IR 05000271/1981016
| ML20041A102 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/29/1982 |
| From: | Baer R, Knapp P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041A101 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-271-81-16, NUDOCS 8202190096 | |
| Download: ML20041A102 (17) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-271/81-16 Docket No. 50-271 Category C
License No. DPR-28 Priority
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Licensee: Vennont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Mass. 01701 Facility Name: Vennont Yankee Nuclear Station Inspection at: Vernon, Vermont Inspection conducted: October 7, 8 and 26-30, 1981 Inspector:
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NWdE R'. E. Baer, Radiation Specialist date signed date signed
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N date signed Approved by:
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P. J. Inapp, Chief, Facility' Radiological date signed Protection Section, Technical Inspection Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on October 7, 8 and 26-30,1981 (Report No. 50-271/81-16)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by a regional based inspector of radiation protection during refueling including: procedures; advance planning and preparation; training; exposure control; posting and control; radioactive material control; surveys and NUREG 0578 items. The inspection involved 50 inspector hours onsite by one regional based inspector.
Results:
Of the.eight areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified.
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
8202190096 820204
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PDR ADOCK 05000271
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- Mr. L. W. Anson, Plant Training Supervisor
- Mr. E. W. Bowles, Training Department Supervisor
- Mr. R. J. Kenney, Engineer Assessment Coordinator
- Mr. B. N. Leach, Health Physicist
- Mr. W. Murphy, Plant Manager Mr. J. Pelletier, Assistant Plant Manager
- Mr. D. Reid, Engineer Support Supervisor
- Mr. G. D. Weyman, Chemistry and Health Physics Supervisor
- Mr. S. J. Collins, Resident Reactor Inspector, USNRC Mr. W. J. Raymond, Senior Resident Reactor Inspector, USNRC The inspector also interviewed several other licensee and contractor employees including Health Physics Technicians, Operators and Maintenance Personnel.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview on October 30, 1981.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-271/80-15-15):
Review of controls over monitoring personnel exposures during drywell work. The inspector reviewed control measures used during the 1981 outage including: use of a radio dosimeter, worn by one member of each work group with readout at the drywell control point; time keeping for workers in high radiation areas where close rates exceeded 600 mr/hr; Health Physics Technicians touring the ground floor of the drywell observing worker locations every 15 minutes; and establishment of radiation areas.
b.
(Closed) Noncompliance (50-271/81-04-01):
Failure to mark nine drums of low level radioactive waste with radio-active LSA markings. The inspector verified that procedure OP-2511, Radwaste Cask, Drum and Box Handling, Revision 8, dated April 24, 1981, had been revised and an individual designated as the shipment coordinator. A checklist is provided requiring the individual to verify and attest (by signature) that each package is properly labeled.
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(Closed) Noncompliance (50-271/81-13-02):
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Failure to maintain posting and barricades for a contaminated area.
The inspector verified by interviews and record review that at the staff safety meeting held on September 25, 1981, the health physics
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3-supervisor presented a lecture to 120 Vermont Yankee (VY) staff personnel.
During this lecture-he addressed the item on noncompliance and immediate corrective action each individual should take should they observe a-similiar condition in '1e future.
3.
Radiation Protection Procedures-The inspector reviewed the following procedures, which had been revised, to assure that commitments were still being met.
AP 0501 Radiation Protection Standards, Revision 6, 9/18/81 AP 0503 Establishing and Posting Controlled Areas, Revision 6, 10/16/80 AP 0505 Respiratory Prote-tion, Revision 8, 8/19/81-AP 0507 Primary Containmeat Entry, Revision 4, 10/16/81 OP 0533 Body Burden Counting, Revision 3, 8/19/81 OP 2511 Radwaste Case, Drum and Box Handling, Revi.ston 8, 4/24/81 OP 2611 Gaseous Radwaste, Revision a, 10/5/81 OP.4533 Airborne Radioactivity Concentration Determination, Revision 6, 6/30/81 DP 4531 Radioactive Contamination Surveys, Revision 5, 4/16/81 No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Advance Planning and Preparation a.
Health Physics Staffing To augment its staff for the refueling outage, the licensee obtained suplemental health physics personnel from a contractor firm. Approxi-mately 30 senior and junior. level technicians were used. A licensee representative stated these individuals received training in plant procedures commensurate with their work function prior to assuming work assignments. The-licensee's principal health physics technicians provided supervisory control for contractor-supplied personnel.
The licensee provides a screening method for contractor health physics-personnel which includes a review of previous 'related experience, formal and practical training, testing ard check,cff sheets.
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The inspector reviewed the screening process used yy the licensee and examined the application of the process to 11 contractor technicians.
Technicians designated as senior level met the qual'ifications of ANSI N18.1-1971, " Selection and Training of personnel for Nuclear Power Plants."
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Inktrumentation,EquipmentandSupplies-The' inspector reviewed material inventory lists, made observations in the field, and interviewed licensee representatives to verify that adequate quantities of instrumentation, equipment and supplies were available during the outage.
The inspector noted that approximately 100 radiation detection instruments were available for the outage.
The inspector found that the licensee had sufficient material available or obtainable to support maintenance and refueling activities throughout the outage.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Training The inspector attended selected portions of the licensee's general employee training program provided to employees, supplemental work force personnel and contractor-supplied personnel, and reviewed the program against the requirements of 10 CFR 13.12, " Instructions to Workers." In addition the inspector reviewed the training records and test results of 17 contractor-supplied individuals.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Exposure Control All personnel entering the radiation control area (RCA) were routinely issued a thermoluminescent dosimeter and self-reading dosimeter (SRD).
These devices were assigned.to individuals to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.202(a). Additional dosimetric devices, such as high range SRD's and radio dosimeters, may be required in certain areas such as the drywell or as spect fled on the radiation vork permit (RWP).
The licensee administrative 1y limits radiation exposures to 1000 milli-roentgen per calender. quarter. Authorization to exceed this limit is granted after the licensee has a current Form NRC 4 for the individual, as required by 10 CFR 20.102. T,he inspector examined Forms'NRC 4 for 16 individuals.
Six had received authorization 'to receive exposures in excess of 1000 mrem per quarter.
Form VYAPF 0501.01 was examined for adherence to the requirements of procedure AP-0501 (ree paragraph 3).
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The licensee's respiratory protection program was reviewed. This program included requirements for medical certification and individual man-fit testing in a Nacl test booth.
Individuals were allowed to use only those respirators for which they passed the man-fit testing, s
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No items of' noncompliance were identified.
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Posting and Control The inspector examined posting and control of radiation areas, high radiation areas, contaminated areas, and radioactive material areas against the requirements of 10 CFR 20.203, 20.207, and plant procedures, AP-0501, AP-0503 and DP-4531 (See Paragraph 3), developed in accordance with Technical Specification 6.5.B.
Several tours of the entire facility, including the l
RCA, were conducted.
Radiation work permits were reviewed against licensee
.I surveys and independent measurements made by the inspector to determine whether they afforded an adequate level of protection to workers. Workers
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were observed for adherence to procedures and RWP's.
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No items of concompliance were identified.
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Radioactive Material Control Radioactive material labeling and identification were examined against the
_ requirements in 10 CFR 20.203(f) and the following licensee procedures:
OP 2153 > Solid Radwaste OP 2511 Radwaste Case, Drum and Box Handling DP 0531 Laundering of Protective Clothing The inspector observed the licensee's control of' contaminated tools and equipment used during the outage. The licensee requires that tools and equipment be surveyed by Health Physics prior to release to uncontrolled areas. Within the RCA several areas were dedicated to storage of radio-active components. Containers were marked with labels that identified the radioactive contents.
On October 27; 1981, during a routine plant tour, the inspector conducted a survey of boxes and 55 gallon drums containing solid radioactive waste.
All items were labeled " Radioactive LSA" and were stored east of the reactor building, prepared for shipment to a disposal site. The inspector noted that one box had a high radiation label. A radiation level of 350 mrem /hr at contact, 100 mrem at approximately 18 inches, was detected with an R0-2A
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ionization survey meter. The inspector informed the Plant Health Physicist
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who took immediate action to barricade and post the waste packages.
A similar occurance was observed by the Resident Reactor Inspector in October 1980 (Inspection Report 50-271/80-15.)
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The inspector discussed the storage of radioactive waste packages with the Hadith Physicist. Storage criteria specify that radioactive waste packaged
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for transport.is exempt from 10 CFR 20.204(d) posting requirements. All workers having access to this area would not necessarily be issued personnel
. monitoring devices and the potential existed for workers to unknowingly er,ter a radiation area. A dedicated storage area ~is to be provided in the future. This will be reviewed during future later inspection (50-271/81-
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
' Surveys The inspector reviewed licensee radiation, contamination, and airborne radioactivity surveys to determine compliance with 10 CFR 20.103, 20.201 and 20.401 and the following licensee procedures:
OP 4530, Dose Rate Rcdiation Surveys OP 4531, Radioactive Contamination Surveys OP 4533, Airborne Radioactivity Concentration Determination Selected radiation and contamination surveys for the period October 10 through October 29, 1981, were examined. The inspector made_ independent measurements to verify recently reported licensee survey levels. Airborne radioactivity surveys were examined for the period October 20 through October 29, 1981.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
10. TMI Category A Items NUREG-0578 As a result of the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) and the significant safety concerns identified subsequent to the accident, the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation estab!'.shed a Lessons Learned Task Force to identify and evaluate safety concerns brought to light by the TMI accident.
The findings and recommendations of the Lessons Learned Task Force were published in July 1979 as NUREG-0578. The recommendations were divided into ' Category A' items recommended to be implemented by January 1,1980 and ' Category B' items recommended to be implemented by January 1,1981.
NUREG-0578 made, among others, the recommendations that post-accident sampling be improved (Section 2.1.8.a), radiation monitor ranges be increased (Section 2.1.8.b), and in plant iodine instrumentation be improved (2.1.8.c).
Item 2.1.8.a, post-accident sampling capability, dealt with the necessity to take, handle and analyze highly radioactive samples of the reactor coolant and the containment atnasphere while, at the same time, maintaining personnel exposure as low as rt;asonably achievable and below specified maximum values. Chemical and radiological analyses were specified and the time within which collection and analyses were to be completed was set forth.
Item 2.1.8.b, increased range of radiation monitors, provided licensees with minimum acceptable ranges of instruments and stated that capability for effluent monitoring of radioactivity was to be accomplished through the use of noble gas effluent monitors and iodine sampling with charcoal or other media. Two independent in-containment ridiation level monitors were also called for.
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Item 2.1.8.c, improved in plant iodine instrumentation, required that licensees provide equipment, training, and procedures for accurately deter-mining the airborne iodine concentration in areas within the facility where personnel may be present during an accident.
Subsequent to the issurance of NUREG-0578, the NRC provided, in letters dated September 13, 1979, and October 30, 1979, additional clarification and requirements. On January 2,1980, a Confirmatory Order was issued to appropriate licensees to confirm their commitment to implement the applicable NUREG-0578 items (L" Category A").
ADDITIONAL NRC REQUIREMENTS AND LICENSEE COMMITTMENT-NRC Letter of September 13, 1979 In a letter to all operating Nuclear Power Plants _ dated September 13, 1979 trom D. Eisenhut, NRR stated, "... we have concluded that all operating reactor licensees should begin to implement the actions contained in NUREG 0$78... as soon as possible. Accordingly, please submit within 30 days of
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receipt of this letter, your commitment to meet these requirements on the implementation schedule contained in Enclosure 6."
The relevant portion of Enclosure 6 reads as follows:
Section Abbreviated Position Implementation a
No.
Title Description Category 2.1.8.a Post Accident Design review A
Sampling complete Preparation of A
revised procedures Implement plant B
modifications
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Description of A
proposed modification 2.1.8.b High Range
. Installation B
Radiation Monitors complete
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2.1.8.c Improved Iodine Complete A
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Instrumentation Implementation aCategory A:
Implementation complete by January 1,1980, or prior to OL, whichever is later.
Category B:
Implementation complete by January 1, 1981.
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The September 13 letter further states:
"Other Review Areas Enclosure 7 outlines the requirements developed to date resulting from the staff's Emergency Preparedness Studies. Enclosure 8 provides the implementation schedules for the emergency preparedness requirements
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which, you will note, includes three of the Lessons Learned Topics.
We also require that you provide commitments to comply with each of the requirements of Enclosure 7 in accordance with the implementation schedules shown in Enclosure 8.
Such commitments should be included in your letter due in 30 days of receipt of this letter."
The pertintent Section of Enclosure 7 states:
"Our near term requirements in this effort are as follows:...
(2) -Assure the implementation of the related recommendations of the Lessons Learned Task Force involving instrumentation to follow the course of an accident and relate the information provided by this instrumentation to the emergency plan action levels. This will include instrumentation for post-accident sampling, high range radioactivity monitors, and improved in plant radioiodine instrumentation.
The implementation of the Lessons Learned Task Force's recommendations on instrumentation for detection of inadequate core cooling will also be. factored into the emergency plan action level criteria."
The pertinent Section of Enclosure 8 states:
" Enclosure 8 NEAR TERM EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IMPROVEMENTS IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE
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Implementation
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Item Category 1.
Implement certain short-term actions recommended by Lessons Learned Task Force and use these in action level criteria.
2.1.8(a) Post-accident sampling Design review complete A
Preparation of revised procedures A
Implement plant modifications B
Description of proposed ~ modification A
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2.1.8(b) High range radioactivity monitors Methods for estimating release A
High range monitors B
2.1.8(c) Improved in plant iodine instrumentation A
II Category A:
Implementation prior to OL or by January 1,1980 (See NUREG-0578)
Category B: _ Implementation by January 1, 1981."
NOTE:
NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, issued November 1980, changed the implementation date for 2.1.8(b) High Range Monitors (noble gas, iodine / particulate and containment high range) to January 1,1982.
The licensee's reply to the September 13, 1979 letter dated October 18, 1979, stated, "The required commitments have been delineated in the attachment to this letter, along with explanatory notations as to status and anticipated problem areas."
The appropriate statements in the attachment to the licensee's October 18, 1979 letter are as follows:
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"2.1.8.a Post Accident Sampling Design review complete A
Vermont Yankee takes exception-to the require-ment for improved sampling.
Preparation of revised A
Experience at TMI has procedures shown that these samples can be extremely radio-Implement Plant B
octive.
It may not be modifications wise to remove this material from contain-Description of proposed A
ment because of the modification potential for unnecessary plant personnel exposure and exposure of the public.
In addition we are installing additional post-accident monitors with increased ranges.
These monitors will be used to follow the course
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of an accident on a real-
time basis, i.e., monitor readings will be correlated to the extent of core-
damage.
Installation of these improved monitors raise serious questions
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radioactivity sampling.
Sampling results will not be real-time nor will they be representative.
Additionally operating
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decisions will not be based on the results of
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these analyses. The re-quirement to analyze for chlorides is' totally un-necessary. Even if chlo-rides are above specifica-tions, nothing can be done about it'during the accident;
-this information would be
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totally irrelevant.
l Finally, modifications to
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the present'onsite. counting.
facility-(or the provision
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f ity) with spectral analysis capability for highly radioactive samples will
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be extremely costly and provide :no benefit. We-anticipate _endoring the-BWR Owners Group position on this when submitted.
2.1.8.b High Range Radiation B
Vermont Yankee will-iinstall
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Monitors extended range noble gas
effluent monitors and high i-range containment radiation i
monitors by January 1,1981, i
subject to instrument qual-ification and availability.
We endorse the BWR Owners Group position on this item.
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2.1.8.c Improved Iodine A
Vermont Yankee presently Instrumentation has the capability to determine airborne iodine concentrations. Procedures presently in effect re-quire the use of charcoal for iodine sampling and the use of plant's GeLi detec-tor for gamma ray energy spectrum analysis which can discriminate iodine from noble gases. We endorse the BWR Owners Group position on this item."
In a letter to all operating. nuclear power plants dated October 30, 1979, from Harold R. Denton, further clarification of NRC staff requirements was provided with regard to 2.1.8.a Category A items. The attachment to this letter more precise'y defined the analysis capabilities required for both primary coolant and containment atmosphere samples. The attachment stated, in part:
"In addition to the radiological analyses, certain chemical analyses are necessary for monitoring reactor conditions.
Procedures shall be provided to perform boron and chloride chemical analyses assuming a highly radioactive initial sample (Regulatory Guide 1.3 or 1.4 source term). Both analyses shall be capable of being completed promptly; i.e., the boron sample analysis within an hour and the chloride sample analysis within a shift... Plant procedures for the handling and
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analysis of samples, minor plant modifications for taking samples and a design review and procedural modifications (if necessary) shall be completed by January 1, 1980."
The attachment listed matters which were to be considered in the design review.
It also specified-the provisions which should be included in the licensee's radiological sample analysis capability. These included provisions to:
a)
Identify and quantify isotopes of previously listed nuclide catagories to a specified sensitivity.
b)
Dilute samples where necessary to provide capability for measure-ment and reduction of personnel exposure, c)
Restrict background to provide a specified error value.
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Maintain plant procedures which identify the analysis required, measurement techniques and provisions for reducing backgroun.
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The attachment further stated:
"In performing the review of sampling and analysis capability, considera-tion shall be given to personnel occupational exposure. Procedural changes and/or plant modifications must assure that it shall be possible to obtain and analyze a sample while incurring a radiation dose to any individual that is as low as reasonably achievable and not in excess of GDC 19."
In response, the licensee's letter of January 8,1980 stated:
" Item 2.1.8.A Post-Accident Sampling Vermont Yankee has completed a review of_its sampling capability.
a.
Containment Air Sampling On-line hydrogen analysis capability exists in the Containment Air Dilution System. A connection is available outside the reactor building for obtaining an air sample of the containment atmosphere and the capability to perform isotopic analysis of the sample is siso available.
b.
Reactor Coolant Sampling The reactor coolant sample tap is located inside the reactor building and may not be accessible under some accident conditions.
However, procedures have been developed making it possible to draw a reactor coolant sample containing several mci /ml, convey it the lab, and analyze it without exceeding allowable personnel exposures.
Proposed modifications presently under investigation include a dilution system which will allow analysis of the sample with existing laboratory equipment as well as on-line analytical equipment.
Choice of the most suitable method will be made in time to meet the schedule requirements of January 1,1981."
With regard to item 2.1.8.b, the attachment to the NRC's October 30, 1979 letter provided clarification of the need for increased range of radiation monitors and discussed radiciodine and particulate release monitoring. The attachment stated in part:
"1.
Radiological Noble Gas Effluent Monitors A.
January 1, 1980 Requirements Until final implementation January 1, 1981, all operating reactors must provide, by January 1,1980, an interim method for quantifying high level releases which meets the requirements of Table 2.1.8.b.1...
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Methods are to be developed to quantify release rates of up to 10,000 C1/sec for noble gases."
The table which dealt with both noile gas and radiciodine releases is-set-forth below:
" TABLE 2.1.8.b.1 INTERIM-PROCEDURES FOR QUANTIFYING HIGH LEVEL
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ACCIDENTAL RADIOACTIVITY RELEASES Licensees are to implement procedures for estimating noble gas and radioiodine release rates if the existing effluent instrumentation goes off scale.
Examples of major elements of a highly radioactive effluent release special procedures (noble gas).
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- Pre-selected location to measure radiation from the exhaust air, e.g., exhaust duct or sample line.
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- Provide shielding to minimize background interference.
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- Use of an installed monitor (preferable) or dedicated portable monitor (acceptable) to measure the radiation.
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- Pre-determined calculational method to convert the radiation level to radioactive effluent release rate."
The attachment further stated:
"For assessing radioiodine and particulate releases, special procedures must be developed for the removal and analysisio.f the radioiodine/ particulate sampling media (i.e., charcoal canister / filter paper).
Existing sampling locations are expected to be adequate; however, special procedures for retrieval and analysis of the sampling media under accident conditions (e.g., high air and surface contamination and direct radiation levels) are needed...
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Radioiodine and Particulate Effluents A.
For January 1,1980 the licensee should provide the following:
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System / Method description including:
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Instrumentation to be used for analysis of the sampling media with discussions on methods used to correct for potentially interfering background levels of radioactivity.
b)
Monitoring / sampling location.
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Method to be used for retrieval and handling of sampling media to minimize occupational exposure.
d)
Method to be used for data' analysis of individual radionuclides in the presence of high levels of radioactive noble gases, e)
If normal AC power is used for sample collection and analysis equipment, an alternate back-up power supply should be provided.
If DC power is used, the source should b_e capable.
of providing continuous read-out for 7 consecutive days.
2.
Procedures for conducting all aspects of the measurement analysis including:
a)
Minimizing occupational exposure b)
Calculational methods for determining release rates c)
Procedures for dissemination of information d)
Calibration and frequency and technique" By January 1,1981 the licensee was reouired to provide high range noble gas effluent monitors with specified capabilities and characteristics.for each release path; have the capability to continuously sample and provide'
onsite analysis of the' sampling media for radioiodine and particulate effluents; and provide two radiation monitor systems in containment which were documented to meet the requirements of Table 2.1.8.b.3 of the attachment.
As previously noted, these implementation dates were changed to January 1, 1982 by NUREG-0737.
In response, licensee's letter of January 8,1980 stated:
" Item 2.1.8.B Increased Range of Radiation Monitors
' Vermont Yankee has provided interim equipment and procedures to quantify high level releases beyond the capability of previously installed equipment. A dedicated RM-16 is installed in the base of the plant stack. The information provided by this monitor, in conjunction with stack flow rates, can be converted to a release rate. Written procedures are available to the plant operator describing this method. -In addition, the procedure addresses retrieval and analysis of stack iodine and particulate sampling media; reactor coolant sampling and analysis; and primary containment sampling. Techniques for minimizing exposure during the collection, transport, and analysis of these samples are detailed in the procedure. Analysis will be performed in the plant counting laboratory with backup capability at Yankee Rowe, a mobile facility and at Westborough."
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With regard to item 2.1.8.c, the attachment to the NRC's October 30, 1979 letter stated the reasons why portable instruments vece necassary for monitoring airborne iodine levels. This discussion further emphasized the concept presented in NUREG 0578, that it was essential to have a reasonably accurate determination of the concentrations of iodine to which personnel dealing with the incident are exposed. The attachment further stated;
" Iodine Filters and Measurement Techniques A.
The following are short-term recommendations and shall be imple-mented by the licensee by January 1, 1980.
The licensee shall have the capability to accurately detect the presence of iodine-in the region of interest following an accident. This can be accomplished by using a portable or cart-mounted iodine sampler with attached single channel analyzer...
B.
By January 1, 1981:
The licensee shall have the capability to remove the sampling cartridge to a low background, low contamination area for further analysis... The licensee shall have the capability to measure accurately the iodine concentrations present on these samples and
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effluent charcoal samples under accident conditions."
In response, the licensee's letter of Jaunary 8,1980 stated:
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" Item 2.1.8.C Improved In-Plant Iodine Instrumentation Vermont Yankee has the capability to detect the presence of iodine in the region of interest following the accident. Multichannel analyzers are available to monitor a charcoal sampling medium. These analyzers clearly detect iodine in the presence of noble gases.
Plant procedures describe methods of using this equipment.
In addition, these procedures describe methods to prepare the sample medium in the event of a gross activity level on the sample medium.
Briefly, the sample is cleared of noble gases by cleaning with compressed air or a smaller sample volume is used.
Improved equipment for iodine sampling is being evaluated but it will not be available before mid-January."
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Findings During the Inspection of October 26-30, 1981.
NUREG 0578 The inspector reviewed the licensee's implementation of NUREG 0578 short term lessons learned Category A items, including the following procedures:
OP-0631, Radiochemistry, Revision 4, 7/24/81 L
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OP-2611, Gaseous Radwaste, Revision 9, 10/5/81-OP-3510, Off-Site and Site Boundry Monitoring, Revis_ ion 8, 10/5/81 OP-3513, Evaluation of Off-Site Radiological Conditions, Revision 4, 3/30/81 OP-3530, Post Accident Sampling, Revision 1, 12/11/80 OP-4533, Airborne Radioactivity Concentration Determination, Revision 6,
6/30/81 DP-4540, Calibration of H.P. Portable and Laboratory Radiation Detection Instruments, Revision 12, 8/17/81 DP-4562, Calibration of SAM II, Revision 0, 5/1/81 Item 2.1.8.a Post-Accident Sampling The licensee has implementated procedure OP-3530 for post accident sampling of the reactor coolant system (RCS). Obtaining an RCS sample is based on accessibility to the reactor building and taking the sample from the reactor building sample sink. The RCS sample is then transported to the chemistry laboratory for analysis.
Procedures for analyzing RCS samples are contained in OP-0631 and for boron and chloride analysis in OP-0630.
The containment air dilution system is used to obtain containment atmosphere samples and for hydrogen analysis.
Sample collection points are provided at the Delphi hydrogen monitor located in the reactor building and at the-MSA hydrogen monitor located outside the reactor building.
Procedure OP-3530 contains instructions for obtaining and analyzing the containment atmosphere sample.
Item 2.1.8.b(1) Noble Gas Monitoring.
The licensee's interim method for noble gas monitoring consisted of in-stalling a RM-16 radiation monitor with an HP-210 detector on the existing GAS-EDOS effluent monitor sample return line in the plant stack-house. The RM-16 can be powered by 110 Volt AC or battery.
The unit is normally powered by 110 Volt AC, the B diesel generator provides for loss of normal AC power.
In addition, two batteries are provided, capable of operating the instrument for four days.
Item 2.1.8.b(2) Iodine and Particulate Monitoring The existing gaseous effluent monitor has provisions for collection of particulate and iodine samples and is routinely used.
Procedure OP-3530 provides-instructions on how to obtain a sample, OP-2611 provides for the sample analysis.
If the chemistry laboratory is not available, OP-3510 is used for sample analysis.
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-Item 2.1.8.c Inplant Iodine Monitoring The licensee has portable particulate and iodine air samplers available-to monitor. in plant conditions. Charcoal cartridges are routinely transported to the chemistry laboratory Sar analysis on a 20 percent GeLi detector connected to a multichannel analyzer (MCA). Should the MCA be inoperative, a single channel analyzer (SAM-II) is available.
Procedures for routine iodine monitoring, OP-4533, and for emergency condi-tions, OP-3530, are available for sample collection _and analysis.
11.
Exit Interview The inspector net with licensee management representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) on October 30, 1981.
The inspector summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings.
A licensee representative stated that a dedicated enclosed area for the temporary storage of radioactive waste material awaiting transport, packaged in accordance with_ Department of Transportation Regulations, would be available by September 1, 1982.
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