IR 05000275/1981008

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IE Insp Repts 50-275/81-08 & 50-323/81-08 on 810401-30.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Procedure Reviews, Fuel Loading Prerequisites,Preoperational Test Results,Fire Prevention/Protection & Fuel Storage & Security
ML17083A900
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  Pacific Gas & Electric icon.png
Issue date: 05/09/1981
From: Bagaglio M, Mendonca M, Sternberg D
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML17083A899 List:
References
50-275-81-08, 50-275-81-8, 50-323-81-08, 50-323-81-8, NUDOCS 8106080512
Download: ML17083A900 (18)


Text

50-275/81-00 Report No.

50"323/81

U ~ S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION V

License No.

Licensee:

Priority CPPR39, CPPR69 Category P"cific Gas and Electric Company P. 0.

Bo::

7~>(>2 Facility Name:

Inspection at:

San Francisco, California 94106 Diablo Canyon Units 1 6 2 Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California Inspection conducted:

Inspectors:

a'Iari Qg

" 10 April 1-30, 1981 S nio

,esident Reactor Inspector Harvin I!endonca, Resident Reactor Inspector E

Date Signed

~ /l'/

Date Signed Date Signed roved by:

D. kI. Sternberg, Chief, Re ctor Projects Section

Division of Resident Reactor Projects Da e Signed Summary:

Insnection of A ril 1-30 1981 Re ort Nos. 50-275/81-08 6 50-323/81-08 Areas Inspected:

Routine inspection of plant tours, procedure revie~~s, fuel loading prereruisites, bulletin/circular folio<<ups, preoperational test results, follo~mp of outstanding items, fire prevention/protection, fuel storage and security, and operating staff training, This inspection involved 110 inspector-hours onsite by t~~o NRC resident inspectors.

Results:

No items of noncompliance or deviations vere identified.

s xoooso~~

II 7 Form 219 (1)

DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted

""R. Thornberry, Plant Hanager

>R. Patterson, Plant Superintendent

"'J.

S.

Diamonon, QC Supervisor

":J. H. Gisclon, Power Plant Engineer

<D. A, Backens, Supervisor of Haintenance J.

A. Sexton, Supervisor of Operations R.

R. Smith, Security Shift Supervisor

"J. V. Boots, Supervisor of Chemistry and Radiation Protection
>R. T. Twiddy, Supervisor of Quality Assurance The inspectors also talked with and interviewed a number of other licensee employees including members of general construction, the operations staff and QA per onnel.

<Denotes those attending the exit interview.

2, Plant Tour The inspectors walked through various areas of the plant on a weekly basis to observe activities in progress; to inspect fuel storage security; to inspect the general state of cleanliness, housekeeping and adherence to fire protection rules; to check the proper approval of "man on the line, caution and clearance" tags on equipment, and to review with operation personnel the status of various systems in the plant.

The inspectors noted that the status of the systems and the housekeeping appeared consistent with construction activities.

The reactor cavity is still bein" maintained as a clean area.

Cleanliness and housekeeping of the plant is still improving.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified, 3.

Procedure Review An inspector reviewed the following new or revised procedures:

STP I-4B3 STP P-6B STP R-28 NPAP A-102 NPAP A-102 NPAP A-101 Determination of Source Range Detector Characteristic Curves Routine Surveillance Test of Steam Driven Auxiliary Peed-water Pump Determination of Shutdown Flux Level General Authorities and Responsibilities of the Shift Foreman Supp

Assignment of Shift Administrative Duties Supp

Relieving the h'atch No items of noncompliance or deviations

~ ere identifie Fuel Load (EL Prerecuisites The following Task Action Plan (TAP) items were reviewed during the course of this inspection:

a.

TAP I.B.1.2 - Evaluation of Organization and Hanagement Improvements of OL Applicants (FL requirement).

Suaanary:

The criteria for utility management re~uired establishment of a training manager in the plant organization and an administrative training staff at the corporate level.

Findings and Conclusions:

The applicant has elected to maintain decentralized training at the site.

Basically, the individual departments at the site will be responsible for conducting their individual training and providing supplementary general training for the entire site as necessary.

The applicant will also have provision at the site for monitoring training that has been given and formulating that training which must be completed.

The responsibility for maintaining training records will come under the cognizance of the Technical Assistant to the Plant Hanager.

At the corporate level training will be coordinated by the Technical Assistant to the Vice President

- Nuclear Power Generation.

The applicant has elected to coordinate the site training program from the corporate office, an acceptable option.

Based upon review of the revised job description of the Senior Nuclear Generation Engineer (Training) Nuclear Plant Operations, clear guidelines now exist that define the scope of this individual's assignment.

Specifically, the areas cited in ANSI/ANS 18.1 (1971)

(Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel)

are now under the coordination of the Training Engineer.

Accordingly, the training organization is considered satisfactory utilizing the criteria for utility management guidelines, Since final evaluation of the training organization was the last open item under I.B.1.2., this TAP is considered satisfied and closed.

b.

TAP I,A.1.2 - Shift Supervisor Administrative Duties (PL requirement).

TAP I.C.3

<< Shift Supervisor Responsibilities (1L reouirement).

Summary:

Review the administrative duties of the shift supervisor, and delegate functions that detract from or are subordinate to the management responsi-bility for assuring safe operation of the plant to other personnel not on duty in the control room.

Issue a corporate management directive that clearly established the command duties of the shift supervisor and emphasized the primary management

-3>>

responsibility for safe operation of the plant.

Revise plant procedures to clearly define the duties, responsibilities and authority of the shift supervisor and the control room operators.

Findings and Conclusions:

During inspection 50-275/81-02 an inspector reviewed the management directive to the Shift Foreman and the administrative directive (NPAP A>>102)

delineatin the Shift Foreman's duties and responsibilities.

The management directive was evaluated as satisfactory but NPAP A-102 needed revision.

Accordingly, the applicant has revised NPAP A-102 and issued a site specific supplement to NPAP A-102 detailing shift administrative duties and assigning responsibility for their completion.

An inspector has reviewed both NPAP A-102 and its supplement and has found them satisfactory to meet the re~uirements of both TAP's I.A.1.2. and I.C.3.

Accordingly, TAP's I.A.1.2. and I.C.3. are considered closed.

c.

TAP II.E.4.1 - Dedicated Hydrogen Penetrations (FL reruirement).

Summary:

Plants using external recombiners or purge systems for postaccident combustible gas control of the containment atmosphere should provide containment penetration systems for external recombiner or purge systems that are dedicated to that service only, that meet the redundancy and single-failure requirements of General Design Criteria 54 and 56 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50, and that are sixed to satisfy the; flow reruirements of the recombiner or purge system.

The procedures for the use of combustible gas control systems following an accident that results in a degraded core and release of radioactivity to the containment must be reviewed and revised, if necessary.

Findings and Conclusions:

The applicant has elected to install hydrogen recombiners inside containment.

The applicant has completed the internal recombiner installation and pre-operational testing.

This effort by the applicant meets the re~uirement for installation by 7/1/81.

The applicant is now in the process of writing and/or revising operating procedures for the use of the internal recombiners.

Pending issuance of operating procedures for the internal recombiners this TAP will remain open.

d.

TAP II.G.l - Emergency Power for Pressuri".,er Equipment (FL reruirement)

Summary:

Consistent with satisfying the reeuiremtnts of General Design Criteria 10, 14, 15, 17, and 20 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 for the event of loss-of~offsite power, the following positions shall be implemented:

Power Supply for Pressurizer Relief and Block Valves and Pressurizer Level Indicators Ifotive and control components of the power-operated relief valves (PORVs) "hall be capable of being supplied from either the offsite power source or the emergency power source when the offsite power is not available.

(2)

t<otive and control components associated with the PORV block valves shall be capable of being supplied from either the offsite power source or the emergency power source when the offsite power is not available.

(3)

hfotive and control power connections to the emergency buses for the PORVs and their associated block valves shall be through devices that have been qualified in accordance with safety-grade reauirements.

(4)

The pressurizer level indication instrument channels shall be powered from the vital instrument buses.

The buses shall have the capability of being supplied from either the offsite power source or the emergency power source when offsite power is not available.

Findings and Conclusions:

Each PORV is controlled by a solenoid-operated air valve which is energized-to-open, spring<<to-close.

The circuits to the solenoid valves are supplied with power from the emergency station batteries (125 v DC).

The PORV's are air-to-open, fail-closed valves.

They are normally supplied by the plant air compressors with 80 psi air.

Two of the three valves have a backup supply from the nitrogen system to function on loss of air, and Class I high pressure accum-ulators which have sufficient capability to operate each valve 120 times after the loss of both air and nitrogen.

The applicant currently is in the process of preoperationally testing the N2 system for PCV-455C and PCV-456.

(2)

The PORV block valves are powered from ESF buses which are served by either offsite power or the emergency diesel generators.

Each of the three valves is powered from a separate 480 volt ESF bus (Bus Sections 1F, 1G and 1H).

(3)

The motive and control power connections for the PORV block valves axe made with equipment qualified to safety-grade requirements.

The motive poi er for the PORV's is air or nitrogen (see 1 above).

The piping, accumulators, c'ontrol power connections, and the solenoid valves are c;ualified in accordance with safety-grade re< uirements.

(4)

The pressurizer level indication circuits are safety-grade and post-accident qualified.

AC power for all Class IE instrument

A

-5-channels is supplied from inverters which are supplied from the ESF buses with automatic backup from the emergency batteries.

Pending completion of satisfactory preoperational testing on the backup H2 system cited above this TAP will remain open.

e.

TAP I.C.2 - Shift Relief and Turnover Procedures (FL rec uirement)

Summary:

The licensees shall review and revise as necessary the plant procedure for shift and relief turnover to assure the following:

(1)

A checklist shall be provided for the oncoming and offgoing control room operators and the oncoming shift supervisor to complete and sign.

(2)

Checklists or logs shall be provided for completion by the off-going and oncoming auxiliary operators and technicians.

Such checklists or logs shall include any ecuipment under maintenance or test that by themselves could degrade a system critical to the prevention and mitigation of operational transients and accidents or initiate an operational transient (what to check and criteria for acceptable status shall be included on the checklist);

and (3)

A system shall be established to evaluate the effectiveness of the shift and relief turnover procedure (for example, periodic independent verification of system alignments).

Findings and Conclusions:

During a previous inspection (50-275/81-02)

an inspector verified partial compliance with the Summarv cited above.

The applicant has since'evised KPAP A-101 Supplement 1, Relieving the Uatch.

The revised procedure provides direction on use of the Auxiliary Operator's Log at shift turnover and now includes provision for independent system alignment verification by the Shift Engineer evaluating the shift turnover procedure.

Based upon changes made to.NPAP A-'01 Supplement 1, the applicant's administrative procedure for shift turnover meets TAP I.C.2. requirements and this TAP is closed.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5, K B<<lletin/Circular Followu An inspector reviewed licensee actions related to IE Bulletins and Circulars.

Inspection iindings relating to the Bulletins and Circulars revie~ ed i ere as follows; IE Circular S0-05, Emergency Diesel-Generator Lubricating Oil Addition and Onsite Supply (closed):

The licensee has now completed lube oil consumption

-6-testing on the 3 diesel generator units that will be used to support Unit 1 operation.

Accordingly, this Circular is closed.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

Preonerational Test Results An inspector has reviewed the following preoperational tests for adequate documentation, satisfactory use of measuring instrumentation, and the results meeting the, pr scribed acceptance criteria:

Procedure Title 12.2 Addendum

18.11 21.3 Addendum

21.4 Addendum

23.2 Addendum

23.10 Addendum

28.9 Addendum

33.1 Addendum 4 34.1 35.1 Addendum

35.3 Addendum,3 37.7 Addendum

37.20 37.27 39.4 Addendum 2.

Containment Spray System Preop Test Pire Damper Alarms Diesel Engine Air Systems Compressors Preoperational Tests and Air Blow Diesel Generator Preop Test Ventilation - Area H. Elevations 100', 115', 128',

and 165 Containment Hydrogen Purge System Energizing of Nuclear Xnstrumentation Inverters and Vital Instrument AC Distribution Panels Containment Isolation and Spray Initiation Fuel Transfer System Punctional Test Reactor Protection System Time Response Safeguards Systems Operational Test Hain Steam Xsolation Valve Tests Control Room Inaccessibility Dedicated Shutdown Xnstrument Panel Containment Structural Integrity and Integrated Leak Rate Test No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified, Folio~ uo of Outstandin Xtems a.

Hotor Driven Auxiliary Eeedwater (AH0) Pump Suction Gages (80-19-01,closed)

The Hotor Driven AI'H Pumps Suction Gages did not meet the ARiE Section XI Paragraph If%-4120.reruirement with respect to the full scale range.

The applicant has changed the subject gages and an inspector has verified their compliance with the aforementioned recuirement.

Accordingly, this item is closed.

b.

Steam Driven APH Pump Surveillance Test Procedure (STP)

(80-23-01, closed)

Performance of the Steam Driven AFW Pump STP

ould have rec uired ascension into Node 1 prior to verifying pump operability in lower modes and would have violated the proposed Technical Specifications.

The licensee has revised the subject STP to provide for its performance in Nodes 2 and

in accordance

~.ith proposed Technical Specifications.

Accordingly, this item is close c.

Maintenance Procedures (80-23-02, closed)

Some maintenance procedures reviewed did not include provision fcr documenting the cr'teria, specifications, and/or rualifications of measurin" instruments used on safety-related e~uipment.

Based upon discussions held with the applicant the licensee has committed to review existing maintenance procedures and add provisions to identify and document the measuring instruments used in maintenance procedures.

Such docu-mentation

~ ill either enumerate specifi.c c'ualifications of the measuring instrumentation or provide sufficient identifying information that will allori independent evaluation of the measuring instrumentation apart from the maintenance procedure.

Accordingly, this item is closed.

d.

Operating and Emergency Procedures (80-16-02, open)

Four of the subject procedures cited in IE report 50-275/80-16 appeared to conflict with the applicant's proposed Technical Specifications (TS).

An inspector has reviewed revised procedures OP L-4, Normal Operation at Power, and EP OP-16, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions.

'Based upon this review, OP L-4 and HP OP-16 now comply with the proposed TS.

Pending revision of EP OP-24, Loss of Containment Integrity, and EP M-6, Non-radiological Fire, to meet the proposed TS, this item will remain open.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

Fire Prevention/Protection The control room and cable spreading room were inspected.

The fire alarm, extinguishing eouipment actuating controls and fire fighting eauipment were verified to be operable in the cable spreading room and 25% of the balance of the plant.

The results of the latest fire inspections that were performed by the licensee and its consultant have been reviewed.

An audit of potential fire hazards for vital areas found that corrective actions had been taken or planned.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

Ooerating Staff Trainin The inspectors sat in on several training sessions being conducted for the operating.,taff.

The training sessions included renualification for licensed operators, health physics training for instrument and control technicians, security training fox various plant staff, and radiation protection txaining for plant management/supervisory personnel.

The inspectors reviewed some of the lesson plans used during these lectures.

An inspector reviewed and discussed with a licensee representative the applicant's computerized training records system.

The licensee is currently

-8-instituting use of this syst: em to track individual and group training needs and then formulate training schedules.

No items of noncompliance or deviations

>~~ere identified.

10.

Nerd Fuel Storage Unit'

The nevi~ fuel storage and security r~as inspected.

The inspector verified that the inte'"rity of the security controls were being maintained and adequate procedur s

ere available and enforced.

Environmental protection to control dust and debris, and to prevent fuel damage was being maintained.

The inspection ascertained that the re<;uirements of the special nuclear materials license

~~as being met.

No items of noncompliance or deviations vere identified.

ll.

Exit lntervie~;

The inspectors met crith a senior licensee representative on a z"eekly basis and ~rith the representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 on Hay 1, 1981.

The scope and findings of the inspection tuyere summarized by the inspectors.