IR 05000275/1985040
| ML17083B687 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1985 |
| From: | Burdoin J, Dodds R, Jim Melfi NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17083B686 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-85-40, 50-323-85-38, IEIN-81-35, IEIN-85-066, IEIN-85-66, NUDOCS 8601230287 | |
| Download: ML17083B687 (10) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
Docket Nos.
Iicense Nos.
Licensee:
'Zacility Name:
50-275/85-40, 50-323/85-38 50-275, 50-323 DPR-80$
, Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street, Room 1451 San Francisco, California 94106 t,
Diablo Canyon Units 1 and
Inspection at Inspection conducted:
Di'ablo Can'yon Site, San Luis Obispo County, CA I
December 9-13, 1985 Inspectors:
J. Z. Bur oin, Reac or Inspector
, P. Melfi, ctor Inspector Date Signed
Da e igned Approved By:
R. T. Dodds, Chief, Reactor Project Section
Dat Signed Summary:
Ins ection durin eriod of December 9-13 1985 (Re ort Nos. 50-275/85-40 and 50-323/85-38 Areas Ins ected:
Unannounced inspection by two regional inspectors of open items consisting of followup of IE Notices, Part 21 Reports, and followup of allegations.
Inspection procedures numbers 36100, 37702, 92701, and 92703 were used as guidance for the inspection.
The inspection involved 72 inspection hours by two inspectors.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie > ~
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DETAILS l.
Individuals Contacted Pacific Gas and Electric Com an (PGSZ)
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G.. Thornberry, Plant Manager
>R. Patte'rson-;, Assis'tant Plant.Hanager, Plant Superintendent D. A. Pockyell, Assistant Field Construction Superintendent D. L.,Bauer, Senior Power Production 'Engineer D.. R: Bell, QG, Sujeryisor D: D. 'Malo'ne, Senior 'ISC Supervisor
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E." Coley,'ead Starts Engineer J., R. Bratton,'Rate Case, Coordinator
>D. B. Mifclush, Maintenance Department Manager W. J. Xe3.ly, I,icensing Representative M. L.'mith, Power Production, Engineer
>T. L: Grebel, Regulatory'ompliance Supervisor
>'<M. P. ganrahan, Senior ISC Supervisor R.'Q.Cook, Rate Case Group Coordinator I. M. Zakaria, Electrical Field Engineer Various other engineering and QC personnel.
"Denotes attendees at exit management meeting on December 13, 1985.
In addition, NRC Resident Inspectors attended the exit management meeting.
2.
Area Ins ection An independent inspection was conducted in Units 1 and 2 auxiliary buildings.
The equipment spaces inspected for both units included six battery rooms, six 4160 volt switchgear spaces, six 480 volt load center rooms, two hot shutdown panel areas, and two diesel generator (l-l/1-3)
rooms.
Housekeeping and equipment status appeared to be satisfactory.
No violations of NRC requirements were identified.
I 3.
Licensee Action on IE Notices a.
(Closed)
Item 275/81-08-08-xl S ecial Re ort on IE Notice 81-35 Check Valve Failures The Notice alerted licensees to failures of check valves that have occurred at several Nuclear gower Plants.
The failures of the check valves included loose valve internals, failures of the hinge pin, seat ring retention devices, disk retaining pins and hinge lugs.
The check valve failures were attributed to two main causes:
(1)
poor retaining device design, and (2) poor quality control on the assembly of the valve internals.
This Information Notice and others (81-30 and 80-41) were evaluated by the licensee.
In a memorandum, the licensee stated that it
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approached the problem of check valve failures by identifying the check valves made by the mentioned manufacturers in the IE Information Notice and (2) the check valves that could be labeled as vital equipment.
This memorandum also stated that (1) all valves identified as vital were being scheduled for periodic maintenance, inspection, and/or testing, (2) representative valves of each type made by the suspect manufacturers were being periodically inspected and/or tested on a rotation basis and (3) an ongoing training program was being developed to specifically address these problems.
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The inspector examined the licensee's maintenance procedure (MP)
number M-51.14 Rev.
0. which addresses this Notice.
This procedure requires the check valves to be inspected at the first refueling outage (Fall, 1986).'t appears that the procedure properly resolves the concerns of the'otice.
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This item is, closed.
i (0 en)." IE Information, Notice 85-66 Discre ancies between As-Built Construction Drawin s and E ui mend Installations I
The, Notice aleit'ed licensees "of:a'otentially significant problem regarding construction drawings which do not correctly or completely reflect equipment'nstallatio'ns.
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The licensee is currently evaluating their construction drawings and the as-built, installations.
guality support was conducting the investigation and some discrepancies have been identified.
This item remains open and will be examined during a future inspection.
4.
Part 21 Item (Closed)
275/323/85-12-P Part 21 Westin house Su lied Safet Grade Core Exit Thermocou le S stem Environmental uglification Westinghouse (W) notified the NRC of a 10 CFR 21 reportable item associated with the Westinghouse supplied safety grade core exit thermocouple (T/C) system.
Back round and Descri tion Westinghouse has been performing environmental qualification tests on the various components of the safety grade core exit T/C system as part of a IEEE 323-1974 qualification program described in WCAP 8587.
These equipment components include the thermocouples, connectors, potting adaptors, splices and the reference junction box.
Evaluation of test results obtained through early May of this year indicate that the thermocouple signal will be maintained although some errors could be experienced in the system during and following a postulated High Energy Line Break (HELB).
These errors were postulated to be caused by a combination of moisture ingression and thermal expansion but were not completely understood at the time.
The thermocouples have satisfactorily
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completed the qualification program.
The recent testing on connectors, splices, etc.,
have led to a potential total system error that exceeds the allowance for certain functions in the Emergency Response Guidelines that were the basis for plant specific Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) implementation.
Simply adding the estimated errors from the test
'esults for each separate component yields a total of approximately 75~F.
Each Utilitymay have a different combination of splices and connectors so an estimate of 75~F has been used to evaluate the safety significance of the recently completed test,.
Corrective Measures Taken b Licensee The licensee reviewed the problem and determined that the reason for the equipment failure was the W Generic Test parameters were considerably higher than the ones needed for Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP),
specifically, irradiation and pressure levels.
The licensee decided to go ahead with modifying a prototype housing for the reference junction, identical to the ones installed in DCPP and simultaneously proceeded with the, environmental testing of the reactor head connector assemblies.
Two types of connector assemblies have been installed in DCPP.
One type in Unit 1 and another type in Unit 2.
The one type is keyed and the other is not.
Both types of connectors were environmentally tested and met the DCPP test requirements.
Time constraints to meet the March 31st environmental qualification deadline
CFR 50.49 required shortening the aging and irradiation to an equivalent of five years.
The W promise to come up with a more satisfactory connector aided in the decision to qualify the connectors for this period (five years) of service.
Evaluation 1x Inspection Reports 50-275/85-25 and 50-323/85-22, dated July 16, 1985, addressed the issue with regard to the reference junction boxes (RJB).
The NRC (NRR) 'staff has completed its evaluation of the qualifications for the reference, junction boxes and concluded that the qualification test 'results provides reasonable assurance that the junction boxes were capable o'f functioning as required in the postulated pressure and temperature environm'ent.
t The inspector r'eviewed the'yle laboratories,test report for the environmental qualification'esting of four thermocouple disconnect assemblies (test report 26443"2)'.-', It appears that the test results met the DCPP'equirements, for qualifying the connector assemblies.
Since the connectors have be'en 'quali'fied for a period of five years, the inspector reviewed the licensee'
commitment contro1 system and determined that the connect'.or have been i'dentffied in the. tracking system and have been scheduled for replacement by March 1990.
The connectors were also identified on the licensee's master, list of equipment that must be environment, qualified under'10 CFR 50.49.
I This item is closed for Units 1 and 2.
No violations or deviations were ident,ifie t l
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5.
Followu Items Identified in Su lement,21 to the Safet Evaluation Re ort NUREG-0675 (Closed)
Item 21;59-01 for Unit -1 - Toss of Traceabilit of Installed Electrical Cables Action required of Region V was to perform additional verification inspections of cable traceability as a part of the routine inspection program.
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Three allegations, numbe'rs 54, 59 and 63 on the subject of traceability of installed Class 1 cables envelope the above followup item.
The evaluation of these allegations in Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER)
21 do not indicate any loss of traceability of Class 1 circuits.
A conference with the inspector who made the original in-depth examination(s)/inspections of these allegations (54, 59 and 63)
identified the remaining field inspection to be completed to finalize the staff's action on this issue.
The compilation of cable installation records for an additional seventy two circuits had been completed for sampling by the original inspector; but he had not allowed sufficient time to complete the inspection of these circuits'.
A sample of eighteen of these circuits were traced in the field to verify the installation and routing of these Class 1 cables.
No deficiencies were identified.
During the original inspection of this allegation (59), it was found that access to the contractor's (Foley) record vault was not being properly controlled.
Immediate control of access to vault was established by locking and securing the back door to the room from which entry to the vault had been made.
The front entrance to the room has been used to maintain access control.
It appears from review of installation and QC records that traceability of electrical cables has not been lost.
This item is closed.
The inspectors conducted an exit meeting on December 13, with the Plant Manager, Plant Superintendent, and other member's of the plant staff.
During this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope of the inspection activities and reviewed the inspection findings as described in this report.
The licensee acknowledged the concerns identified in the repor d e
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