IR 05000275/1985028
| ML17083B645 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 08/30/1985 |
| From: | Burdoin J, Dodds R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17083B644 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0675, RTR-NUREG-675 50-275-85-28, 50-323-85-25, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-2, NUDOCS 8509180119 | |
| Download: ML17083B645 (12) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY CORiISSION C
REGION V
Report Nos. 50-275/85-28," 50,323/85-25
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Docket Nos. 50-275, 50-323 License Nos. DPR-80, DPR-81 Licensee: Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street, Room 1451 San Francisco, California 94106 Facility Name:
Diablo Canyon Units 1 and
Inspection at:
Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California Inspection condu ed:
u ust 27,
Inspector:
F.
o n Reactor Inspector Approved By:~~ R. T.
Do
, Chief, Reactor Projects Section gS at Signed
ate Signed
~summar:
Ins ection durin eriod of Au ust 5-27 1985 (Re ort Nos. 50-275/85-28 and 50-323/85-25 items consisting of:
followup items, 50.55(e)
items, and SSER-21 Items.
Inspection procedures numbers 92700, 92701, 92704, and 92705 were used as guidance for the inspection.
The inspection involved 78 inspection hours by one inspector.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
,;8509l80l H'509'03
"PDR ADOCN, 05000m 5
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DETAIIS l.
Individuals Contacted Pacific Gas and Electric Com an (PG&E)
"R.
C. Thornberry, Plant Manager R. Patterson, Assistant Plant Manager, Plant Superintendent-J.
M. Gisclon, Assistant Plant Manager, Technical Services J.
B. Maysey, QC Inspection (Mechanical)
M. E. Leppke, Onsite Engineering Group Supervisor G. R. Vincent, QC Inspector R. Kohler, Lead Civil Engineer J.
R. Harris, QA Auditor R. Johnson, Licensing Representative R.
W. Johnson, Field Inspector, Civil M. R. Tressler, Project Engineer D. R. Bell, QC Supervisor M. N. Norm, Field Construction Manager A.
W. Novak, Lead Mechanical Engineer W. E. Coley, Lead Startup Engineer J. R. Bratton, Rate Case Coordinator B. Whited, Electrical Supervisor S. E. Wecell, Communication Technician, Subforeman R.
W. Taylor, QA Engineer Various other engineering and QC personnel.
""Denotes attendees at exit management meeting on August 23, 1985.
In addition, NRC Resident Inspectors attended the exit management meeting.
2.
Followu on Previous Identified Items a
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(Closed)
Item 275/323/83-05-01 En ineerin Document Control The above item described in Inspection Report 83-05 dated March 10, 1983 identified a concern the inspector had for the contractor's (Pullman Power Products Corporation)
system for document control.
Specifically the contractor had no drawing control card which recorded the receipt dates of revisions (Revision 16) to specification no.
8711.
This inspector examined two audit rep'orts (7177-1-83 and 84134S) of audits perfo'rmed in the. area
'of document control for Pullman.
Pullman Corporation audit 7l77-,$ -83 was held January 10-14, 1983.
One of the findings of this, audit -identified as a deficiency the failure to use receiving a'nd distribution drawing control cards as required in procedure,'ESD-26$,Engineering Document, Control".
The correction of the deficient findings of-this audit were reported in Pullman's, interoffice correspondence to director of QA from field I
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gA/(}C manager dated April 22, 1983 and Pullman's quality audit summary report dated March 5, 1985.
This audit summary report contained a copy of the drawing control card for specification 8711.
This drawing control card was examined in detail.
Everything appeared to be in order and the original concern, identification of receipt of revision 16 to specification 8711, was listed on the drawing control card as distributed to the field on August 7, 1979.
Licensee's audit 84134S, of Pullman equality Assurance Program implementation with reference to specification 8711 and 8833XR, conducted May 14-18, 1984 was examined.
Audit finding reports (AFR)
were issued to document deficiencies in four areas.
The dispositioning of these audit findings were examined in AFRs 84-14, 15, 16 and 17.
The findings appeared to have been dispositioned properly.
Based on the review of the above audits, dispositioning of findings, and discussions of the item of concern with the original inspector and licensee's people involved; it is concluded there was no violation of NRC requirements.
This item is closed.
b.
(Closed)
Item 275/83-24-02 Concrete Anchor Bolt Tor uin The issue identified in Inspection Report 83-24 as an item of concern raised an interest in 1) tensioning/torquing requirements and 2) sampling inspection of tensioned concrete type anchor bolts used for the support of Class I electrical raceways and HVAC ducts.
This issue was first filed with the resident inspector by a Foley QC inspector on July 5, 1983.
Five allegations, numbers 25, 58, 142, 154 and 176 filed on the subject of concrete expansion anchors envelope the above item of concern.
The'llegations were grouped together and were addressed under allegation 25...
These allegations were addressed in the li'censee's letters:
DCL-84-031 dated January 27, 1984; DCL-84-048 dated February 7, 1984; and DCL-84-059 dated February 16, 1984.
Based on an evaluation of the material supplied by the licensee in the listed letters, a response to.allegation 25 (58,,142, 154 and 176) concrete expansion anchors was addressed in supplements 21 and 22 to the Diablo"Canyon Plant Safety evaluation re'port.
The evaluation of allegation 25 in supplemental safety evaluation report (SSER)
22 verified that the staff's investigation failed to confirm the alleged significant deficiencies in concrete anchor installation.
The staff did come across some concerns (see SSER
for details);
and to resolve these concerns, the licensee was requested to perform various tests, evaluations and reviews.
The results of these tests,,evaluations and reviews were reported in DCL's 84-48/59 identified above.
The staff then examined these results and concluded that the concerns probably do not,involve violations of any NRC criteria.
The inspector's review of the
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3.
material supplied by the licensee was incomplete.
SSER
established that further followup would be required during routine inspections to complete the NRC's review of the material supplied under DCL's 84-48/59.
A conference with the inspector who made the original investigation identified the remaining review to be completed to finalize the staff's action on the issue of concrete expansion anchors.
The regional based inspector visited the licensee's main engineering office in San Francisco.
There the inspector randomly sampled the calculated factors-of-safety for twenty four electrical, raceway supports of 120 supports identified in the licensee's additional tests and evaluations reported in DCL's 84-48/59.
The sample confirmed that the safety factors of the 120 raceway supports evaluated were greater than three.
None of the safety factors of twenty four supports sampled were less than five.
This completes the staff's remaining review of the material supplied under the licensee's transmittals (DCL's 84-48/59).
This item is closed.
3.
Iicensee Actions on
CFR 50.55(e)
Items (Closed for Unit 1) Item 275/81-01-00 Reduced Ultimate Tensile Values for One Inch Hilti Ex ansion Anchors The licensee reported in January 1981 reduced ultimate tensile values for one-inch diameter Hilti expansion anchors identified by the Hilti Company.
The licensee reduced the allowable pullout on one-inch Hilti anchors to reflect the lower ultimate tensile loads to comply with ZE Bulletin 79-02 requirement for a safety factor of at least 4.
During this time frame (1981)
a review of Units 1 and 2 pipe supports was in
'rocess to verify conformance with Bulletin 79-02.
However with the initiation of the upgraded seismic requirements for the Diablo plant and the independent design verification and internal technical review programs for Unit 1, all class one systems were re-analyzed taking into consideration the requirements of Bulletin 79-02.
These programs resulted in the redesign and modifications to 1'arge numbers of class one system supports.
The evaluation of these programs for the review of the design and upgraded seismic requirements for Unit 1 were addressed in supplements
and 30 to the Diablo Canyon Plant Safety Analysis Report.
The licensee's final responses to Bulletin 79-02 for Unit 1 were dated March 12 and June ll, 1982 and this bulletin was closed for Unit 1 in Inspection Report 275/82-22 dated July 27, 1982.
f It is concluded from review of the above material that the issue of reduced ultimate tensile values for 10 CFR 50.55(e)
one inch Hilti expansion anchors has been prope'rly evaluated.
This item is closed.
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4.
Followu Items Identified in Su lement 21 to the Safet Evaluation Re ort NUREG-0675.
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(Closed)
Item 21-'7-,01 Plant Pa in and Announcin S stem
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Action required of Region V was to verify the installation of the plant paging/announcing system as described under allegation/concern no.
47 in SSER 21 as a followup of the licensee's commitment.
The inspector examined the design and construction documentation (DCNs and work requests)
for the installation of the plant paging and announcing system.
Of a list of eighteen DCN's, the inspector selected a sample of seven DCNs and examined them for completion.
Also a random inspection of speaker locations throughout the plant was made and audio witness of the operation of the system was held.
This item is closed...
(Closed) Item 21-56-.01 Pittin of Main Steam/Feedwater Pi in Action required of Region V was to followup the licensee's commitment to initiate a component. identification and 'engineering analysis to assure that the pitting has not and will not violate minimum wall thickness requirements and commitment to ",inspect locations where the potential for pitting exists during the first refueling outage as described under allegation/concern no.
56 in SSER 21.
The inspector reviewed documentation and met with the licensee on the subject.
It is concluded that the licensee did a plant wide inspection to locate potential corrosion areas.
It was determined that this pitting process occurs on piping located out of doors where it has been subjected to an atmosphere of high moisture content.
It appears that the glue used to attach insulation to impingement sleeves appears to be hydroscopic which causes a
stagnant moist layer'at the glue/surface interfaces to form.
Analysis of the glue showed no detrimental leachable compounds.
All the impingement sleeves were repaired in late 1982.
The repair process consisted of using a rust remover, then wire brushing, and then painting with epoxy type paint.
Minimum wall calculations were performed on appropriate pipe sections.
The main steam and feedwater piping have an excess wall of 0.083 in. and 0.071 in. respectively and have sufficient margin with respect to the external pitting observed on the feedwater elbow inspected.
Xt was the licensee's opinion that during plant operation when the piping is hot, any accumulated moisture will be driven off and eliminating the cause of the pitting.
To confirm this, the licensee has committed to inspect locations of potential pitting during the first refueling outage.
This item is closed except for an examination of the licensee's findings resulting from his followup inspection during the first refueling outage (fall 1986)
(50-275/85-28-01).
5.
(Closed) Item of Concern or Alle ation Cracks in Concrete Halls and Floor of Turbine Buildin An alleger told OIA that 20 to 40 feet long cracks were found in concrete structures in the turbine building, and that 3,000 psi concrete was used
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instead of 5,000 psi concrete.
According to a Region V official, he was unsuccessful in getting the alleger to provide specific details, and there was not sufficient information to followup.
Nevertheless, the Region followed up on this issue.
Two inspectors toured the turbine building in an attempt to locate the alleged cracks in the concrete walls and floors.
The only cracks found were in the machine shop area, and these cracks had been repaired during December 1984.
A contractor on site in late 1984 repaired a number of cracks/fissures in concrete walls and floors throughout, the plant.
This repair 'process was addressed in inspection report 50-323/85-02 dated April 4, 1985 for the repair of cracks/Xisesures in the south end of Unit 2 fuel handling building at elevation 100'. It is concluded that the caller was possibly making reference to the cracks/fissures identified in the above inspection report as they were long cracks 20/30 feet.
In response to the second part of the alleger's concern, 3000 pound concrete versus 5000 pound concrete.
The following data identifies the concrete compressiv'e strengths specified and tested for different elevations in the turbine building for the original construction and for the 1978 Hosgri modifications.
Turbine Buildin Com ressive Stren th Iocation
~Secified, Test Original Construction Floor, elevation l40 Other floors East-west walls North-south walls 5000 3000 5000 3000 6590 3870 5500 3870 1978 Hosgri Modifictions Above elevation
5000 Elevation 85 and below 3000 5680 4260 It can be seen that both 3000 and 5000 pound strength concrete was used in the turbine building in accordance with design.
It is concluded that allegation was not substantiated.
This issue is closed.
The inspector conducted exit meetings on August 9 (an interim meeting)
and 23 with the Plant Manager, Plant Superintendent, and other members of the plant staff.
During these meetings, the inspector summarized the scope of the inspection activities and reviewed the inspection findings as described in the report.
The licensee acknowledged'the concerns identified in the report.