IR 05000275/1985029
| ML17083B659 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 10/18/1985 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17083B658 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-85-29, 50-323-85-26, NUDOCS 8511040124 | |
| Download: ML17083B659 (76) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY,'CoeaSSION REGION"V ,
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT 'OP.'LICENSEE,'PEREORMANCE'~,
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PACIFIC GAS, AND,ELECTRIC COMPANY ',
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I DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR, POWER 'PLANT fl
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REPORT NOS.
50-275/85-,29'~AND.50-323/85-'26
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ASSESSMENT PERIOD:
JULY 1, 1984 THROUGH "JULY 31, 1985 ASSESSMENT CONDUCTED:
SEPTEMBER 18, 1985 I
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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I.
Introduction l.
2.
3.
4.
Purpose and Overview SALP Meeting/Board Licensee Activities Summary of Regulatory Activities
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1
IX.
Summary of Results XII. Criteria IV.
Performance Analysis l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Plant Operations Radiological Controls Maintenance Surveillance Fire Protection Emergency Preparedness Security and Safeguards Fuel Loading Quality Programs, Administrative Safety Licensing Activities Engineering and Construction Training
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9 10ll
13 Controls Affecting
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20 V.
Supporting Data and Summaries
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Licensee Event Reports Part 21 Reports Investigations and Allegations Escalated Enforcement Actions Management Conferences Held during SALP Period Special Reports
23
24
24 TABLES Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table
2
4
6
8
Summary of Inspection Activities Unit 1 Summary of Inspection Activities Unit 2 Inspections Conducted Enforcement items Unit 1 Enforcement Items Unit 2 Synopsis of Licensee Event Reports Unit 1 Synopsis of Licensee Event Reports Unit 2 Licensee Event Reports Unit 1 Xicensee Event. Reports Unit 2
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INTRODUCTION
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Pur ose and Overview The Systematic Assessment of, Licensee Performance (SALP) is an integrated NRC staff effort to collect available observations on an annual basis and evaluate licensee performance based on those observations with the objective of improving the NRC Regulatory Program and 1j.censee performance.
2.
The period of this assessment was July 1, 1984 through July 31, 1985.
Evaluation criteria used during this assessment are discussed in Section II below.
Each criterion was,-applied using the
"Attributes for Assessment of Licensee Performance" contained in NRC Manual Chapter 0516.
V,S SALP Board Meetin
- September 18, 1985 NRC Region V Office P.
Board Members:
D. F: Kirsch;,,Acting Director," Division-of Reactor Safety 'and 'Projects (Board, Chairma'n)
A. E. Chaffee'," Chief, ';,Reacto'r",Proje'cts Branch R. T. Dodds'," Chief; Re'actor" Prospects Section
M. D. Schus'ter., 'Chief,',Physical'ecurity'Licensing and Emergency,~'Prepa'redness Section,.
T. Young Jr., Chief>>Engineerin'g'ection M. M. Mendonca, Senior Resident'Inspector',
J. F. Burdoin Senior Reac'tor Xnspecto'r, T,
M. Ross, Resident"In'specto'r M. Cilli's, Ra'diati'on Speciali'st'.
E. Schierling', NRR'roject 'Manager ';.,'-
C. I. Grimes, Chief,'ystematic Evaluate.,on Program Branch,'.
A. Venslawski, Chief~ Radiological Safety Branch R. F. Fish, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section 3.
Licensee Activities a.
Construction At the beginning of the assessment period (July 1, 1984),
a major modification program was in progress for Unit 2 as a
result of the Internal Technical Review Program (ITRP).
The effort for this program concentrated on the modifications in the following areas in the fuel handling building and the containment and auxiliary building for Unit 2:
Electrical Raceway Supports Piping Supports/Restraints Piping Changes Containment Annulus Structural Steel HVAC Duct Supports Instrumentation Equipment/Tubing Supports
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The construction/modification program in Unit 2 was completed during the early spring of 1985.
Startu and Pre-0 erational Activities Unit 1 Startu Activities Unit 1 was in cold shutdown conditions at the beginning of the SALP period.
On July 24, 1984 natural circulation tests were re-performed to assure that all operators had observed reactor coolant system natural circulation.
On August 18, 1984
, the plant was again taken critical to complete control rod swap testing.
In August 1984, the Commission authorized the staff to issue a
full power operating license for Unit 1.
The power ascension program was delayed as a result of a U. S. Appeals Court stay on Unit 1 operations.
The Court lifted the stay on October 31, 1984; and on November 2, 1984 the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) issued the full power license.
Unit 1 reactor was taken above 5$ power for the first time on November 9,
1984, and began power ascension testing.
Testing included:
plant thermal power measurements and statepoint data collection, plant control and reactor protection systems calibrations, dynamic steam dump control testing, main turbine overspeed testing, load swings, static rod drop test, power coefficient measurements, plant shutdown from outside control room, large load reductions including a successful 100'j load reduction, turbine trip, steam generator moisture carry over test, plant cooldown with ASW and CCW single failure, rod group drop test, pseudo rod ejection, neutron surveys, and demusselling tests.
The power ascension test program 'w'as completed on March 30, 1985.
Unit 1 was decla~red to be in commercial operation on May 7, 1985, following completion of a scheduled maintenance outage.
Unit 2 Prep erati'onal Activities I
The construction. program w'as completed during this period upon completion of various, Class 1 systems modifications which resulted from the licensee"s internal review program (seismic ire-analysi's).
t The integrated 'leak rate test of Unit 2 containment was completed in August 1984; and the hot functional test program was completed on December 24, 1984.
On May 7, 1985,.Unit 2 began initial fuel loading.
This activity conti'nued until May 21 when the plant achieved cold shutdown conditions.
There were only two significant delays during the fuel load evaluation.
One delay occurred, when a
fuel assembly was slightly damaged during removal from the spent fuel pool rack and had to be replaced.
The other
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occurred when some debris was identified and removed from the reactor vessel lower core suppor't plate.
RCS heatup commenced on July 19 and Unit 2 was in hot standby condition at the end of the SALP period.
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Unit 1 commercial operation began on May 7, 1985 with the return to 100$ power after completion of the main steam strainer removal outage.
On May 18, the plant experienced a
reactor trip and safety injection from, 100/ power, caused by a failure of an instrument inverter, transformer.
Repairs were completed and the plant restarted on May 19.
On May 20, during recovery from the trip two days earlier, the plant had another reactor trip and safety injection caused by a loose connection on a breaker in another instrument inverter.
d.
En ineerin Desi n and Iicensin The licensee's activities for Unit 1 during the assessment period were directed towards obtaining a full power license, which was issued on November 2, 1984.
The licensee's activities during this period for Unit 2 were directed towards obtaining low power and full power licenses.
The major efforts for Unit 2 were:
(1) the completion of the Internal Technical Review Program; and (2) the review, and necessary design engineering, of piping, raceway and HVAC supports as required.
Other matters were the evaluation of numerous allegations, additional engineering and design effort to complete the Post Accident Sampling System, revisions to technical specifications, and the resolution of NRC requirements for fire protection (10 CFR 50 Appendix R).
In addition to the technical efforts, the licensee also performed the associated licensing activities.
4.
Summar of Re ulato Activities a.
Ins ection Activities Approximately 9500 on-site inspector hours were involved in performing a total of 51 routine resident, region-based, and contract inspections and seven inspections to follow-up allegations.
Areas of inspection activity are summarized in Table 1.
Inspections conducted within the SALP period are listed individually in Table 3.
Allegation related inspection efforts are described in Diablo Canyon Supplements to Safety Evaluation Reports (SSER)
21, 22, 26 and 28.
b.
Technical Review Licensin Activities The NRC technical review and licensing effort during this SALP period applied almost exclusively to Unit 2.
However, this report is an evaluation of the licensee's performance on both
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units.
The NRC licensing activities during this period included the following:
Unit 1 Full Power License DPR-80, November 2, 1984'PR-80 Amendment 1, April. 26, 1985 Amendment 2, August 26,i 1985>
Unit 2 Iow Power License DPR-81, April 26, '4985 Unit 2 Full Power License DPR-82, August 26, 1985 Long Term Seismic Program Development and Approval, July 31, 1985 m
Combined Unit 1/Unit 2 Techn'ica1',Specifications
e Associated licensing activities were completed prior to the end, of the assessment period.
s These actions required frequent interactions with the licensee at all levels.
On numerous'ccasions, the NRC staff met with licensee personnel, includi'ng management,
'and performed detailed audits at the licensee's offices and at the Diablo Canyon site.
As a result of this effort, eight SER Supplements (SSER 25 through SSER 32) were issued during the evaluation period.
II.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS Overall, the SALP Board found the performance of licensed activities was satisfactory and directed toward safe operation of the facilities.
The overall performance showed improvement since the last SALP evaluation period, as shown in the table below.
The SALP Board has made specific recommendations in most functional areas for licensee management, consideration.
Functional Area Rating Last Period Rating This Period Trend*
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Plant Operations Radiological Controls Haintenance Surveillance (Including Inservice Inspection)
Fire Protection Emergency Preparedness Security 6 Safeguards Fuel Loading Quality Programs and Administrative Controls Affecting Safety Licensing Activities Engineering and Construction Training None apparent None apparent Improving Declining None apparent Improving None apparent None apparent Improving Improving Improving Improving An The trend indicates the SALP Board's perception of the licensee's performance
~durin the current assessment period It is.not
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necessarily a comparison of performance during the current period with the previous period.
For example, performance in the maintenance area was considered to be improving, even though performance in this functional area was not assessed during the previous SALP period.
III. CRITERIA The following attributes were evaluated for each functional area above as appropriate.
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6, 7.
Management involvement in assuring quality.
Approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint.
Responsiveness to NRC initiatives.
Enforcement history.
Reporting and analysis of reportable events.
Staffing (including management).
Training effectiveness and qualification.
To provide consistent evaluation of licensee performance, attributes associated with each functional area and describing the characteristics applicable to Category 1, 2, and 3 performance, were applied as discussed in NRC Manual Chapter 05163 Part II and Table 1.
The SALP Board conclusions were categorized as follows:
Cate or 1:
Iicensee management attention and involvement are aggressive and oriented toward nuclear safety; licensee resources are ample and effectively used such that a high level of performance with respect to operational safety is being achieved.
and are concerned with nuclear safety; licensee resources are adequate and are reasonably effective such that satisfactory performance with respect to operational safety is being achieved.
~Cate or 3:
Both BRC and licensee attention shonld he increased.
licensee management attention or involvement is acceptable and considers nuclear safety, but weaknesses are evident,; licensee resources appear strained or not effectively used such that minimally satisfactory performance with respect to operational safety j.s being achieved.
IV.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS The following is the Board's assessment of the licensee's performance in each of the functional areas, and the Board's conclusions and recommendations regarding corrective actions in each area, if any.
1.
Plant 0 erations This evaluation was based on,routine inspection of operational activities by the resident inspectors and a
tecum inspection conducted in June, 1985.
This inspection effort.--consisted of 3017 hours0.0349 days <br />0.838 hours <br />0.00499 weeks <br />0.00115 months <br /> on Unit 1 and 869 hours0.0101 days <br />0.241 hours <br />0.00144 weeks <br />3.306545e-4 months <br /> on Unit 2.
There were no violations
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in this functional area, and the licensee issued only nine Licensee Event Reports (LERs) as compared to 14 LERs for the last SALP period.
All LERs were acceptably reported and resolved by the licensee.
Licensee management continued to be involved in the plant operations area, including the frequent presence of senior corporate management on site.
The use of shift managers during the low power testing program for Unit 1 was continued during the power, ascension program.
The licensee also enhanced operating crews with additional licensed operators at every. opportunity.
Additionally, the licensee set plans to establish,a
'licensed Shift Manager over operating crews.
The professional attitude, as exemplified by shift turnovers and
'lant housekeeping, has been another strong management initiative during this SATP period.
These, and other actions demonstrated a
commitment to improve,plant operations and a high degree of responsiveness'o NRC "initiatjves.
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Licensee management continued to support conservative approaches to
" the resolution of technical issues, as well as, the organized i;deliberate conduct of operational activities.
The best examples of this attribute",h'as been the careful analysis and evaluation of plant Y
trips, e.g.,
a trip caused by turbine control problems and another caused by radio interference.
The enforcement history in the plant operations area can be attributed, in part, to strict. adherence to operating procedures and policies, and the cautious philosophy that has characterized the licensee's operational activities (for example, startup testing delays to assure all equipment was operable rather than only needed equipment).
However, several events which indicate a lack of operator attentiveness and supervision were identified.
The Incidences that involve operator attentiveness were an unplanned radiation release when auxiliary operators failed to observe,a decreasing tank level in a timely fashion, and a Unit 2 control room operator failed to note that a vital DC power supply was provided from a non-vital backup source.
Another event that involved a less than desirable degree of operator supervision that resulted in a power excursion, was caused by the operators lack of "feel" for the effect of xenon on power increases.
These incidences were of minor safety significance and were not typical of the overall performance in this functional area.
Required corrective actions were effective as indicated by the lack of repetition in problem areas and reportable events.
Inspection of startup test procedures and test witnessing revealed that field changes were frequently required in order to continue testing in an acceptable fashion.
The planning and prioritization of testing was considered to be consistent.
However, test result evaluations by the inspectors, subsequent to licensee management review, found an occasional need for re-evaluation, and in one case, the need to retest.
The licensee was responsive to the NRC concerns, initiating prompt corrective actio \\
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Controls and policies on staffing, responsibilities and training of operations personnel were well defined, understood and implemented as demonstrated by the licensee's, performance, and the NRC's inspection activity findings.
Conclusion Performance Assessment
" Category 2.
This is the same rating as the last SAIP evaluation.
However, the Board believes the licensee closely approached a category 1 in this area.
Board Recommendations Continued corporate management involvement onsite, continued utilization of management, oversight during the conduct of significant operational activities and power as'cension testing, and continued support of organized and deliberate conduct of operational activities is encouraged.
Radiolo ical Controls g
h.
A total of eight inspections related to radiological controls at Units 1 and 2 were performed by the NRC's Facilities Radiation Protection Section during this SAIP period.
A total of 511 inspector hours were spent in this area.
Primary areas examined during the inspections were the startup testing atUnit 1 and preoperational testing at 'Unit 2.. Due to the lack of any major outages involving repair and/or refueling, and because of the lack of any significant source term, the, areas of radioactive material transportation, As I,ow As Reasonab]y Achievable (AIARA) concept, and the environmental protection programs wer'e not examined in depth.
Specific areas examined were as follows:
a.
Radiation protection organiz'ation >(in'eluding staffing and qualifications)
b.
General Employee's Training c.
Chemistry and Radiation Protection Technicians (G&RPT)
replacement and retraining "program d.
NUREG 0737 items II.B.3IX'.F.land III.D.3.3 e.
Confirmatory measurements f.
Biological shield survey Radioactive waste systems Calibration of radiation survey instruments (e.g. portable, liquid and gaseous effluent monitors, and area radiation monitors)
i.
Four Iicensee Event Reports j.
Followup on lE Information Notices (IN's)
The Region V resident inspector staff also provided additional observations in these areas.
During the appraisal period, two Violations were identified.
These violations related to a failure to adhere to procedures and the assignment of an individual in a responsible position who did not
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meet the qualifications prescribed in the.regulatory requirements.
It should be noted that two vio3,anions of a similar nature were identified during the previous SALP,period.
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i The two LERs that were submitted'were related to the failure to perform Technical Specification,sur've'illance4.
'" One LER involved the failure of a Chemistry and'adiation Protection Technician to.
maintain positive exposure, control and"another LZR involved the mispositioning of an in-coze'etector.'
The licensee's reports were submitted on time and demonstrated adequate analysis and corrective action.
Inspection Report 50-275/85-23 identified two weaknesses in the area of radiological controls.
One weakness was related to the considerable use of "permissive" terms in procedures.
The other weakness involved the experience level of the licensee's Chemistry and Radiation Protection Technicians., It should be noted that licensee had also recognized the latter weakness and had taken steps to augment their permanent technician staff with the acquisition of experienced contractor staff.
The inspector noted that the licensee has not been able to fillall authorized Chemistry and Radiation Protection Technician, positions, and as a result had to rely on the use of contractor technicians to support the program.
The vio1ations and weaknesses identified do not represent.
a programmatic breakdown in the Radiological Controls area.
The inspections identified there was evidence of adequate attention, involvement and commitment to the radiation protection program.
This commitment ha's been demonstrated by:
a).
Qualified staff of professionals in the Chemistry and Radiation Protection Department.
b).
Allocation of resources exemplified by the quantity and quality of equipment provided to support the program.
c).
Augmentation of the CAPT staff with contractor personnel.
d).
Completion of Unit 1 startup test program and Unit 2 preoperational program with only a minor number of radiological occurrences.
e).
Acceptable resolution to TMI action plan commitments.
Conclusion Performance Assessment
- Category 2.
This is the same category as the last SALP assessment in this functional area.
Board Recommndations With operation of Units 1 and 2, implementation of the radiological control program will require increased management attention from all sectors of the facility organization including filling of open
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positions with qualified staff.
Procedures should be reexamined to assure that they require the necessary actions to be accomplished, describe the system and interfaces on both Units and, that they are clearly defined and are'being e'ffectively implemented.
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Inspection of the maintenance program'and its', implementation primarily consisted of monthly routine inspections by the resident inspectors and by special team inspection'. 'lso, 'regional based inspector observations of maintenance in specific-ar'eas,,e.g.,
radiation protection and secur'ity," provided~additional insight into maintenance activities.
'A total of 258 j.nspecti~on hours were expended in this functionalarea.
No~.,violations 'were identified during the assessment period."';Of four maintenance r'elated LERs, three were attributed to random component failures and one to personnel error.
Subsequent analysis, did not indicate any generic problems attributable to the preventive or, corrective maintenance programs.
All LERs were acceptably reported and resolved by the licensee.
A major improvment in this functional area has been the implementation of the Work Planning Center, which has required substantial commitment of resources and attention'y high level plant management.
Maintenance activities have been planned and prioritorized in a well controlled manner through the Work Planning Center.
Generally, maintenance work has been performed in accordance with procedures and shop work followers by qualified personnel.
Foreman, Journeyman, and apprentice personnel participate in an active training program.
Review of maintenance activities has been thorough and at appropriate levels of management.
Records have generally been complete, well maintained and accessible.
Procurement controls have been well controlled and documented.
Another strong attribute of the maintenance department at Diablo Canyon has been the maintenance engineering staff, who have continually provided prompt, technically sound, conservative resolutions of problems; whether self-identified, industry identified or NRC identified.
Department staffing levels were adequate, as demonstrated by only occasional difficulties with backlogs or use of overtime.
As mentioned in the last SALP review, the licensee's maintenance foreman has continued to trend maintenance and plant equipment histories.
The licensee still plans to use the Plant Information Management computer system to aid and automate this manual function.
Conclusion Performance assessment
- Category 1.
This is an improved rating from the previous SALP evaluation, and is primarily due to the significant efforts in the Work Planning Center and the continued acceptability of maintenance work activities'
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Board Recommendation Implementation of the planned computerized trending function and continued scrutiny and development of the Work Planning Center is encouraged to assure continued improvements in this area.
Surveillance A July 1985 team inspection, along with routine inspections by resident and regional staff, evaluated the licensee's surveillance program and its implementation based on 375 inspection hours on Unit 1 and 212 inspection hours on Unit 2.
Two violations identified in this assessment period were attributed to the surveillance functional area.
One violation was due to inadequate control of measurement and test equipment.
The licensee's control program in this area was in a transitional state and inspections in the next appraisal period will examine this area.
The other violation involved a failure of engineering personnel to assure diesel generator engineered safety feature timers were reset following surveillance testing.
During this SALP period 16 LERs were reported in this functional area.
The majority of these LERs were attributed to personnel error.
The programmatic reviews in this area found that controls exist to assure surveillance ac'tivities were generally planned and assigned.
Reviews and policy decisions in this area were usually made by the appropriate level of management in a timely manner.
However, analyses of the LERs and violations indicate procedures and policies were occasionally violated (as previously mentioned, most of these violations were due to personnel error) and therefore procedures and policies in this functional area should be examined.
Corrective action systems have been initiated to address identified problem areas.
The licensee has been very responsive to these specific multiple minor violations and programmatic breakdowns.
Responsible personnel were assigned and trained to perform surveillance related activities.
However, based on the analysis of violations and LERs, the staffi'ng levels and training appears to need additional management emphasis to meet the demand for two operating units.
Conclusion Performance assessment
- Category 2.
This is the same category as in the previous SALP period, however, the trend appears to be in a negative direction at this time.
Board Recommendations Based on the licensee's performance as summarized above, licensee management may wish to reexamine surveillance control procedures and policies, as well as, staffing levels and training adequacy to assure an effective overall program that keeps up with the increased demand for two operating units.
Pire Protection
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During the current SAIP assessment period, three inspections totaling 166 hours0.00192 days <br />0.0461 hours <br />2.744709e-4 weeks <br />6.3163e-5 months <br /> of inspection effort were applied in the area of fire protection at Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2.
Xn addition, the resident inspectors provided continuing observations in this area.
During the course of these inspections no violations were identified.
Only one IER was submitted during this reporting period.
Xt pertained to exceeding the requirement to issue a 30 day special report on loss of a fire barrier penetration.
The licensee site staff consists of a station emergency services supervisor with a station fire marshall and.fire protection engineer working for him.
A corporate fire protection engineer and staff are based in the Corporate Office.
A large n'umber of fire watch personnel are used at the site and are, under the direction of the fire marshall.
The staff appears to be well qualified and of adequate size for their workload.
Site personnel appear to have been well trained and'conscious of fire program requirements.
The licensee appears to be,'doing an effective job of coordinating and implementing the program.
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The licensee on site manageme'nt"staff and fire'atch organization make frequent tours through the facility searching-for potential fire protection problems.
They 'have, been,very effective identifying and correcting any potential problems.
The licensee has responded in a safety conscious, conservative manner,to i,dentified.problems (
and NRC questions.
I Conclusion Performance Assessment
- Category 1.
This area has shown significant improvement since the last SAIP, period.
The licensee has been aggressive and responsive to the WC concerns and has been effective in coordinating and implementing fire protection program requirements.
Board Recommendation Continued management attention is encouraged to maintain proficiency in this area.
Emer enc Pre aredness During this assessment period, Region V conducted two routine inspections, one Emergency Response Facility (ERE) Appraisal, and observed one full scale Emergency Preparedness Exercise.
One violation involving training requirements was identified.
The Region V Resident Inspector staff also provided observations during this period.
The routine inspection program identified some weakness in management's involvement in the Training Program which resulted in a violation being issued.
Corrective action on the violation was timely and demonstrated management's commitment to a quality program.
Subsequent inspections documented improvements in training
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management, lesson plans, and staffing levels for the Training and Emergency Planning Programs.
>ianagement's approach to the resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint was thorough and conservative.
Responses to NRC initiatives were timely and complete.
The licensee's Emergency Response Organization was found to be adequately staffed with qualified and dedicated personnel.
The results of the ERF Appraisal, along with the observation of the 1984 full scale exercise, demonstrated the adequacy of the ERF and
'the licensee's ability to protect the health and safety of the public.
FEHA observed the offsite activities during the EP exercise and found no significant deficiencies.
FEMA did identify some items that needed improving.
Conclusion Performance assessment
- Category
~
This represents an improvement in the performance from, the category assigned, during the previous SALP cycle.
Board Recommendation Continued management emphasis in this area's encouraged.
Securit and Safe uards
'From July 1, 1984 to July 31, 1985',.'Region V conducted five Safeguards Inspections at Diablo Canyon Power Plant'for a total of 399 hours0.00462 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.597222e-4 weeks <br />1.518195e-4 months <br /> of on-site inspection effort.
Two inspec'tions, totaling 67 hours7.75463e-4 days <br />0.0186 hours <br />1.107804e-4 weeks <br />2.54935e-5 months <br />, were routine physical security inspections at. Unit l.
A third inspection totaling,'156 hours0.00181 days <br />0.0433 hours <br />2.579365e-4 weeks <br />5.9358e-5 months <br /> was a Safety/Security Assessment at Unit 1, while the fourth security inspec'tion totaling 134 hours0.00155 days <br />0.0372 hours <br />2.215608e-4 weeks <br />5.0987e-5 months <br /> was a pre-operational se'curity inspection at Unit 2.
The fifth inspection was a material control and accounti'ng pre-"operational inspection at Unit 2 totaling 42 hours4.861111e-4 days <br />0.0117 hours <br />6.944444e-5 weeks <br />1.5981e-5 months <br />.
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During the pre-operational security inspection at Unit 2, a Level IV violation was observed which impacted upon the security program at Unit 1.
For this reason, Unit 1 was charged with this single security violation, in which the licensee failed to properly search handcarried packages.
The five inspections demonstrated that licensee management was actively involved in the overall security and safeguards programs.
The security staff worked steadily to improve their Security Plan and updated their security procedures in support of this plan.
Procedures and policies were clear and disseminated to individuals responsible for their application and enforcement.
Staffing of the security organization was judged to be adequate.
An effective program for the reporting and analysis of reportable events has been implemented.
The security management staff continued to be responsive to NRC initiatives and demonstrated a coordinated effort
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toward safety/security issues at 'Diablo 'Canyon.
Appropriate and timely reviews of NRC Informati'on Notices have been made -by the licensee and action taken where needed.
The licensee continues to effectively utilize a uniformed security force comprised of both proprietary licensee and contract personnel.
The security training and qualification program made a positive contribution to the overall security effort.
Conclusion
~I Performance assessment
- Category,l.
Recommendation Continue the high level of attention to detail to maintain the present performance level.
Fuel Loadin (Unit 2)
Unit 2 initial fuel loading was conducted from May 1 to May 18, 1985.
All significant aspects of this evolution were witnessed and evaluated by the resident inspectors.
This effort consisted of 87 inspector hours.
There were no violations identified or IZRs issued in this functional area during this appraisal period.
The review of procedures established that there were several FSAR and gA commitments which had not been fully considered.
Subsequent plant management involvement, to resolve these problems was aggressive, prompt and complete.
The inspection concluded that additional licensee effort to update and implement their Commitment Management Data Base may be desirable to assure that these type of deficiencies do not exist in other areas (see paragraph 9).
The licensee encountered several problems during fuel loading operations which were promptly addressed, e.g.,
a damaged fuel assembly and debris in the reactor vessel as mentioned under Unit 2 Preoperational Activities.
The resident inspector's evaluation of licensee records in this functional area found some incomplete data sheets which were indicative of less than desirable procedure control and management review during the final stages of fuel load.
In overview, the initial Unit 2 fuel loading evolution was generally conducted in a technically conservative, methodical fashion by qualified personnel.
Conclusion Performance assessment
- Category 2.
This is the same rating as the previous SALP evaluation.
Board Recommendation Since the licensee will be challenged by the preparation for and potential conduct of the first refueling outage, additional
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resources and attention to detail in the areas of procedure review and implementation, and radiological controls for refueling should result in improvements in this functional area.
ualit Pro rams and Administrative-Controls Affectin Safet
This inspection effort consisted primarily of"quality'rogram reviews by the resident inspection staff.,
a special team inspection, and observations of implementation of admini'strative controls in all disciplines.
This consisted of 122 inspection hours. 'here were no violations identified in this functional area, and only four IERs in this functional area we'e submitted by the 'licensee.,
'he inspection ef'fort found consistent
'evidence of',prior "QA Audit planning and assignment of priorities in 'accordance with established procedures and policies.
Theinspectio'n effort also 'found that QA audits were previously conducted in areas examined by the NRC.
Corporate and plant management were frequently involved in site activities and audits.
Quality-related committees and groups were properly staffed and functioning.
Corrective actions were prompt and technically thorough.
Progress toward the implementation of the revised PSAR Chapter
QA program has been a strong point in the licensee s quality activities.
Emphasis on staffing and training has made a positive contribution to quality programs during this assessment period.
Another strong point in the quality program implementation has been the establishment of an on site Quality Support organization, staffed by experienced individuals, to provide fresh perspectives regarding activities affecting plant operations (maintenance, health physics, operations, chemistry and material control).
However, as indicated by the procedural difficulties encountered in the Unit 2 fuel loading discussed under Item 8 above, the licensee should apply the appropriate resources and efforts to develop and implement the Commitment Management Data Base to ensure that all commitments are being met; in the interim, the licensee should evaluate their system to ensure that all commitments are tracked.
Additionally, analysis of the LERs and inspection efforts in the Unit 2 preoperational test program indicate that Quality Assurance involvement in the Startup Department should be examined.
This functional area was also extensively examined during the staff's allegation review.
A discussion of the staff's effort on allegations is contained in section U.3.b. of this report.
Conclusion Performance assessment
- Category 1.
This rating is better than that of the previous SALP cycle and is attributable to the licensee's performance and implementation of several quality programs.
Board Recommendations
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Continue with current initiatives to further enhance QA efforts, particularly the recognition and acceptance of quality programs, the Commitment Management Data Base, and Startup Department Quality Controls.
10.
Licensin Activities While most of the licensing activities during this evaluation period were associated with Diablo Canyon Unit 2, this report is an evaluation of the overall licensee's performance and applies to both units.
The engineering and design efforts by the licensee throughout this SALP, period required extensive licensing activities and interactions with the NRC.
The NRC licensing activities during this evaluation period included the following:
Unit 1 Full Power Iicense DPR-80, November 2, 1984 DPR-80 Amendment 1, April 26, 1985 Amendment 2, August 26, 1985>
Unit 2 Low Power License DPR-81, April 26, 1985 Unit 2 Full Power Xicense DPR-82, August 26, 1985-Iong Term Seismic Program Development and Approval, July 31, 1985 Combined Unit 1/Unit 2 Tech Specs, August 26, 1985 These actions were based on extensive NRR reviews, evaluations and audits as documented in the following supplements to the Safety Evaluation Report:
SSER-28 Allegations (April 1985)
SSER-29 Seismic Design and other IDVP Matters Related to Unit 2 (March 1985)
SSER-30 Piping and Pipe Supports (April 1985)
SSER-31 Unit 2 Low Power Licensing Matters (April 1985)
SSER-32 Unit 2 Full Power Licensing Matters (July 1985)
The licensing activities included the resolution of the following specific issues:
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b.
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d.
e.
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Piping and Pipe Supports for Unit 2 Based on a Unit 1 License Condition Unit 2 Seismic Design Based on Unit 1 XDVP Unit 2 Nonseismic Design Based on Unit 1 XDVP Allegations on Numerous Issues Seismically Induced Systems Interactions Regulatory Guide 1.97 Masonry Walls Physical Security Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation (IX.F.2)
Equipment Qualification Control Room Design',(I,D.1)
Safety Parameter Display System (X.D.'2)
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Staffing Post Accident Sampling System (II.B.3)
Valve Testing (XI.D.1)
Generic Letter 83-28 Items Boron Mixing - Natural Circulation Test Fire Protection Long Term Seismic Program Main Steam Iine Break (MSLB) Environmental Conditions Unit 1/Unit 2 Combined Technical Specifications Technical Specifications:
Associated licensing activities were completed prior to July 31, 1985, end of assessment period.
- I Reactor Trip System Movable Control Rods
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DG Fuel Oil'Surveillance General Office Nuclear Plant Review and Audit Committee (GONPRAC)
Radiological Effguents w.
RHR Interlock kl t
The licensing activities inclu'ded the resolution of these, specific issues.
They vary with respect to their safety, significance, the time when final resolution was/is rhquired,'nd the NRR a'nd licensee effort that was associated with each,",during this evaluation" period.
These factors were taken into consi'deration when evaluating the licensee's performance regarding each",issue with respect, to the overall performance.
The items that required,a majoM 'effort both by licensee and 'the NRC, were items a,': b, d, u and w.
Presented below is the NRR detailed evaluation with respect to applicable criteria from the Manual Chapter.
a
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Throughout this evaluation period licensee management demonstrated effective involvement.and control in assuring quality with respect to licensing activities.
Management established the Internal Review Program (IRP) to monitor its technical activities directed to the resolution of issues for Unit 2 that (1) had been raised and resolved during the Unit 1 Independent Design Verification Program (IDVP), (2) resulted from the Unit 1 license condition regarding piping and pipe supports, and (3) were raised in numerous allegations.
Licensee management also established and committed to the execution of a long term seismic program to reevaluate the seismic design basis for the Diablo Canyon site.
The combined Technical Specifications for Unit 1 and Unit 2 were developed during this evaluation period with direct participation by licensee operations management from the site and the San Francisco offices.'he numerous licensee licensing activities associated with the resolution of issues listed in Table 1 and discussed in SSER 31 and SSER 32 indicated a management commitment to assuring quality in the licensing process.
In May 1985 the re-structured Diablo Canyon organization included
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the establishment of the position of Director for Nuclear Regulatory Affairs.
This position reports directly to the Vice President for Nuclear Power Generation and is a member of GONPRAC.
Management involvement in licensing activities was demonstrated with respect to,. safety for technical issues, quality assurance, licensing commitments, programmatic aspects, participation. in meetings, frequent site visits, and establishment of a record control system.
One exception was the detailed control room design review, where management's involvement was not as clearly demonstrated in the review of Human Engineering Deficiencies (HED) and in the development of design solutions.
The licensee's corporate management commitment to quality in licensing activities, as expressed by the Senior Executive Vice President, has continued during this evaluation period.
The safety related design effort on piping and pipe supports, which was performed by the Onsite Project, Engineering Group (OPEG)
prior to this SALP period, was transferred to the San Francisco offices in June 1984.
The same commitment has now been successfully implemented at':all management levels at the site and at the San Francisco offices.
This is an important improvement over the last 'performance evaluation.,
f The licensee's approach to the resolution of the numerous technical issues identified above required a satisfactory resolution prior to the issuance of the Uni't 1 and Unit 2 licenses, including the preparation. of combined technical specifications for Units, 1 and 2.'n many, cases a s'atisfactory resolution had been developed and implemented, previously for Unit 1.
In genera1,
.the same "resolution.was'ery'ffective3.y and timely applied to Unit 2.'n'articular, this appioach was instituted for the seismic and non-seismic'issues identified during the Unit 1 IDVP and for the piping and pipe support effort that resulted from the Unit 1 licens'e condition.
,I The licensee's technical staff demonstrated a sound awareness and familiarity with the'afety significance of the technical issues.
The resolutions were based on appropriate conservatisms and were technically well founded.
Examples are the resolution for the post accident sampling system, PASS (XI.B.3), the fire protection provisions in -response to Appendix R requirements, the physical security measures, and analyses and modifications related to masonry walls.
Two major li'censing efforts that clearly demonstrated the licensee's understanding of the technical issues and commitment. to resolution are the development of (1) the Unit 1/Unit 2 combined technical specifications, including, safety analyses for publishing in the federal register, and (2) the long term seismic program.
In some efforts the licensee approach to resolving the technical issue was not as readily acceptable to the staf f I
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For example, the final'design,'perating,"'pr'ocedures, and technical specifications for the inadequate core cooling instrumentation system (XI.F.2) was achieved after numerous interchanges between the staff and the licensee.'nother example is the evaluation of 'the pipe-way structures for Unit 1 and Unit 2 as discussed in detail in SSERs,29 and 32.
A number of 'interactions were required before the methodology for final resolution was reached and included as a condition'n the Unit 2 full power license.
While the licensee's commitment for resolution of technical issues during the evaluation period can largely be attributed to the then forthcoming issuance of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 licenses, the timely resolution always considered the safety significance of the issue under-evaluation.
When such resolution was not achievable, the staff identified the need for final resolution as a condition in the license(s).
The licensee provided excellent documentation of the proposed resolutions in submittals to the staff and made detailed information available during audits and meetings.
The licensing activities in response to NRC initiatives during this evaluation period were almost entirely associated with issuance of licenses for Units 1 and 2.
NRR requests for information regarding the many technical issues were identified in letters, during numerous meetings with the licensee, and audits of records at the site and at the San Francisco offices.
The licensee responded promptly to NRR initiatives providing timely, technically sound and thorough resolutions to issues identified by the staff.
Xn September 1984 the licensee submitted the first complete FSAR updated in accordance with 10 CFR 50 71(e)
During this evaluation period the licensee made in excess of 400 submittals providing requested information and documenting resolutions of analyses.
This correspondence provided the necessary record for the staff evaluations.
As during the staff's earlier evaluation of the piping and pipe support for Unit 1, the licensee demonstrated the same positive responsiveness for the Unit 2 effort.
The technical, licensing, and management staff were available at all times for interaction with the NRC staff.
The licensee's responsiveness to the Unit 1 license condition for the development of a long term seismic program in 1984 was exceptional.
At a number of meetings on this subject, the staff provided comments on the program which subsequently were incorporated in the program plan and submitted to the staff in January 1985.
Another example of programmatic responsiveness was the seismically induced systems interaction program.
The licensee has submitted extensive information on individual, potential systems interactions for both units.
The licensee's responsiveness with respect to NRC requests for information for specific Technical Specifications as well as for the preparation of the co'mbined Technical Specifications, including
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follow-up meetings and telephone disucssions, were a major factor for the timely preparation of the specifications.
'i The licensee has in place a well staffed and organized licensing group under the management of, the Director for Nuclear Regulatory Affairs who: repor'ts dire'ctl'y to the Vice President for Nuclear Power Generation.,
The licensing organization has been staffed with",'qualified engineers that includes approximately 50 individuals providing, internal licensing support and interaction with the NRC.
Throughout the evaluation period this organization',provided an'effective interface between the licensee's technical staff and the NRC, including arrangments for,meetings and 'audits on short notice, expediting the transmittal, of. information, actively participating in the development of the combined Technical Specifications, and providing weekly status information.
The licensing organization wa's'ery active and 'effective in communicating NRC requirements, view'p'oints, and need for information to the licensee's technical staff and pursuing a
timely resolution.
Throughout the evaluation period there were numerous interactions between the NRR and the licensee technical staff.
In all cases the licensee was represented by qualified technical and management representatives.
For the previous evaluation period it had been noted that the Unit 1 piping and pipe support effort had been performed largely by the Onsite Project Engineering Group (OPEG) with many newly employed engineers.
For Unit 2 this effort was effectively transferred in June 1984 to the San Francisco office with a qualified and capable technical staff who interacted with the NRC staff during a number of audits and site visits.
During this evaluation period the licensee developed the long term seismic program in response to a condition in the Unit 1 license.
This program, under the direction of a Vice President, was staffed with qualified employees and with consultants with expertise in all aspects of the program.
Conclusion Performance Assessment
- Category 1.
The licensee's performance in this functional area can be attributed to (1)
the licensee's corporate management commitment to a high quality performance; (2) the licensee's qualified technical and licensing staff; (3) the importance for issuance of licenses for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and (4) the lessons learned and resulting improvements based on the previous SAIP evaluation.
Board Recommendations To continue this level of performance licensee corporate management should continue to maintain a high level of involvement in all licensing activities.
A review should be
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'20 made of all outstanding licensing activities and a priority schedule for resolution should be developed and implemented.
The progress of the long term seismic, program should be monitored closely by management.
En ineerin and Construction Inspection activities during this SALP period consisted of seven inspections by regional based inspection staff.
In addition, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), under contract to NRC Region V, provided assistance in inspecting plant modifications implemented at Unit, 2 as a result of the internal technical review program.
The total number of construction inspection hours involved for Unit 2 were 153 hours0.00177 days <br />0.0425 hours <br />2.529762e-4 weeks <br />5.82165e-5 months <br /> by Regional inspectors and 349 hours0.00404 days <br />0.0969 hours <br />5.770503e-4 weeks <br />1.327945e-4 months <br /> by contractor inspectors.
The number of construction items inspected on Unit 2 during this period included 254 pipe supports, 113 structural steel connections (416 welds),
137 electrical raceway supports,
HVAC supports, 15 rupture restraints and qualifications of personnel.
Only one Notice of Violation and six LERs pertaining to construction activities were issued during this SALP period.
This violation addressed a cross-section of construction errors in modifications to electrical raceway supports.
The licensee was responsive to the Notice of the Violation.
The Construction Quality Assurance/Quality Control programs along with the audit program were revised and upgraded following Bechtel's joining General Construction in the early summer of 1982.
These programs were developed to assure good quality control for the large numbers of modifications to pipe, raceway and HVAC supports; and annulus area structural steel
'or Unit 1 which resulted from the design verification efforts (IDVP and ITP).
These quality/audit programs were refined and improved upon during the period of modifications for Unit l.
By the time Unit 'l was completed and the construction effort was re-directed to Unit 2, all of the problems with the above identified programs had been. solved and the programs were functioning efficiently.
Unit 2 became the beneficiary of these established programs.
Consequently, the final construction and modifications accomplished in Unit 2 during this SALP period progressed to completion without any major problems.
This functional area was also extensively examined during the staff's allegation review.
A discussion of the staff's effort on allegations is contained in section V.3.b. of this report.
Conclusion
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Performance assessment
- Category 1.
This is an improvement over the last SALP period, attributed the utilization of well established quality/audit programs for construction.
Board Recommendations Continued management attention to high quality standards should be maintained for future modification work.
T~aainin The evaluation of this functional -area consisted of observations during a team inspection in June 1985 and routine inspections by resident and regional staff for a total of 149 inspector hours on Unit 1 and 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> on Unit 2.
There were no LERs or violations identified in this functional area.
The training department has continued to develop.and grow during the SALP cycle.
Management attention'nd involvement in this area has been substantial with emphasis, in attaining accreditation in accordance with 'the Instit'ute, for Nuclear Power Operations guidelines.
The licensed 'operator training programs, as configured, were technically, sound and implemented in a responsive manner tq the needs of the operations organization.
The Chemistry,and Radiate.oan Protection Technician and Maintena'nce personnel, replacement,and retraining programs also met-the 'regulatory requirements.'taffing and resources for the training department, were ample as indicated by a generally trained and updated'lant staff.
Strong points in this functional are'a have been lice'nsed operator training and 'general employee training.
Conclusion Performance assessment
- Category 1.
This'unctional area was not specifically addressed during the *last SALP cycle.
Board Recommendations Continue with efforts toward INPO accreditation and improvements in non-licensed operator, technician, apprentice and journeymen job-related training program r l
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V.
SUPPORTING DATA AND SBRfARIES 1.
Iicensee Event Re orts (LERs)
A total of 43 licensee event reports were submitted (2 for Unit 2)
during this SAIP period.
Tables 6 and 7 give a synopsis of the IERs, and they are listed in Tables 8 and 9.
The 43 LERs were evaluated by Region V and by the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD).
AEOD's examination of the randomly selected LERs was conducted following the instructions and procedures described in NUREG-1022.
AEOD's observations were as follows:
a
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b.
c ~
The information presented in the narrative section was generally sufficient to provide the reader with a good understanding of the events.
However, in some LERs there was insufficient information regarding when the symptoms first appeared, how long they lasted, and/or when the plant was restored to normal conditions.
Examples are:
IERs 84-019-00, 84-020-00, 84-022-00, 84-028-00, 84-030-00, 84-032-00, 85-001-00, 85-002-00, 85-007-00, 85-014-01 and 85-015-00.
In some IERs, the initial plant conditions were not explicitly mentioned in the event descriptions.
The information contained in the abstract or on -the coded portion should not be a
substitute for the information requi'red,in 'the text,'o enable the reader to follow the development of an event.,
LERs 84-025-00, 84-027-00, and 84-028-00 did not r'efer to initial plant conditions at the beginning of an event."
Xn some cases, the time of onset, of an event and/or the duration of an event
-- from the time of,discovery until,'the implementation, of the corrective measures -- were'not addressed.,
The time the"',plant was restored'to normal conditions.,should also be included in an IER.
Some examples are:
LERs 84-023-00, 84-031-00, 8'4-032-00, 85"001-00, 85-002-00 and 85-019-00.
t,
I There were no significant,problems,with the coded information on the LER forms submitted by the licensee.
On LER 84"027-00, the report date was omitted.
The LERs 84-022-00 ("Reactor Trip"), 85-004-00 ("Thirty (30) Day Reporting Period Exceeded" )
and 85-022-00 ("Safety Injection") have uninformative titles.
More descriptive titles should, be used.
Generally, root causes were identified in LERs'r an updated LER was issued after a detailed examination of the event by the licensee.
However, in some instances, no explanation was given for isolating one cause as the root cause; for example, LER 85-002-00.
When appropriate, information should be provided in the text to enable the reader to understand how the root, cause was identified.
d.
After discovery of the human error, the licensee seems to indicate in the LERs various corrective actions such as
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personnel counseling, procedural,mo'difications and implementation of other controls 'such, as displ'ay signs, etc. to preclude similar occurrences in,the future.
However, in some cases, there was no explicit mention in the, LER regarding the type of error suchas, inadequate, or incorrect procedures, or adequate procedures but failure 'to,'implement, them., lf an operator took a different course than that'prescribed, a
discussion on why such action was chose'n would be beneficial.
i In some TERs, the time elapsed between the event, date and the report date exceeded the '30-day'limit.
With the exception of the voluntary reports, examples that exceeded the limit include LERs 84-018-00, 84-020-00, 84-024-00, 85-004-00, 85-013-00, 85-014-00, 85-017-00 and 85-018-00.
The licensee routinely referenced the applica'ble technical specification when the event was reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i).
i g.
During the assessment period, 13 Preliminary Notifications were issued.
Seven of these events did not require the submittal of LERs.
The following six events were deemed to be reportable by the licensee and LERs were submitted accordingly:
PNO-V-84-46 (LER 84-022-00),
PNO-V-84-54 (LER 84-025-00))
PNO"V-84-70 (LER 84-030-00))
PNO-V-85-02 (LER 85-002-00))
PNO-V-85-09 (LER 85-009-00))
PNO-V-85-24 (LER 85-013-00).
In conclusion, the licensee has provided adequate LERs, but, some improvements are needed in the areas as described above.
2.
Part 21 Re orts (Letters)
10/29/84
-
Potential Problem BBC Brown Boveri Inc. Votage Balance Relay (ITE-60)
ll/06/84
-
Deficiency in Ruskin Firedamper Closure Models IBD-23 Sc NIBD23 05/09/85
-
Deficiency of Environmental Qualifications of Core Exit, Thermocouple System Connectors and Splices 07/19/85
-
Quality Deviation in the TEC Model 914-1 Valve Flow Monitor Module 3.
Investi ations and Alle ations Investi ations Inquiries Opened:
Inquiries Closed:
Investigations Opened:
Investigations Closed:
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During the assessment period the followup and resolution of allegations involved in excess oX, 1000 inspect'.ion hours, by
, resident regional base8 and contract, inspectors.
This effort was a continuation of the allegation program identified in the 1984 SALP Report.
The Diablo 'Canyon allegation management program (DECEM) described 'in'l'ast year's SALP Report remains in service to manage" and track'allegations.,
During thi's appraisal, period seven inspection reports identified,in Table
addressed the resolution of". some 875,allega'lions.
The,'taff's efforts during the assessment period ~are fully'iscussed in SERs 26 and 28.
ll Due to the continuing receipt of allegations for both units an ongoing program for the followup and resolution of allegations is in place.
Periodic inspection reports will be issued in the future reporting the status and resolution of allegations.
4.
Escalated Enforcement Actions a.
Civil Penalties:
None E
b.
Orders:
None c.
Confirmation of Action Letters:
None 5.
Mana ement Conferences Held None 6.
S ecial Re orts Unit 1 Startup Reports reviewe r
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TABLE 1 INSPECTION ACTIVITIES AND ENFORCEMENT SE1MARY (7/1 84 - 7/31/85)
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 Functional Area 1.
Plant Operations 2.
Radiological Controls 3.
Maintenance Inspection-Hours Percent of Effort 3017
309 218 Ins ections Conducted Enforcement Items Severit Level -=
I II III IV V
Dev.
4.
Surveillance (Including 375 Inservice Inspection)
5.
Fire Protection
6.
Emergency Preparedness 331 7.
Security and Safeguards 231 8.
Fuel Loading 9.
Quality Programs and Administrative Controls Affecting Safety 10.
Licensing Activities 122 11.
Engineering 8 Construction 158 12.
Training TOTAL 149
4995 100
Allocations of inspection hours to each functional area are approximations based upon NRC Form 766 data.
Severity levels are in accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy (10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C).
NOTES:
1)
2)
Data reflects Reports 84-22 through 85-25.
Some 20 man-years of effort was expended by NRR reviewing allegations for Units 1 and 2 and an additional 494 inspection hours was devoted to allegations for Unit g, K
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TABLE 2 INSPECTION ACTIVITIES AND ENFORCEMENT S'B1MARY (7/1/84 - 7/31/85)
DIABIO CANYON UNIT 2 Functional Area Inspection-Hours Percent of Effort Ins ections Conducted Enforcement Items Sevexit Level
>'
I II III IV V
Dev.
1.
Plant Operations 2.
Radiological Controls 3.
Maintenance 869 202
8 4.
Surveillance (Including Inservice Inspection)
5.
Fire Protection 6.
Security and Safeguards 8.
Fuel Ioading 9.
quality Programs and Administrative Controls Affecting Safety 212 81-
168
324
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Licensing Activities i'C ll.
Engineering 8 Construction 12.
Training NA 650
30
TOTAL 2682 100 Allocations of inspection hours to each functional area are approximations based upon NRC form 766 data.
Severity levels are in accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy (10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C).
This number includes 349 inspection hours of NRC contract personnel.
NOTES:
1)
2)
Data reflects Reports 84-12 thxough 85-24.
Some 20 man-years of effort was expended by NRR reviewing allegations for Units 1 and 2 and an additional 521 inspection houxs was devoted to allegations for Unit v l
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TABLE 3 - Ins ections Conducted Report No.>
Dates
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84-22 7/1-8/4/84 Residents (84-12)
Area
~Zus ected Routine Montly Inspection Hours 447
84-23 8/6-14/84 84-24 7/18-8/17/84 (84-i4)
84-25 7/9-13/84 (84"17)
84"26 8/5-9/1/84 (84-i8)
84-27 8/13-17/84 (84-i9)
84"28 8/6-10/84 (84-15)
84-29 10/29-31/84 Emergency Preparedness Operations Special Residents Radiation Specialist Construction Emergency Preparedness Emergency Planning Follow-up on Bulletin/
Circulars Allegation Pullman's Audit Program Routine Monthly Inspection Follow-up on TMI Action, Plan and Radiation Monitbring Calibration Follow-up on Outstanding Items/TMI Action Plan Emergency Planning 173
46 425
72 138 84-30 84-31 7/1-10/29/84 Resident 8/20-25/84 Special 84-32 9/2-29/84 (84-20)
Resident 84-33 9/30-11/17/84 Resident (84-21)
84-34 1/1/83-6/30/84 Staff (84-22)
Q.A. Addi't Program,
'llegation
- Bolts Main Fi.re Loop Routine'onthly
- Inspection" Routine Monthly Inspection SALP
40 166
325 169 84-35 10/29-11/29/84 Safeguards Special Assessment 156 84-36 8/27-10/26/84 Residents (84-23)
84-37 10/27-11/2/84 Radiation (84-24)
Specialist 84-38 9/17-10/26/84 Operations (84-25)
Allegation Followup Radiological Organization TMX Followup Allegations and Followup of Outstanding Items 301
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Report No.-
(84-26)
84-39 84-40 (84-27)
Table 3 - Ins Dates
~II 10/22-11/9/84 Operations r
11/12-16/84 Safeguards 11/18-12/29/84 Residents I
1h ections'onducted I
A'rea
'
~Xus ected I
Fo'liow-"uhp,.TMI Action I'lans Routine Security Routine Monthly Inspection Hours 106
392 359 84-41 (S4-29)
12/3-13/84 84-42 (84-31)
84-43 (s4-28)
11/30/84-1/18/85 12/10-21/84 (84-30)
11/26-30/85 Radiation Specialist Engineering Operations Engineering Radiological I
h
Construction Allegation Followup Construction
39
106 85-01 (85-03)
85-02 (s5-o4)
1/6-2/16/85 Residents 1/14-18/85 Engineering Routine Monthly Inspection Construction 245 201
85-03 (85-05)
85-04 85-05 (85-06)
85-06 (S5-O7)
1/14-2/1/85 1/21-25/85 2/11-15/85 Operations CANCELI ED Engineering Radiation Specialist Construction Fire Protection Radiological
85-07 (85"08)
85-08 (85-09)
85-09 (85-10)
1/7-2/14/85 2/17-4/6/85 2/11-15/85 Operations Residents Radiation Specialist Construction/Followup of Open Items Routine Monthly Inspection Radiological 357 303 85-10 (85-12)
CANCELLED 85" 11 3/18"22/85 Engineering Pre-Service Inspection
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Table 3 - Xns ections Conducted Report No.-
85-12 (85-11)
85-13 (85-13)
(85-14)
85-14 (85-02)
Dates 3/4-15/85 4/15-26/85 3/25-29/85 3/4-8/85 Ins ector(s)
Safeguards Radiation Specialist Engineering Engineering I
Area
~Zns ected Security Pre-Operational 1I I
e Radiological Construction
'onstruction Hours 134
'6
80 85-15 85-16 (85-16)
4/8-13/85 Engineering Integrated Leak Rate Test 3/25-4/19/85 Operations Allegations Followup
86 85-17 (85-17)
4/7"5/25/85 Residents Routine Monthly Inspection 385 372 85-18 (85-18)
85-19 (85-19)
85-20 (85-20)
85-21 85-22 (85-15)
85-23 85-24 4/8-26/85 4/22"26/85 4/11/85 (1 day)
4/22-26/85 4/8-26/85 6/10-28/85 6/3-7/85 Emergency Preparedness Operations Operations Construction Engineering Operations Emergency Preparedness Emergency Planning Followup Open Items/
Bulletins/Circulars Allegation Followup Inservice Testing Fire Protection Team Inspection Emergency Response facilities
96
719 370 85-25 (85-22)
85-26 (85-23)
5/26-6/29/85 Residents 6/30-8/17/85 Residents Routine Monthly Routine Monthly 209
196 271 85-27 (85-24)
2/11-7/17/85 Contract inspectors (LINL)
Allegations 400 200
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TABLE 4 DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 ENFORCEMENT ITEMS (7/01/84 - 7/31/85)
Inspection R~eort No.
84-23 85-12 85-17 85-23 S~eb'eet PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO EMERGENCY/
RESPONSE ORGANIZATION HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN ALL THE REQUIRED TRAINING SECURITY VIOLATION ENTERED OPERATXONAI MODE 4 WITH ONLY TWO D-Gs OPERATIONAL WHEN TS REQUIRE THREE OPERATIONAL D-Gs FAILURE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF MEASUREMENT AND TEST EQUIPMENT Severity Level IV XV IV IV Functional Area 85-23 85-23 FAILURE TO PERFORM RADIATION SURVEYS IV AS SPECIFIED ON SWP RADIATION TECHNICIAN DID NOT MEET IV MINIMUM 2 YEARS WORK EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENT
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TABLE 5 DIABIO CANYON UNIT 2 ENFORCEMENT ITEMS (7/01/84 - 7/31/85)
Inspection R~eort No.
~Rob ett Severity Level Functional Area 85-06 THREE ELECTRICAL RACEWAY SUPPORTS V
WERE FOUND TO HAVE CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCIES ll
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TABLE 6'IABLO CANYON UNIT 1 SYNOPSIS OF LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS"-'unctional Area SAIP Cause Code>"
A B
C D
E X
Totals 1.
Plant Operations 2.
Radiation Protection 3.
Maintenance 4.
Surveillance
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Fire Protection
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
3
0
0
0
0
6.
0
0
7.
Safeguards 8.
Refueling 9.
Quality Programs and Administrative Controls Affecting Safety
0
oi,
0
0 ',0 2,
0
0
0
10.
Licensing ll.
Engineering and Construction
0
1 1,
0.
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,1 5'2.
Training
0
TOTATS
4
5
4
- Cause Codes:
A-Personnel Error B-Design, Manufacturing or Installation Error C-External Cause D-Defective Procedures E-Component Failure X-Other
'>'<Synopsis includes LER Nos.
84-18 through 85-23 NOTE:
Several IERs categorized in multiple areas of cause codes---
follow-up LERs which do not identify additional areas or causes were not double accounted along with the original IER during this perio mh
TABLE 7 DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2 SYNOPSIS OF LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS"""
Functional Area SALP Cause Code="
A B
C D
E X
Totals 1.
Plant Operations 2.
Radiation Protection 3.
Maintenance 4.
Surveillance 5.
Fire Protection
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 6.
0
0
0 7.
Safeguards 8.
Refueling 9.
(}uality Programs and Administrative Controls Affecting Safety 10.
Iicensing 11.
Engineering and Construction
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0 12.
Training
0
'0
0
TOTALS
- Cause Codes:
A-Personnel Error B-Design, Manufacturing C-External Cause D-Defective Procedures E-Component Failure X-Other
.1
L s
s I
or Installation Error 0'
a s
.2'>Synopsis includes LER Nos.
85-01 through 85-02.
NOTE:
Several LERs categorized in multiple areas of cause codes---
follow-up LERs which do not, identify additional areas or causes were not double accounted along with the original LER during this perio (
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LER TITLE TABI,E 8 DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 Licensee Event Reports (7/01/84 - 7/31/85)
SALP AREA/CAUSE CODE'4-18 84-19 84-20 84-21 84-22 84-23'4-24 INADVERTENT ESF ACTUATION FROM FAILED RADIATION DETECTOR INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF CR HVAC...INCORRECT AS-BUILT DWG INADVERTENT START OF "SWING" DIESEL GENERATOR TRIP OF ESF DUE TO FAILED FEEDWATER VALV, TESTING, AND USE OF THE AUX FEED PUMP SAFETY INJECTION INADVERTENT LOSS OF STARTUP POWER AND START OF DIESEL GENERATORS FAILURE TO COMPLETE FIRE DETECTOR SURVEILLANCE ON TIME 3/E 11/A 1/A 1/E 1/A 4/A 4/A 84-25 INOPERABLE RADIATION MONITORS IN A AND B 84-26 MISPOSITION OF MOVEABLE INCORE DETECTORS 84"27 OXYGEN IN RADWASTE SYSTEM EXCEEDED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IIMIT 84-28 ESF ACTUATION - DIESEL GENERATOR AUTO START 84-29 IOSS OF POWER CAUSED INADVERTENT CONTAINMENT ISOIATION 1/A 9/X 4/A 3/E 1/X 84-30 84-31 84-32 84-33 84-34 REACTOR/TRIP/S.I.
MALFUNCTION OF MAIN TURB. DIGITAL ll/X ELECTRO-HYDRAULIC (DEH)
CONTROL SYS.
TURB/REACTOR TRIP DUE TO MALFUNCTION FLOW CONTROL 3/E VALVE IN S/G FEEDWATER FLOW
I WHILE IN MODE 1, AN INADVERTENT R TRIP OCCURRED 4/D DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR 6 A CONSERVATIVE I'gSTR SETPT,'HILE IN MODE 2, THE R TRIPPED DUE TO HIGH FIUX
,'
4/D SOURCE RANGE BEFORE P-5 AILOWED TRIP BLOCKAGE.
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UNIT IN MODE 1 DGl-2 START DUE TO UNDERVOLTAGE
, "
1/A ON 4KV BUS G.
PERSONNEL ERROR WHILE. OPERATING '
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84-35 85-01 85-02 85-03 85-04 85-05 85-06 85-07 85-08 85-09 85-10 85-12 85-13 85-14 85-15 85-16 WHILE IN MODE 2, TURBINE TRlP AND FEED XSO DUE TO HI-HX SG LEVEL.
TURBINE WAS LATCHED BUT NOT ROLLING ESF-ACTUATION-RX TRIP ON LOW RCS FLO DUE MAIN TURBINE FREg DROP D/TO SOLENOID VALVE FAIL ON STRTUP TEST REACTOR TRIP ON POWER INCREASE TRANSIENT DIESEL START ON POWER TRANSFER NONFUNCTIONAL FIRE BARRIERS AND 30 DAY TIME PERIOD FOR REPORT EXCEED RHR ISOLATION DUE TO VERIFXCATXON OF POSITION OF WRONG BREAKER
)
MISADJUSTMENT OF AUX SWITCHES CAUSED LOSS OF 4KV BOARD AND RHR jl
'f SPURIOUS TRANSFER OF CRVS FROM MODE 1 TO MODE 4-CAUSED BY TECHNICIAN PERFORMING STARTUP TESTING
I TIME PERIOD FOR ISOTOPXC ANALYSIS'OF I;, 131 PURSUANT TO TS TABLE 4.4-4)
ITEM '4B WAS'XCEEDED-REVIEW ESF ACTUATION - SAFETY INJECTION CAUSED BY RADIO FREg.
INTERFERENCE NEAR,STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE TO PERFORM 6 MO. LEAK TEST OF CS-137 CHECK SOURCE PURSUANT TO TS)
SECTION 4.7.8.1.2, REVXEW MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO EXCESSIVE THRUST BEARING WEAR INDICATION MANUAL REACTOR TRIP REACTOR TRIP CAUSED BY SHORTING 115 VOLT VITAL POWER DURING TESTING RWST LEVEL CHANNELS DIESEL LOAD SEQUENCE TIMERS OUT OF SPECIFICATION REACTOR TRIP 8 SI CAUSED BY FAILURE OF SLAVE 2.5 KVA REG TRANSFORMER ON INSTR INVERTER IY-1-3 REACTOR TRIP AND SI CAUSED BY LOOSE CONN TO OUTPUT CLRC BKR INSTR XNVERTER IY-1-2 REACTOR TRIP IN MODE 3 CAUSED BY TRANSFERRING XY-1-2 FROM BACKUP TO NORMAI 4/E 11/B 4/A 4/B 5/A 4/A 9/B 9/A 4/A 9/X 4/D 4/B 4/A 4/A 11/E 11/E 1/D
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85-17 MAINTENANCE WORKER WAS PERMITTED TO ENTER A HIGH RADIATION AREA WITHOUT POSITIVE EXPOSURE CONTROL 85-18 ICO TS 3.3.3.6 ACTION b EXCEEDED, TEST LEADS LEFT ON REACTOR COOLANT OUTLET TEMPERATURE MONITORS 85-19 THERMOCOUPLE MONITORING SYSTEM CHANNEL CHECK EXCEEDED 85-20 WHILE SURVEILIANCE TESTING AUTO STARTING OF D-G 1-3, D-G 1-2 AUTO-STARTED 85-21 AXIALFLUX DIFFERENCE 5 PERCENT TARGET BAND EXCEEDED 85-22 MISSING SEALS ON ACCUMULATOR DISCHARGE VALVES Personnel Error Design, Manufacturing or, Installation Error External Cause
~I D
-
Defective Procedures E
-
Component Failure X
-
Other 85-23 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SPURIOUS SPIKE Cause Codes:
tl A
B C
~ I 2/A 4/A 4/A 4/A 4/A 1/D 3/E
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