IR 05000275/1981026

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IE Insp Repts 50-275/81-26 & 50-323/81-16 on 811005-09.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Const Activities Including Licensee Actions on 10CFR50.55e Items & Hosereel Fire Sys Hangers
ML16340C130
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  Pacific Gas & Electric icon.png
Issue date: 11/12/1981
From: Bishop T, Burdoin J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML16340C129 List:
References
50-275-81-26, 50-323-81-16, NUDOCS 8112080453
Download: ML16340C130 (16)


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I 50-275/81-26 Report No.

50-323 81-16 U. S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF IflSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION V

Docket No.

50-2

50-323 License No.

CPPR-39 CPPR-69 Safeguards Group Licensee:

Pa ific G s and Electric Com an P.

8 x 7442 an F

n i C lifrni 94120 Facility Name:

Diablo C n on Units 1 and

Inspection at:

Diablo Can on Site San Luis Obis o Count California 5 Cor orate Office Inspection conducted:October 5-9 1981 Inspectors:

J.

. Bur oin, Reactor Inspector Date S gned Date S gned Approved by:

T.

W. Bishop, Chief, P ojects Section

Reactor Construction-Projects Branch Summary:

LK lxl85 ate S gne Ins ection durin eriod of October 5-9 1981 Re ort Nos. 50-275/81-26 and 50-323/81-16

.

Areas Inspected:

Routine unannounced inspection by regional based inspector of construction activities including licensee actions on 50.55(e)

items, TMI task action plan items, hosereel fire system hangers and site tour.

The inspection involved 38 inspection hours by one inspector.

Results:

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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~ PD~R PDR ADOCK 05000275 RV Form 219 (2)

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DETAILS 1.

Individuals Contacted a.

Pacific Gas and Electric Com an PGEE H.

R.

R.

D. Etzler, Project Superintendent

  • D. A. Rockwell, Resident Electrical Engineer C. L. Braff, Piping Hanger Group Supervisor R.

K. Rhodes, Technical Services:Supervisor

  • J. R. Bratton, Lead,,QC,Eng'ineer J. J.

Nystrom, QC>,'Engineer, E. L. Green, Field'echanical

>Engi'neer "

D. R. Cryer,'iping Engineer,,l '

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W.,J.

Manegold, Construction,.Engi'nee'r;,

G. L. Johnson, ',Civ'j),'Engineeri,ng !Inspector<<

b.

Pullman W. Karner, QA/QC',Manager,',

M. Llewellyn," QA Auditor,,'.

H. P. Foie Com an V. H. Tennyson, QA, Ma'nager E. T. Smullen, QC Records Supervisor

  • Denotes attendees at exit meeting; NRC Resident Inspectors, Messrs.

J.

D. Carlson and M. M. Mendonca attended exit meeting.

2.

Plant Tour Upon arrival at the site on October 5, 1981, the inspector toured Unit 1 containment.

Modifications to containment spr ay piping hanger 176-146V at the 140 ft. elevation were in progress.

It was noted considerable scaffolding lumber was stored under the pressurizer relief tank at the 91 ft.,elevation.

The licensee stated that this lumber would be removed prior to closing the containment for low power testing.

3.

Licensee Action on 50.55 e

Items a.

Modifications to Unit 1 Containment S r a Pi in Han ers

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The licensee submitted a potential 50.55(e) report dated September 21, 1981 regar ding making modifications to containment spray piping due to the use of incorrect seismic analysis in the original hanger design.

The re-evaluation of the hangers for Unit 1 containment spray piping required fourteen hangers to be modified.

The modifications have been completed on all but three hangers, located at the 190 ft. and 250 ft. elevations.

Scaffolding must be erected on the polar crane before these containment spray hangers can be modified.

The inspector examined the modification packages for four of these hangers and inspected two of the hangers in the containment.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

This item remains open and will be reported in a subsequent inspection report.

I I b.

Re-Evaluation of Pi in Han ers in Annulus Area of Unit 2 Containment l'he licensee submitted a potential 50.55(e) report dated September 29, 1981 regarding a potential problem in the analysis of piping systems contained in ',the annulus area of Unit 2 containment.

The inspector reviewed, this item. with 'the licensee.

The licensee's engineering effort is presently involved 'in'the r'eview of piping supports for Unit 1,'(submitted 'on iSeptember 28, 1981 as a potential 50.59 report)

and 'will take'p the issue for Unit 2 as early as engineering effor't is'available.

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The overall licenseecorrective actions in,.the area'f 'seismic design have not been finalized as of the 'close of the inspection.

The development of these actions is being reviewed separately, by the.NRC and will be addressed in subsequent inspection reports;

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4.

TMI Task Action Plan Items for.Unit 1 The following TMI task action plan items described in NUREG-0737 were inspected to verify that the installation is completed in accordance with acceptable criteria, that applicable drawings were changed and that the components and system have been tested and placed in service or are ready to be placed in service.

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II.B.1 Reactor Coolant S stem Vents This task action item requires the addition of Reactor Coolant System (RCS)/Reactor Vessel Head high point vents.

The modification at Diablo Canyon Unit 1 consists of the installation of redundant reactor head vent systems.

Each system consists of two DC solenoid operated valves in tandem.

These valves are normally closed and are energized to open.

They close on loss of power.

The two valves of each system are energized from a 125 volt vital batter IL I

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The inspector examined the design and construction records and inspected the installation in the containment and control room for:

(1)

Identification and location - proper type of instrument component with proper range, rating and proper location.

(2)

Supports and protection - physical protection from missiles and high energy line breaks.

(3)

Independence

- physical separation between redundant instrument components at sensors and actuating devices in the control panels.

(4)

Testing - calibration of indicating instruments in the control room, and pressure or level tr'ansmitters (sensors).

I (5)

gC inspection--, including 'generation of inspection records during inspection activities: by, gC'ersonnel.

(6)

Records Inspection

- Modification package and dr awings changed.

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The installation of these redundant systems is compl'eted except for receipt and installation of environmentally qualified electrical connections on the reactor, head for the'our solenoid valves.

I No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

This item remains open and will be reported in a subsequent inspection repor t.

II.E.1.2 Auxiliar Feedwater S stem Automatic Initiation and Flow Indication Part One,-

The position requires the design shall provide for automatic initiation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFWS)

and further requires that the initiation system be safety grade.

The auxiliary feedwater system, consisting of two motor driven, and one turbine driven pumps, is initiated by low-low steam generator level; feedwater pump trip; safety injection; or loss of offsite power.

The auxiliary feedwater initiation circuitry at Diablo Canyon Unit 1 is part of the Engineered Safety Features (ESF)

System, and as such, is installed in accordance with IEEE-Standard 279.

The modifications to the auxiliary feedwater system consisted of upgrading to safety grade (class I) the controls to the four steam generator level control valves, LCV-110, 111, 113 and 115, and the four bypass valves LCV-106, 107, 108 and 109.

The four level control valve operators are safety grade limitorque operators.

The bypass valve operators originally rotork have been replaced with Class I limitorque operator rh f

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The inspector examined the design and construction records, and inspected the installations of modifications to the level control valves, and the by pass valves.

Part Two - The position requires that capability be provided in the control room to ascertain the actual performance of the AFWS when it is called to perform its intended function.

This entai ls providing safety-grade indication in the 'control room of auxiliary feedwater flow to each steam generator.

The position further requires that the auxiliary feedwater flow instrument channels be powered from erne'r'gency,',,buses.

The original design included four'(one per steam generator)

auxiliary feedwater flow channels energized from two separate critical instrument power buses, with two flow channels on each bus.

The upgrading of these channels

'to safety grade required rearranging and relocating flow 'chan'nel components'in Hagan Racks 18 and 26 to provide class 5 isolation'betwe'en>.:loops" I E'2 and

8 4, and modifying the cabling and;!circhitry, between'the flow transmitters The modificati ohs," and> changes >to,<the auxi l.i arg, feedwater system automatic initiatjon 'and.",flow indication.,to.',upgrade,",them to safety grade were inspected for:,',,,

(1)

Identification and location - (prop'er'ype of,'n'strument component with'proper'r'ange;.,ratjn'g

'and. proper location.

(2)

Supports and.pr'otection - physical protection-from missiles and high energy line breaks.

I (3)

Independence

- physical separation between redundant instrument components at sensors and actuating devices in the control panels.

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Testing - calibration of indicating instruments in the control room, and pressure or level transmitters (sensors).

(5)

gC inspection - including generation of inspection records during inspection activities by gC personnel.

(6)

Records Inspection - Modification package and drawings changed.

The modifications and changes to the auxiliary feedwater system automatic initiation are completed.

Preliminary testing of the system has been accomplished.

Final testing which can only be

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accomplished when the system is operational will be completed during hot functional testing following fuel load.

The modifications to the auxiliary feedwater system flow indication channels are completed, tested and turn over to operations.

The installations of the auxiliary feedwater automatic initiation system and flow indication channels are acceptable.

This task action item is closed.

II.F.2 Instrumentation for Detection of Inade uate Core Coolin This task action item requires that the licensee shall provide for each PWR a primary coolant saturation meter to provide on-line indication of coolant saturation conditions.

Additional instrumentation to provide an unambiguous indication of inadequate, core cooling is to include reactor-water-level indication.

The licensee installed a combustion engineering PWR subcooled margin monitor on unit 1 with a meter'-.in'he, control room.

A Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS-)-'was installed on Unit 1 to provide reactor-water-level indication in the control room.

The inspector examined the design and construction records and inspected the installations in the containment, auxiliary building and control room for,.~t'he subcooled margin monitor, and the reactor vessel level system.'I 1(

Attachment 1 o'f thi,s<.task, action ate'm requires upgrading to safety grade the incor'e,the'r'mocoup1e.

cablin'g,,to',44'e,,cont'gaol room.

These thermocouples monitor. core. outlet temperatures.~,",,,"

'he inspector exam'ined. the des,ign..and constriction records and inspected in the containment',, a'uxi,liary bui,lding. an'd control room the modifications to the installat'ion';ofthe', incore 'thermocouple cabling.

  • J The install ati ops. of:-'subcooled margin moni toring system'nd RVLIS, and the modifications; tq 'incore thermocouple'ablingwere inspected for:

(1)

Identification and location - proper typ'e of instrument component with proper range y'ating and proper location.

(2)

Supports and protection - ph'ysical protection from missi les and high energy line breaks.

(3)

Independence

- physical separation between redundant instrument components at sensors and actuating devices in the control panels

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Testing - calibration of indicating instruments in the control room, and pr essure or level, transmitters (sensors).

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gC inspection - including generation of inspection records during inspection activities by gC personnel.

(6)

Records Inspection

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Modificati'on,. package and drawings changed.

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ij The installation of the subcooled,ma'rgin monitoring system is completed, tested'and'urnover,to

"'o'perations. 'he installation of this system is,acceptable.,

The installation, and'pqeliminary'te'sting of, the ~reactor vessel level instrumentation,'system has been completed.Final testing will be completed duringhot functional 'testing following fuel load.

The install'ation,of> this'system,is,'a'cceptable.

The modifications.'.to!the'incore,'ther'mocouple cabling is incomplete.

The completion of-thH>'system,is'waiting delivery of a LOCA qualified enclose're-for the cold junction box lo'cated in the containment.

'Also qualifi'ed thermocouple extension cable is scheduled for delivery;i'n January 1982.

This task action item will remain'open pending completion of the modifications to the incore'thermocouple cabling.

5.

Hosereel Fire S stem Han ers During a telephone conversation on September 16, 1981, the licensee informed us that while conducting the routine as-built (final) design review of the hosereel fire system hangers (by the field pipe hanger design group) three overspan conditions were identified.

A review of entire system resulted in the addition of a number of new hangers to the hosereel fire system.

The inspector examined the installation packages for thirteen additional pipe hangers (listed below) for units 1 and 2 Hosereel Fire System in the auxiliary building and inspected the installation of four (*) of these hangers.

384-11R

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384-229R 384-150R

  • 384-260R 384-152R
  • 385-54R 384-201R 385-58R
  • 384-209R
  • 385-59R 384-211R 385-60R 384-212R No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

This item is close à 1(

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6.

On-Site Desi n Activities The inspector examined a sample of the quality records of onsite design activities, design of small bore (2 inches and less) piping hangers (unit 2).

The inspection of this activity was not completed and will be continued during a subsequent inspection, in conjunction with the followup discussed in paragraph 3 of this report.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified for those records which wer e examined.

7.

Mana ement Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives, denoted in section

on October 9, 1981 to discuss the scope and findings of the site inspectio V I

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