IR 05000261/2004004
| ML042860197 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 10/08/2004 |
| From: | Fredrickson P NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4 |
| To: | Moyer J Carolina Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| IR-04-004 | |
| Download: ML042860197 (23) | |
Text
ber 8, 2004
SUBJECT:
H.B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000261/2004004
Dear Mr. Moyer:
On September 11, 2004, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your H.B. Robinson reactor facility. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on September 22, 2004, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Paul E. Fredrickson, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-261 License No.: DPR-23
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000261/2004004 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket No: 50-261 License No: DPR-23 Report No: 05000261/2004004 Facility: H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2 Location: 3581 West Entrance Road Hartsville, SC 29550 Dates: June 13, 2004 - September 11, 2004 Inspectors: R. Hagar, Senior Resident Inspector D. Jones, Resident Inspector Approved by: P. Fredrickson, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000261/2004-004; 06/13/2004-09/11/2004; H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2;
Routine Integrated Report.
The report covered a three month period of inspection by resident inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
No findings were identified during this inspection period.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status: The unit began the inspection period at full rated thermal power, and operated at full power for the entire inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
When a tornado watch was predicted for the site on August 12, the inspectors reviewed actions taken by the licensee in accordance with Procedure OMM-021, Operation During Adverse Weather, prior to the onset of that weather, to ensure that the adverse weather conditions would neither initiate a plant event nor prevent any system, structure, or component from performing its design function.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
Partial System Walkdowns The inspectors performed the following three partial system walkdowns, while the indicated structures, systems, and/or components (SSCs) were out-of-service for maintenance and testing:
System Walked Down SSC Out of Service Date Inspected B emergency diesel A emergency diesel July 6 generator generator Motor-driven auxiliary Motor-driven auxiliary July 14 feedwater train B and steam- feedwater train A driven auxiliary feedwater Safety injection train A Safety injection pump C August 24 To evaluate the operability of the selected trains or systems under these conditions, the inspectors compared observed positions of valves, switches, and electrical power breakers to the procedures and drawings listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
For the six areas identified below, the inspectors reviewed the licensees control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures, to verify that those items were consistent with the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, and UFSAR Appendix 9.5.A, Fire Hazards
Analysis.
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of each area and reviewed results from related surveillance tests, to verify that conditions in these areas were consistent with descriptions of the areas in the UFSAR. Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Attachment.
The following areas were inspected:
Fire Zone Description Control room Service water pump area Diesel generator B room 25A and 25B Turbine building east and west ground floor Dedicated shutdown diesel generator 25E, 25F and 25G Turbine building mezzanine and operating deck
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the inspection of the C safety injection pump bearing cooler, to verify that inspection results were appropriately categorized against the pre-established acceptance criteria described in Procedure CM-201, Safety Related and Non-Safety Related Heat Exchanger Maintenance. The inspectors also verified that the frequency of inspection was sufficient to detect degradation prior to loss of heat removal capability below design basis values. Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed licensed operator performance during simulator training for operating crew 5, to verify that operator performance was consistent with expected operator performance, as described in Full Scope Scenario, FSS-LOCT-SEG-Eval-1, Rev. 0. This evaluation tested the operators ability to respond to, in part, the loss of a heater drain pump, unwarranted rod motion, an electro-hydraulic turbine control failure and the failure of a steam generator power-operated relief valve. The inspectors focused on clarity and formality of communication, the use of procedures, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics and supervisory oversight.
Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Attachment.
The inspectors also observed the post-exercise critique, to verify that the licensee had identified deficiencies and discrepancies that occurred during the simulator training.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the five degraded SSC/function performance problems or conditions listed below, to verify the licensees appropriate handling of these performance problems or conditions in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, and 10 CFR 50.65, Maintenance Rule. Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Attachment.
The problems/conditions and their corresponding action requests (ARs) were:
Performance Problem/Condition AR SV1-2B [a safety valve on steam generator B] setpoint 124647 failure C charging pump overload trip due to motor ground 107251 CC-749A [the valve that isolates component cooling water to 133282 the residual heat removal heat exchanger] failed to close B service water booster pump motor failure 57917 RC-550 [a containment isolation valve on the line from the 126069 nitrogen supply to the pressurizer relief tank] failed [local leak rate test] with excessive leakage During the reviews, the inspectors focused on the following:
- Appropriate work practices,
- Identifying and addressing common cause failures,
- Scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b),
- Characterizing reliability issues (performance),
- Charging unavailability (performance),
- Trending key parameters (condition monitoring),
- 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification and reclassification, and
- Appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs/functions classified (a)(2) and/or appropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs/functions classified (a)(1).
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
For the four time periods and/or emergent activities listed below, the inspectors reviewed the licensees risk assessments and the risk-management actions used by the licensee to manage risk. The inspectors verified that the licensee performed adequate risk assessments and implemented appropriate risk-management actions when required by 10CFR50.65(a)(4). For emergent work, the inspectors also verified that any increase in risk was promptly assessed, and that appropriate risk-management actions were promptly implemented. Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the
. Those periods included the following:
- The work week of June 19 - June 25, which included emergent work associated with removing a safety injection pump from service and re-aligning another safety injection pump from one electrical supply to another in order to conduct post maintenance testing
- The work week of June 28 - July 2, which included troubleshooting of a risk-significant circuit in the reactor protection system and schedule changes associated with risk-significant maintenance work in the switchyard
- The work week of July 5 - July 9, which included planned work on A safety injection pump and construction activities in the transformer yard
- The work week of August 9 - August 13, which included emergent work associated with the replacement of the B service water booster pump motor and the replacement of the flow control valve for the steam driven auxiliary feed-water pump
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
For the two operability evaluations listed below, the inspectors assessed the accuracy of the evaluations, the use and control of any necessary compensatory measures, and compliance with the Technical Specifications (TS). The inspectors also verified that the operability determinations were made as specified by Procedure PLP-102, "Operability Determinations." The inspectors compared the justifications provided in the determination to the requirements from the TS, the UFSAR, associated design-basis documents, and other applicable documents, to verify that operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available, such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred.
The operability evaluations and their corresponding action requests were:
- Containment vessel pressure spurious bistable actuation, AR 129378129378* Safety injection pump A casing leakage, AR 121862121862Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R16 Operator Work-Arounds
a. Inspection Scope
On the basis of risk insights, the inspectors selected and reviewed two licensee-developed operator workarounds, to verify that the workarounds did not affect either the functional capability of the related system in responding to an initiating event, or the operators ability to implement abnormal or emergency operating procedures. The selected workarounds are listed below.
Number Description 04-07 Electro-Hydraulic controls will not operate the turbine in auto 04-09 Dedicated shutdown equipment PI-607E-1 [pressurizer pressure indicator] is out of tolerance The inspectors also reviewed the cumulative effects of the operator workarounds listed on the RNP Unit 2 Workaround Log dated June 15, 2004, to verify that those effects could not increase an initiating event frequency, affect multiple mitigating systems, or affect the ability of operators to respond in a correct and timely manner to plant transients and accidents. Documents and operator workarounds reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
For the five post-maintenance tests listed below, the inspectors witnessed the test and/or reviewed the test data, to verify that test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions described in the UFSAR and TS. Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Attachment.
The tests included the following:
Related Test Procedure Title Maintenance Activity Date Inspected OST-151-3 Safety Injection Removal, disassembly, June 25 System Components repair, and Test - Pump C reinstallation of the C safety injection pump LP-030 Steam Generator #1 Replacement of level July 10 Narrow Range Level indicator Channel 474 OST-101-2 [Chemical and Replacement of valves July 21 Volume Control on B charging pump System] Component Test Charging Pump B
OST-409-1 [Emergency Diesel Extensive preventive August 5 Generator] A Fast maintenance on the Speed Start A emergency diesel generator OST-303-2 Service Water Motor replacement on August 10 Booster Pump B Test the B Service Water Booster Pump
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
For the six surveillance tests identified below, the inspectors witnessed testing and/or reviewed the test data, to verify that the systems, structures, and components involved in these tests satisfied the requirements described in the TS, the UFSAR, and applicable licensee procedures, and that the tests demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their intended safety functions. Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Attachment.
Test Procedure Title Date Inspected OST-401-2 [Emergency Diesel Generator] B Slow Speed June 23 Start OST-303-2 Service Water Booster Pump B Test June 30 OST-251-2 [Residual Heat Removal] Pump B and June 30 Components Test OST-352-2 Containment Spray Component Test - Train B July 21 OST-701-5* Reactor Coolant System Inservice Valve Test August 16 OST-901** [Heating Ventilation Recirculation] Condensate September 5 Measuring System (Weekly)
- This procedure included inservice testing requirements.
- This procedure was a reactor coolant system leakage detection surveillance.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
On August 24, the inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill to verify licensee self-assessment of classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix E. The inspectors also attended the post-drill critique, to verify that the licensee properly identified failures in classification, notification and protective action recommendation development activities. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
a. Inspection Scope
For the six PIs identified below, the inspectors verified the accuracy of the PI data that had been previously reported to the NRC by comparing those data to the actual data, as described below. The inspectors also compared the licensees basis in reporting each data element to the PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev. 2. In addition, the inspectors interviewed licensee personnel associated with collecting, evaluating, and distributing these data.
Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Attachment.
Initiating Events Cornerstone
- Unplanned Scrams
- Scrams with Loss of Heat Removal
- Unplanned Power Changes For the period from April, 2003 through March, 2004, the inspectors reviewed a selection of licensee event reports, operator log entries, daily reports (including the daily CR descriptions), monthly operating reports, and PI data sheets to verify that the licensee had accurately identified the number of scrams and unplanned power changes greater than 20 percent that occurred during the subject period. The inspectors compared those numbers to the numbers reported by the licensee for the PI.
The inspectors also reviewed the accuracy of the number of critical hours reported, and the licensees basis for crediting normal heat removal capability for each of the reported reactor scrams.
Mitigating Systems Cornerstone
- Safety System Unavailability, Emergency AC Power System
- Safety System Unavailability, Auxiliary Feedwater System
- Safety System Unavailability, Residual Heat Removal System For the period from the second quarter of 2003 through the first quarter of 2004, the inspectors reviewed licensee event reports (LERs), records of inoperable equipment, and Maintenance Rule records, to verify that the licensee had accurately accounted for unavailability hours that the subject systems had experienced during the subject period.
The inspectors also reviewed the number of hours those systems were required to be available and the licensees basis for identifying unavailability hours.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Routine Review of ARs
To aid in the identification of repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for followup, the inspectors performed frequent screenings of items entered into the licensees CAP. The review was accomplished by reviewing daily AR reports.
.2 Annual Sample Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected AR 128419128419 Operational Impact of Troubleshooting, for detailed review. The inspectors selected this AR because it relates generally to the Initiating Events cornerstone. The inspectors reviewed this report to verify:
- complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner;
- evaluation and disposition of performance issues;
- evaluation and disposition of operability and reportability issues;
- consideration of extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences;
- appropriate classification and prioritization of the problem;
- identification of root and contributing causes of the problem;
- identification of corrective actions which were appropriately focused to correct the problem; and
- completion of corrective actions in a timely manner.
The inspectors also reviewed this AR to verify licensee compliance with the requirements of the licensees corrective action program as delineated in Corporate Procedure CAP-NGGC-0200, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Follow-up
(Closed) LER 05000261/2004-001-00, Both Trains of High Pressure Safety Injection Inoperable for Approximately 25 Minutes. This LER reported that on March 27, while realigning two safety-related power supplies among three high-pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps, the licensee placed the plant in a configuration not allowed by the plants TS for approximately 25 minutes. The inspectors reviewed the circumstances associated with this event, and noted that the licensee restored full compliance with the TS in accordance with the required action statements for that configuration. This event did not constitute a violation of NRC requirements.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On September 22, 2004, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr.
John Moyer and other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- C. Burton, Director of Site Operations,
then Manager, Performance Evaluation Section & Regulatory Affairs (Corporate Office)
- A. Cheatham, Radiation Protection Superintendent
- C. Church, Engineering Manager
- B. Clark, Nuclear Assurance Manager
- T. Cleary, Plant General Manager, then Director of Site Operations (Brunswick)
- W. Farmer, Engineering Superintendent
- R. Howell, Supervisor, Regulatory Support
- R. Ivey, Operations Manager
- E. Kapopoulos, Outage Management Manager
- J. Lucas, Manager, Support Services - Nuclear
- G. Ludlum, Training Manager
- J. Moyer, Vice President
- B. Noll, Director of Site Operations
- D. Stoddard, Maintenance Manager, then Plant General Manager
NRC personnel
- P. Fredrickson, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
None
Closed
- 05000261/2004-001-00 LER Both Trains of High Pressure Safety Injection Inoperable for Approximately 25 Minutes (Section 4OA3)
Discussed
None