IR 05000266/2001015
| ML020230048 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 01/22/2002 |
| From: | Lanksbury R NRC/OCIO/ITID/IDIB |
| To: | Reddemann M Nuclear Management Co |
| References | |
| IR-01-015 | |
| Download: ML020230048 (34) | |
Text
ary 22, 2002
SUBJECT:
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-266/01-15; 50-301/01-15
Dear Mr. Reddemann:
On December 29, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your Point Beach Nuclear Plant.
The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on January 4, 2002, with you and members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Specifically, this inspection was a routine review of plant activities by the resident inspectors and regional inspectors.
No findings of significance were identified.
Immediately following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the NRC issued an advisory recommending that nuclear power plant licensees go to the highest level of security, and all promptly did so. With continued uncertainty about the possibility of additional terrorist activities, the Nation's nuclear power plants remain at the highest level of security and the NRC continues to monitor the situation. This advisory was followed by additional advisories, and although the specific actions are not releasable to the public, they generally include increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities, additional security posts, heightened coordination with law enforcement and military authorities, and more limited access of personnel and vehicles to the sites. The NRC has conducted various audits of your response to these advisories and your ability to respond to terrorist attacks with the capabilities of the current design basis threat (DBT). From these audits, the NRC has concluded that your security program is adequate at this time. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 50-266/01-15; 50-301/01-15
REGION III==
Docket Nos: 50-266; 50-301 License Nos: DPR-24; DPR-27 Report No: 50-266/01-15; 50-301/01-15 Licensee: Nuclear Management Company, LLC Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 Location: 6610 Nuclear Road Two Rivers, WI 54241 Dates: November 6 through December 29, 2001 Inspectors: P. Krohn, Senior Resident Inspector R. Powell, Resident Inspector H. Peterson, Senior Operations Specialist B. Palagi, Operations Specialist B. Wetzel, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Approved by: Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000266-01-15, IR 05000301-01-15, on 11/06-12/29/2001, Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2. Routine Resident and Licensed Operator Requalification Report.
This report covers a 7-week routine resident inspection and a licensed operator requalification inspection. The inspections were conducted by resident and regional specialist inspectors. No findings or violations were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. Findings for which the Significance Determination Process does not apply are indicated by No Color or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.
A. Inspector-Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.
B. Licensee-Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.
Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power and remained at 100 percent until December 3, 2001, when power was reduced to approximately 98 percent for work associated with the plant process computer system (PPCS). Unit 1 remained at 98 percent power until December 18, when power was reduced to 30 percent to reduce the potential dose to workers for a containment entry to isolate a small leak on the sensing line for 1PT-420, reactor coolant system (RCS) wide range pressure detector. Unit 1 was returned to 98 percent power on December 19 and to 100 percent power on December 24 after the PPCS modification was accepted for Rated Thermal Power calculation purposes. Unit 1 remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power and remained at 100 percent until November 14, 2001, when power was reduced to approximately 67 percent for turbine stop valve testing. Unit 2 was returned to 100 percent power later that day and remained at 100 percent until December 3 when power was reduced to approximately 98 percent for work associated with the PPCS. Unit 2 remained at 98 percent power until December 7, when power was reduced to 92 percent for condenser steam dump testing. Unit 2 was returned to 98 percent power on December 19 and to 100 percent power on December 24 after the PPCS modification was accepted for Rated Thermal Power calculation purposes. Unit 2 remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of inspection period.
1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity 1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
.1 Unit 2 'A' Train Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Partial System Walk-down a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a partial system walk-down of the Unit 2 A Train EDG (G-02), while a planned service water (SW) system modification rendered the normal Unit 1 A Train EDG (G-01), unavailable. The inspectors used licensee checklists (CLs)
during the walk-downs and used selected portions of system electrical, fuel oil, lubricating oil, and starting air drawings to accomplish the inspection.
The inspectors walked down G-02 to verify the correct position of control switches, breakers, louvers, dampers, and valves associated with G-02, and ventilation, heating, fuel oil transfer, starting air, and engine control power alignments associated with G-02 support systems. The inspectors also performed walk-downs in the control room to verify appropriate switch positions and valve configurations. Finally, the inspectors evaluated other elements, such as material condition, housekeeping, and component labeling.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Unit 1 SW Complete System Walk-down a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a complete walk-down of accessible portions of the Unit 1 SW system to verify system operability. The SW system was selected due to its high risk significance and because of several configuration changes made during recent system modifications. The inspectors used SW system CLs and system drawings to accomplish the inspection.
The inspectors walked down the system to verify the correct position of valves and breakers in the SW system using the system diagrams and CLs. The inspectors also observed instrumentation valve configurations and whether appropriate meter indications existed. As part of the walk-down, the inspectors checked control room switch positions to verify that they were in the correct position. Finally, the inspectors evaluated other elements, such as material condition, housekeeping, and component labeling.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors walked down the following areas to assess the overall readiness of fire protection equipment and barriers:
- Fire Zone 780, G-03 Radiator Room
- Fire Zone 783, G-04 Radiator Room
- Fire Zone 784, G-04 Exhaust Fan Room
- Fire Zone 785, G-03 Exhaust Fan Room Emphasis was placed on the control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, the material condition of fire protection equipment, and the material condition and operational status of fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or propagation. Area conditions/configurations were evaluated based on information provided in the licensees Fire Hazards Analysis Report, dated August 17, 2001.
The inspectors looked at fire hoses, sprinklers, and portable fire extinguishers to verify that they were installed at their designated locations, were in satisfactory physical condition, and were unobstructed. The inspectors also evaluated the physical location and condition of fire detection devices. Additionally, passive features such as fire doors, fire dampers, and mechanical and electrical penetration seals were inspected to verify
that they were located per Fire Protection Evaluation Report requirements and were in good physical condition. The documents listed at the end of the report were used by the inspectors during the assessment of this area.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11)
.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review: Large-Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident and Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation a. Inspection Scope On November 7, 2001, the resident inspectors observed licensed operator training involving a main turbine first stage pressure instrument failure, reactor coolant pump high vibrations, a large-break loss-of-coolant accident, a residual heat removal and safety injection pump auto start failure, and transfer to containment sump recirculation.
The inspectors evaluated crew performance for clarity and formality of communication; the ability to take timely action in the safe direction; the prioritizing, interpreting, and verifying of alarms; the correct use and implementation of procedures, including alarm response procedures; timely control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions; and group dynamics. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation of a reactor and senior reactor operator's actions during the scenario to verify that the training staff had observed important performance deficiencies and specified appropriate remedial actions.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Facility Operating History a. Inspection Scope The operations specialists reviewed the plants operating history from January 2000 through September 2001, to assess whether the Licensed Operator Requalification Training (LORT) program had addressed operator performance deficiencies noted at the plant.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Licensee Requalification Examinations a. Inspection Scope The operations specialists performed a biennial inspection of the licensees LORT program. The operations specialists reviewed the annual requalification operating and written examination material to evaluate general quality, construction, and difficulty level.
The operating portion of the examination was inspected during October 29 - 31, 2001.
The operating examination material consisted of dynamic simulator scenarios and job performance measures. The biennial written examination administered during January -
February 2001 was inspected. The biennial written examination material included a total of 35 open-reference, multiple-choice questions. Approximately half of the 35 written examination questions were static-simulator, multiple-choice questions. The operations specialists reviewed the methodology for developing the examinations, including the LORT program two-year sample plan, probabilistic risk assessment insights, previously identified operator performance deficiencies, and plant modifications. The operations specialists assessed the level of examination material duplication during the current year annual examinations and with last years annual examinations. The operations specialists also interviewed members of the licensees management and training staff and discussed various aspects of the examination development.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Licensee Administration of Requalification Examinations a. Inspection Scope The operations specialists observed the administration of the requalification operating test to assess the licensees effectiveness in conducting the test and to assess the facility evaluators ability to determine adequate performance using objective, measurable performance standards. The operations specialists evaluated the performance of one operating shift crew during three dynamic simulator scenarios and five job performance measures in parallel with the facility evaluators. The operations specialists observed the training staff personnel administering the operating test, including pre-examination briefings, observations of operator performance, individual and crew evaluations after dynamic scenarios, techniques for job performance measure cuing, and the final evaluation briefing for licensed operators. The operations specialists noted the performance of the simulator to support the examinations. The operations specialists also reviewed the licensees overall examination security program.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Licensee Training Feedback System a. Inspection Scope The operations specialists assessed the methods and effectiveness of the licensees processes for revising and maintaining its LORT program up-to-date, including the use of feedback from plant events and industry experience information. The operations specialists interviewed licensee personnel (operators, instructors, training management, and operations management) and reviewed the applicable licensees procedures. In addition, the operations specialists reviewed the licensees self-assessment reports, including the 2001 Point Beach Nuclear Plant Operations Training Self-Assessment Report, S-A-OPS-2001-01, the Cycle 01-02 Licensed Operator Requalification End of Cycle Report, and the training section of the Nuclear Oversight Quarterly Report, 2Q2001.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.6 Licensee Remedial Training Program a. Inspection Scope The operations specialists assessed the adequacy and effectiveness of the remedial training conducted since the previous annual requalification examinations and the training planned for the current examination cycle to verify that they addressed weaknesses in licensed operator or crew performance identified during training and plant operations. The operations specialists reviewed remedial training procedures and individual remedial training plans, and interviewed licensee personnel (operators, instructors, and training management). In addition, the operations specialists reviewed the licensees current examination cycle remediation packages for unsatisfactory operator performance on the written examination and operating test to ensure that remediation and subsequent re-evaluations were completed prior to returning individuals to licensed duties.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.7 Conformance with Operator License Conditions a. Inspection Scope The operations specialists evaluated the facility and individual operator licensees'
conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 55. The operations specialists reviewed the facility licensees program for maintaining active operator licenses. The operations specialists reviewed the procedural guidance and the process for tracking on-shift hours for licensed operators and which control room positions were granted credit for maintaining active operator licenses. The operations specialists also reviewed
eight licensed operators medical records maintained by the facility for verifying the medical fitness of its licensed operators and to assess compliance with medical standards delineated in American National Standards Institute and American Nuclear Society ANSI/ANS-3.4 and with 10 CFR 55.21 and 10 CFR 55.25.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.8 Written Examination and Operating Test Results a. Inspection Scope The operations specialists reviewed the overall pass/fail results of individual written tests, operating tests, and simulator operating tests (required to be given per 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2)) administered by the licensee during 2001.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the maintenance rule requirements to verify that component and equipment failures were identified, entered, and scoped within the maintenance rule and that select structures, systems and components were properly categorized and classified as (a)(1) or (a)(2) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65. The inspectors reviewed station logs, maintenance work orders, condition reports (CRs), (a)(1) corrective action plans, selected surveillance test procedures, and a sample of CRs to verify that the licensee was identifying issues related to the maintenance rule at an appropriate threshold and that corrective actions were appropriate. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensees performance criteria to verify that the criteria adequately monitored equipment performance and to verify that licensee changes to performance criteria were reflected in the licensees probabilistic risk assessment. Specific components and systems reviewed were:
- Engineering Safety Features System
- Diesel Generator Room Heating & Ventilation
- Nuclear Instrumentation For a safeguards timing relay calibration procedure, the inspectors examined the cumulative effect of six time-delay relays which had drifted and required adjustment.
The inspectors considered the potential cumulative effect to ensure that the engineering safety feature system remained capable of performing its design basis function.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees evaluation of plant risk, scheduling, configuration control, and performance of maintenance associated with planned and emergent work activities, to verify that scheduled and emergent work activities were adequately managed. In particular, the inspectors reviewed the program for conducting maintenance risk safety assessments to verify that the licensees planning, risk management tools, and the assessment and management of on-line risk were adequate. The inspectors also reviewed actions to address increased on-line risk during periods when equipment was out-of-service for maintenance, such as establishing compensatory actions, minimizing the duration of the activity, obtaining appropriate management approval, and informing appropriate plant staff, to verify that the actions were accomplished when on-line risk was increased due to maintenance on risk-significant structures, systems, and components. When risk-significant equipment was taken out-of-service, the inspectors reviewed selected tagouts to verify that no unintentional equipment had been removed from service which would increase the assumed risk profile. The following specific activities were reviewed:
- The maintenance risk assessment for work planned for the week beginning November 11, 2001. This included risk-significant work and testing involving the Unit 1 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, both motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, and the Unit 1 'B' train component cooling water pump.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the activities added to the work week to verify that emergent work did not adversely affect the previously completed risk assessment.
- The maintenance risk assessment for work planned for the week beginning November 18, 2001. This included work involving risk-significant surveillance testing of the Unit 2 safeguards bus undervoltage relays, steam generator safeguards logic testing, Unit 1 over-temperature-delta-temperature setpoint calibrations, and a Unit 2 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump oil change and cold-start test. This testing occurred while the Unit 2 'A' EDG was out-of-service due to an electrical generator rotor failure. The inspectors also reviewed the additional activities added to the work week to verify that emergent work did not adversely affect the previously completed risk assessment. Finally, the inspectors reviewed selected procedures to verify that configuration changes as a result of cycling main steam valves and purifying the refueling water storage tanks did not render any safety-related functions unavailable.
- The maintenance risk assessment for work planned for the week beginning November 25, 2001. This included risk-significant work and testing involving the Unit 1 condenser steam dump valves, Unit 2 reactor protection logic testing, and SW Pump P-32A.
- The maintenance risk assessment for work planned for the week beginning December 23, 2001.
b Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions (71111.14)
.1 Unit 1 RCS Leak on RCS Wide Range Pressure Transmitter Sensing Line a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed licensee performance during the identification and isolation of a small RCS leak from a Unit 1 wide-range pressure transmitter sensing line leading to pressure transmitters 1PT-420, 1PT-420C, and 1PI-447. The inspectors reviewed licensee efforts at identifying the source of the leak through chemistry analyses, determining the physical location of the leak through containment entries, reducing reactor power while isolating the leak to minimize personnel radiation exposure, and subsequent sensing line repair activities. The inspectors also reviewed design basis information to determine if any control or interlock functions were lost as a result of isolating the pressure transmitters. Where interlock functions were affected, the inspectors verified that the licensee had taken appropriate compensatory actions to ensure adequate equipment protection remained. Inspectors also considered the location of the leak and the potential effect on adjacent equipment to ensure the effects of the leak were fully understood.
b Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) (URI 50-266/01-13-01): Operating crew response to high electrical generator differential temperatures during Unit 1 startup activities. The inspectors reviewed the operating crew response to an electrical generator hot gas differential temperature limit being exceeded during Unit 1 startup activities on September 17, 2001, to determine the appropriateness of crew actions. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensees root cause evaluation of the manual turbine trip which included an evaluation of operating crew response to the event.
Specifically, the inspectors considered procedural compliance and conservative decision making practices when reviewing the crew's decision to manually trip the turbine despite the procedural guidance of Operating Procedures (OPs) OP 1C, Step 3.8.7.c, and OP 2A, Step 2.8.6.c, which directed a manual trip of both the reactor and the turbine.
The inspectors reviewed the associated emergent temporary procedure change notice, the 10 CFR 50.59 screening and safety evaluation, the turbine trip incident investigation report, and conduct-of-operations guidance in determining the appropriateness of the crew's decision to deviate from safety-related, continuous-use, and reference-use procedure requirements.
The inspectors concluded that the crew's response was technically justifiable and was conducted in accordance with established procedures for emergent procedure changes.
The inspectors were, however, concerned about the potential ramifications of setting a precedent of not tripping a reactor when directed to do so by procedure. The inspectors engaged licensee management on several occasions to discuss the concern. In this instance, the problems experienced on the secondary side were quickly diagnosed and determine to be isolated to the secondary side. For that reason, not tripping the reactor below the P-9 permissive (49 percent power) concurrent with a turbine trip was consistent with operator training and management expectation for procedure compliance. The inspectors conducted reviews to verify that the licensee reinforced expectations concerning conservative decision-making practices, reactor trip criteria, and the requirements for procedure changes during crew training cycle 01-06, conducted after the September 17 trip.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
.1 Environmental Qualification (EQ) of Units 1 and 2 Nuclear Instrument Channel Wide Range Detectors a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the operability determination associated with CR 01-3407, Environmental Quals of Components Questioned, to understand the impact of radiation dose levels during normal and accident conditions on wide range nuclear instrument EQs. The inspectors reviewed selected drawings to determine the specific location of important wide range nuclear instrument components including the detectors, cable runs, connectors, seals (o-rings) and junction boxes. For each component and location, the inspectors considered the effects of gamma, beta, and neutron radiation for the integrated dose projections over 40 years of operation and post-accident expected exposures. The inspectors also interviewed an EQ engineer to understand vendor qualification tests and sources of EQ data that were not part of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) design basis documentation. Finally, the inspectors performed detector junction box and connector exposure calculations to independently confirm the licensee's conclusions of operability.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Comparison of FSAR Total Integrated Dose for Equipment Inside Containment to the Cumulative Contribution of Normal and Post-Accident Radiation Qualification Requirements a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the operability determination associated with CR 01-3408, Total Integrated Dose Equipment In Containment May Not Be Accurate, to understand the ability of equipment inside containment to withstand the cumulative effects of normal (gamma and neutron) and post-accident (gamma, neutron, and beta) radiation exposures. Final Safety Analysis Report Figure 14.3.4-15 for total integrated dose for equipment inside containment only identified gamma radiation for post-accident conditions up to 1,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> and did not consider the effects of neutron or beta radiation during accident conditions or gamma and neutron radiation during normal conditions.
The inspectors reviewed the additional dose to equipment as a result of beta and neutron exposures during accident conditions and the neutron and gamma exposure during normal conditions to verify that the gamma exposure data included in the FSAR remained bounding for all accident and normal operating conditions. The inspectors also reviewed selected licensee submittals to verify that compliance with all regulatory requirements concerning radiation qualification of equipment inside containment had been met and no violation of regulatory requirements had occurred.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Effects of Low Environmental Temperatures on Primary Containment Tendon Cable Fracture Toughness Characteristics a. Inspection Scope During a review of cold weather preparations, the inspectors considered the effects of cold ambient temperatures on the exposed tendon cans and adjacent ductile material in the facade area. The inspectors interviewed a containment structural engineer to understand the tensile load bearing components of concern in the tendon system and the containment stress response during a design basis event. The inspectors also referenced the design basis pressurization rates, peak pressures, and temperature profiles across the primary containment wall during a design basis accident to understand the integrated stress response of the primary containment structure. The inspectors researched local temperature extremes in Two Rivers, Wisconsin, to determine the lowest temperature to which tendon materials had been exposed. The inspectors reviewed American Society for Testing and Materials 421-90, Standard for Uncoated Stress-Relieved Steel Wire for Prestressed Concrete, requirements for tendon cables and researched the available literature for fracture toughness data to determine if local temperature extremes could cause tendon material to transition from the ductile to the brittle response regime. The inspectors also considered the energy absorption capability of the primary containment structure during cold temperature extremes to other design basis considerations such as tornado and wind impact loadings.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Safety Injection Pump Operability With Safeguards Bus Voltages in Excess of Continuous Operating Motor Rating a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the operability considerations associated with CR 01-3528, Safety Related Bus Voltages High - 7 Day LCO [Limiting Condition for Operation]
Entered, to understand the impact of safeguards bus voltages in excess of 4400 volts alternating current (VAC) on safety injection pump (rated at 4000 VAC) operability. The inspectors reviewed Improved Technical Specification Bases Section B.3.8.1 which set a maximum continuous voltage rating for safety-related motors of 110 percent of nominal ratings. The inspectors reviewed recent safeguards bus voltage levels and referenced industry guidance for electric motor overheating effects with terminal voltages in excess of 110 percent of nominal ratings.
Following the licensee's change of Improved Technical Specification bases to allow maximum system voltage operating limits of 115 percent nominal voltage (4600 VAC),
the inspectors reviewed the associated safety evaluation screening that concluded that the change would not have more than a marginal effect on the reliability of the safety-related motors. The inspectors challenged this assumption and interviewed selected engineering personnel to better understand the design basis functional impact of elevated 4160- and 480-VAC safeguard bus voltages on safety-related motor continuous ratings. The inspectors also considered the effects of increased safeguards bus voltages on current transformers, protective relaying devices, motor starting torques, solenoid-operated devices, and power transformer magnetic core saturations.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R16 Operator Workarounds (OWAs) (71111.16)
.1 OWA Review a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed OWAs to identify any potential effect on the function of mitigating systems, or the ability of operators to respond to an event and implement abnormal and emergency OPs. The inspectors interviewed selected operations and engineering licensee personnel and evaluated the following OWAs:
- OWA 2-01R-001 CW, Waterbox Level Alarms
- OWA 0-01C-001 PI, Unit 2 Main Condenser Vacuum Gages in Control Room Unreliable Requiring Frequent Venting b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Cumulative Effect of OWAs a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effect of OWAs to determine the total impact of these workarounds on plant operations. Specifically, the inspectors considered the interactions between OWAs associated with oversized condenser steam dump valves, water intrusion into the Unit 2 facade sump indicating submersion of selected electrical cables, manual operator action required to reseat crossover steam dump valves, safeguards battery room high speed ventilation fan operation which caused moisture intrusion in the vicinity of safety-related equipment, and the inability to use two Unit 2 letdown system orifices at higher RCS pressures. The inspectors also reviewed the interaction between four of the thirteen OWAs which, in part, pertained to maintaining the condenser as the normal, preferred heat sink for reactor operations. The inspectors also reviewed OWA meeting minutes from June, July, August, September, and October 2001, to determine if the licensee had been conducting periodic reviews of OWAs and considering the total impact of workarounds on plant operations. The inspectors reviewed probabilistic risk assessment personnel involvement in the periodic workaround reviews to determine if the licensee was attempting to gain possible risk insights concerning the cumulative effect of OWAs.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (71111.19)
.1 G-01 SW Supply a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed PMT activities conducted in accordance with Individual Work Plan 00-102-01, Service Water Upgrades to Emergency Diesel Generator G01 Units 1 and 2, to verify that the test was adequate for the scope of the maintenance work which had been performed and that the testing acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents. The inspectors reviewed, following system modifications, portions of the SW system associated with EDG G-01 to verify that the systems were leak tight and capable of performing their design functions. The inspectors also examined selected pipe supports and hangars to verify seismic adequacy of the modified SW piping.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 'D' SW Pump Removal, Installation, and Maintenance a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed PMT activities conducted in accordance with Work Order (WO)
9933943 and Routine Maintenance Procedures (RMPs) 9216-1, 9216-2, and 9216-3 following replacement of the 'D' SW pump and motor to verify that the tests were adequate for the scope of the maintenance work which had been performed and that the testing acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents. The inspectors observed portions of the motor and pump replacement activities and reviewed completed maintenance records to verify that foreign material exclusion controls were properly applied; inservice leak tests were properly performed; pump and motor vibrations following reassembly were at acceptable levels; motor power supply lugs and cables were properly reattached and assembled; the new motor had acceptable electrical performance characteristics; and shaft runout and bearing clearances following reassembly were within acceptable limits. The inspectors selected this activity due to the risk-significance of the SW system.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Unit 2 Containment Spray Pump 2P-14B a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed PMT activities conducted in accordance with Inservice Test Procedure (IT)-06, Containment Spray Pumps and Valves (Quarterly) Unit 2, Revision 50, following an oil change of 2P-14B to verify that the test was adequate for the scope of the maintenance work which had been performed and that the testing acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
.1 Control Room Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Testing a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed design basis requirements and completed documentation for Procedure TS-9, Control Room Heating and Ventilation System Monthly Checks, Revision 22, to verify operability of the control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 'D' SW Pump Surveillance Testing Following Motor and Pump Replacement a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed portions of the surveillance test and reviewed the completed documentation for IT-07D, P-32D Service Water Pump (Quarterly), Revision 10, to verify operability of 'D' SW pump following motor and pump replacement activities. The inspectors also reviewed design basis requirements for the SW system to verify that the surveillance test accurately tested the design function of the pump.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Cold Start of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump and Valve Test a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed portions of the surveillance test and reviewed the completed documentation for IT-08A, Cold Start of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump and Valve Test (Quarterly) Unit 1, Revision 24, to verify operability of Unit 1 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The inspectors also reviewed design basis requirements for the auxiliary feedwater system to verify that the surveillance test accurately tested the design function of the pump.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)
.1 EDG Fuel Oil Storage Tank (FOST) Temporary Filtration Skid Installation a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed temporary modifications01-041 and 01-042, Installation of Filtration Skid for the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tanks (T-175A/B), to verify that the modifications were properly installed, had no effect on the operability of adjacent safety-related equipment, and adequately reduced elevated FOST particulate levels.
The inspectors performed walk-downs of the modification while filtering of each FOST was occurring to verify that appropriate compensatory actions for open vital area security and fire protection barriers had been implemented. During filtration, the inspectors examined the temporary modification flow paths, suction and discharge piping, and filtration equipment to verify that the design basis amount of fuel oil remained available for each EDG to meet its intended safety function. The inspectors verified that the filtration skid took a suction from the bottom of each FOST to ensure that all fuel oil was being effectively filtered and to eliminate the possibility of high and low particulate fuel oil stratification. The inspectors also examined foreign material exclusion controls during the filtration process to verify that no unwanted materials entered the safety-related EDG fuel oil supply system. Finally, the inspectors examined the filtration skid for fuel oil leaks to verify that appropriate precautions had been taken to prevent leaks from affecting adjacent equipment or the environment.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Temporary Cooling for the Cable Spreading Room (CSR)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed Safety Evaluation 2001-0049, Upgrade of the Control Room Ventilation Boundary, to understand the effects of the upgrade on control room in-leakage rates and habitability. The first phase of the control room envelope upgrade included temporary cooling for the CSR which consisted of a skid mounted chiller in the Unit 1 turbine building, piping manifolds and electrical power feeds to six CSR air handling units, and CSR pipe penetrations. The inspectors performed a walk-down of the temporary CSR cooling installation to verify that the temporary equipment did not impact the operation of adjacent safety-related breakers, relays, and transformers. In addition, the inspectors examined the temporary equipment for seismic adequacy and the maintenance of fire barrier integrity. During the temporary modification, the CSR temporary chilled water line and electrical power penetrations were also reviewed for high-energy-line-break barrier adequacy since these penetrations passed from the turbine building into the CSR. The inspectors also checked to verify that insulation had been applied to chilled water lines as necessary to prevent dripping condensation from affecting nearby components in both the turbine building and CSR. At selected times while the CSR temporary cooling system was installed and operating, the inspectors performed walk-downs to verify that work-in-progress did not cover or degrade the
detection capability of smoke and heat detectors in the control room ventilation equipment room or the CSR. The inspectors also reviewed the temporary modification fire protection conformance CL to verify that as-built configurations in the turbine building and CSR were in compliance with fire protection requirements.
The inspectors reviewed the CSR temporary cooling system operating instructions to verify that they provided adequate operator direction during normal start-up, steady state, and shutdown conditions. The inspectors also reviewed the area to verify that in the event of a CSR temporary cooling system failure, emergency CSR cooling equipment was staged and available as required by Abnormal Operating Procedure 10A, Safe Shutdown - Local Control, Attachment E, Revision 32. Following removal of CSR temporary cooling system, the inspectors walked down portions of the control room ventilation boundary to ensure that normal ventilation alignments, fire penetration barriers, and high energy line break barriers had been properly restored.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151)
.1 Emergency Alternating Current System Power Availability a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed reported third quarter 2001 data for the Emergency Alternating Current System Power Availability PIs for Units 1 and 2 using the definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Revision 1.
The inspectors reviewed station log entries and system engineer data sheets for periods of system unavailability to verify that planned and unplanned unavailability hours were characterized correctly in determining PI results. The inspectors also made independent calculations to verify PI data. The inspectors reviewed recent equipment failures and the recording of fault exposure hours to verify system unavailability was being properly reflected in the PI. Where questions arose concerning an electrical rotor failure associated with the G04 EDG, the inspectors engaged the licensee staff who submitted a frequently-asked-question to NRC headquarters to clarify the intent of reporting emergency alternating current system power fault exposure hours. Finally, the inspectors reviewed selected surveillance test procedures affecting the EDGs to verify that the surveillance tests did not render the generators unavailable for performing their safety-related function.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Follow-up (71153)
.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Reports (LERs) 50-266/2001-003-00; 50-301/2001-003-00; 50-266/2001-003-01 and 50-301/2001-003-01: Containment response for MSLB [Main Steamline Break] may exceed design pressure of 60 pounds per square inch gauge (psig). This event report and supplement discussed a potential non-conservatism in the Point Beach primary containment analyses for a MSLB inside containment with an assumed failure of a main feedwater regulating valve to close. The inspectors previously reviewed the licensee's interim operability determinations and event response notifications as documented in Inspection Report 50-266/01-10; 50-301/01-10, Sections 1R15 and 4OA3.1.
Based on a review of the issue, the LER, and the supplement, the inspectors determined that no violation of regulatory requirements had occurred and that compensatory measures instituted by the licensee were sufficient to prevent primary containment design pressure from being exceeded in the event of a MSLB inside containment with failure of the main feedwater regulating valve to close. This issue has been included in the licensees corrective action program as CR 01-2026.
4OA6 Meetings Exit Meeting The resident inspectors presented the routine inspection results to Mr. and other members of licensee management on January 4, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.
Interim Exit Meetings Senior Official at Exit Meeting: Mark Reddemann, Site Vice-President Date: November 2, 2001 Overall annual examination results via telephone Proprietary: No Subject: Results of an Inspection of the Licensees Licensed Operator Requalification Program Change to Inspection Program: No Senior Official at Exit Meeting: Chuck Sizemore, Training Supervisor Date: November 20, 2001 Overall annual examination results via telephone Proprietary: No Subject: Results of an Inspection of the Licensees Licensed Operator Requalification Program Change to Inspection Program: No 4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations No findings of significance were identified.
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee J. Anderson, Production Planning Group Manager L. Armstrong, Design Engineering Manager C. Arnone, Outage Manager A. Cayia, Site Director F. Flentje, Senior Regulatory Compliance Specialist D. Gehrke, Nuclear Oversight Supervisor N. Hoefert, Engineering Programs Manager R. Hopkins, Nuclear Oversight Supervisor V. Kaminskas, Maintenance Manager C. Krause, Regulatory Compliance R. Mende, Director of Engineering D. Schoon, Operations Manager R. Pulec, Site Assessment Manager M. Reddemann, Site Vice President D. Shannon, Radiation Protection Supervisor C. Sizemore, Training Supervisor P. Smith, Operations Training Supervisor J. Strharsky, Assistant Operations Manager T. Taylor, Plant Manager S. Thomas, Radiation Protection Manager R. Turner, Inservice Inspection Coordinator P. Walker, Training Manager T. Webb, Licensing Manager NRC B. A. Wetzel, Point Beach Project Manager, NRR ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-266/2001-003-00 LER Containment response for MSLB [Main Steam Line 50-301/2001-003-00 Break] may exceed design pressure of 60 pounds per 50-266/2001-003-01 square inch gauge (Section 4A03.1)
50-301/2001-003-01 Closed 50-266/01-13-01 URI Operating crew response to high electrical generator differential temperatures during Unit 1 startup activities (Section 1R14.2)
50-266/2001-003-00 LER Containment response for MSLB [Main Steam Line 50-301/2001-003-00 Break] may exceed design pressure of 60 pounds per 50-266/2001-003-01 square inch gauge (Section 4A03.1)
50-301/2001-003-01 Discussed None.
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CFR Code of Federal Regulations CL Checklist CR Condition Report CSR Cable Spreading Room DRP Division of Reactor Projects EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EQ Environmental Qualification FOST Fuel Oil Storage Tank FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report IT Inservice Test Procedure LER Licensee Event Report LORT ` Licensed Operator Requalification Training MSLB Main Steam Line Break Mwth Megawatts Thermal NCV Non-Cited Violation NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OP Operating Procedure OWA Operator Workaround PI Performance Indicator PMT Post-Maintenance Testing PPCS Plant Process Computer System psig Pounds Per Square Inch Gauge RCS Reactor Coolant System RMP Routine Maintenance Procedure SCR Safety Evaluation Screening SW Service Water URI Unresolved Item VAC Volts Alternating Current WCAP Westinghouse Commercial Atomic Power WO Work Order
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 1R04 Equipment Alignment Checklist (CL) 10B Service Water Safeguards Lineup Revision 50 CL 10D Fuel Oil System Revision 17 CL 11A G-02 G-02 Diesel Generator Checklist Revision 24 CL 10C Service Water Turbine Building Valve Lineup Revision 19 Unit 1 CL 10J Safeguards Service Water System Checklist Revision 18 Unit 1 1R05 Fire Protection Fire Hazards Analysis Fire Zone 780, G-03 Radiator Room August 17, 2001 Report Fire Hazards Analysis Fire Zone 783, G-04 Radiator Room August 17, 2001 Report Fire Hazards Analysis Fire Zone 784, G-04 Exhaust Fan Room August 17, 2001 Report Fire Hazards Analysis Fire Zone 785, G-03 Exhaust Fan Room August 17, 2001 Report 1R11 Licensed Operator Qualifications Simulator Guide Large-Break LOCA [Loss-of-Coolant Revision 2 SES-034 Accident] and Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation TI 9.0 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Revision 1 Examination Security Requirements OM 3.1 Operations Shift Staffing Requirements Revision 11 OM 3.7 AOP and EOP Procedure Sets Use and Revision 10 Adherence OM 3.10 Operations Personnel Assignments and Revision 13 Scheduling OM 3.31 Removal and Restoration of Control Room Revision 3 Alarms OM 3.34 Reactivity Management Procedure Revision 1
OM 3.35 Improving Operator Performance Revision 0 NP 1.10.1 Record Keeping for NRC Licensed Revision 3 Operators NP 2.1.1 Conduct of Operations Revision 0 NP 6.1.1 Training Revision 7 TRPR 33.0 Licensed Operator Requalification Training Revision 14 Program OTS 01 Training Advisory Committees Revision 2 OTS 02 Written Evaluations/ Remediation/ Revision 4 Watchstander Log OTS 04 Technical Qualifications for Instructors Revision 0 OTS 06 Performance Review Committee Revision 1 OTS 07 Operations Instructor In-Plant Time Revision 0 List Plant vs. Simulator Differences (Listing) List as of November 1, 2001 List Simulator Discrepancy Report (Listing) List as of November 1, 2001 Training Plan 2001/2002 LOR [Licensed Operator May 16, 2001 Requalification] Long Range Training Plan Report Cycle 01-2 LOR End of Cycle Report October 29, 2001 S-A-OPS-2001-01 PBNP [Point Beach Nuclear Plant] February 28, 2001 Operations Training Self-Assessment January 22-26, 2001 2Q2001 Nuclear Oversight Quarterly Report 2Q2001 Second Quarter Section 2.4, Plant Support Training and (April-June, 2001)
Qualification WMR# Nuclear Oversight Work Monitoring Report April 27, 2000 2000-0086 Activity Observed: Instructor Performance WMR# Nuclear Oversight Work Monitoring Report August 2, 2000 2000-0152 Activity Observed: Review of NRC Information Notices WMR# Nuclear Oversight Work Monitoring Report August 10, 2000 2000-0163 Activity Observed: TS 84, Emergency Diesel Generator G-04 Monthly
WMR# Nuclear Oversight Work Monitoring Report August 22, 2000 2000-0177 Activity Observed: Hazmat Drill 2000 WMR# Nuclear Oversight Work Monitoring Report September 18, 2000 2000-0202 Activity Observed: Operations Continuing Training Cold Weather Protection Lesson WMR# Nuclear Oversight Work Monitoring Report November 14, 2000 2000-0248 Activity Observed: Operations TAC Meeting WMR# Nuclear Oversight Work Monitoring Report December 7, 2000 2000-0270 Activity Observed: Instructor Performance WMR# Nuclear Oversight Work Monitoring Report February 20, 2001 2001-0028 Activity Observed: Operations Requal Training Presentation for NMC Conduct of Operations Procedure WMR# Nuclear Oversight Work Monitoring Report May 7, 2001 2001-0106 Activity Observed: Initial Auxiliary Operator Training WMR# Nuclear Oversight Work Monitoring Report September 26, 2001 2001-0149 Activity Observed: Review of Actions Taken to Address SOER 88-03-03, Review Initial and Continuing Training from SOER 85-4 (SOER 85-4, Loss or Degradation of Residual Heat Removal Capability in PWRs)
EP 5.0 Organizational Control of Emergencies Revision 44 EPIP 1.1 Course of Action Revision 37 EPIP 1.2 Emergency Classification Revision 34 EP Appendix A Emergency Response Organization Revision 20 Personnel Function and Responsibility SER Safety Evaluation Report April 29, 1983 Topic: Minimum Staffing Levels for Emergency Situations Letter Wisconsin Electric to NRC Response Letter March 6, 1984 Dated March 6, 1984 Topic: Emergency Plan Clarifications, Attachment A, Item 4, Communicator and Rad/Chem Technician On-Shift Staffing SES-029 Licensed Operator Requalification Simulator Revision 2 Scenario SES-029
SES-034 Licensed Operator Requalification Simulator Revision 2 Scenario SES-034 SES-039 Licensed Operator Requalification Simulator Revision 4 Scenario SES-039 P000.043 Licensed Operator Requalification Job Revision 1 AOT Performance Measure: Perform Manual Hand Pump Operation of the Containment Sump B Isolation Valves P000.049a Licensed Operator Requalification Job Revision 0 COT Performance Measure: Respond to a Dropped Rod P045.005 Licensed Operator Requalification Job Revision 2 COT Performance Measure: Synchronize Turbine Generator with Output Grid at Minimum Load P0062.009b Licensed Operator Requalification Job Revision 0 AOT Performance Measure: Operate a 4.16kV Breaker Locally P000.033b Licensed Operator Requalification Job Revision 0 COT Performance Measure: Respond to Degraded RHR System Records Sample of Four Licensed Operators Various Medical Records Records Annual LORT Exam Remediation January - February Packages: Four Written Examination 2001 Failures Written Exams LOR Biennial Written Examinations Cycle 1 of 2001 Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator Training Records Cycle 01-6 Examination Evaluation Forms November 1, 2001 Crew F 1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation WO 9913385 2ICP-05.058, Safeguards Timing Relay October 18, 2000 Calibration Performance Criteria for Engineered Safety December 3, 2001 Features (ESF) System ESF Unavailability Time, Unit 1 and 2, Trains December 17, 2001 A & B, Unavailability Records
List of WOs for ESF Initiated or Completed December 6, 2001 between 1/1/2000 and 12/31/2000 List of WOs for ESF Initiated or Completed December 3, 2001 between 1/1/2001 and 12/31/2001 CR 00-3270 ORT 3A Acceptance Criteria for Test Lamp October 23, 2000 Indication Requested CR 01-3097 TS Equipment Failure, Unit 1 Containment October 9, 2001 Pressure Indicator WO 9602189 Containment Pressure Inverter Maintenance Rule (a)(1) System Action Plan May 11, 2001 Checklist and Approval - VNDG NPM 2001-0251 2000Annual Report for the Maintenance rule March 26, 2001 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation Weekly Core Damage Risk Profile (Safety November 11, 2001 Monitor) - Unit 1 Weekly Core Damage Risk Profile (Safety November 11, 2001 Monitor) - Unit 2 Weekly Core Damage Risk Profile (Safety November 18, 2001 Monitor) - Unit 1 Weekly Core Damage Risk Profile (Safety November 18, 2001 Monitor) - Unit 2 Weekly Core Damage Risk Profile (Safety November 25, 2001 Monitor) - Unit 1 Weekly Core Damage Risk Profile (Safety November 25, 2001 Monitor) - Unit 2 Weekly Core Damage Risk Profile (Safety December 23, 2001 Monitor) - Unit 1 Weekly Core Damage Risk Profile (Safety December 23, 2001 Monitor) - Unit 2 Periodic Check (PC) Recirculation and Purification of RWST Revision 18 25 [Refueling Water Storage Tank] Unit 1 PC-25 Recirculation and Purification of RWST Unit Revision 21
Inservice Test (IT) 85 Main Steam Valves (Quarterly) Unit 2 Revision 20
1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions FSAR Section 9.2 Residual Heat Removal June 2001 Point Beach Drawing Reactor Coolant System Point Beach Revision E PB Nuclear Plant Unit 1 01MRCK00000611 1R15 Operability Evaluations CR 01-3407 Environmental Quals [Qualifications] of November 2, 2001 Components Questioned Operability Unit 1&2 N-00040 NI [Nuclear Instrument] November 6, 2001 Determination (OD) Fission Channel Wide Range Detector CR 01-3407 Environmental Qualification Drawing 900131 Customer Assembly, NFMS Point Beach Revision E Nuclear Plant Units 1&2 Bechtel Drawing Electrical Layout Containment Vessel Area Revision E E-133 #7 Elevation 21'-0, Point Beach N.P. Unit 1 Bechtel Drawing Electrical Layout Containment Vessel Area Revision E E-2133 #11 Elevation 21'-0, Point Beach N.P. Unit 2 Bechtel Drawing Electrical Layout Containment Vessel Area Revision E E-132 #7 Elevation 8'-0, Point Beach Nuclear Plant Bechtel Drawing Electrical Layout Containment Vessel Area Revision E E-2132 #11 Elevation 8'-0, Point Beach Nuclear Plant Bechtel Drawing Electrical Layout Containment Vessel Area Revision E E-134 #7 Elevation 46'-0, Point Beach N.P. Unit 1 Bechtel Drawing Electrical Layout Containment Vessel Area Revision E E-2133 #11 Elevation 46'-0 CR 01-3408 Total Integrated Dose Equipment In November 2, 2001 Containment May Not Be Accurate CR 01-3408 EQSS [Environmental Qualification November 7, 2001 Summary Sheets] Reference FSAR 14.3.4-15, TID [Total Integrated Dose] Does Not Include Neutron, Beta and Normal Operation Radiation Wisconsin Electric Environmental Qualification of Class 1E June 13, 1979 Letter Equipment Response to IE Bulletin No. 79-01 Point Beach Nuclear Plant
FSAR Section 5.1 Containment System Structure June 2001 FSAR Section Containment Integrity Evaluation June 2001 14.3.4-1 American Society for Standard Specification for Uncoated Testing and Materials Stress-Relieved Steel Wire for Prestressed Designation A 421-90 Concrete Drawing CH-1072 Grease Volume Unit 1 Schematic Work Contract #247680 Sheet Internet Site Midwestern Regional Climate Center Climate Summaries for the Midwest, Wisconsin, Two Rivers (Site 478672), Climate Summary (Test),http://mcc.sws.uiuc.edu/Summary/Ht ml/478672.html CR 01-3528 Safety Related Bus Voltages High - 7 Day November 21, 2001 LCO Entered Document Review and Approval for TS November 21, 2001 Bases B.3.8.1, AC [Alternating Current]
Sources - Operating 0-TS-EP-001 Weekly Power Availability Verification Revision 0 Wisconsin Electric AC Distribution System Maximum Voltage Revision 0 Calculation N-94-081 Study American National Variation from Rated Voltage and Rated Standard C50.41- Frequency 1982, Section 14 EPRI NP-1558 A Review of Equipment Aging Theory and Technology US Department of Optimizing Your Motor-Driven System Energy Motor Challenge Program Safety Evaluation Revision to Technical Specification Bases November 21, 2001 Screening (SCR) B.3.8.1 2001-0480 1R16 Operator Workarounds Operator Workaround Meeting Minutes June - October, 2001 Operator Workaround Summary List November 13, 2001
NP 2.1.4 Operator Workarounds Revision 0 Plant Modification Subsoil Sump Drain Line Reroute July 12, 2001 01-089 CR 01-1790 Unit Low Condenser Vacuum Trend May 17, 2001 CR 01-1822 Water Box Cleaning May 21, 2001 CR 01-1818 Lessons Learned While Removing Unit May 20, 2001 Water Boxes From Service OI 38 Circulating Water System Operation Revision 27 AOP-5A Loss of Condenser Vacuum Revision 10 Alarm Response Condenser Vacuum Low Revision 4 Book (ARB) 2C03 2F 1-8 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing IWP 00-102-01, Service Water Upgrades to Emergency Revision 0 Diesel Generator G01 Units 1 and 2 OI 70 Service Water System Operation Revision 36 TS 81 Emergency Diesel Generator G-01 Monthly Revision 61 WO 9933943 P-32D SW [Service Water] Pump Discharge Expansion Joint Removal, XJ-02975C, P-032D Service Water Pump December 19, 2001 Replacement, and Discharge Expansion Joint Modification Form 01-0005 Routine Maintenance Service Water Pump Motor Removal and Revision 3 Procedure (RMP) Installation 9216-1 RMP 9216-2 Service Water Pump Motor Removal and Revision 3 Installation, and Maintenance RMP 9216-3 Service Water Pump Vibration Testing and Revision 5 Balancing for Post-Maintenance Testing Motor Removal and Installation IT-06 Containment Spray Pumps and Valves Revision 50 (Quarterly) Unit 2
1R22 Surveillance Testing Technical Control Room Heating and Ventilation Revision 22 Specification Test TS- System Monthly Checks
Design Basis Control Room HVAC and Habitability Revision 0 Document DBD-31 IT-7D P-32D Service Water Pump (Quarterly) Revision 10 FSAR Section 9.6.2 Service Water System Revision June 2001 IT-08A Cold Start of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feed Revision 24 Pump and Valve Test (Quarterly) Unit 1 1R23 Temporary Modifications Temporary DG [Diesel Generator] Fuel Oil Tank T-175A November 18, 2001 Modification (TM) Filter Skid Installation 01-041 TM 01-042 DG Fuel Oil Tank T-175B Filter Skid November 18, 2001 Installation SCR 2001-0967 Change Stability Testing Requirements for November 19, 2001 Diesel Fuel Oil in TRM [Technical Requirements Manual] From Absolute to Trending Only SCR 2001-0965 Installation of Filtration Skid for the Diesel November 18, 2001 Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tanks (T-175A/B)
OI 92C Filtration of T-175A/B Using Temporary Filter Revision 0 Unit TM 97-049*D Upgrade Control Room Envelope Boundary March 21, 2001 Isolation WO Plan for MR 97- Cable Spreading Room Temporary Cooling September 11, 2001 049*D01 Safety Evaluation Upgrade Control Room Envelope Boundary August 17, 2001 2001-0049 Fire Protection Cable Spreading Room Ventilation and August 15, 2001 Conformance Control Room Ventilation Systems Checklist for MR 97-049*D01 Abnormal operating Safe Shutdown - Local Control, Attachment Revision 32 Procedure 10A E
Operating Instruction Control, Computer, and Cable Spreading Revision 15 (OI) 90, Attachment M Room Ventilation Systems, CSR Temporary Chiller and CSR Temporary AHUs [Air Handling Units]
4AO1 Performance Indicator Verification NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline Revision 1 WO 9945275 Voltage Regulator Does Not Respond to Manual August 5, 2001 Control TS-84 Emergency Diesel Generator G-04 Monthly Revision 10 RMP 9043-41 Emergency Diesel Generator G-04 2 Year Electrical Revision 0 Inspection RMP 9043-41 Emergency Diesel Generator G-04 2 Year Electrical Revision 4 Inspection RMP 9043-41 Emergency Diesel Generator G-04 2 Year Electrical Revision 3 Inspection Electro-Motive 645 E4 Engine Maintenance, Sections 5.8, Control #00367G Diesel Vendor Windings, and 5.10, Insulation Resistance Manual 1RMP 9071-1 A-05 4160/480 Degraded and Loss of Voltage Revision 14 Monthly Surveillance 2RMP 9071-2 A-06 4160/480 Degraded and Loss of Voltage Revision 12 Monthly Surveillance 2RMP 9330-1 2X-13/A-05 Relay Testing and Calibration Revision 7 1RMP 9330-2 2X-14/A-06 Relay Testing and Calibration Revision 7 OI 35A Standby Emergency Power Alignment Revision 7 IT 72 Service Water Valves (Quarterly) Revision 17 IT 100 Seat Leakage Test of Diesel Air Compressor Revision 10 Discharge Check Valves (Quarterly)
4A03 Event Follow-up WCAP 15153 Wisconsin Electric Power Company Point December 1998 Beach, Units 1 and 2 Steamline Break and Containment Integrity Analysis CR 99-0153 Some Accident Reanalyses of Containment January 15, 1999 Integrity Using Thermal Upgrade parameters Do Not Meet FSAR Limits
CR 00-1304 Failure to Consider Single Failure to Close April 24, 2000 FWRV [Feedwater Regulating Valve] to Faulted SG [Steam Generator] -
Containment Pressure CR 01-2026 Containment Design Pressure Issue June 6, 2001 FSAR Section 14.2.5 Rupture of a Steam Pipe June 2000 33