IR 05000266/1993002

Insp Repts 50-266/93-02 & 50-301/93-02 on 930104-0215. Noncited Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Radiological Controls,Maint & Surveillance, Emergency Preparedness & Security

ML20034F324
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	02/22/1993
From:	Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20034F310	List: IR 05000266/1993002 ML20034F305
References
50-266-93-02, 50-266-93-2, 50-301-93-02, 50-301-93-2, NUDOCS 9303030032
Download: ML20034F324 (14)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

E Reports No. 50-266/93002(DRP); 50-301/93002(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 Licenses No. DPR-24;-DPR-27

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Licensee:

Wisconsin Electric Company 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53201

Facility Name:

Point Beach Units 1 and 2

Inspection At:

Two Rivers, Wisconsin i

Dates: January 4 through February 15, 1993 Inspectors:

K. R. Jury

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J. Gadzala i

A. T. Gody, Jr.

.t Approved By:

N.k e [ /,,

E-2

. N. JackiR( Chief Date

eactor Projects, Section 3A i

d inspection Summary Inspection from January 4 throuah February 15. 1993. (Reports No. 50-266/93002 l

(DRP): No. 50-30lIF3002(DRP))

F Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of corrective actions on previous findings; plant operations; radiological controls; maintenance and surveillance; emergency preparedness; security;

engineering and technical support; and safety assessment / quality verification.

Results:

Two non-cited violations (paragraphs 4.a and 6.a) and two unresolved

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it.'ms were identified. An Executive Summary Follows.

Plant Operations Both units operated at full power during this period with the exception of a

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5-percent power reduction on January 7 in preparation for a required unit shutdown that was averted by a temporary waiver of compliance.

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On January 27, a Unit 2 containment isolation valve was found to be leaking i

past its seat.

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9303030032 930223-PDR AD3CK 05000266 i

G PDR:

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l Maintenance / Surveillance

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Good engineering and supervisory support was observed for a maintenance action i

raising the setpoints on degraded grid voltage protection relays.

A non-cited violation was identified for. a G02 diesel generator output breaker

being reassembled without its control power alarm relay being replaced.

Enoineerino and Technical Support On January 7, it was determined that the setpoints-for the 4160 VAC vital bus

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degraded voltage protection relays were set too low to assure protection of

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480 VAC vital bus.;afety equip:..ent under certain degraded voltage. conditions.

The emergency diesel engines were derated 5 percent due to utilizing glycol as

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the corrosion inhibitor in the coolant.

This derating reduced the capacity of diesel G02 below the loading required by the safety analysis.

Safety Assessment /0uality Verification The safety analysis in a' Licensee Event Report regarding emergency diesel

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generator load sequencing was incomplete.

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DETAILS

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1.

Persons Contacted (71707) (30702)

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• G. J. Maxfield, Plant Manager

• T. J. Koehler, Site Engineering Manager R. D. Seizert, Training Manager J. F. Becka, Regulatory Services Manager J. G. Schweitzer, Maintenance Manager J. C. Reisenbuechler, Manager - Operations N. L. Hoefert, Manager - Production Planning J. J. Bevelacqua, Manager - Health Physics F. P. Hennessy, Manager - Chemistry J. A. Palmer, Manager - Maintenance G. R. Sherwood, Manager - Instrument & Controls W. B. Fromm, Sr. Project Engineer - Plant Engineering T. G. Staskal, Sr. Project Engineer - Performance Engineering W. J. Herrman, Sr. Project Engineer - Construction Engineering

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A. Flentje, Administrative Specialist Other company employees were also contacted including members of the technical and engineering staffs, and reactor and auxiliary operators.

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• Denotes the personnel attendir.g the management exit interview for

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summation of preliminary findings.

2.

Corrective Action on Previous Inspection Findinas (92701) (92702)

a.

(Closed) Violation (301/92023-01):

Inadvertent Diesel Generator Start Due to failure to Follow Procedure During Relay Testing.

During performance of a surveillance test on October 26, a maintenance electrician did not open an isolation knife switch as required by the procedure prior to depressing the relay test button. This caused an undervoltage signal to be transmitted to 4160 VAC safeguards bus 2A06 and consequent deenergization of that bus. The 480 VAC safeguards bus 2B04,.which is powered by bus 2A06, was also deenergized.

Emergency diesel generator G02

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started as required and energized bus 2A06.

After determining the

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cause of the safeguards bus loss, operators restored the electrical line up to normal and secured the emergency diesel.

A review of the incident determined that the scheduling of this routine monthly surveillance had not been adequately coordinated with respect to the prevailing plant conditions (reactor coolant system in a reduced inventory condition). The plant evaluated l

methods to ensure that safety-related work is placed on the major item work list so that it receives adequate screening for appropriateness in scheduling. These methods are to be-implemented in a revision to procedure PBNP 3.1.5, " Outage Planning, Scheduling, and Management". Additionally, the

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personnel involved in this specific work activity were counseled

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regarding their actions, and the applicable maintenance procedures were revised to deter performance of such evolutions during reduced inventory conditions. The inspector discussed this event-with plant management and reviewed the revised procedures.

No further concerns were noted and this item is closed.

b.

(Closed) Unresolved item (266/92023-02):

Non-Safeguards Equipment Lockout Relay Incorrectly Wired.

This item concerns the inadvertent actuation of an equipment

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lockout that is designed to strip non-safeguard. loads from 480 VAC safeguards bus 2B04.

This inadvertent actuation of the 2B04 lockout identified a wiring error in the control circuitry for motor control center MCC-B21, which did not strip from bus 2B04 during this event as designed. Additional information appears in paragraph 6.a below.

The wiring error was corrected and this item is closed.

3.

Plant Operations (71707)

The inspectors evaluated licensee activities to confirm that the facility was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements. These activities were confirmed by direct observation, facility tours, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel and management, verification of safety system status, and review of facility records.

To verify equipment operability and compliance with technical specifications (TS), the inspectors reviewed shift logs, Operations'

records, data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions. Through work observations and discussions with Operations staff members, the inspectors verified the staff was knowledgeable of plant conditions, responded promptly and properly to alarms, adhered to procedures and applicable administrative controls,'was cognizant of in progress surveillance and maintenance activities, and was aware'of inoperable equipment status. The inspectors performed channel verifications and reviewed component status and safety-related parameters to verify conformance with TS. Shift changes were observed, verifying that system status continuity was maintained and that proper control room staffing existed. Access to the control room was restricted and operations personnel carried out their assigned duties in an effective manner.

The inspectors noted professionalism in most facets of control room operation.

Plant tours and perimeter walkdowns were conducted to verify equipmer operability, assess the general condition of plant equipment, and to verify that radiological controls, fire protection controls, physical protection controls, and equipment tag out procedures were properly implemented.

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Unit Ooetational Status Both units continued to operate at full power during this period

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with the exception of requested load following power reductions and a 5-percent power reduction on January 7 in preparation for a required unit shutdown that was averted by a-temporary wai.ver of compliance.

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Containment Isolation Valve leakaae

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On January 27, the Unit 2 B steam generator sample line isolation valve (2MS-2084), was identified to be leaking past its seat.

Valve 2MS-2084 is a 3/8 inch (1 cm) air operated globe valve which serves as the second containment isolation boundary. An operator sent to investigate was able to initiate slight valve movement in

the shut direction by applying pressure with his hand on the top of the air operator. Although this action stopped the leak, the plant considered the valve inoperable and shut the backup manual

isolation valve to reestablish required containment integrity'.

This event was reported to the NRC as required. A leak test using design containment pressure (60 psi) yielded satisfactory results.

However, the valve continued to leak slightly when exposed to normal steam generator operating pressure (850 psi). The valve was repaired by increasing the closing spring tension and returned to service following acceptable leak and stroke time testing. The.

inspector discussed this event with plant management and had no further concerns.

4.

Maintenance / Surveillance Observation (62703) (61726_1 a.

Maintenance The inspectors observed safety-related maintenance activities on systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with TS, approved procedures, and appropriate industry codes and standards. The inspectors determined that these activities did not violate limiting conditions for' operation (LCOs) and that required redundant components were operable. The inspectors verified that required administrative, material, testing, and radiological and fire prevention controls were adhered to.

Specifically, the inspectors observed / reviewed the following maintenance activities:

RMP 56 (Revision 7), Calibration and Testing of Safety-

Related Protective Relays e der Technical Specification This action raised the setpoints of the degraded voltage protection relays on the 4160 VAC safeguards busses.

Details are contained in paragraph 5.a.

One electrical

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engineer was assigned to monitor the entire evolution while

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two engineering managers performed periodic oversight of work in progress.

• RMP 43 (Revision 16), Diesel Annual Inspection This maintenance was performed on diesel G02 and included replacing the glycol engine coolant with treated water to eliminate any need for diesel engine capacity derating..

Various portions of this work were also witnessed by the NRC Engineering and Technical Support Team and are documented in the associated report.

ICP 13.7 (Revision 14), Emergency Diesel Calibration

Procedure

MWR 930300, Repair of G02 emergency diesel generator output

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breaker 2A52-67 On January 19, during performance of G02 diesel surveillance testing, Unit 2 output breaker 2A52-57 failed to close upon receipt of a signal from the control room. The diesel was

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declared inoperable (for Unit 2) and corrective action was initiated. The cause of this problem was a loose latch check limit switch. This switch had worked free and therefore did not indicate the correct position of the

breaker contacts. This mechanical failure prevented the.

breaker closure coil from energizirg, which precluded the j

breaker from shutting. The switch was subsequently replaced i

and the breaker tested satisfactory. The plant also j

initiated action to verify that fasteners securing these switches in other vital breakers were not slowly l

disengaging.

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During the course of repairing the breaker, its control power alarm relay was unplugged from its socket as required and temporarily laid on top of the relay cabinet. When the

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breaker was reinstalled, the electrician did not notice the

relay still laying on top of the cabinet and failed to

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reinsert it.

Procedure 01-35, which governs breaker removal and installation, directs restoration of the alarm relay after a breaker is racked in. Although the work plan directed that breaker manipulations be performed per procedure 01-35, this procedure was not provided to the electrician with the work plan.

The turbine building watchstander noticed the relay laying on top of the cabinet two days later and it was subsequently plugged back into its socket. The breaker's control power fuses had been installed as required, therefore the breaker remained operable and would have fulfilled its safety

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function. The control power alarm relay only provides for annunciation in the control room upon loss of DC control power to the breaker.

If such a condition had occurred i

without the alarm relay in place, the only indication immediately available would have been both breaker position indicating lights being extinguished on the control panel.

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Plant management initiated a performance evaluation of.this event to determine its cause and to prevent reotcurrence.

An additional control to ensure replacement of removed

control power relays was a new requirement to include their entry onto the equipment tagout sheet accompanying any breaker repair work. The inspector discussed this issue with plant management and had no further concerns.

As described above, certain of the licensee's activities

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appeared to be in violation of NRC requirements.

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the licensee identified this violation and it is not being cited because the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the

" General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions," (Enforcement Policy, 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C) were satisfied.

b.

Surveillance The inspectors observed certain safety-related surveillance activities on systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with license requirements.

For the surveillance test procedures. listed below, the inspectors

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determined that precautions and LCOs were adhered to, the required

administrative approvals and tag-outs were obtained prior to test

initiation, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved test procedure, test instrumentation was properly calibrated, the tests were completed at' the required

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frequency, and that the tests conformed to TS'reouirements.

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test completion, the inspectors verified the recorded test data was complete, accurate, and met TS requirements; test discrepancies were properly documented and rectified; and that the

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systems were properly returned to service.

Specifically, the inspectors witnessed / reviewed selected portions of the following test activities:

TS-1 (Revision 36), Emergency Diesel Generator G-01 Biweekly

IICP-02.0038-1 (Revision 3), Reactor Protection Sy. stem Logic Train B Monthly Surveillance Test Good communications were noted between the technician in the field and the control operator involved in the tes t

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PC 29 Part 1 (Revision 0), Gas Turbine and Auxiliary Diesel e

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Reliability Load Test This test is part of the plant's program to quantify reliability level of the gas turbine generator as an alternate AC source for station blackout purposes. The gas turbine generator was started under blackout conditions and run at a load of 23 MW for one hour.

A. transfer of auxiliary loads from the auxiliary diesel generator to the turbine generator was successfully performed at the end of the procedure prior to securing the gas turbine.

• IT-05 (Revision 25), Containment Spray Pumps and Valves (Quarterly), Unit 1 This procedure employs a cumbersome method of verifying that the spray header isolaticn valve is shut prior to operating a pump. A clear tygon tube is temporarily rigged between test connections at two elevations of discharge piping to form a water column.

The header is then pressurized from the refueling water storage tank and the water level in the tubing is monitored to detect any leakage. Although this is not a significant safety concern, the plant is considering installation of a permanent sight glass to replacs the tygon tubing. This will reduce the-potential for spills of contaminated fluid from any improper connection of the tygon tubing.

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Enaineerina and Technical Support (71707) (37828_)_

The inspectors evaluated engineering and technical support activities to determine their involvement and support of facility operations. This was accomplished during the course of routine evaluation of facility events and concerns, through direct observation of activities, and discussions with engineering personnel, a.

Incorrect Settinas on Dearaded Bus Voltaae Protection Rglam On January 7, after discussions with the NRC, the plant determined that the setpoints for the 4160 VAC vital bus degraded voltage protection relays were set too low to assure protection of 480 VAC vital bus safety equipment under certain degraded voltage conditions.

A temporary waiver of compliance allowing operation at the current setpoints was requested and initially granted by the NRC for a period of 14 days while compensatory measures were taken.

In June 1992, a contractor completed a calculation concerning the available voltage on plant electrical busses and equipment under various operating conditions. The calculation indicated that for a voltage of 351 kV on the 345 kV grid, several safety-related

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electrical busses would have voltage levels less than 90. percent

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of nominal. The grid is normally maintained between 356 kV and 358 kV with a low voltage alarm setpoint of 354 kV.

Plant management stated that the lowest grid voltage observed in the past few years was 351.3 kV on May 30, 1991, as a result of a Unit-1 reactor trip. A scram of the nearby Kewaunee Nuclear Plant on January 28, 1993, was noted by the inspector to have minimal i

affect on grid voltage. The lowest value observed following that

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trip was 355.2 kV for a period of about two seconds.

Operation of electrical equipment at voltages below 90 percent of equipment ratings can cause inadequat:: equipment performance and lead to equipment damage. Degraded grid voltage relays are installed on each of the 4160 VAC busses to protect against such a condition. They function by disconnecting the safety busses from offsite power and placing them on the emergency diesel generators.

However, due to long cable runs and high load on certain equipment (containment accident fan 18 and 480 VAC bus 1803), the resultant

voltage drop created a possibility that the voltage available to this equipment would be below the 90 percent nominal value even though the 4160 VAC bus voltage was still above the protective relay trip setpoint.

Wisconsin Electric received the contractor's calculation and perfor med an evaluation of it. On January 7, the plant determined that the existing settings for the degraded grid voltage relays installed on the 4160 VAC busses were too low to provide-adequate protection for all safety-related equipment. Therefore,.all 4160 VAC degraded grid voltage protection channels were declared inoperable. Technical specifications allow continued operation for up to seven days with degraded voltage protection inoperable provided that the emergency diesel is supplying the affected safeguards bus.

However, operation of.a unit with both safeguards busses powered by their respective diesels is not permitted.

The plant's safety staff concurred that such operation 'or an extended period was not consistent with maintaining an optimum level of plant safety because the preferred source of power to the safeguards busses is from their offsite source. This condition placed the plant in a condition not defined by technical specifications, thereby requiring both units to be in a hot shutdown condition within three hours. A powe. V uction on both units was subsequently initiated. However, a snutuown of both units was not desirable because grid voltage could best be maintained with both units on line.

The NRC granted a temporary waiver of compliance from this technical specification requirement on January 7 based on the very low probability of occurrence of an undervoltage condition;

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compensatory actions implemented by the plant to monitor bus voltage and prevent the occurrence of an undervoltage condition; and a commitment by Wisconsin Electric to submit an exigent technical specification change request containing updated

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undervoltage relay setpoints.

Both units were restored to full

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power and the plant's compensatory actions were promulgated in Special Order 93-01, " Degraded Grid Voltage Compensatory Measures".

Based on Wisconsin Electric's evaluation of the contractor's calculation, the setting of the 4160 VAC undervoltage relay needed to be raised from 3875 to 3960 volts to provide the minimum required voltage at the most limiting load. This action was

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completed on Unit 1 January 13 and on Unit 2 the following day.

Wisconsin Electric submitted an exigent technical specification change request on January 19 to specify 3959 volts as the minimum i

value for the undervoltage relays.

Licensee Event Report 266/301/93-001 was also written to document this incident.

This issue remains unresolved pending further licensee corrective actions and analyses, evaluation by the NRC, and disposition of

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the technical specification change request (266/93002-01; 301/93002-01).

b.

Deratino of Emeraency Diesel Generators On January 20, the licensee discovered that its two diesel generators needed to be derated.

Since initial installation, the plant has used a glycol water mixture in the diesel engine coolant as a corrosion inhibitor. During discussions with the diesel vendor regarding installation of two additional diesels of the same type, the vendor indicated that if a glycol water mixture is to be used as the engine coolant in this model, the engine power rating must be reduced by 5 percent. The glycol reduces the heat transfer capabilities of the coolant which can cause hot spots in the cylinder heads and possibly lead to cracking. Upon further questioning, the vendor stated that the existing diesel engines at Point Beach must also be derated since they use glycol in their coolant.

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Loading calculations in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) do not take engine derating into account. Design engine capacities for the diesels are as follow:

Period Full Canacity Derated Canacity

% hr 3050 kW 2898 kW 4 hr 3000 kW 2850 kW 200 hr 2963 kW 2815 kW 2000 hr 2850 kW 2708 kW The safety analysis assumes offsite power is restored within 200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br />.

Since the worst case loading on the G01 diesel (2786 kW)

is less than its 200 hour0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> derated capacity, that engine's safety function was not substantially affected by the derating.

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because G02 carries additional loads not found on G01, its worst i

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case loading is 2909 kW. This load is above the maximum derated

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capacity of the engine.

Consequently, the plant declared the G02 diesel inoperable and reevaluated the loads it is required to carry. A notification of this condition was made to the NRC.

Because the plant is

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configured with one service water pump per train in excess of technical specification requirements, one of the B train service water pumps was removed from service by placing its control switch in the pull-to-lock position. This action removed 239 kW of load from the G02 diesel, thereby bringing its maximum loading to 2670 kW.

Since this loading restored that engine to below the 200 hcur derated capacity, it was declared back in service.

Additionally, temporary changes were made to the plant's emergency operating procedures to alert operators to the derated engine condition.

An operator aid was installed on the affected service water pump to ensure it remained out of service except for certain definad conditions.

As long term action, the plant decided to replace the glycol water mixture in the installed diesels with boron nitrate treated water.

This will allow restoring the power ratings of the engines. The two new diesels planned for installation are to be modified with tangent flow cylinder heads to allow operation with glycol water coolant at full power rating.

This type of cylinder head provides additional heat transfer area to compensate for the reduced heat transfer effectiveness inherent in glycol.. These new engines are

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to be installed in a potentially unheated building, necessitating

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the use of anti-freeze.

On January 25, the G02 diesel was removed from service for a scheduled annual overhaul. The glycol coolant was removed from the engine ano replaced with boron nitrate treated water.

Since this restored the engine to its full power rating, the affected service water was restored to service.

The annual outage for the G01 diesel is scheduled for the second half of February, at which time its coolant will also be replaced with treated water.

The inspector monitored the plant's deliberations of this issue, observed replacement of the coolant, and reviewed the compensatory actions. Additionally, a review of previous diesel generator periodic load tests was performed to determine if diesel loading exceeded the derated limits. No record of loading above 2650 kW was noted in the past year. This issue remains unresolved pending further evaluation by the NRC (266/93002-02; 301/93002-02).

All other activities were conducted in a satisfactory manner during this inspection period.

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6.

.51faty Assessment /Ouality Verification (40500) (90712) (92700) (36100)

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Licensee Event Report (LER) Review The inspectors reviewed LERs submitted to the NRC to verify that the details were clearly reported, including accuracy of the description and corrective action taken.

The inspector determined

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whether further information was required, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether the event warranted onsite follow up.

The inspector also verified that appropriate corrective action was taken or responsibility was assigned and that continued operation of the facility was conducted in accordance with Technical Specifications and did not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined-in 10 CFR 50.59.

Report accuracy, compliance with current reporting requirements and applicability to other site systems and components were also reviewed.

The following LERs were reviewed:

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(0 pen) 266/301/92-004-02 Improper Sequencing of Emergency Safety Features This report describes discovery of safeguards load sequencing on the emergency diesel generators being in nonconformance with requirements.

Details are contained in NRC Inspection Reports No. 50-266/92012; No. 50-301/92012. The inspector's review of this report determined that the safety analysis was incomplete.

Extensive details were provided regarding two service water pumps

starting simultaneously, even though service water pumps sequenced properly during the test. The apparent missequencing was found to be due to misreading of the test data.

The report states that simultaneous starting of a containment spray pump and any load except for a safety injection pump will not overload the diesel.

This implies that a safety injection pump starting coincident with any other load could overload the diesel.

However, plant design is such that an engineered safeguards actuation under station blackout conditions would have the safety injection pump on the accident unit starting on the same diesel simultaneously as a component cooling water pump on the other unit.

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discussions with plant engineers indicated that an analysis had been performed to demonstrate that simultaneous starting of a safety injection pump, component cooling water pump, and service water pump will not overload the diesel.

This analysis was absent from the event report. Wisconsin Electric stated that a supplement to this report will be provided with a more in depth safety assessment.

This report remains open pending receipt of the supplement and review by the inspector.

(Closed) 301/92-006 Inadvertent ESF Actuation as a Result of

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As-Built Wire Tracing (report 00 and

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supplement 01)

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I These reports describes the inadvertent actuation of an equipment lockout that is designed to strip non-safeguards loads from 480 VAC safeguards bus 2B04. This inadvertent actuation of the 2B04 lockout identified a wiring error in the control circuitry for motor control center MCC-B21, which did not strip from bus 2B04 during this event.as designed. Details are contained in NRC

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Inspection Reports No. 50-266/92023; No. 50-301/92023. The trip of this lockout is believed to have occurred when a-B train safety injection relay was inadvertently bumped during as-built wire tracing in the Unit 2 safeguards racks.

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The supplemental report describes how the lockout relay output:

wiring for the MCC-B21 supply breaker, which is powered from bus 2B04, was instead connected to bus 2803 lockout.

It also provides details on how the incorrect wiring, coupled with the undervoltage

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relays tripping of the supply breaker to MCC-B21 on loss of voltage, caused MCC-B21 to shed during loss of power testing which thereby prevented previous identification of this wiring error.

As described above, certain of the licensee's activities appeared to be in violation of NRC requirements.

However the licensee identified this violation and it is not being cited because the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the " General Statement of

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Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions," (Enforcement Policy, 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C) were satisfied.

b.

Manaaer's Supervisory Staff Meetina The inspector observed sessions 92-01 and 92-03 of the Manager's Supervisory Staff.

Issues discussed included minimum levels in the steam generator for decay heat removal, atmospheric steam dump technical specifications, Unit 2 reactor coolant system flow degradation due to steam generator tube plugging, and service water operability.

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10 CFR Part 21 Inspection The inspector performed a review of the company's procedures and program activities to provide assurance that they have established and effectively implemented the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21,

" Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance". The plant's postings, procurement documents, evaluations of identified deviations, and records maintenance controls were reviewed for adequacy. The company's program for reporting of defects and noncompliance is considered to be good.

All activities were conducted in a satisfactory manner during this inspection period.

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7.

Unresolved Items (92701)

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order.to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in paragraphs 5.a and 5.b.

8.

Manacement Meetinas (307021 E

A Meeting was held between NRC Region III, NRR, and Wisconsin Electric management on February 5, to discuss items of interest and foster improved communications between Wisconsin Electric and the NRC.

Items of discussion included Wisconsin Electric Nuclear Power Department management changes, major projects ongoing and planned for Point Beach,

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and status of plant improvement programs.

9.

Exit Interview (71707)

A verbal summary of preliminary findings was provided to the Wisconsin Electric representatives denoted in paragraph 1 on February 16, at the

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conclusion of the inspection.

Na written inspection material was provided to company personnel during the inspection.

i The likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed during the inspection was-also i

discussed. Wisconsin Electric management did not identify any documents or processes that were reported on as proprietary.

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