IR 05000275/1985019
| ML17083B599 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1985 |
| From: | Dodds R, Pereira D, Pereirg D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17083B598 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-85-19, 50-323-85-19, IEB-84-03, IEB-84-3, NUDOCS 8506060424 | |
| Download: ML17083B599 (10) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO%'1ISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-275/85-19, 50-323/85-19 Docket Nos.
50-275 and 50-323 License Nos.
DPR-80 and Construction Permit No.
CPPR-69 Licensee:
Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street, Room 1451 San Francisco, California 94106 Facility Name:
Diablo Canyon Units 1 and
Inspection at:
San Luis Obispo County, California Inspection conducted:
April 22-26, 1985 Inspector:
'ati vr'
EWui4 D.
B. Pereira, Reactor Inspector Date Signed Approved By:
R. Dodds, Chief, Reactor Projects Section
5 s
PS D te igned Summary:
Ins ection on A ril 22-26 1985 (Re ort 50-275/85-19 and 50-323/85-19)
Areas Ins ected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of the IE Bulletins, Circulars, and Notices, and outstanding open items.
The inspection involved 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> onsite inspection by one NRC inspector.
Results:
Of, the areas examined no violations or deviations were identified.
8506060424 8505i5 PDR ADOCK 05000275 G
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted R.
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Mr Johnson, PGSE Licensing Engineer Womack, NPO/Engineering Manager Taggart, Acting Director, Quality Support, QA Doss, NPO/OSRG Conway, NPO/Pers and Gen SVCS Martin, NPO/Training Hanager Wogsland, NPO/NPG/GO Weinberg, PGSZ News Services Thornberry, PGSE Plant Manager Gisclon, PGRE Assistant Plant Manager Sundquist, WPC Fisher, NPO/Security Todaro, NPO/Security Cramins, NPO, Quality Control Warrizk, PGSE, Department of Engineering Research Crockett, PGSZ Instrumentation and Control Manager Angus, PGSE/NPO Bratton, PGGE Allegations Coordinator Foster, PGSZ Senior Power Production Engineer Mikleesh, NPO/Maintenance Boots, NPO/CHIRP Patterson, Plant Superintendent
"Indicates those individuals attending the exit interview on April 26, 1985.
In addition to the individuals noted above, the inspector interviewed other members of the licensee's and contractor's staff.
2.
Follow-u on Previous Ins ection Findin s
The inspector conducted a review of open previous inspection findings compared to the licensee's response for technical adequacy, and implementation of corrective actions.
The following Diablo Canyon Unit
open items are determined to be closed:
a.
TI-15-66 (Closed)
Tem orar Instruction concernin Information Bulletin 84-03 Refuelin Cavit Water Seal In PGSZ letter No. DCL-84-367, dated November 30, 1984, the licensee states that Diablo Canyon has maintained the original NSSS supplier's seal ring assembly design.
This design is significantly different from the Haddam Neck Seal ring assembly.
The Diablo Canyon assembly consists of a metal-to-metal surface with double seals on the inside reactor flange and double seals on the outside of the seal ring.
This type of seal assembly would physically limit a large leak due to the metal-to-metal contact.
In addition, a leak test of the seal assembly is performed as required at each refueling. If a small leak develops due to the failure of the
double seal, the makeup capacity from two 3000 gpm RHR pumps could maintain water level.
Since a gross failure of the reactor refueling cavity water seal is not considered applicable to Diablo Canyon, no further action is required to mitigate the consequences of such a failure.
Temporary Instruction TI-15-66 is closed for Diablo Canyon Units
and 2.
Licensee Event Re ort 82-005-Xl - (Closed)
Steam Generator Blowdown Tank Li uid Radiation Monitor Failed In PGSE letter from Mr. James D. Shiffer to Mr. R.
H. Engelken, Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, dated June 7,
1982; the licensee explained. the cause of photo multiplier failure due to be end of life time.
The manufacturer states that tube life is about five years.
The failed tube was manufactured approximately eight years ago.
Channel calibrations required by Technical Specifications will detect incipient detector failures'icensee Event Report 82-005-Xl is closed.
Part
Re ort 84-00-P (Closed) - PT 21:
BBC Brown Boveri Inc.
Volta e Balance Rela ITE- 0
According to a
BBC Brown Boveri, Inc. letter to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, dated October 29, 1984, four voltage balance relays (Model ITE-60) were returned to the factory from the Hope Creek Generating Station.
Startup testing had indicated that the relays were outside of published specifications for operating time.
Factory testing verified this condition.
The ITE-60 voltage balance relay is a voltage comparison relay,"
which is generally used to detect the failure of a potential transformer and to block the operation of various other protective relays used in generator protection schemes.
BBC Brown Boveri, Inc. requested users to review their emergency diesel generator protective systems to determine if excessive operating time was occurring.
The relays mentioned above operated in approximately 40 milliseconds, whereas the published specification calls for the ITE-60 relay operation within 10 milliseconds on the complete loss of one input voltage source.
The inspector verified with licensee management that they do not have voltage balance relays and have not purchased any items from BBC Brown Boveri, Inc.,
Based on the licensee's response that they do not have voltage balance relays nor purchased from BBC Brown Boveri, Inc; this Part 21 report is closed.
(84-00-P Closed)
LER 84-10-LO (Closed)
Im ro er Jum er on Radwaste Effluent Valve
As described in LER 84-10-00, dated April 25, 1984, a Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Isolation Valve (RCV-18) failed to close as required during the performance of a surveillance test.
An improperly coordinated jumper installation had disabled the air operator to RCV-18 and would not have allowed this valve to shut upon receipt of a high radiation signal from the discharge radiation monitor, %1-18.
The jumper was removed upon discovery, and valve RCV-18 was returned to service.
The plant Administrative procedure (APC-4S1) pertaining to jumpers and lifted circuits has been revised to provide more clearly defined guidance to operations and maintenance personnel.
The inspector verified that the administrative procedure APC-4S1 was revised by Revision 5 on September 6,
1984, and that department managers management were directed to train their applicable personnel on the requirements of the revised administrative procedure.
Based on the above licensee actions, LER 84-10-LO is closed.
The following Diablo Canyon Unit 2 open items are determined to be closed:
Followu Item 85-05-02 (Closed)
Com letion of Unit 2 Seismicall Induced S stems Interactive Pro ram SISIP In PGGE letter No. DCL-85-162, dated April 22, 1985, the licensee provided five copies of Revision 1 to PGandE's SISIP Final Report.
In addition, this revision documents the results of the SISIP for Unit 2, thereby-fulfilling PGandE's commitment noted in 'SER Supplement II for performing and documenting a SISIP.
In PGSE's November 29, 1984 letter, the licensee indicated that the completion of all modifications resulting from the SISIP on Unit 2, including final inspection, would occur prior to the issuance of an operating license.
As of Hay 1, 1985, all Unit 2 SISIP modifications identified in the above'report have been completed.
Followup item 85-05-02 is closed.
TI-15-66, (Closed)
Tem orar Instruction concernin Information Bulletin 84-03 Refuelin Cavit Water Seal As stated above in item 2.a, PGSE letter No. DCL-84-367, dated November 30, 1984, the licensee states that Diablo Canyon has maintained the original NSSS supplier's seal ring assembly design.
For the same reasons as discussed in item 2.a above, Unit 2 Temporary Instruction TI-15-66 is close.
Reactive Ins ection Concernin Cardinal Industrial Products Cor oration An audit of Cardinal Industrial Products disclosed that 48 discrepant studs and nuts had been furnished to Unit 2.for use on main steam isolation valves.
The studs had lost material traceability during the forming process; while the nuts had been obtained from an unapproved vendor.
The licensee determined that 32 of these studs had been installed on the HSIVs and the other 16 were still in stock; 38 of the nuts had been installed, 6 were in stock and the other 4 had been used on Class 2 check valves, but were subsequently discarded following maintenance on the valves.
The inspector verified by a review of pertinent records and an examination of Unit 1 and Unit 2 MSIVs not covered with insulation that the discrepant studs and nuts supplied by Cardinal Industrial Products have been replaced.
The licensee's records indicate that only Unit 2 HSIVs had discrepant material; whereas, the original studs and nuts were installed in Unit 1 MSIVs.
The new material, which was supplied in accordance with Haterial Request Form No.
16045 dated April 14, 1985, was found to have the appropriate material and quality control certifications.
It appeared to the inspector that the licensee responded responsibly regarding the replacement of the discrepant material.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1 on April 26, 1985, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.