IR 05000275/1981019
| ML16340B985 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 08/12/1981 |
| From: | Morrill P, Thomas Young NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16340B984 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-81-19, 50-323-81-13, NUDOCS 8109030225 | |
| Download: ML16340B985 (16) | |
Text
50-275/81-19 Report No.
0-323 81-13 Docket No.
-275 50-323 U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEt1ENT REGION V
License No.CPPR-39 CPPR-69 Safeguards Group Licensee:
d ctric Com an San Franci sco Cali fornia 94106 Facility Name:
Diablo Can on Units
8
Inspection at:
Diablo Can on Site, San Luis Obis o County, California Inspection conducted:
Jul 20-24, 1981 Inspectors:
Philip Morrs
,
eactor sp or Date S gned Date S gne Approved by:
Summary:
T. Young, Jr.,
Ch f, Reac r
ojects,Section
Reactor Operations, Projects ranch Date S gne Ins ection of Jul 20-24, 1981 Re ort Nos.
50-275 81-19
& 50-323 81-13)
Areas Ins ected:
Routine inspection of plant, tours, procedure reviews, fue oa ing prerequisites, bulletin/circular followups, preoperational test results, followup of outstanding items and operating staff training.
This inspection involved 32 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Persons Contacted
- R. Thornberry, Plant Manager
- R. Patterson, Plant Superintendent
- J.
S.
Diamonon, Quality Control (QC) Supervisor
- J.
M. Gisclon, Power Plant Engineer
"J.
A. Sexton, Supervisor of Operations J.
V. Boots, Supervisor of Chemistry and Radiation Protection
- R. T. Twiddy, Supervisor of Quality Assurance (QA)
R.
C.
Howe, Nuclear Generation Engineer The inspector also talked with and interviewed a number of other licensee employees including members of the operations staff, QC, and QA personnel.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
2.
Plant Tour The inspector walked through various areas of the plant to observe activities in progress; to insPect the general state of cleanliness, housekeeping and adherence to fire protection rules; and to review with operation's personnel the status of various systems in the plant.
The inspector noted that the status of the systems and the housekeeping appeared consistent with construction activities.
The reactor cavity is still being maintained as a clean area.
Cleanliness and housekeeping of the plant is still improving.
No'tems of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Task Action Plan TAP) Items The following TAP items were examined during the course of this inspection.
a.
I.A.2. 1 IMMEDIATE UPGRADING OF REACTOR OPERATOR AND SENIOR REACTOR OPE TOR TRAINING AND UALIF ICATIONS SURINRY:
This item requires revision of operating license (DL)
applicant's training programs to provide:
(I) training in heat transfer, fluid flow, and thermodynamics; (2) training in the use of installed plant systems to control or mitigate an accident involving core damage (related TAP item II.B.4); and (3) increased emphasis on reactor and plant transients.
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FINDINGS:
During inspection 50-275/80-20 (October 1-31, 1980)
~Nuc ear Plant Administrative Procedures (NPAP) 0-100, "Licensed Senior Operator and Operator Training Program,"
and NPAP B-101,
"NRC Licensed Operator Retraining Program,"
were examined and found not to address the expanded training requirements described above.
During the current inspection the inspector examined Administrative Procedure (AP) B-1, "qualification of Personnel on the Plant Staff,"
AP B-l, Supplement 1, "gualific'ations of Personnel on the Diablo Canyon Plant Staff,"
NPAP B-100, Revision 1, "Licensed Operator and Senior Operator Training Program,"
NPAP B-100, Revision 0, Supplement 1,
"NRC Licensed Operator Training Program,"
and NPAP-B-101,
"NRC Licensed Operator Retraining Program."
The inspector also discussed the implementation of the Reactor Operator (RO) and Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) retraining programs with plant staff and general office personnel.
CONCLUSIONS:
Based on these examinations and discussions, the inspector determined that the revised procedures addressed the expanded training'requitrements.'TAP Item 1.A.2. 1 is closed.
I.A.2.3 ADMINISTRATION OF TRAINING PROGRAMS SUMMARY:
Pending'ccreditation" of training institutions, licensees ancnapplicants for operating lice'nxses will assure that training center and facility instructors -who teach systems, integrated responses,'transient, and simulator courses demonstrate senior reactor operator qualifications and be enrolled in appropriate requalification programs.
FINDINGS:
During inspection 50-275/80-20 (October 1-31, 1980),
ttsTCP item was examined and left open pending satisfactory completion of Senior Reactor Operator examinations by the facility instructors.
The inspector examined the results of the SRO and RO examinations, held discussions with plant staff, and reviewed the qualifications of the instructors.
CONCLUSIONS:
Based on the examinations described above, the inspector 3idh th 0 ling
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t senior reactor operator qualifications and are enrolled in appropriate requalification programs.
TAP item I.A.2.3 is closed.
TAP II.B.4. TRAINING FOR MITIGATING CORE DAMAGE SUNNARY:
Licensees are required to develop a training program to teach the use of installed equipment and systems to control or mitigate accidents in which the core is severely damaged.
Shift technical advisors and operating personnel from the plant manager through the operation's chain to the licensed operators shall receive all the training indicated in Enclosure 3 to H.
R.
Denton's March 28, 1980 letter.
Managers and technicians in the Instrumentation and Control (18C), Health Physics and Chemistry Departments shall receive training cormensurate with their responsibilities.
Applicants for operating licenses should develop a training program prior to fuel loadin ~ 4
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FINDINGS:
The inspector examined the licensee's training programs to meet the requirements of this TAP.
The inspector also participated in portions of the classroom training sessions being given by Westinghouse personnel for the applicant.
CONCLUSIONS:
Based on these examinations, the inspector concluded m
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TAP. Item II.B.4 is closed.
TAP II.E.'4. 1 DEDICATED HYDROGEN PENETRATIONS FL RE UIREMENT)
SUMMARY:
Plants using external recombiners or purge systems. for postaccident combustible gas control of the containment atmosphere should provide containment penetration systems for external recombiner or purge systems that are dedicated to that service only, that meet the redundancy and single-failure requirements of General Design Criteria 54 and 56 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50, and that are sized to satisfy the flow requirements of the recombiner or purge system.
The procedures for the use of combustible gas control systems following an accident that results in a degraded core and release of radioactivity to the containment must be reviewed and revised, if necessary.
. FINDINGS:
The licensee has elected to install hydrogen recombiners
~nsi e containment.
The licensee has completed the internal recombiner installation and preoperational testing.
This effort by the applicant meets the requirement for installation by July 1, 1981.
The licensee has written and is finalizing operating procedures for the use of the internal recombiners.
CONCLUSIONS:
For the purposes of fuel loading and low power testing this TAP Item II.E.4. 1 i's considered closed.
III.A.1<<2 UPGRADE EMERGENCY SUPPORT FACILITIES SUMMARY:
Establish a near-site Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
with communication links to the on-site Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operational Support Centers (OSC).
FINDINGS:
The inspector examined the licensee's EOC, TSC, and OSC to verify operability of telephones, two-way radios, and computer links.-
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CONCLUSIONS:
The applicant's EOC (located at the San Luis Obispo
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For the purposes of fuel loading and low power (55 percent) testing, TAP III.A.1.2 is closed.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Prep erational Test Results Title i
Motor Dpiven"Aux.
FWP Initial Startup Turbine Driven Aux.
FWP Initial Startup and Per'form.
Demonstration An inspector has reviewed the following pr eoperational tests for adequate documenta'tion, satisfactory use of measuring instrumentation, and the resul,ts'meeting the prescribed acceptance criteria:
e Procedure ll 3.1 Addendum
3.7 8.4.1 16. 2 39.1 and,. Addendum
39.2 Letdown,'harging, Seal Water Makeup Water System Flushing Containment Isolation Valves Leak Test Preop.
Misc. Containment Leak Rate Test No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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5.
Fol 1 owu of Outstandin Items a.
0 eratin and Emer enc Procedur es 80-16-02, Closed)
Two of the subject procedures cited in IE Report 50-275/81-08 appeared to conflict with the applicant's proposed Technical Specifications (TS).
The inspector reviewed" revised procedures EP OP-24,
"Loss of Containment Integrity," and EP M-6, "Non Radiological Fire."
Based upon this review, EP OP-24 and EP M-6 now comply with the proposed TS.
Accordingly, this item is closed.
b.
Surveillance Set Point for Lo-Lo Steam Generator Level 80-15-01, lose During a previous inspection, an inspector found that the minimum Lo-Lo Steam Generator Level Trip Setpoint in STP I-11A and STP I-11B2 was established at 14 percent on the narrow range level channe ~
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-5-Supplement 9 to the Diablo Canyon Safety Evaluation Report requires that the minimum Lo-Lo steam Generator Level Trip Setpoint be established at 16 percent on the narrow range level channel.
Pending resolution of this difference between NRR and the licensee, this concern was kept as an open item.
During the current inspection, the inspector examined revised procedures STP I-11A and I-11B2.
The inspector also read an NRC internal memorandum dated May 5, 1981, from D. Dunning of the Instrument and Control System Branch, Division of Systems Integration, to B. Buckley of Operating Licensing Branch 4'3, Division of Licensing which documented that the setpoint of 15 percent requested by Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) was acceptable.
Based on the applicants'evised procedures and the documented acceptability of the 15 percent steam generator low-low level trip, the inspector concluded that this item is closed.
This also closes out the same item identified as a 50.55(e)
item in an initial PG&E letter dated July 26, 1979. This letter was followed-up by another PG&E letter dated February 19, 1981, which requested NRR to review the acceptability of the setpoint at 15 percent.
OI 80-15-01 is closed, as is the 50.55(e)
item identified in PG&E's letter dated July 26, 1979.
items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
IE Bulletin Circular Followu An inspector reviewed licensee actions related to IE Bulletins and Circulars.
Inspection findings relating to the Bulletins and Circulars reviewed were as follows:
IE Circular No. 79-05 - MOISTURE LEAKAGE IN STRANDED WIRE CONDUCTORS:
The inspector examined a
PG&E Memo to file from Mr. J. Herbst dated October 22, 1980, which documented the licensee's evaluation.
The evaluation concluded that there was no problem at Diablo since heat shrink butt splices were used and moisture incursion into the conductors was not possible.
This item is closed.
IE Circular No. 80-04 - SECURING OF THREADED LOCKING DEVICES ON SAFETY-RELATED E UIPMENT The inspector examined a
PG&E memo, Mr. J. Patterson to Mr. J. Shiffer dated September 8,
1980, which concluded that there was no problem at Diablo due to the nature of the equipment and the experience of the maintenance staff.
This item is closed.
IE Circular No. 80-09 - PROBLEMS WITH PLANT INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS The inspector examined licensee internal correspondence and test results to verify that the plant internal communications and "hot lines" are powered from the vital buses.
The inspector also verified that radio interference tests had been completed and that the licensee had taken appropriate corrective action.
No unsafe condition was identified.
This item is close ~
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I IE Circular No. 80-12 - VALVE-SHAFT-TO-ACTUATOR KEY MAY FALL OUT OF PLACE WHEN MOUNTED BELOW HORIZONTAL AXIS The inspector examined a
PG&E memo to file by Mr. A. Hardy dated September 29, 1980. This memo concluded that the circulars'xpressed concerns were not a problem at Diablo based on disassembly and visual examinations of actuators as well as inquiries to vendors.
This item is closed.
IE Circular No. 80-15 -
LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT PUMP COOLING AND NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN The inspector examined PG&E internal correspondence regarding the items contained in the circular.
The inspector concluded that the licensee was aware of the concerns expressed in the circular and had either closed them out or was handling them via the Westinghouse owner's group on a generic basis.
This item is closed.
IE Circular No. 80-16 - OPERATIONAL DEFICIENCIES IN ROSEMOUNT MODEL OD TRIP U ITS ND MODEL 1152 PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS The inspector examined an internal PG&E memo, Mr. R. Patterson to J. Shiffer, dated October 28, 1980, which documented that none of the subject trip units or pressure transmitters are installed at Diablo Canyon.
This item is closed.
IE Circular No. 80-21 -
REGULATION OF REFUELING CREWS The inspector verified that the concerns identified by the circular were examined and dealt with by the licensee in changes to core alteration procedure.
This item is closed.
IE Circular No. 80-22 -
CONFIRMATION OF EMPLOYEE UALIFICATIONS The inspector verified that the licensee's staff had reviewed the subject circular and had inplace appropriate means to verify employee qualifications.
This item is. closed.
IE Bulletin, No." 80-15 - POSSIBLE LOSS OF EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM ENS WITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER Based on 'examinati'ons of, Diablo':-Canyon Loss of Offsite Power Tests, licensee procedures,and licensee internal correspondence, the inspector verified that the licensee had addressed the concerns of the Bulletin as described
'-in, the licensee's letter 'response dated April 10, 1981.
This item is close f
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IE Bulletin No. 80-18 - MAINTENANCE OF ADE UATE MINIMUM FLOW THRU CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING'PUMPS FOLLOWING SECONDARY SIDE HIGH'ENERGY LINE RUPTURE The inspector examined the licensee's actions in response to the Bulletin,
, as described in the licensee's letter dated October 16, 1980, to verify that the mini-flow bypass valves had been opened and that emergency procedures had the appropriate precautionary statements.
This item is closed.
- hi No items of noncompl;iance~or deviations were identified.
gaaf0 The inspector,examined'the gA, program and procedures for operations.
This exa*mination consisted,,of a review of the licensee's program; examinations-.'of'auditreports, nonconformance reports, and corrective actions';,and discussions with plant staff personnel regarding the onsite and offsit'e auditschedule,"manning, levels',
and gA involvement in routine plant'= operation's'..
The inspector verified',that the'licensee's gA for operations, was,'being conducted
.in accordance with the established program, procedures
",. and 'administrative controls.'-+
I No items',-'of, 'noncompli'ance or"'deviations were identified.
Exit Interv'i'ew."
u The,i'nspector met-with licensee re'presentatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
at the end o'f the inspection on July 24, 1981, to summarize the scope and findings. of the inspection.
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