IR 05000275/1985043
| ML17083B704 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1986 |
| From: | Dodds R, Mendonca M, Padovan M, Polich T, Ross T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17083B701 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-85-43, 50-323-85-41, IEIN-85-096, IEIN-85-96, NUDOCS 8602250120 | |
| Download: ML17083B704 (18) | |
Text
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U. S.
NUCLEAR"REGULATORY COMMISSION k
REGION V
Report Nos:
Docket Nos:
50-275/85-43 and 50-323/85-41, 50-275 and 50-323
¹ License Nos:
f Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street, Room 1451 San Francisco, California 94106 Facility Name:
Inspection at:
Diablo Canyon Units 1 and
Diablo Canyon Site, San'Luis Obispo County, California Inspection Conducted:
Xnspectors:
M. M. Mendonca, Sr. Resident Inspector Date Signed t/go/gg Approved by:
M. L. Pa ovan, Resident Inspector
.
M.
oss, Resident Inspector T. J. Polic Resid nt Inspector gQ R. T. Dodds, Chief, Reactor Projects Section
Date Signed Dat Signed yag5 Date Signed Summary:
Ins ection from December
1985 throu h Januar
1986 (Re ort Nos.
50-275/85-43 and 50-323/85-41)
Areas Ins ected:
The inspection included routine inspections of plant operations, maintenance and surveillance activities, follow-up of on-site events, open items, and LERs, as well as selected independent inspection activities.
Additionally, inspection of the Unit 2 power ascension startup program continued.
Inspection Procedures 71707, 30307, 71710, 62703, 61726, 93702, 72580, 70302, 70301, 70300, 35501, 92701, 92709, and 92700 were applied during this inspection.
This inspection effort required 143 inspector-hours for Unit 1, and 212 inspector-hours for Unit 2 by four resident inspectors.
This inspection began during an off-shift period; approximately 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> on Unit 1 and 35 hours4.050926e-4 days <br />0.00972 hours <br />5.787037e-5 weeks <br />1.33175e-5 months <br /> on Unit 2 were accomplished during off-shift periods.
Results of Ins ection:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8602250120 860204 i PDR ADOCN, 05000275
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted c
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D. Shiffer, Vice.President Nuclear'ower Generation
"R.
C. Thornberry, Plant Manager
"-R. Patterson, Assistant Plant Manager; Slant Superintendent
"<J.
M. Gisclon, Assistant Plant Manager for Technical Services-'C.
L. Eldridge, Quality Control Manager
='K. C. Doss, On-site Safety Review Group 1-
-"D. A. Taggart, Quality Assurance Supervisor R.
G. Todaro, Security Supervisor; S.
D. Townsend, Assistant Plant Superintendent~
-"D. B. Miklush, Maintenance Manager,".
J.
A. Sexton, Operations Manager
>"T. J. Martin, Training Manager
'"W. G. Crockett, Instrumentation and Control Ma'intenance Manager
<J. V. Boots, Chemistry and Radiation Protection Manager
<L. F. Womack, Engineering Manager
"T. L. Grebel, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor
"=S. R. Fridley, Senior Operations Supervisor R.
S. Weinberg, News Service Representative
>E. M. Conway, Personnel and General Services Manager I
The inspectors interviewed several other licensee employees including shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians and engineers, quality assurance personnel and general construction/startup personnel.
<'enotes those attending the exit interview.
Note:
Acronyms are used throughout this report; refer to the Index of Acronyms at the back of the report.
2.
0 erational Safet Verification a ~
General During the inspection period, the inspectors observed and examined activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facility.
The observations and examinations of those active.ties were conducted on a daily, weekly or monthly basis.
On a daily basis, the inspectors observed control room activities to verify compliance with selected LCOs as prescribed in TSs.
Logs, instrumentation, recorder traces, and other operational records were examined to obtain information on plant conditions, and trends were
'reviewed for compliance with regulatory requirements.
Shift turnovers were observed on a sample basis to verify that all pertinent information of plant status was relayed.
During each week, the inspectors toured the accessible areas of the facility to observe the following:
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(a)
General plant and equipment conditions.
(b)
Surveillance and maintenance activities.
(c)
Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment.
(d)
Radiation protection controls.
(e)
Conduct of selected activities, for compliance with the licensee's administrative controls and approved, procedures.
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(f)
Xnteriors of electrical and control panels.
(g)
Xmplementation of selected portions of the,licensee's physical security plan.
(h)
Plant housekeeping and cleanliness.
(i)
Essential safety feature equipment,'alignment a'nd conditions.
t II The inspectors talked with operators in the control room, and other plant personnel.
The discussions centered on pertinent topics of general plant conditions, procedures, security, training, and other aspects of the involved work activities.
b.
Unit 2 Residual Heat, Removal Pum 2-2 Suction Valve Position Switch During a tour of the Unit 2 BXT room the inspector observed that the stem of RHR pump 2-2 suction valve,'RHR-2-8700B, was not extended far enough to contact its "snap-lock" interlock position switch.
This MOV, normally required to be fully open, was verified to indicate full open on remote control room VPX.
The inspector promptly notified the SFM of this discrepancy.
Subsequent investigation by operations and XSC determined this valve was indeed fully open, but the position switch was improperly located.
The inspector discussed with plant management the necessity for a high level of awareness by auxiliary operators during their plant equipment tours.
Final resolution of the RHR-2-8700B "snap-lock" position switch is described further in this report under section 3.a.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Maintenance The inspectors observed portions of, and reviewed records on, selected maintenance activities to assure compliance with approved procedures, technical specifications, and appropriate industry codes and standards'urthermore, the inspectors verified maintenance activities were performed by qualified personnel, in accordance with fire protection and housekeeping controls, and replacement parts were appropriately certified.
a.
Residual Heat, Removal Pum Suction Valve Position Switch Ad ustment
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The inspector observed selected portions of the subject maintenance to relocate Unit 2 valve 8700B interlock position switch.
The work was conducted in accordance with plant procedures and the subject SWF.
The valve was cleared with the SFM.
The IRC technician was qualified to perform the task.
The valve was cycled to verify position switch performance and then was acceptably returned to service.
Further investigation by the ISC department revealed this position switch has no safety-related function.
b.
Diesel Generator 1-3 Lube Oil Tem erature Instrument The inspector observed portions of the repair work, on the subject temperature instrument.
The work was conducted in accordance with Action Request A0014382.
This temperature instrument was verified to be correctly operating by calibrated equipment.
The technician was qualified and understood the work activity.
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Pressurizer Level Transmitter The inspector observed portions of the replacement of the Unit 2 pressurizer level transmitter (LT-460).
The level transmitter was isolated and tagged in accordance with the clearance.
The replacement transmitter was appropriately stored and packaged prior to installation.
The inspector observed the "proof" test of the capillary filland the transmitter installation, and reviewed the work package for compliance to administrative controls.
d.
Limitor ue 0 erator Tor ue and Limit Switch Ad ustment Containment isolation valves FCV-658 and 659 of the CHP Exhaust, System were cleared for electrical maintenance during the Unit 2 outage.
The inspector reviewed approved clearances and SWFs for both valves and determined the work activities were properly authorized and scoped.
Torque and limit switch adjustments on FCV-658 were observed by an inspector.
The "open" torque switch setpoint was adjusted to.be the same as the "close",
and the "close" limit switch was set for 10% valve steam 'travel vice 5%.
All observed maintenance activities were, performed in accordance with the SWF, and properly documented by a.journeyman electrician.
Subsequent post maintenance testing included manual and remote valve stroking operation.
No violations or deviations were identifie'd.
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4.
Surveillance By direct observation and record review of selected surveillance testing, the inspectors assured compliance with TS requirements and plant procedures.
The inspectors verified that test equipment was calibrated, and acceptance criteria were met or appropriately dispositioned.
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Feedwater Flow Nozzle Calibration
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The inspector observed selected portions of subject STP R-14.
The licensee engineers understood and conducted the calibration in accordance with the STP.
b.
Boric Acid Transfer Pum s
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Performance of STP P-14B "Routine Surveillance Test of Boric Acid Transfer Pumps" on Unit 1 transfer pump 1-2, was witnessed by the inspector.
The test included measurements of pump differential pressure, bearing lube oil.temper'ature, and vibration.
Required administrative approvals to perform the test were verified, and test instrumentation was calibrated.
Additionally, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel 'in accordance, with an approved test procedure and shopwork follower.
"'ontainment Fan Cooler Units Routine'~Surveillance 1:
rt'he inspector observed selected p'ortions of the subject STP M-51 for Unit 1.
The test was performed and data,was'ecorded in accordance with the procedure.
The licensed op'er'ator p'erforming the test was knowledgeable of test objectives and conduct; and took the data neatly and accurately.
The te'st results were reviewed by'he SFM to verify compliance to TS.
d.
Batte 2-2 uarterl Surveillance The inspector observed technicians sampling and measuring electrolyte specific gravity, temperatur'e and level.
The data was taken and recorded in accordance with STP M-llB requirements and data sheet.
The technicians were qualified for the task and were knowledgeable of the conduct of the STP.
Test, data was reviewed by a power production engineer.
e.
Fire Detection S stem Functional The inspector observed selected portions of STP I-34B on control room fire detectors.
The technicians conducted the test in accordance with the procedure and documented results on a data sheet.
Material for the test was as 'required by the procedure and equipment was calibrated.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Steam Generator Moisture Carr -over Sodium Tracer Radiolo ical Controls The inspector observed the establishment and maintenance of the boundaries of the subject controls.
Access to the radiological areas in the turbine building was limited to required personnel that had been verified as appropriately trained and qualified.
Surveys of the source container and packaging were appropriately documente ~
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b.
Plant Tri from 100/ Power'
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'I The inspector reviewed the S/U TP 43.4, "Plant Trip," used to conduct a turbine/reactor trip 'fro'm 100'/ power.
This test was performed when the 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> "warranty run was terminated due to a condenser tube leak.
All safety systems, functioned a's designed.
The analysis of test. data'ill be evaluated'as part of the 100'ower plateau data review.
C.
Net I,oad Re'ection Test Unit,2 The Unit 2 net load rejection from 100/ power has been attempted twice, both times resulting in a reactor trip.
In each instance, all safety related components responded as required and operator actions were in accordance with plant procedures.
The licensee plans to re-attempt this startup test after the current strainer outage and a successful 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> warranty run at 100/ power have been completed.
The inspector reviewed S/U TP 43.2,
"Net Load Trip Test from 100/ Power," which was similar to the Unit 1 test procedure.
d.
ualit Assurance for the Startu Test Pro ram The inspector reviewed several QA department audits of the startup test, program.
The audits verified conduct of selected tests in accordance with the test sequence and administrative controls, tracking of test deficiencies, and control of measurement and test equipment.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Follow-u of Information Notice a
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Tem orar Strainers Left Installed in Pum Suction Pi in Information Notice Number 85-96 (Closed)
The licensee's review of the subject notice indicated that control of strainers was documented in S/U test procedure 1.11.
This S/U test was accepted as complete for operations on October 27, 1983 for Unit 1 and July 3, 1985 for Unit 2.
Completed test procedure S/U TP 1.11 showed that all strainers were removed, or being tracked by a Mechanical Jumper Log.
Review of the Mechanical Jumper Logs indicates that all strainers have been documented as removed or were being tracked by a log for both Units.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
0 en Item Follow-u a
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0 en Item 50-275/85-32-01 (Closed)
The inspector verified the corrective actions taken to prevent, future occurrences of improper control of personnel access to Class 1 material storage areas.
A recent inspection of Class
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material storage areas indicates an increased awareness of personnel to access control requirements.
Open Item'50-275/85-32-01 is considered closed.
ti b.
0 en Item 50-323/85-32-01
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I4 In response to the inspection findings described in section 4.b of IR 50-323/85-32-01 concerni'ng FME and CSE,,the QC an'd maintenance departments have implemented',certain, corrective actions.
Supplement 2 was added to NPAP C-10,
"Housekeeping General",
to explicitly prescribe housekeeping requirements for each zone (i.ncluding zone
"Tool Control/Foreign Material Exclusion").
Also, a
gC surveillance plan for evaluating entry or work in confined -spaces;,,and a QC,check list to verify FME/Tool accounta'bility were created.
The inspector has reviewed all aforementio'ned documents and considers, them sufficient to close open item 50-323/85-32-;01.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Licensee Event Re ort Follow-u Circumstances and corrective actions described in the LER listed below, were examined by the inspector.
Reporting to the NRC was within the required time intervals.
The inspector also ensured corrective actions had been established and the event was accurate1y described.
a.
Licensee Event Re ort 1-85-035 Following a detailed review of the Unit 1 LER 85-035, the inspector discerned several specific discrepancies.
Most. of the identified errors were of minor significance and could be characterized as typographical and'ditorial in nature.
However, the inspectors primary concern centered upon an inaccurate description of the plant conditions existing during discovery of the event.
The licensee plans to issue a revised LER to correct all identified discrepancies.
Furthermore, the Regulatory Compliance Supervisor intends to discuss the importance of complete and accurate event reporting with his group using LER 1-85-035 as an example.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Licensee Plans for Co in with Potential Strike Licensee contingency plans have been re-inspected since the last inspection (IR 50-275/85-39)
because of a change in security personnel numbers and a new, potential strike vote by contract security personnel on January 22.
The licensee had contingency plans for this potential strike to assure manning of all security plan required positions.
The licensee implemented the contingency plan prior to the strike vote and assured all requirements were continually met.
However, the strike was averted by satisfactory completion of contract negotiations.
No violations or deviations were identifie A d
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10.
On-site Event Follow-u a
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Hi h Dra Bindin of Anchor Darlin Snubbers A
During post fuel load RCS heatup and power ascension pipe support walkdowns of Unit 2, OPEG discovered several snubbers that appeared to be bound up.
Walkdown problem'eports have documented seventeen instances of ten specific,snubbers (primarily on HFW lines) that have exhibited high drag'orce binding conditions following'thermal transients.
These snubbers, whre <<observed to 'r'estrict'the normal thermal growth of their asso'ciated piping systems,', whi:ch'resulted in unexpectedly higher stress loading (but. within design "limits).
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'I As of yet, all occurrences of high.'drag binding, have,'been limited to Unit 2 and to a specific type of snubber (i.e. Anchor Da'rling 5500).
OPEG and the manufacturer ha've identi~fie'd'the root cause's design and/or manufacturing tolerance'elict'encies in the ball screw assembly which were not pi'eked up during'the manufacturers standard acceptance test.
Immediate
'corrective 'actions" w'ere, taken by the licensee's maintenance staff toeplace all. the effected AD-5500 snubbers with similar shop tested"snubbers and to conduct enhanced pipe support walkdowns during'~power operations.
The licensee and the manufacturer have continued to work closely to establish a long-term plan of corrective action.
During the Unit 2 strainer outage, all AD-5500 snubbers, including those in containment, have been scheduled for *functional testing and repair work to modify the ball screw assembly.
All accessible Unit
AD-5500 snubbers will receive the same treatment in the near future; inaccessible snubbers will be tested/repaired in the upcoming refueling outage.
Furthermore, Anchor Darling as the manufacturer, has been formally requested by the licensee's general office to consider applicability of a
CFR 21 report.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Exit On January 24, 1986 an exit meeting was conducted with the licensee's representatives identified in. paragraph 1.
The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as described in this repor r P
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Index of Acron s
BIT CHP CSE FCV FME IRC IR LER LCO ICV LT MFW MOV MP NPAP NRC OPEG
,PG&E QA QC RCS RHR SFM STP S/U SWF'P TS VPI Boron Injection Tank Containment Hydrogen Purge Confined Space Entry Flow Control Valve Foreign Material Exclusion Instrumentation and Control
Inspection Report
Licensee
Event.Report
Limiting Conditions for Operation
Level Control Valve
Level Transmitter
Main. Feed Water
Mo'tor'perate'd Valve
'
Maintenance
Procedure
Nuclea'r Plant Administrative Procedure
Nuclear Re'gulatory
Commission
On-site Plant Engineering'roup
< Pacific
Gas '6 El'ectric
wQuality Assurance
Quality Control
Shift Foreman
'" Surveillanc'e'est.
Procedure
Start-up
Shopwork
Follower'est
Procedure
Technical Specification
Valve, Position Indication
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