associated with the installation of the SPDS and performed a visual inspection of the installed SPDS.
The inspectors verified installation of the SPDS located in the Control room.
Installation and Implementation of the SPDS located in the technical support center is addressed in inspection report 50-275/84-10.
This item is considered closed.
c.
Item II.F.2 " Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling".
This task action item requires that the licensee shall provide for each PWR a primary coolant saturation meter to provide on-line indication of coolant saturation conditions. Additional instrumentation to provide an unambiguous indication of inadequate core cooling is to include reactor-water-level indication.
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This TMI item was identified in inspection report 50-323/85-08 as remaining open pending further inspection of the systems.
1.
Subcooling Margin Monitor The licensee installed a PWR subcooling margin monitor on Unit 2 with a meter in the control room.
The inspectors reviewed on a sample basis Quality Control (QC)
installation records and visually inspected the subcooling margin meter and the strip chart labeled Degree of Subcooling located in PAM panels one through four in the control room.
The inspectors verified adequate control and review of QC records, proper installation of the subcooling margin monitors and operability of the meters.
This portion of the item is considered closed.
2.
Reactor Vessel Level Indications System (RVLIS)
The RVLIS was installed on Unit 2 to provide reactor-water-level indication in the control room.
The inspectors performed a visual inspection of the mechanical portion of the RVLIS beginning at the instrument taps on the reactor vessel though containment penetrations PM 59 and 80 to PM 78 and 79 panels (train A and B respectively). The inspectors conducted a visual inspection of the electrical portion of the RVLIS at the PM 78 and 79 panels in the auxiliary building and the FAM one through four panels in the control room. The inspectors also reviewed on a sample basis Quality Control (QC) documentation relating to the installation of the RVLIS.
Based on this inspection and review, the inspectors verified the following:
Instrumentation and components are correctly identiried and located.
- Supports and physical protection from missles and hiG energy line breaks are adequate.
- Physical independence between redundant instrument components at sensors and actuating devices in the control panels.
- QC involvement during installation.
- QC documentation properly reviewed and signed.
The installation of the RVLIS has been completed. Final testing will be completed following fuel loading and the test report will be m
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reviewed at that time by the division of Nuclear Reactor Regulations.
Installation of this system is acceptable.
This portion of the item is considered closed.
3.
Incore Thermocouples This task action item requires upgrading to safety grade the incore thermocouple cabling to the control room. These thermocouples monitor core outlet temperatures.
The inspector examined the design and construction records and inspected the containment and control room and the modifications to the installation of the incore thermocouple cabling.
The installation of the modifications to incore thermocouple cabling was inspected for:
(1) Identification and location proper type of instrument component with proper range, rating and proper location.
(2) Supports and protection physical protection from missiles and high energy line breaks.
(3) Independence physical separation between redundant instrument components at sensors and actuating devices in the control panels.
(4) Testing - calibration of indicating instruments in the control room.
(5) QC inspection - including generation of inspection records during inspection activities by QC personnel.
The installation of the incore thermocuples system is completed ar.d turnover to operations.
The licensee was recently informed by Westinghouse that tests to verify the environmental qualifications for the reference junction boxes and connectors were not successful. This portion of the item remains open and will be reported in a future report (50-275/85-14-01 and 50-323/85-02-01).
4.
Licensee Action on 10CFR 50.55(e) Items a.
(Closed for Unit 2) Deficient Low Level Amplifiers In The Rcactor Protection System The licensee submitted a final 50.55(e) report, dated March 9, 1981,
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regarding defective operation of Hagan Model 118 low level l
amplifiers used in the reactor protection system. The resolution of l
the problem was to replace all 2N699 transistors in the Q14 location of each module with 2N4383 (Sprague TP4384) transistors.
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DC2-E-J-4029 which called for replacing the 2N699 transistors and the completed work order No. 354 that the work has been completed.
This item is closed.
b.
(Closed for Unit) 2 Modification to Reactor Protection system Cabinet Doors The licensee submitted a final 50.55(e) report, datei August 27, 1981, regarding a modification made to doors on equipment cabinets to allow easy removal when performing maintenance. The modification involved replacing the existing hinges with hooks that would allow the door, once they are opened, to be removed. After the modification was made it was determined that it had the potential to affect the seismic qualification of the enclosed equipment. Accordingly, the doors have been returned to their original conditions.
In order to prevent a recurrence of this type of problem, additional instructions have been given to plant personnel concerning requirements for proper authorization of work and the need for an Engineering Department review of any work which might affect seismic qualification of equipment. These requirements are now clearly stated in the Nuclear Plan Administrative Procedure NPAP C-1 " Design Changes".
The inspector inspected the cabinet doors and examined procedure NPAP C-1 to verify that the corrective measures were accomplished.
This item is closed.
c.
(Closed for Unit 2) Malfunction of Limitorque Value Operators The licensee submitted a final 50.55(e) report, dated March 1, 1984, regarding binding of a torque switch on a valve operator manufactured by Limitorque.
Investigation into the cause of the binding showed that it was due to excessive height of the mounting screws, which interfered with free movement of the torque switch on some valves. The existing mounting screws (hex socket heads) had l
been installed as a precaution after the original mounting screws
were found to be loose following severe seismic testing. Since the acceleration during the test exceeded requirements for seismic qualification and the original screws had been qualified to Diablo Canyon requirements by the vendor, the precaution was unnecessary.
Replacement of the existing screws with the origianl type (round head machine screws) on the affected valves will eliminate the binding problem.
The inspector examined the documentation, NRC DC2-83-EN-N026 and i
DCN #DC2-EJ-12615, for the replacement of the hex socket head screws
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with round head machine screws on eight value operators.
An additional 67 valves were reviewed by maintenance to determine if l
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modifications were required. The inspector also review maintenance l
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procedures which were revised to require the use of the screw type supplied by the manufacturer for mounting torque switches. The documentation for the changing the mounting screws and the revised maintenance procedure appear to be in order.
This item is closed.
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d.
(Closed for Unit 2) Reduced Ultimate Tensile Values for One Inch Hilti Expansion Anchors The licensee reported in January 1981 reduced ultimate tensile values for one-inch diameter hilti expansion anchors identified by the Hilti Company. The licensee reduced the allowable pullout on one-inch hilti anchors to reflect the lower ultimate tensile loads to comply with IE Bullentin 79-02 requirement for a safety factor of least 4. During this time frame (1981) a review of Units 1 and 2 pipe supports was in process to verify conformance with Bulletin 79-02.
However with the initiation of the upgraded seismic requirements for the Diablo plant and the Internal Review Program for Unit 2, all class one systems were re-analyzed. This resulted in the redesign and modifications to large numbers of class one systems supports.
The licensee's final response to IE Bullentin 79-02 was submitted by letter dated February 4, 1985. This letter states that during the weeks of October 22 and November 26, 1984 and January 14, 1985 the NRC Staff (NRR) conducted audits of Unit 2 piping design analysis work; and that these audits verified compliance with the concerns of IE Bullentin 79-02.
A telephone discussion with the NRR people who conducted the above audits confirmed the licensee's conclusions.
This item is closed.
e.
(0 pen for Unit 2) Water Hammer Phenomenon In ASW System The licensee reported October 8, 1982 of a water hammer phenomenon in the auxiliary saltwater system (ASW) of Diablo Canyon Unit 1. The licensee determined by test on the ASW system for Unit I that the system is susceptible to water hammer effects during anticipated operational transients such as pump trip and restart sequences.
These transients could occur following a loss of offsite power.
It was further determined by test that the installation of a vacuum breaker in the ASW system eliminated the water hammer effect in the system.
The licensee's letter of November 8, 1982 identified his corrective action. The ASW system design is essentially identical for both Units 1 and 2; therefore, the same water hammer phenomenon is expected in Unit 2.
A design change, DC2-EM-4328, was issued to install the vacuum breaker on the ASW system piping in Unit 2.
The installation has been completed, but a field modification has been initiated by the licensee to correct an error to insure the
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vacuum breaker vent pipe is above maximum flood elevation of the valve box.
This item remains open and will be reported in a future report (50-323/85-02-02).
f.
(Closed for Unit 2) Deficiencies In Design of Systems in The Annulus Area The licensee's letters of September 28/30 and November 5,1981;and March 16, 1982 Identified deficiencies in the design of systems contained in the annulus areas of Units 1 and 2 containments. The problem developed from the use of Unit 2 spectra diagram in seismic design for Unit 1.
The design verification program and internal technical program for Unit 1 and internal review program for Unit 2 which developed to review the design of all systems in the annulus areas of both containments resulted in major modifications to pipe supports, structural steel, electrical raceway supports, HVAC supports etc.
The field inspections of these modifications were performed both by Region V and contractor inspectors. The progress and inspections of
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these modifications have been reported periodically in inspection reports over the past three and half years starting with report 50-275/82-07 (Unit 1) and 50-323/84-01 (Unit 2) including the enclosure with this report.
Supplement No. 29 to the Diablo Canyon Safety Evaluation Report (SSER 29), date March 1985 address NRR's evaluation of the programmatic and technical aspects of the internal review program for Unit 2.
This item is closed.
g.
(Closed for Units 1 and 2) Containment Spray Pump Initiating Time It was verified that Table 8.3-4 of the FSAR and Section 3/4.6.1.4 of the Technical Specifications as amended now reflect starting times of 26 and 22 seconds for containment spray pumps No. I and 2 respectively as stated in the licensee's final report dated January 9, 1984. The starting times are demonstrated periodically during the conduct of Surveilance Test Procedures M 13 B and M-15
" Engineered Safeguards Automatic Times Setting Verification" and
" Integrated Test of Engineered Safeguards and Diesel Generators" respectively.
This item is closed for Units 1 and 2.
h.
(Closed for Units 1 and 2) Control and Inventory of Aluminum Inside Containment The inspector examined the results of the licensee's inventory of aluminum contained in materials and components used inside the containment vessels for Units 1 and 2 and determined that it was
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less than the amount allowed in Table 6.2-27 of the FSAR as stated in the licensee's report dated October 27, 1980. Procedure
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I4.0-3.6, " Inventory Control of Aluminum Inside Diablo Canyon Unit I
and Unit 2 Containment" now requires PG&E engineering to identify t
and maintain an inventory of aluminum contained in materials and L
components installed inside containment.
This item is closed for Units 1 and 2.
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(Closed for Units 1 and 2) Electrica1' Conductors Routed to Intake Structure The repair and replacement of conductors to the intake.;.ructures was verified to have been accomplished in accordance with the licensee's final report dated December 12, 1980 by an examination of the dispositioning of NCR's DC1-80-RE-003 and DC2-80-RE-004 with the-associated work performance records. Survey results contained in a memorandum dated October 17, 1980 indicated similar, but not as extensive deficiencies for Unit 2 as noted for Unit 1.
The Work Assignment sheet showed that all hold points were initiated and dated by the QC Inspector. The work was completed and approved on February 27,.1981.
Quality Assurance finally closed the NCR on April 28, 1982. No anomalies.were identified.
This item is closed for Units 1 and 2.
5.
Licensee Action on IE Bulletins a.
(Closed for Unit 2) IE Bulletin 79-13, Cracking in Feedwater System Piping The licensee's response to subject Bulletin for Unit 2 was submitted by letter dated February 8, 1985.
IE Bulletin 79-13, including its supplements, summarized the requirements for the inspection of feedwater nozzle-to-pipe welds.
At this time, items la, lb, lc, 4, and 5 are required to be l
addressed for Unit 2.
The licensee's letter dated December 12, 1979 addressed Item 5 of the Bulletin. The following information e
provides the licensee's final response for the remaining items.
The licensee's completed radiographic examinations of the feedwater nozzle-to pipe welds and adjacent areas on January 10, 1985. The
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radiography complied with the requirements of Item 1.a of IE
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All welds were found acceptable; therefore, Items l
1.b and 4 of the Bulletin do not apply.
i The licensee has also completed visual inspections of the feedwater system piping supports and snubbers inside containment as required by Paragraph 1.c of the Bulletin. An engineering walkdown was conducted during hot functional testing to verify operability.-
As-built drawings were used to verify that all supports and snubbers
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The inspector examined eight radiographs and four radiographic inspection reports to verify compliance with the requirements of the bulletin. No violations of NRC requirements were identified.
This bulletin is closed.
b.
(Closed for Unit 2) IE Bulletin 79-28 Possible Malfunction of Namco Model EA180 Limit Switches At Elevated Temperatures The licensae's response to subject bulletin for Unit 2 was submitted by letter dated April 14, 1983. The licensee identified twelve limit switches in Unit 2 that were corrected by replacing the top cover gaskets in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendation enclosed with bulletin. The inspector examined documentation for gasket replacement for twelve switches installed in safety related systems in Unit 2.
This bulletin is closed.
6.
Closed (323/84-30--01) Followup Item:
Concerns Regarding Crack / Fissure in Concrete Wall of Fuel Handling Building The licensee has evaluated and repaired the long crack / fissure observed in the vertical concrete wall and extending across the floor at the south end of Unit 2 fuel handling building at elevation 100'.
The licensee's evaluation has concluded that the cracks were due to accumulated shrinkage strain and do not impair the structural safety of the concrete wall and floor. The maximum crack sizes were-in the order of 0.005" to 0.008".
The required repair by grouting provides protection for the embedded rebar and maintains airtight walls and slabs for compartment pressurization. The grout restores the concrete to its original compressive strength.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation of the crack, inspected the pressure grouting repairs of the crack / fissure in the concrete wall and floor, and examined the documentation for repairs.
It is concluded that the evaluation and repair of the crack / fissure are adequate and complete.
This item is closed.
7.
Technical Assistance Contract A contract has been awarded by NRC Region V to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to provide assistance in inspecting the plant modifications being implemented at Diablo Canyon as a result of the design verification program. Enclosures B, C and D contain the contractors progress reports for November, December, 1984 and January 198 F.~
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Item of Concern
- A contract (LLNL) inspector identified a concern with regard to the
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environmental. qualifications for limitorque valve operators on values
'LCV's -108, 109, MPH's.-06, 11, and MPG's. 21-and 48. This item is being reviewed and will be addressed in a future inspection report (50-323/85-02-03).
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-Exit Meeting 10n March 8, 1985 the inspector met with.the' licensee's; representatives identified in paragraph 1.
During this meeting, the inspector summarized th'e scope of the inspection activities and reviewed the inspection findings as described in the report. -The licensee acknowledged the concerns identified in'the' report.
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