IR 05000271/1981013
| ML20010F931 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/13/1981 |
| From: | Collins S, Gallo R, Raymond W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20010F924 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-271-81-13, NUDOCS 8109150124 | |
| Download: ML20010F931 (26) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TERA 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 50-271-810715 50-271-810723 Region I Report No. 81-13
Docket No. 50-271 License No. DPR-28 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation 1671 Worcester Road Framinaham Massachusetts 91701 Facility Name:
Vermont Yankee Inspection at:
Vernon, Vemont Inspection conducted:
July 1-August 10, 1981 bf/jbm
$ fraf]/tt'11 f}IJ. Raymond/Seni/r Resident Inspector 9ll/f8f Inspectors:
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W date signed ArnatM11UjDV pldy
S. J. Collins, Resident Inspector dite signed
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Approved by:
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R. M. Gallo, Chief, Reactor Projects date signed l
Section 1A, Projects Branch #1 Inspection Summary:
l Inspection on July 1-August 10, 1981 (Report.No. 50-271/81-13)
Arcas Inspected: Routite announced inspection on regular and backshifts by Resident Inspectors of: action taken on previous inspection findings; IE Bulletin and Circular followup; review of shift logs and operating records; plant tours; observation of physical security; review of periodic and special reports; surveillance testing; maintenance activities; inspector followup of events; licensee staffing; in-office review of licensee
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event reports; inspector actions based on a report of radioactive material disposed on site property; and a review of personnel and qualifications and training. The inspection
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l involved 160 inspector hours onsite by two resident inspectors.
Results: Of the fourteen areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified in thirteen areas; one apparent item of noncompliance was identified in one area, as discussed in paragraph 6.J. of this report.
8109150124 810817 PDR ADOCK 05000271
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PDR Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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't DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted The below listed technical and supervisory level personnel were among those contacted:
Vemont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation Mr. L. Anson, Plant Training Supervisor Mr. E. Bowles, Training Supervisor Mr. R. Branch, Assistant Operations Supervisor Mr. P. Donnelly, Instrument and Control Supervisor
- Mr. R. Kenny, Mechanical Engineer Mr. L. Goldthwaite, Instrument and Control Foreman Mr. S. Jefferson, Reactor Engineering and Computer Supervisor Mr. B. Leach, Health Physicist Mr. M. Lyster Operations Supervisor
- Mr. W. Murphy, Plant Superintendent
- Mr. J. Pelletier, Assistant Plant Superintendent Mr. W. Penniman, Security Supervisor
- Mr. D. Reid, Engineering Support Supervisor Mr. S. Vekasy. Senior Mechanical Engineer Mr. G, Weyman, Chemistry and Health Physics Surervisor Mr. W. Wittmer, Maintenance Supervisor
- denotes those present at management meetings held periodically during the inspection.
2.
Action Taken on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (50-271/78-05-05): Adequate Decontamination Procedure. A draft copy of procedure AP 0620, solvents for Chemical Cleaning, was reviewed. AP 0620 will be used in conjunction with OP 5204 to establish controls for cleaning of fluid systems and com-ponents.
The controls established by OP 5204 and (proposed) AP 0620 were reviewed against the requirements of ANSI N45.2.2-1973 during a meeting with the plant Chemical Engir.2er on July 21, 1981. The
inspector noted the following dt. ring this review:
(1) The proposed version of AP 0620 identifies the specific cleaning solutions to be used on specified materials. The list of cleaning solutions developed and deemed acceptable for general use were l
evaluated to assure the solutions would have no adverse impact l
when used on the specified materials. Strengths of acid solutions would be 10% or less for general applications, (2) AP 0620 requiresplant chemistry personnel to provide directions i
for the preparation of cleaning solutions.
The solutions would
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be prepared from QC Stores supplies, whose chemical components would be known and controlled, and whose constituents would not be subject to deterioration for the solutions of interest, i
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The inspector noted that the requirements for Chemistry personnel involvement in cleaning solution preparation.
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could be clarified. The licensee noted the. comment and
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reviseo the draft version of AP 0620 accordingly,
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(3) AP 0620 specifies two methods for removing cleaning
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solutions from components to which they were applied, including a method for removal by rinsing in water. Afte discussion of the technique with the licensee, the draft version of
AP 0620 was changed to require components be flushed twice with water to ensure all residue of cleaning solutions are
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rencved, The inspector noted that the controls established by OP 5204
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and the proposed version of AP 0620 would meet the requirements
of ANSI N45.2.1-1973. This item will renain open, however, pending issuance of AP 0620 as an approved procedure, The licensee re sentative stated that AP 0620 should be issued by September 1, pre-1981, b.
(Closed) Unresolved Itan (50-271/79-04-04): Protection of DC Power Supplies from Common Mode Flooding in ECCS Corner Rooms, Licensee
.l reviews of the IEC 78-06 concerns were provided in evaluation memoranda dated A)ril 5, 1979 and April 22, 1981 Equipment 2nd floordrainsintieRhR(Northeast / Southeast)cornerroomswere
l previously sealed and capped to prevent open comunication between i
the rooms and the torus bay area. Additionally, water tight doors l
separate the P.HR corner rooms from the torus bay area. The licensee
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concluded that the RHR corner rooms were sufficiently protected to
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preclude a common mode failure from flooding,
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The RCIC and HPCI rooms were deemed susceptible to flooding from several line breaks postulated in the April 22, 1981 evaluation memo. However, since HPCI is rat an ECCS system, flooding of both HPCI and RCIC is not considsred to be a connon isode failure problem.
DC power panels located in both rooms could be affected by a single flooding event, but circuit breakers provide fault protection for the main 125 VDC Buses, DC-1 and DC-2, so that power supplies for redundant ECCS equipr1ent should not be affected.
Several examples of line breaks were considered in the April 22, 1981
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evaluation memo that could, assuming a single active failure of isolation valves, lead to large scale flooding in the torus area.
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j-Examples of failures included loss of the suppression chamber integrity; loss of ECCS suction lines from the tcrus; and loss of eqcipment suction lines from the condensate storage tank. None of
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the postulated failures t:1at could flood both HPCI pnd RCIC also involved a breach in the primary system boundary and, therefore, safe shutdown of the reactor using nomal means (condenser as heat sink) could be initiated independent of ECCS equipment,
i Based on the above, the licensee concluded no further flood protec-tion modifications were deemed necessary. The inspector reviewed
j the licensee evaluation memo, the arrangement of DC supply cabinets l
in the HPCI and RCIC rooms and the 125 VDC one line diagrams from
Drawings G191148, G191372, CWD 1184 and CWD 1452 No instances
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wherein a single failure could result in a degradation (loss) of
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both DC buses from a comenn flood of HPCI and RCIC were identified,
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Tnis item is closed.
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(Cicsed) Unresolved Item (50-271/79-12-03): Applicability of l'
Irifomation in SIL 299 relating to high drywell tci.pera-I ture effects on reactor vessel instrumentation were found applicable to VY.
Infomation from SIL 299 was incorporated in emergency pro-cedures OP 3116. Revision 10, and OP 3124, Revision 2, to caution
the operator about potential inaccuracies in vessel level and pro-
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vide limits in vessel level error. This item is closed, i
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-271/79-17-03): Torus Water Level f
Instrumentation. Periodic filling of the torus level instrumenta-
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tion reference legs has been added to the weekly checklist, as rE-
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ported in Inspection Report 79-21. No further failures of the type reported in LERs 79-30, 24 and 21, have occurred since initiation
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of the weekly checks of the reference legs in December 1979. Thus, corrective actions taken by the licensee appear adecuate to pre-clude recurrence of the event. Additionally, reduncant, wide range
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torus level instruments were installed under EDCR 79-57 (reference:
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NRC Region I Inspection Report 50-271/80-22), which provide. backup information on torus level. Additionally, two torus level taps are now used, with one wide range and one narrow range level instru-ment associated with each tap.
The dual tap arrangement should
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provide more reliable torus level readings. No further design modifications are presently planned by the licensee. This item is closed, (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-271/79-17-04): Fuel Water Rod Wear.
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Supplement I to LER 7945 was submitted by the licensee on June 25,
l 1980, which arovined th iasults of a loose parts evaluation and analysis. T1e analysis concluded that generation of loose parts i
from water rod lower end plugs is not expected to occur and, if a loose part were generated, there would be no unacceptable conse-quences. This item is clor.ed.
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f, (0 pen) Unresolved Item (50-?71/79-17-05):
Co.npliance with ANSI N18.7-1976 versus Technical Specification Requirements. This item had been submitted to NRC:NRR and the NRC's Quality Assurance Branch for review and resolution. The NRC Staff interpretation of the re-quirements of Note 1 of YOQAP-I-A is as follows:
When ccnflicts exist between the Technical Specifications and like requirements in the ANSI Standards, the conflicts will be resolved in favor of the Technical Specifications.
However, when requirements in the ANSI Standards supplement but do not conflict with like recuirements in the Technical Specifications, the ANSI Standarc s requirements shall also be complied with.
This position was forwarded to the licensee by memorandum from the Resident Inspector. This item remains unresolved pending licensee review of current practices for compliance with the ANSI Standards in light of the NRC Staff position; identification and incplementa-tion of changes to current practices; and subsequent review by the NRC.
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(0 pen) Unresolved Item (50-271/79-18-01): Use of Inprocess Inspection versus Mandatory Witness Point. The inspector noted during discussions with the onsite Operational Quality Assurance Coordinator on July 31, 1981, that instructions have been provided by corporate management to incorporate requirements for QC Hold Points in plant procedures, where applicable.
Examples of procedures where such requirements had been incorporated included the following:
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(1) AP 6001, Revision 7, Installation, Test and Special Test Procedures. Procedure Step 3 and Appentix A requires that the onsita 0QAC review Installation and Test procedures for PDCRs and EDCRsfor QA Hold Points, f
(2) AP 6023, P.evision 5, Unanticipated Non-Routine Corrective j
Maintenance. Procedure Step 1.f. and VYAPF 6023.01 requires OQAC notification of work plans for a review of required i
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Hold Points.
(3) OP 2511, Revision 8, Radwaste Cask Drum and Box Handling.
Procedure Step A.2 and VYOPF 2511.01, Step 2 require 0QAC sign-off for Hold Point inspections.
(4) OQAK-1, Revision 3,QualityInsuranceInspections.Section III specifies that the 0QAC shall specify Hold Po;nts as re-c quired for inspection of Job Orders and maintenance requests, l
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The inspector noted that the mechanism to provide for 0QAC notifica-tion prior to start of work on safety related maintenance requests had yet to be established by the licensee. This item remains unre-solved pending development of procedural controls to provide such notification and subsequent review by the inspector.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-271/80-04-01): Tap Setting Changes on AKV/480V and Startup Transfomers. Actions were completed on March 31, 1980, to position taps on Startup Transfomers T-3A and T-3B and Station Service Transfomers T-9 T-8. T-7, T-6, T-11 T-10. T-5B1-1A and T-582-1A to the positions recommended ir YAEC Report No. 1205. Work was completed in accordance with Maintenance Request 80-00367 and Procedure OP 5200.22. The changes effected by OP 5200.22 decreased the startup transformer tap by 2.5% and increased the station service taps by 5% to achieve an optimum operating voltage band to assure adequate operation of safeguard loads. This item is closed.
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(Closed) Follow Item (50-271/80-06-04):
Control Blade Lifetime Procedure. Reactor Engineering procedure OP 4404, Control Blade Lifetime Management, Revision 1, dated November 13, 1980, was re-vicwed. The procedure is used to calculate control blade exposures and to detemine when individual blocks should be replaced to avoid exceeding pre-established exposure limits. The present exposure limits are defined to require blade replac m ent wher a 10% reduction in worth has occurred. A projected blade (upper k segment) exposure of 2.025 SNYTS has been shown to correspond to a 10% reduction in worth.
OP 4404 was used to detemine which coerol blades should be changed out during the 1980 refucling outage. Plans for blade replacement during the 1981 outage are in progress.
Exposure pro-jections for blades now in use in cycle 8 were reviewed using foms VYOPF 4404.01, 4404.02 and 4404.03.
Based on prcjected exposures through cycle 9 operation, 9 blades are expected to exceed the criteria by E0C 9 and thus will be changed out in the 1981 refueling outage.
This item 1s closed.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-271/80-15-03): Verification That Installed Cables Are As Specified By YAEC 1216. The inspector reviewed the following documentation:
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Internal memorandum, RJK to JPP dated June 22, 1981
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CWDs B191301 Sheets 11V9, 803, 810, 1436 and 1108
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C/Cs B191301 Sheets 803, 1436 and 1108
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Ebasco Cable Pull Slips for cables C1803MRA1, C11109ES1, C1810MRB1,C11108FSIand11436BSII(11436BFII)
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Materials Order for cables from ROME CABLE under Order No. NY 706155
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Ebasco Services Inc. Specification Ebasco CX-68 for Electric Cable, Parts One and Two, Revision 6 dated November 16, 1970
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The licensee demonstrated for the cables identified above (in the
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MSIV and HPCI circuits) that the cables are traceable to the ROME CABLE Company, as specified in YAEC 1216. This item is closed.
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(Closed)FollowItem(50-271/80-06-02): Annual Recertification of I&C Technicians. The inspector reviewed forms VYDPF 0303.05 for the I&C Technicians who filled tne six pennanent positions as of June, 1980. The inspector not d that the annual 1980 recertification had been completed for each person, including the Department Supervisor's evaluation.
This item is closed.
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(Closed) Follow Item (50-271/80-08-02):
Licencee Actions in Response to IEB 80-17. Licensee actions in response to IEB 80-17 have been reviewed in previous NRC inspections, as documented in NRC Region I Inspection Reports 50 271/80-13, 80-15, 80-17 and 80-22.
Items re,naining open pending resolution of NRC Staff concerns are documented elsewhere in this report. This item is closed, m.
(0 pen)UnresolvedItem(50-271/80-15-05): Environmental Qualifica-
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tion Data for Components in the HPCI System.
Inspection item 80-15-05 is unresolved, in part, due to questions concerning the traceability
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of cables in the HPCI system, as indentified by reference 3.b. (3) (c)
in Report 30-15. Concerns associated with the traceability of cables in the HPCI system are considered resolved, based on the rev'ew dis-cussed above. However, item 80-15-05 remains unresolved pending resolutions of the other concerns identified in Report 90-15 and will be reviewed further on a subsequent inspection.
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(Closed) Follow Item (50-271/80-17-01): Analysis of RWCU Defects Inside Drywell and Supplemental Report. The licensee provided a Supplementa? Report to LER 80-37 by letter VYV-81-164 dated i
July 8, 1981. Based on the metallurgical analyses parformed by Battelle Laboratories, the failure mode for defects located in the
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weld heat-affected zones is intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) of the type previously experienced in BWR environments.
Following extensive investigation of a suspected through-wall crack on the sweepolet throat, which included dye penetrant, flourescent penetrant, radiographic, and microscopic inspection examinations, no flaw in this area was found. Thus, corrective actions taken by the licensee to replace Class I reactor water cleanup system piping with material conforming to NUREG 0313, Revision 1, requirements is considered sufficient to resolve this item. NRC Region I Inspection Report 50-271/81-12 documents further NRC staff review of RWCU pipe cracks. This item is closed.
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(Closed) Follow Item (50-271/80-22-01):
Information Required on SDV Level Probe Sensitivity to Temperature Changes.nd Crud Buildup. Additional data on SDV 1 robe sensitivity was supplied by NSD Engineering personnel to tie inspector and in the licensee's Jar:uary 30, 1981, response to IEB 80-17 Supplement 4.
The change
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inprobecutputwithchangeinwatertemperature(andtherefore dielectric constant of the water) is small by comparison with the total capacitance range of the instrument. The design temperature range for the probes is compatible with its application in the SDV headers. The effects of crud buildup, if any, should be detectable through periodic monitoring and calibration of the 3 robes. Additionally, provisions now exist to periodically flush the SDV 1eaders with water, w'iich should serve to inhibit long term crud buildup. This item is closed, p.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-271/81-05-06): AP 0036 Update.
Revision 1 to AP 0036, Shift Staffing, dated June 30, 1981, now requires that the shift supervisor be on shift (onsite) at all times fuel is in the reactor. The revised AP 0036 criteria satisfy the adjunct (a) recuirements of the NRC's July 31, 1980, letter, This item is closec.
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IE Bulletin Review and Followup Licensee responses ano actions taken for the IE Bulletins listed below were reviewed to verify that:
i the bulletins were received onsite and reviewed for applicability
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to the facility; bulletin action items, if applicable, and identified problem: were
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appropriately dispositioned;
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corrective actions taken, or planned, were appropriate; and,
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responses to the NRC were accurate and within the time period
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specified in the bulletin.
Inspector followup on selected bulletins is summarized below. The inspector had no further cocinent on the subject bulletins, except as indicated below, a.
IEB 79-11, Faulty Overcurrent Trip Devices in Westinghouse DB-50 Circuit Breakers VY responded to this bulletin in letter WVY 79-108 dated September 21, 1979. VY stated that all 4 circuit breakers would be tested during the 1979 refueling outage and that all would again be tested during the 1980 refueling outage.
If the time-current characteristics were found acceptable at that time, a surveillance test interval of once every three years would be initiated.
By letter WVY 79-131 dated November 13, 1979, VY reported that the two main battery circuit breakers (installed between station batteries and the main DC distribution switchgear) were tested satisfactorily. However, problems exptrienced with the special test equipment precluded testing of the bus tie breakers, associated with spare charger tie to the DC buses. These breakers would be tested pending repair of the test equipment at the next outage of sufficient duration.
During the 1980 refueling outage, the main battery breakers were retested and the bus tie breakers were tested and calibrated following end cap replacement. Testing and calibra-tion were completed satisfactorily, as documented in a January 27, 1981, vendor report. A licensee representative stated that all four breakers are scheduled for retest during the 1981 refueling outage.
If acceptable time-current characteristics are again i
found during the second round of testing, surveillance testing l
of the breakers would continue at a reduced frequency. This item is closed, b.
IEB 79-18, Audibility Problems Encountered On Evacuation of Personnel from High-Noise Areas
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VY response to the concerns raised in IEB 79-18 were submitted to l
the NRC in letter WVY 79-109 dated September 21, 1979. Plant areas were surveyed to determine problem areas where evacuation alarm
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audibility was questionable. Five areas were identified as pro-blems areas and plans were initiated to modify the communications systems in the subject areas. This item is closed.
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IE8 79-23,' Potential Failure of Bergency Diesel Gencrator Field QciterTransformer VY letter WVY 79-103 dateo October 29, 1979, reported that no connection exists between the primary windings of the exciter power transformer and the neutral of the generator on the VY Fairbank Morse Diesels. Also, each diesel generator has success-fully completed a 24-hour full load capacity test. This item is closed, d.
IEB 79-25, Failure of Pestinghouse BFD Relays in Safety Related Systems VY letter WYY 79-147 dated December 27, 1979, documents the results of the reviews for this item. VY investigation of the application of BFD relays in plant safety systems identified relays with coil styles 503C428G21 used in each of the diesel. generator control cir-cuits. BFD relays used in the HPCI, RCIC, RHR, MS and RWCU systems were inspected during the February 1980 outage and no relays of the styles referenced in the bulletin were ideatified. The BFD relays used in the DG control circuits are nonnally de-energized, except for the following three: control aower failure alarm; engine low speed; and engine normal speed. T1e control power relay is energized at all times control power is available. The engine speed relays arc energized only during diesel operaticn. Proper relay operation is verified during monthly and annual diesel surveillance testing. Addi-tionally, inspection of the subject relays has been included in the diesel annual inspection procedure. Since no failures of the BFD relays have been experienced at VY, no plans to change-out the relays exists at the present. This item is closed.
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IEB 79-26, Boron Loss from BWP' Control B1ades e.
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VY letter WVY 79-149 dated December 27, 1979, arovided the prelimi-nary response to the concerns raised by the su) ject bulletin and described the VY program for monitoring control blade exposure and replacement. The program for blade exposure prediction and replace-ment is provided by OP 4404 and is discussed further in paragraph 2.1,
of this report.
Tubes from high exposure control blades were provided to General Electric for destructive examination, as required by Item 4 of the Bulletin. VY letter FVY 81-63 dated April 14, 1981, trans-mitt?d vendor re nrts NEDE-24226-P and NEDO-24325 to the NRC staff, which provided t1e results from the analysis of the blade tubes,.
along with conclusions rpplicable to the VY blade exposure monitoring /
replacement program. The subject reports have been reviewed by the NRC staff and found acceptable. This item is closed.
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IEB'79-28,'Possible Malfunction of NAMCO Model EA. 80 Limit
Switches at. Elevated Temperatures.
VY letter WVY 80-6 dated January 7,1980, reported the results of the VY inves;igation of limit switches installed on plant systems.
The investigation determined that no NAMCO Model EA180 limit switches
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bear the star. ping 02-79 through 08-79. None of the subject switches are installed on safety related equipment and none are planned to be used in the future. This item is closad.
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IEB 80-07, BWR Je'; Pump Assembly Failure VY letter WVY 80-70 dated May 8,1980, provided the licensee's response to this item and ccmmitments for further actions. Plant procedure AP 015C.03, Revision 15, provides for daily surveillance of jet pump perfonnance and specifies the required operator actions in respunse to a c'egraded jet pump. Licensee Report LER 80-33/1T provides a sumary of the inspections conducted during the 1980 refueling outage and the actions taken based on the inspection findings.
NRC Region I Inspection Report 50-271/80-15, 16, and 17 document previous NRC staff review of this item, This item is closed, h.
IEB 80-13, Cracking in Core Spray Spargers VY letter 80-164 dated December 1, 1980, provided a report to the NRC of the core spray sparger inspections conducted during the 1980 refueling outage and the actions taken as a result of those examina-tions.
NRC Region I Inspection Reports 50-271/80-15, 16, and 17 document previous NRC staff reviews for this iteu. Continued periodic examination of the CS Spargers is scheduled for the up-coming refueling outage and for subsequent outages as long as the clamp on junction box "C" remains in place. This item is closad.
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IEB 80-17, BWR Failure to Scr:.m, Supplements 4 and 5 IEB 80-17 Supplement 5 notified the licensee that certain reporting require-ments instituted by previous Bulletin Supplements were no longer being imposed by the NRC. No specific VY response was required by Supplement 5.
The licensee responded to Supplement 4 by letter FVY 81-18 dated January 30, 1981, to address questions raised by Items 1 through 6.
NRC staff evaluation of the actions taken for Supplenst 4 require-ments is documented in a July 2, 1981, memorandum from R. L. Baer to E.J.Brunner(SSINS6820). VY actions in regard to Supplement 4
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requirements were found acceptable pending comp?etion of certain procedural items. These items are discussed further below.
NRC Region I Inspection Report 50-271/80-22 documents previous review of plant modifications made per Supplement.4 requirements.
Inspection Item 80-22-01 has been satisfactorily resolved, as dis-cussed in paragraph 2.0,oi this report. Similarly, Inspection Item 80-08402 has been satisfactorily resolved, as discussed in paragraph 2.1.of this report.
Inspection Item 80-10-05 concerns NRC verification of SDV line slope in the main steam tunnel; this item remains open pending inspector review of the line during the upcoming refueling outage.
In his response to Item 6 of Supplement 4, the licensee stated that plant procedures would be expanded by March 1, 1981, to specify actions to be taken if the SDV Continuous Monitoring i
System (CMS) is detemined to be inoperable. Procedures would also be developed for functional testing and calibratior of the CMS prior to the next functional test and calibration.
The inspector reviewed Operations Department procedures on July 31, 1981, and noted instructions were provided to the control room operator to pravide for periodic monitoring of the CMS, actions to be taken in response to CMS alams and ections tc be taken when the scram discharge volume is not drained. No procedural instructions were noted that specified opcrator actions if the CMS were determined to be inoperable. This item is unre-solved pending development of procedures for the inoperable CMS condition and pending issuance of the periodic test / calibration procedures (UNR 50-271/81-13-01).
This itan was discussed during the exit interview on August 10, 1981.
The licensee stated that procedures to specify operator actions in response to an inoperable CMS would be issued by September 30,1981.
d.
IE Circular Followup The following IE Circulars wereceviewed to ascertain if the following actions were taken by the licensee:
The Circular was received by licensee management.
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A review for applicability was perfomed.
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For Circulars forwarded to the facility, appropriate corrective
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actions have been taken or are scheduled to be taken as noted below.
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a.
IE Circular 79-05, Moisture Leakage in Stranded Wire Conductors, datedMarch10,1979 The licensee has addressed the issues of IEC 79-05; the inspection of equipment during outage conditions remains to be completed and documented.
This IEC 79-05 is open.
b.
IE Circular 79-20, Failure of GTE Sylvania Relay, Ty]e PM 7305, Catalog SU12-11 AC With a 120V AC Coil, dated Septem)er 24, 1979 The inspector noted from discussions with the Instrument and Control Supervisor that reviews completed to date have shown that none of the subject relays are used in safety related circuits. However, further work to complete this review effort has yet to be completed.
The i."spector reviewed the VY Class IE Instrument List for relays in safety related applications in the HPCI, ADS, Core Spray, LPCI, RPS, PCIS, RCIC and Containment Air Dilution systems.
No relays in the above systems were the GTE Types PM 7305.
The licensee has yet to review the circuitry for the Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS) for use of the subject relays. This item is considered open pending completion of the licensee's review and subsequent followup by the Resident Inspector, c.
IE Circular 79-21, Radioactive Release at North Anna and Lessons Learned, dated October 19, 1979 The inspector noted that the licensee iiad completed actions to address the circular concerns as part of reviews conducted for NUREG 0578 Item 2.1.6.a - Primary Coolant Outside Containment.
These actions have been reviewed during a previous inspection (see reference tiRC Region I Inspection Report 50-271/80-17). This it~n is closed.
d.
IE Circular 80-09, Plant Internal Communication Systems, dated ADril 28, 1980 A licensee internal memorandum, P. J. Donrelly to J. P. Pelletier dated July 29, 1980, documented the reviews conducted of the power supplies for plant internal communications equipment.
Feeds to the communication equipment from vital power supplies were already provided, along with feeds from non-vital power supplies. This item is closed.
e.
IE Circular 80-10, Failure to Maintain Environmental Qualification of Equipment, dated April 29, 1980
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The licensee has addressed the issues of IEC 80-10 and assigned departmental responsibility. This IEC remains open pending completicn of licensee's revie.
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f.
IE Circular 80-11, Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil Cooler Failures, dated May 13, 1980 The licensee has addressed the issues of IEC 80-11 and assigned departmental responsibility. This IEC remains open pending completion of inspection :f the Emergency DG cooling system.
g.
IE Circular 80-12, Valve-Shaft-Te-Actuator Key May Fall Out of Place When Mounted Below Horizontal Axis, dated May 14, 1980 The licensee has addressed the issues of IEC 80-12 and assigned departmental responsibility. This IEC remains open pending completion of the licensee's reconnended inspection.
h.
IE Circular 80-14, Radioactive Contamination of Plant Demineralized Water System and Resultant Internal Contamination of Personnel, dated June 24, 1980 The licensee has addressed the concerns of IEC 80-14 and assigned departmental responsibility. This IEC remains open pending completion of licensee assigned actions, i.
IE Circular 80-16, Operational Deficiencies in Rosemont Model 510D0 Trip Units and Model 1152 Pressure Transmitters, dated June 27, 1980
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's internal Memorandum which responded to the concerns of IEC 80-16 and IEB 80-16, dated I
l June 27, 1980, Potential Misapplication of Rosemont Inc. Models 1151 and 1152 Pressure Transmitters with Either "A" or "D" Output Codes. The inspector detennined that Model 1152 Pressure Transmitters I
are used for measurement of torus water level and containment pressure, however the model utilization is model
"D" in lieu of the model "E" transmitters addressed in IEC 80-16. This circular is considered closed.
j.
IE Circular 80-18, 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations for Changes to Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems, dated August 22, 1980 l
The licensee has addressed the issues of IEC 80-18 and assigned departmental responsibility. This IEC remains open pending licensee disposition of staff recommendation concerning training in the area of 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations.
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IE Circular 81-01, Design Problems Involving Indicating Pushbutton l
Switches Manufactured by Honeywell Incorporated, dated January 23, 1981
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The licensee has addressed the issues of IEC 81-01 and determined
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that there are no indicating pushbutton switches in any safety-related
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function.
This IEC is closed.
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5.
S,bift Logs and Operating Records a.
The inspector utilized the following plant procedures to determine the licensee established aareinistrative requirments in this area in preparation for review of various logs d records.
AP 0001, Plant Procedures, Revision 6, dated September 25, 1979
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AP 0150, Responsibility and Authority of Operations Department
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Personnel, Revision 15, dated May 1,1981 AP 0153, Maintenance of Operations Department Logs, Revision 8,
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dated Cecember 31, 1979 AP 0140, VY Local Control Switching Rules, Revision 4, dated
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Dece1ber 19, 1930 AP 0020, Lifted Leac/ Installed Jumper Request Procedure,
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Revision 4, dated October 16, 1980 AP 0021, Maintenance Requests, Revision 9, dated September 25, 1980
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AP 0154, Control Room Night Order Book, Revision 5, dated
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January 7, 1980 AP 0030, Plant Operations Review Committee, Revision 6, dated
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January 17, 1980 The above procedures, Technical Specifications, ANSI N16,7-1972
" Quality Assurance Recuirements for Nuclear Power Plants" and 10 CFR 50,59 were usec. by the inspector to determine the accepta-bility of the logs and records reviewed, b.
Shift logs and operating records were reviewed to verify that:
Control Room logs and surveillance sheets are properly
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completed and that selected Technical Specificatic.r. limits were met.
Control Room log entries involving abnomal conditions
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provide sufficient deta',1 to communicate equipment status, lockout status, correction, and restoration, Log Book reviews are being conducted by the stat f,
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Operating and Special orders do not conflict with Technical
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Specifications requirements.
Jum3er (Bypass) log does not contain bypassing discrepancies
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witi Technical Specification requirements and that jumpers are properly approved prior to installation, c.
The following )lant logs and operating records were reviewed periodi-cally durinC tie period of July 1-August 10, 1981, Shift Supervisor's Control Room Log
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Night Order Book Entries
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Safety Related Maintenance Requests
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Control Room Operator Round Sheet
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Plant Information Reports
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Auxiliary Operator #1 and #2 Rounds Sheet
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Equipment Status Log
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RE Log Typer-Core Perfonnance Log
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Control Room Chemistry Log Sheets
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Health Physics Control Point Log
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No items of noncompliance were identified, 6.
Plant Tour The inspector conducted a tour of accessible areas of the plant including the Control Room Building, Turbine Building, Reactor. Building, Diesel Rooms, Intake Structure, Security Gate Houses 1, 2 and Alarm Stations, Radwaste Building and Control Point Areas, a.
Monitoring Control Room Panels Routinely during the inspection period, the inspectors conducted re-views of the control room panels, The following items were reviewed to determine the licensee's adherence to Licensee Technical Specifica-tion - Limiting Conditions for Operation and to verify the licensee's.
adherence to approved procedures.
Switch and valve positions required to satisfy LCO's, where
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applicable,
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Alarms or absense of alanns. Acknowledged alarms were reviewed
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with on shift licensed personnel as to cause and corrective actions being taken where applicable.
Review of " pulled alarm cards" with on shift personnel.
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Meter indications and recorder values.
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Status lights and power avaiiable lights.
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Front panel bypasses.
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Computer printouts.
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Comparison of redundant readings.
No items of noncompliance were identified, b.
Radiological Controls Radiation controls established by the licensee, including:
posting of radiation areas, radiological surveys, condition of step off pads, and disposal of protective clothing were observed for confonnance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20 and AP 0503, Establishing and Posting Controlled Areas, OP 4530, Dose Rate Radiation Surveys and OP 4531, Radioactive Contamination Surveys.
Confirmatory surveys were conducted in the following areas to verify licensee posted results:
Reactor Cuilding general areas -
all elevations.
The following Radiation Work Permits were reviewed by the inspector to verify conformance with licensee procedure AP 0502, Radiation Work Permits:
81-00534, 81-00529, 81-00557 and 81-00562.
No inadequacies were identified, except as noted in paragraph 6.j, c.
Plant Housekeeping and Fire Prevention Plant housekeeping conditions, including general cleanliness and storage of materials to prevent fire hazards were observed in all areas toured for conformance with AP 0042, Plant Fire Prevention and AP 6024, Plant Housekeeping.
No inadequacies were identified.
d.
Fluid Leaks and Piping Vibrations Systems and equipment in all areas toured were observed for the existence of fluid leaks and abnormal piping vibration.
No inadequacies were identified.
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Pipe Hangers / Seismic Restraints During routine tours of the plant, pipe hangers and restraints installed on various piping systems were observed for proper installation, tension, and condition.
No inadequacies were identified, f.
Control Room Manning / Shift Turnover Control loom tianning was reviewed for conformance with the require-ments of 10 CFR 50.54 (k), Technical Specifications, AP 0152, Shift Turnover, AP 0150, Responsibility and Authority of Operations Depart-ment Personnel and AP 0036, Shift Staffing. The inspector verified, during the inspection, that appropriate licensed operators were on shift. Manning requirements were met at all times. Several shift turnovers were observed during the course of the inspection. All were noted to be thorough and orderly.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Equipment Tagout and Controls Tagging and removal of equipment from service was observed in areas toured to verify that equipment was controlled in accordance with AP 0140.
No inadequacies were identified.
h.
Primary Containment Isolation Valves Piping between the primary containment and outboard isolation valves was inspected for leakage during tours of the Reactor Building.
Additionally, containment isolation valves were inspected for proper positioning, on a sampling basis, by comparing "as found" positions with that specified by OP 2115, Appendix B.
No inadequacies were identified, i.
Analyses of Process Liquids and Gases Analyses results from sar.ples of process liquids and gases were re-viewed periodically during the inspection to verify conformance with regulatcry requirements. The results of isotopic analyses from reactor coolant, off-gas and stack samples were reviewed routinely erom the " Daily Plant Status Report" to verify that Technical Speci-fication Limits were not exceeded and that no adverse trends were
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apparent. The n-m ;hly boron analysis in the Standby Liquid Control
Supply. Tank was reviewed on July 23, 1981, to verify conformance with Technical Specification 4.4.C.
No inadequacies were identified.
Except as noted below, the inspector had no further questions in this area.
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j.
Contamination Area Posting During an inspection tour of the Torus Bay area on saly 23, 1981, at 3:50 P.M., the inspector encountered what appeared to be a con-taminated area at the RCIC Room exit to the Torus Bay. Barricades and posting of the area were found established to preclude inadver-tant entrances into the area from the North. However, the rope barricade and sign posting the area as contaminated for entrance i
from the West were not erected, but found lying on the floor. The inspector immediately reported his findings to the Check Point HP Technician, who took actions to resurvey the subject area, re-esta-blish proper post'ng with barricade and remove a bag of dirty anti-Cs. Survey results reported to the inspector on July 24, 1981, indicated that the area was slightly contaminated with levels from 1200-1500 dpm/100cm2 beta-gamma. Based on the above, the failure to maintain proper posting and barricades for a contaminatea area is contrary to the requirements of AP 0503 and Technical Specifica-tion 6.5.B. (INC 50-271/81-13- 02).
7.
Observations of Physical Security The inspector made observations, witnessed and/or verified during regular and offshift hours that selected a_spects of plant physical security were in accordance with regulatory requirements, the physical security plan and approsed procedures.
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Physical Protection Security Organization observations indicated that a full time member of the security
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organization with authority to direct physical security actions was present as required.
manning of all shifts on various days was observed to be as
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required.
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Access Control identification, authorization and badging.
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access control searches, including, when applicable, the use
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of compensatory measures during periods when equipment was inoperable.
escorting.
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c.
Physical Barriers selected barriers in the protected area and vital areas were
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observed and random monitoring of isolation zones was perfcrmed.
Observation of vehicle searches were made.
inspector tours of gate houses 1 and 2, the Central and
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Secondary Alam Stations were conducted at random periods.
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construction activities relating to Gatehouse 2 were monitored to verify licensee compliance with Security Special Memo #81-23, dated July 27, 1981.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specification 6.7 and Environmental Technical Specification 5.4 were reviewed by the inspector to verify that applica-ble reporting requirements had been met.
VYV 81-156, Monthly Statistical Report, Month of June,1981
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dated July 10, 1981.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
9.
Surveillance Testing The inspector ooserved or reviewed portions of the following surveillance tests to verify that testing was perfomed in accordance with procedures, that results were in confomance with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that redundant system (s) or component (s) were available for service, that work was being performed by qualified personnel, and that activities were in compliance with AP 4000, Surveillance Testing Control, a.
The inspector witnessed portions of surra'ilance testing in progress on July 21,1981, per OP 4020 on the Dic.el Driven Fire Water Pump.
Testing was being completed as part of the fire system annual functional
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performance test to verify conformance nith fire pump discharge prassure and flow capacity requirements. The requirements of Technical Specification 4.13.B.I.e. on pump discharge pressure and flow were met for the diesel driven fire pump. The inspector also noted by review of VYOPF 4020.16 that the performance criteria for the electric driven fire pump were also met. The Pitot Tube and pressure guage used for the test, labeled as VY instrument No.139, was noted to be in calibration by review of its calibration data Sheet, form VYAPF 0302.02, dated January 20, 1981.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
10. Maintenance Activitius The inspector reviewed portions of the following maintenance activities to verify compliance with LC0 requirements where applicable, that redundant components were operable, administrative approvals and tagouts were proper, approved procedures were utilized, activities were controlled by qualified personnel, equipment certification, proper equipment return to service, and compliance with AP 0021, Maintenance Requests, and AP 0200, Maintenance Program. The following a6tivities were reviewed by the inspector:
Repair of RHR-V10-31B valve operator motor conducted under MR 81-0824
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as discussed in detail 11.a. of this inspection report.
CS System valve V14-11A, CS System I pump discharge valve, breaker
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repair conducted under MR 81-0808.
No items of noncortpliance were identified.
11.
Inspector Followup of Events The inspector responded to events that occurred during the inspection period to verify continued safe operation of the reactor in accordance with the Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements. The following items, as applicable, were considered during the inspector's review of operational events:
cbservations of plant parameters and systems important to safety
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to confinn operation within approved operational limits; description of ev^nt, including cause, systems involved, safety
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significance, fx tiity status and status of engineered safety features equipment; details relating to personnel injury, release of radioactive
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material and exposure to radioactive material;
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verification of correct operation of automatic equipment;
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verification of proper manual actions by plant personne!; and,
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verification of adherence to approved plant procedures.
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a.
RHR-V10-31B, Upper Containment Spray Isolation Valve, Sheared Motor Mounts During a routine review of the Operators Log or, the morning of July 16, 1981, the inspector noted that at 10:15 P.M. on July 15, 1981, the motor mount bolts on RHR-31B were found sheared.
Inspector followup revealed the following:
During a routine plant tour the evening of July 15, 1981, the Assistant Plant Superintendant noted that the Tour motor mount bolts on RHR-31B, the upper containment spray isolation valve, were sheared and the motorend can appeared loose.
Upon notification, the shift supervisor declared the subsystem inoperable and commenced alternate testing of 'A' contain-ment spray subsystem per Technical Specification 3.5.B. at 11:15 P.M,
July 15, 1981. An Operators Log entry at 12:30 A.M., July 16, 1981, notes completion of operability surveillance for 'A'
RHRSW pump and its return to stand'y mode.
'C' RHRSW pump operability was completed
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u at 12:40 A.M. and left running in the torus cooling mode. Torus cooling was secured at 4:26 A.M., July 16, 1981, and 'C' RHR/RHRSW was returned to standby.
Upon watch relief on July 16, 1981, the Day Shift Assistant Operations Supervisor roted that VY TS Basis for section 3.5.B designates an RHR subsystem to include the RHRSW pumps, heat exchanger, and RHR (LPCI)
Pumps. The RHR operability surveillance for pumps A and C was com-pleted at 8:36 A.M. AND RHR V10-31B was released for maintenance in accordance with I intenance Request (MR) 81-0824.
The inspector observed the removal and disassembly of RHR V10-31B operator motor. The four 3/16 inch motor bolts appeared sheared within the valve operator housing. The inspector noted that the sheared bolts had replaced the standard motor mount bolts, extended beyond the motor housing and were bolted inte a backing plate in an apparent effort to increase rigidity. A review of the maintenance department records for valve V10--31B (VISI CARD FILE) revealed that on October 23, 1971 V10-31B motor bolts sheared during system testing. The bolts were replaced with 3/16 inch rods, no documentation of the repair was available onsite. Upon motor disassembly, the inspector noted rubbed areas on the armature and windings indicating apparent misalighment prior to the mounting bolt failure. The July 16th repair consisted of operator motor removal and installation of a spare motor from stores.
The replacement motor originated from HPCI 23-15 valve. The inspector reviewed the completed MR 81-0824 for completeness and during the repair verified Tag Order 81304 implementation on VA V10-31B ACB. No inadequacies were identified.
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Upon completion of the repair, the valve motor repair was opera-tionally tested by valve stroke and timing per VY OP 4124 The inspector reviewed VYOPF 4124.01 dated July 16, 1981, special surveillance to retest V10-31B and noted satisfactory data for valve open and closing times. The Operators Log entry at 12:55 A.M.
l on July 16, 1981, notes completion of V10-318 retest and motor re-l placement and syr'.em return to service.
The inspector addressed tne inspection of other valve operator assemblies to ensure similar " backing plate" modifications were The licensee reported that the maintenance degrtment had adequate.
containment spray isolation valves (V10,26B, -26A, and -31A)
visually'
inspected the remaining three RHR system motor o and i
found them satisfactory; long-tem evaluation and corrective actions l
would be detemined during Plant Operaticns Review Committee (PORC)
j investigation of the event.
The inspector reviewed the reportability of V10-31B motor mount
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failure per VY TS 6.7.B. and determined a thirty-day written report was required. The inspector notes that a Potential Report Fem, t
l VYAPF 0010.01, dated July 15, 1981 was completed in accordance with VYAP 0010, Occurrence Reports.
Inspector review indicated that failure to complete alternate testing l
of 'A' containment spray subsystem in a timely manner per TS section
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3.5.B was a item of noncompliance identified and corrected by the
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licensee. Followup of PORC evaluation of the event and licensee l
issue of an LER will be the subject of a subsequent inspection (UNR l
271/81-13-03).
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Licensee Staffing During the inspection period the inspector discussed proposed Vermont Yankee NPS organizational changes with the licensee, The plant Superintendent infomed the Resident Inspector's Office on July 31,1981 that the following proposed changes to the on-site. organization would be implemented August 1, 1981:
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Plant Superintendent becomes Plant Manager
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The creation of two new management positions:
Operations Assistant Superintendent and Technical Services l
Assi.tantaSuperintendent, to report directly to the Plant Manager.
e Discussions with the licensee, NRR, and the Resident Office resulted in the licensee withdrawing the Aug.1,1981 implementation date for the proposed changes and on August 4,1981 Vemont Yankee Nuclear Power i
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Corporation submitted a proposed modification to ApFsndix A of the Operating Licen,se for NRR approval.
The inspector had no further questions in this are _
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13.
In-Office Review of Licensee Event Reports The licensee event reports (LERs) listed below were reviewed in the NRC Resident / Regional Office.
The reports were reviewed to detemine whether:
the information provided was clear in the description of the event and identification of safety s'ynificance; the event cause was identified and
'enned) were appropriate; the report satis-corrective actions taken c fied requf rements with.w.cu to information provided and timeliness of submittai per NUREG 016 W fechncial Specification 6.7 criteria. Those reports annotated wit'.,
asterisk (*)concerneventsthatrequiredinspector followup action and inspector review / evaluation of the event is documented elsewhere, in this or other inspection reports.
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- LER 80-37, UPDATE REPORT, Cracking of 4 inch Reactor Water Cleanup Suction Line, event date October 27, 1980, report date June 8, 1981.
Report forwards the results of pipe labora-tory analysis.
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LER 81-17, Containment isolation valve LRW-95 failed to close during quarterly surveillance due to dirt plugging port.
Event date June 29, 1981, report date July 28, 1981.
14.
Report of Radioactive Material Disposed Cn Site Property The Resident Inspector received a telephone call from a journalist at 11:20 A.M. on July 23, 1981, who requested information concerning the recovery and disposal of Radium sources from VY Site property. The journalist stated that, based on information he received during an inter-view conducted on or about July 1, 1981, three conventional radium " needles" of the type used in radiation therapy were stolen by a member of the public and then secretly dumped inside the VY Site fence in May or June of 1973.
The journalist requested copies of any reports submitted to the NRC which described the discovery, retrieval and disposal of the sources.
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The inspector talked with members of the licensee staff to detemine if l
those interviewed recalled whether radium sources of the type described
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above were ever discovered during routine radiation surveys of the site l
area. The inspector also reviewed all Reportable Occurrence Reports sub-mitted to the NRC by the licensee during the period from 1972 to 1975.
Personnel interviews and a review of the Reportable Occurrence file failed to identify any report:: of finding three radium sources on site.
I Under the assumption that the radium sources were still located on site property and thus created the potential radiation exposures in excess of l
10 CFR Part 20 limits for an unrestricted area, the inspector requested l
assistance from the licer.see in a meeting with the Plant Superintendent on July 24, 1081, to conduct a radiation survey of the site perimeter. A
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perimeter survey was conducted on July 28, 1981, by a VY Health Physics
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Technician using YY radiation monitoring equipment, The inspector witnessed the survey, Information received from the journalist on July 23, 1981, and during a subsequent telephone conversation on July 27, 1981, indicated the sources were three conventional therapeutic sources, each containing one milligram (Img.) cf radium. The radium " needles" were made of stainless steel. Based on the above descriptions, it was assumed that the sources contained Radium -226, which is an isotope having a 1600 year half-life and decays with a 4.8 Mev al aha and a 0.18 Mev gamma. Alpha radiation would be largely attenuated ay the stainless steel casing.
Based on a 1 mg quantity of radium, the expected gamma dose rates would be about 1.4 R/hr at one inch,10 mR/hr et 1 foot and 1 mR/hr at 3 fet.t from each source.
An arrangement of a RM-14 Detector (VY #2400) with two HP 210 GM probes was assembled by the licensee for the survey. The two probes were mounted on a four foot long stick.
The licensee expected the RM-14 sensitivity would be sufficient to detect radiation levels down to 0.5 mR/hr, which would produce a 700-1000 cpm response on the instrument.
The 0.5 mR/hr response would be at least double the background levels indicated by two HP 210 probes. The expected sensitivity was confirmed using a Co-60 calibration source to determine the RM-14 count rate in a 3 mR/hr,1 mR/hr and 0.5 mR/hr field.
lhe survey of the site preimeter (owner controlled) fence was conducted by traversing the detectors paral?el to and about 2.2 feet above the ground. A strip of land from the fence inward to about 50 feet was covered in this manner. Aay area showing even the slightest (though spurious) deviation from background indication were further investigated using a single probe closer to the ground.
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The surveys conducted on July 28, 1981, failed to locate any sources of radiation above background within 50 feet of the perimeter fence. All areas surveyed showed background radiation of about ?GO cpm on the RM-14 detector. One small area of ground (roughly 15 feet by 15 feet) in the Northuest corner of the fence line showed a slightly elevated background level in the range of 300-350 cpm. However, extensive investigation of the area with the RM-14 failed to pinpoint ary localized sources. Special attention was also given to the North fence line, the West fence line and the areas in the vicinity of TL.' stations 7, 8, 9 and 10, located on the West fence.
In addition to the above survey, an inspector in the NRC Rt.y >n I Office
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reviewed licensee TLD data for the period 1978-1981. The TLD data was reviewed for indications of any TLD station reading consistently higher than the others. No indications of sources in the vicinity of the TLD stations were found.
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Tentative plans were made to conduct an additional, finer survey of the Northwest fence line on July 30, 1981. However., the inspector was notified that representatives of the Vermont State Health Department, Radiation Control Program, would also conduct a survey of the fence line using detectors more sensitive than the RM-14 used in the July 28, 1981, survey.
Thus, no further actions were taken by the Resident Inspector, The survey results obtained by Vermont State person al will be followed by the intpector(50-271/81-13-04).
Although the July 28, 1981, survey could not conclusively prove that no radium sources are present on the site property (they could have beccme buried during excavaticn work or settled into the ground over the 8 year period), the survey did show that no radiation hazard existed in the area surveyed, in that aP RM-14 readings corresponded to dose rates much less than 1 mR/hr.
The inspector had no further comment on this item at the present.
15.
Personnel Qualifications and Training The inspector reviewed experience and training records for Techniciar:s filling the pemanent and temporary positions in the I&C Department as of July 21, 1981. Records for personnel filling 5 permanent positions and 3 temporary positions were reviewed to verify the experience and training requirements of ANSI N18.1-1971 were met.
No inadequacies were identified. The inspector noted that one individual was recently hired to fill a sixth pemanent position and that his work on safety related systems was being limited pending completion of Initial Certification requirements.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
16. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are items about which more information is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items are discussed in Detail 3.i and ll.a of this report.
17. Management Meetings During the period of the inspection, licensee management was periodically notified of the preliminary findings by the resident inspectors. A summary was also provided at the conclusion of the inspection and prior to report issuance. Additionally, the resident inspectors attended the entrance and exit interviews on July 6, 1981 and July 7, 1981, respectively, conducted by a region based inspector in regard to an inspection of the licensee's actions in regard to compensatory actions taken in the plant security area as e result of system modifications and maintenance.
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