IR 05000261/1986030
| ML20210C445 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 01/07/1987 |
| From: | Decker T, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210C408 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-86-30, NUDOCS 8702090391 | |
| Download: ML20210C445 (19) | |
Text
1 e REIo,D UNITED STATES o
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REClON li g
j 101 M ARIETTA STREET, N.W.
- ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323 k ""',/
JAN 131987 Report No.: 50-261/86-30 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company P. O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.: 50-361 License No.: DPR-23 Facility Name:
H. B. Robinson Inspection Conducted: Dece er 16_-18, and 22, 1986 Inspector:
[G up /
/h/b7 W. M. Sartor Date/ Signed Accompanying Personnel:
E. F. Williams G. Arthur F Victor
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Approved by:
C T. R. Decker, Section Chief Date' Signed Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This routine announced inspection involved observation and evaluation of key emergency organization functions and locations during the annual emergency preparedness exercise.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified. Three exercise weaknesses
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were identified which resulted in a commitment by the licensee to demonstrate early corrective action. The weaknesses included a delayed first aid response to a simulated medical emergency, an excessive time period required for activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Operations Facility and an
incomplete information flow from the Control Room to the TSC and from the Communicators to the State and counties. A fourth exercise weakness, which does
l not require early licensee followup, addressed the need for an earlier and nore comprehensive review of the scenario package and its data by the controllers.
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REPORT DETAILS i
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1. -
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- B. G. Rieck, Manager, Control and Administration
- R. E. Morgan, General Manager
- D. R. Quick, Manager, Maintenance
- C. A. Bethea, Manager, Training
- H. S. Zimmerman, Long Range Planning
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- N. J. McConnell, Sr., QA Manager
- E. M. Harris, Jr., Director, Onsite Nuclear Safety
- A. R. Wallace, Manager, Technical Support
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- R. M. Smith, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control
- B. D. McFeaters, Corporate Emergency Preparedness
- R. A. Indelicato, Brunswick Emergency Preparedness
- M. Marrow, Robinson Emergency Preparedness
- B. Thorson, Training / Emergency Preparedness
- R. Black, Manager, Corporate Emergency Preparedness i
- E. Bean, Director of News Programs, Corporate Communications
- J. Curley, Director, Regulatory Compliance Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security office members and office personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Comission
- H. Krug, Senior Resident Inspector i
- R. Latta, Resident Inspector l
- Attended exit interview l
- Participated in supplementary exit interview via telephone on December 22, l
1986
- Participated in both of the exit interviews
i 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were sumarized on December 18, 1986, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
The i
licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
l As a result of the exercise findings, a supplementary exit interview was
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l-conducted via telephone on December 22, 1986, among Messrs. T. Decker and W.
Sartor of NRC and R. Morgan, B. Rieck, B. Thorson, and J. Curley of your organization.
As a result of the latter meeting, the licensee committed to f
the following:
(a) conduct a licensee only medical drill to demonstrate the ability to respond and provide timely first aid to a medical emergency; and (b) conduct a limited table top exercise to demonstrate:
(1) the ability to V
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provide timely information flow from the Control Room to the Technical Support Center (TSC) prior to TSC activation; (2) a sufficient and trained communicator staff to ensure an adequate flow of information to the State and counties via followup notifications; and (3) to accomplish the above
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actions within 90 days of the date of this letter and to inform NRC of the schedule of performance to permit NRC observance.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not' addressed in the inspection.
4.
Exercise Scenario (82301)'
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The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine whether
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provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's emergency plan and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The scenario developed for this exercise was adequate to fully exercise the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee.
The scenario was reviewed and discussed in advance of the scheduled exercise date with licensee representatives. The licensee's controller / evaluators meeting held on December 16,.1986, revealed numerous inconsistencies with the exercise
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messages that necessitated last minute changes and the distribution of a revised. exercise messages packet the morning of the exercise.
Although no major scenario problems were noted during the exercise, some minor inconsistencies and data corrections were observed.
It was noted by an inspector in the simulated Control Room that the uncertainty of the primary
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Control Room controller in the adequacy of the exercise messages may have attributed to the excessive controller prompting of the Control Room players
which was identified as an inspector follow-up item during the NRC presentation in the exit critique (50-261/86-30-01).
The failure to have conducted a detailed review of the exercise messages with the leading
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controllers prior to the day before the exercise was identified as an i
exercise weakness during the critique on December 18, 1986
(50-261/86-30-02).
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee had been specifically established and whether adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1;; 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A; and specific
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criteria in NUREG-0654, Sections II.A and II.B.
The inspector verified that the licensee made specific assignments to the emergency organization.
The inspector observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organizations in the Control Room, the
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Technical Support Center, the Operations Support Center (OSC), and the
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Emergency Operations Fecility (E0F).
At each of these centers, the assignment of emergency staff personnel appeared to be consistent with the licensee's emergency plan.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine that the responsibilities for emergency response had been unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility accident
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response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces were specified as required by 10 CFR 50.54(b)(2); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV. A; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.B.
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The inspector noted that the. licensee's onsite emergency organization as observed did not appear to adequately provide for staffing to insure initial facility accident response within specified time periods.
Observations
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which supported this included:
I a.
The Technical Support Center required approximately one hour and twenty
minutes from the declaration of the Alert until it was activated.
A portion of this delay was attributed to the shift foreman (acting as
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the Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC)) being unable to brief the General Manager (the new SEC in the TSC) of the events leading to the emergency classification because of ongoing events which required his attention.
It was also observed that when the TSC was activated the plant status parameters were not current and were not updated until approximately
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thirty minutes later.
b.
The General Manager assumed SEC duties as a result of having information requiring a General Emergency declaration that the Control Room did not have.
c.
The Emergency Operations Facility required approximately one hour and thirty minutes to activate.
The delay was caused by the lack of a communications staff in the E0F to provide notifications.
The apparent lack of sufficient communications to support the timely activation of the TSC and the EOF and the observed delayed activation of these emergency organizations was identified as an exercise weakness (50-261/86-30-03).
Additional discussions between the licensee and the NRC on December 22, 1986, resulted in a commitment by the licensee to demonstrate early corrective action as discussed above in Paragraph 2.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources had been made and whether other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response were identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47)b)(3); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.C.
An inspector observed that the Radiological Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures provided for requesting and using assistance resources.
During the exercise the licensee demonstrated the ability to coordinate with local agencies the evacuation, transportation, and treatment of a contaminated injured individual.
Although this objective was accomplished with no problems, the licensee noted that the onsite response to the medical emergency was unsatisfactory because it required 42 minutes from notification of the injured individual to the arrival of the first-aid team.
The licensee committed to take necessary corrective action and demonstrate a rore timely response to a simulated medical emergency within 90 days of the date of this report.
This delayed medical response was also identified as an exercise weakness by the NRC inspector (50-261/86-30-04).
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.D.
An emergency action level scheme was in place as stated in the Radiological Emergency Plan and the Implementing Procedures.
The system appeared adequate for the classification of the simulated accident and the emergency procedures provided for initial and continuing mitigating actions during the simulated emergency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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S 9.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and follow-up messages to response orgaL.zations had been established; and means to
provide early notification to the populace within the p(lume exposure pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) 5); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.E.
Inspectors observed that notification methods and procedures had been'
established to provide information concerning the simulated emergency
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conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization. Because the State and county warning points were not participating in the exercise, the initial notifications were simulated and later notifications were provided to the County Energency Operations Centers and to the State of South Carolina in Columbia.
Although notifications were provided for the changes in emergency classifications, significant events occurred without being reported to the State and counties via follow-up notifications.
Examples were as follows:
(a) the follow-up message provided from the TSC at 0915 hours0.0106 days <br />0.254 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.481575e-4 months <br /> indicated a radioactive release which began at 0757 hours0.00876 days <br />0.21 hours <br />0.00125 weeks <br />2.880385e-4 months <br /> was still in progress whereas the release had been terminated at 0850 hours0.00984 days <br />0.236 hours <br />0.00141 weeks <br />3.23425e-4 months <br />, and (b) from 0915 hours0.0106 days <br />0.254 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.481575e-4 months <br /> to 1201 hours0.0139 days <br />0.334 hours <br />0.00199 weeks <br />4.569805e-4 months <br /> only one follow-up message was provided to the State and counties although significant events were occurring at the site, and the primary purpose of the one message was a change in the protective action recommendations.
Because significant events were not reported to the State and counties this area was identified as an exercise weakness (50-261/86-30-05) and on December 22, 1986, the licensee committed to an early demonstration of corrective action taken in response to this finding.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether provisions existed for prompt communications among the principal response organization and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
The communication links available to the emergency response organizations appeared to be adequate throughout the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Public Education and Information (82301)
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This area was observed to determine whether information concerning the simulated emergency had been made available for dissemination to the public as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.G.
Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the exercise.
The licensee established a Media Center in the Visitors Center and provided periodic news announcements.
No violations cr deviations were identified.
12. Emergency Facil' ties and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support emergency response were provided and maintained as
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required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
The emergency facilities were activated and staffed during the exercise.
The facilities appeared to be adequately aquipped to support the emergency response.
Event status boards were available in both the TSC and E0F, however, significant events were not posted on the boards.
Inspector Follow-upItem(50-261/86-30-06): TSC and E0F status boards were not posted with significant events.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13. AccidentAssessment(82301)
This area was observed to determine whether adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
No violations or deviations were i<jentified.
14.
Protective Response (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether guidelhaes for protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.J.
An inspector verified that the licensee had emergency procedures for formulating protective action recommendations for offsite populations within the ten-mile EPZ.
The licensee's protective action recommendations were consistent with the EPA and other criteria.
No violations or deviations were identified.
15. ExerciseCritique(82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to verify that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organizations were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
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The licensee conducted a post-exercise critique on December 17, 1986, and presented the results to licensee management the next day. Although player critique input was solicited it appeared to be done superficially.
The licensee's critique identified some 21 items requiring follow-up, but it was not clear which were considered to be the more significant findings.
Following the licensee's critique the NRC inspector provided a summary of preliminary NRC findings during the exercise.
No vio~.9tions or deviations were identified.
16.
Inspector Follow-up (92701)
a.
(Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-261/85-32-01:
Improving respirator communications for PASS Team.
The licensee has established a maintenance system for the respiratory-associated communications and no problems were observed during the exercise.
b.
(Closed) IFI 50-261/85-32-02:
Insuring information transmission to FE0C upon activation.
The licensee has revised both procedures and training.
c.
(Closed) IFI 50-261/85-32-03:
Maintaining exercise logs IAW requirements for legal record.
The licensee used bound books for the exercise logs.
d. 3 (Closed) IFI 50-261/85-32-04:
Thorough preparatory briefings for OSC teams. An inspector observed the OSC team briefings to be thorough, e.
(Closed) IFI 50-261/85-32-05:
Reevaluation of OSC location and configuration. The OSC has been reconfigured.
Attachment:
Exercise Objectives and Narrative Summary l
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A ATTACHMENT H. B. ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT
- 1986 ANNUAL EXERCISE OBJECTIVES A
A.
Accident Assessment and Emergency Classification 1.
Demonstrate the a'bility of the Control Room staff to perform accident assessment, and implement those appropriate s; ([
mitigating actions necessary to place the Unit in a safe and
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stable condition.
2.
Demonstrate the profic1Incy of the Control Room and TSC personnel to properly classify an emergency condition.
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3 Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room staff to analyze current Plant conditions, and identify projected trends and potential consequences.
4.
Demonstrate the ability of the TSC staff to analyze current Plant conditions, identify projected trends / potential consequences, and provide recommendations for near term mitigating actions.
Demonstrate the ability of the EOF technical analysis staff to
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assess Plant conditions and formulate long-term mitigation recommendations.
6.
Demonstrate the ability of the EOF staff to recognize the need for vendor and other outside resources to assist in accident analysis and/or mitigation efforts.
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7.
Demonstrate a familiarity and working knowledge of emergency response personnel in implementing Plant Emergency Procedures.
B.
Notification, Mobilization, and Communications U
1.
Demonstrate the ability to alert, mobilize, and augment RNPD emergency response personnel without pre-positioning.
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2.
Demonstrate the ability to notify and communicate initial and follow-up emergency information to State and local authorities.
Demonstrate the ability of emergency response personnel to Sather and disseminate information regarding the status of emergency conditions and emergency response activities through proper use of available communications systems.
4.
Demonstrate the adequacy, operability, and effective use of communications procedures and methods to inform onsite and offsite emergency response personnel of the status of the emergency situation and the Plant conditions.
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Demonstrate the ability to communicate protective action recommendations to State and local authorities in a timely manner.
C.
Dose Calculation and Radiological Assessment 1.
Demonstrate the proficiency of the TSC and EOF staffs to perform dose calculations and offsite dose projections.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to assess information available from the containment and effluent high-level radiation monitoring systems and respond accordingly.
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Demonstrate the ability of the TSC and OSC to direct and coordinate Plant Monitoring, Damage Control, and Environmental Monitoring Teams' activities.
4.
Demonstrate the ability of onsite survey personnel to efficiently and effectively utilize their procedures and associated equipment to perform dose rate surveys, collection and analysis of radiological samples, and other prescribed onsite and in-plant radiological monitoring activities.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to control and coordinate the flow of information regarding radiological consequences between RNPD radiological assessment personnel stationed at the TSC, OSC, and the EOF.
6.
Demonstrate the ability to obtain, transport, and analyze samples utilizing the Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS)
within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of the decision to obtain a PASS sample.
Demonstrate the proficiency of the EOF staff to direct and coordinate the Environmental Monitoring Team activities utilizing correct procedures and radiological protective methods.
8.
Demonstrate the ability of the offsite Environmental Monitoring Teams' personnel to efficiently and effec,tively utilize their procedures and equipment to perform dose rate
surveys, collection and an analysis of radiological samples, and other prescribed radiological monitoring activities.
9.
Demonstrate the use of appropriate equipment for measurement of airborne radioiodine concentrations as low as 10-7 uCi/cc in the presence of noble gases.
10.
Demonstrate the proficiency of the TSC and EOF staffs to incorporate the results of onsite and offsite dose assessments into protective action recommendations.
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D.
Protective Response 1.
Demonstrate the ability of emergency response personnel to execute the RNPD Radiological Emergency Plan and associated Plant Emergency Procedures to protect Plant personnel and the general public as appropriate.
2.
Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room, TSC, and OSC staffs to implement onsite protective measures.
Demonstrate the ability of the emergency response personnel to integrate Plant conditions (including barrier status and effectiveness of protective measures) into the protective action decision making process.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to perform and maintain onsite accountability.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to monitor and evacuate non-essential site personnel to a designated assembly area.
6.
Demonstrate the ability to adequately control the spread of contamination and the radiological exposure of onsite and offsite emergency workers.
7.
Demonstrate the ability to formulate and execute measures to protect emergency workers onsite and within the Plume Exposure EPZ, including decisions whether to issue KI to emergency Workers.
8.
Demonstrate the ability to survey, respond to, and treat a contaminated medical emergency using the proper first aid equipment.
Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures necessary for decontamination of emergency workers and equipment.
10.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate with local agencies the evaluation, transportation, and treatment of a contaminated injured individual.
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11.
Demonstrate the ability to identify and organize CP&L Corporate or outside support when onsite capabilities may be exceeded.
12.
Demonstrate the ability of the RNPD Security organization to effectively implement procedures for responding to an emergency situation.
Demonstrate the ability to continually assess the habitability of emergency response facilities during periods, when radiological airborne contamination potentially exists.
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E.
Emergency Response Facilities 1.
Det nstrate the initial activation and functional adequacy of the Technical Support Center (TSC), the Operational Support Center (OSC), the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), and the Plant Media Center (PMC).
2.
Demonstrate the ability of each emergency response facility manager to maintain command and control over all emergency response activities conducted in his facility throughout the exercise.
Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the Control Room staff to the TSC staff and subsequently to the EOF.
4.
Demonstrate the operational adequacy of emergency response facilities' emergency status boards, maps, displays, associated equipment, and supplies necessary to support emergency response activities.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to properly form, brief, dispatch, and debrief emergency teams utilized during a response to emergency conditions.
6.
Demonstrate the documentation of emergency response activities.
Demonstrate the functional adequacy of the location and physical arrangement of the Operational Support Center.
8.
Demonstrate the Operational Support Center's effectiveness as
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a staging area and logistics planning area in support of emergency operations.
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F.
Public Information
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1.
Demonstrate the capability to coordinate the preparation, f
review, and release of information providing accurate and
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timely information, releases for issue to the general public.
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2.
Demonstrate the ability of the PMC staff to receive and coordinate information from media inquiries.
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G.
Recovery
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1.
Demonstrate the ability to reassess Plant conditions and enter l
into a recovery operation mode as defined by the RNPD
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Demonstrate the ability to identify and implement appropriate
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recovery activities based upon the current or projected conditions in affected onsite and offsite areas.
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F H.
' Critique and Corrective Actions
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1.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct a post-exercise critique to
determine areas requiring corrective action.
Demonstrate the a' equacy of the program to identify, document, d
2.
and implement corrective actions as a result of prior exercise deficiencies.
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NARRATIVE SUMMARY This exercise scenario is based upon a small loss of coolant accident with initial fuel damage caused by loose parts in the core.
Subsequent electrical failures increase the severity of the fuel damage through loss of feedwater and emergency cooling systems. Activity passes from the primary to the secondary system via ruptured tubes in
"C" S/G.
Initial conditions establish that the Plant has been at 100% power for the last 45 days with 250 effective full power days on cycle 11.
Emergency Die.sel
"A", Steam Driven Auxiliary Pump, and SI Pump "A" are all out-of-service.
The initiating event for the scenario occurs when a loose parts monitor alarm
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is received. An Auxiliary Operator is dispatched, and he discovers that the alarm is on multiple channels.
Shortly thereafter, a 30 gpm RCS leak occurs which is indicated by decreasing pressurizer level and pressure, charging pump speed increase, and VCT makeup. Plant shutdown begins.
The Dispatcher calls to report the presence of severe electrical storms in the area, the startup transformer is struck by lightning and trips. A west bus lockout occurs, and a turbine runback of 30% is experienced.
Pressurizer pressure and level continue to decrease, and there are coratinuing loose part
monitor alarms. Emergency diesel "B" starts automatically. A tube leak in
"C" S/G increases in severity.
A tornado is seen south of the Plant, and a loss of offsite power occurs.
PORVs open, but PORV RV1-3 fails to reseat. A substantial radioactive release to the environment occurs as the primary coolant has substantially higher than normal activity due to loose parts damaging the fuel. The primary to secondary leak in "C" S/G is the main release path.
After almost one hour, RV1-3 reseats on its own, but a fire breaks out in the diesel generator "B" area, taking that diesel permanently out-of-service.
DS/DG fails to start due to failure of the bull gear.- Thus, there are no sources of onsite or offsite AC power. The primary coolant temperature i
increases rapidly.
"A" and "B" S/G PORVs open fully. The Fire Brigade l
responds to the diesel fire, and one man is injured in the process of fighting the fire. As he is being transported out, the crew moving him accidentally slip and soil themselves and the injured person in a contaminated area.
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One hour later DS/DG is repaired but a bomb threat h'as been called into the l
Plant. Shortly after, emergency diesel "A" is repaired and SI pumps "A" and
"B" are started and then secured after 10 minutes of operation.
Forty minutes later, RCS cooldown commences. Long-term recovery operations are considered.
i SCN:86-4927
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P INITIAL CONDITIONS HBR Unit 2 has been at 100% power for the last 45 days with 250 effective full power days on Cycle 11.
The CP&L electrical power system is in a " low reserve" electrical condition, and the demand is slightly higher than normal.
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OUT-OF-SERVICE EQUIPMENT
Equipment Reason Emergency Diesel "A" Corrective maintenance on fuel injectors (duration 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />)
Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedpump Bearing failure (currently 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> into a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO)
i Charging Pump "A" Excessive plunger leakage (expected back in service at 16:00 hours)
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R-9 CVCS Detector failure SI Pump "A" Repaired, but awaiting area decontamination prior to release of
equipment for use i
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The condenser vacuum pump discharge is presently aligned to the Plant vent.
METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS Initial conditions: Skies will be overcast with showers and thunderstorms in the area. Winds are from the north northwest at 4 to 10 mph. The National Weather Service has issued a " TORNADO WATCH" for all of South Carolina, effective between the hours of 04:00 and 10:00. At 05:30 a.m.,
there is no
,prec pi itation occuring onsite at the present time.
RADIOLOGICAL CONDITIONS All Plant area radiation monitors are reading at levels normal for the initial conditions described above.
Plant chemistry is also at normal levels.
i SCN:86-4926 3.0-2
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SCENARIO TIMELINE INITIATING MESSAGE TIME NUMBER PLANT EVENT SUMMARY H+00:00 1.
Initial conditicns are established.
(05:30 AM)
H+00:05 2.
A loose parts monitor alarm is received on (05:35 AM)
APP-036-03.
H+00:15 3.
The dispatched Auxiliary Operator has found multiple (05:45 AM)
signal alarms for Channels 752, 753 (lower Rx vessel), and 756 (Steam Generator "C").
H+00:20
Rx Coolant System pressure decreases due to a 30 gpm (05:50 AM)
leak. Indications are:
VCT experiencing more frequent makeup (low-level
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makeup at 20.2 inches, filling to 24.4 inches).
NOTE: Operator should know that 1 inch equals
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approximately 21 gallons.
H+00:25 C-1.
Pressurizer pressure and level experience a 1% drop (05:55 AM)
indicated by LI-460, 461, and PI 455, 456, and 457.
H+00:26 C-2.
RMS 15 trending upscale to 900 cpm.
(05:56 AM)
RMS 19 trending upscale to 8,500 cpm.
H+00:27 C-3.
OST-051, "RCS Leakage Evaluation Based on Primary (05:57 AM)
System Inventory," should be initiated. R-19 alarms / isolates blowdown.
H+00:40 5.
OST-051 has been identified a leak rate of 30 gpm.
(06:10 AM)
NOTE: Tech. Specs. 3.1.5.3 states that primary to
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secondary leakage in excess of
.35 gpm/ generator or >1.0 gpm total will necessitate cold shutdown in 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
H+00:45 6.
Plant shutdown has commenced at 1% power / minute.
(06:15 AM)
Dispatch requests load due to loss of Brunswick 1 and 2.
H+01:00 C-4.
An Unusual Event should have been declared at this (06:30 AM)
time due to Unusual Event (3)a - RCS leakage identified >10 gpm.
SCN:86-4926 3.0-3
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INITIATING MESSAGE TIME NUMBER PLANT EVENT SUMMARY H+01:00 7.
Dispatcher calls to report the presence of severe (06:30 AM)
electrical storms in the area.
The National Weather Service has issued a Tornado Warning for Darlington County from 6:00 AM to 7:00 AM.
One was spotted west of Darlington.
RMS 19 is isolated.
(>10,000 cpm)
RMS 15 900 cpm.
H+01:18 8.
A west bus lockout has occurred.
(06:48)
Alarm on R-15/ swap to stack vent.
A turbine runback of 30% was experienced due to loss of instrument bus #4 (1% gap activity release).
Emergency diesel "B" starts automatically.
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Upon inspecting the startup transformer, it is apparent that lightning has struck the unit, and it is damaged extensively.
H+01:35 10.
Loose part monitor multiple signal alarm received on (07:05 AM)
Channels 752, 753, and 756 (30% gap activity release). Operator reopens RMS 1, 2, 3, and 4.
H+01:36 C-5.
Pressurizer pressure and level continue to trend down (07:06 AM)
while Rx power stabilized at 31% to attempt to regain S/U transformer.
H+01:50 C-6.
An Alert should have been declared by this time (07:20 Ahi due to 19(a)3 - Alert due to low falling PZR pressure and level with approximate constant Tave with an alarm on R-19 or R-15.
H+02:25 11.
A tornado has been spotted south of the Plant.
(07:55 AM)
SCN:86-4926 3.0-4
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INITIATING MESSACE TIME NUMBER PLANT EVENT SUMMARY H+02:26 12.
Loss of offsite power due to a disturbance in the (07:56 AM)
electrical grid. Alarms received are:
OCB 52-8 Fail Set Trouble Alarm APP-009-37.
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OCB 52-9 Fail Set Trouble Alarm APP-009-38.
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Cen. Neg. Seq. on O.C. Backup Trip APP-009-018.
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Turbine Overspeed Trip APP-008-015.
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Turbine Trip Trip APP-004-034.
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NOTE: Because of loss of offsite power, blackout sequence starts, no circ. water pumps or condenser dump are available.
LPMS alarm received - multiple signals - Channels 752, 753, and 756.
H+02:27 13.
Indications of PORVs RV1-1, RV1-2, RV1-3 have (07:57 AM)
opened.
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H+02:28 14.
Indications that PORV RV1-1, RV1-2 have reseated.
(07:58 AM)
RV1-3 indicates a fail open signal.
NOTE:
PORY will not isolate when A0 is dispatched, k
H+02:45 C-7.
A Site Emergency should have been declared by this (08:15 AM)
time due to 15 - Site Emergency - Any release resulting in offsite dose in excess of.1 rem whole body.
H+3:00 C-8.
A General Emergency should have been declared at this-(00.30 AM)
time due to 15.0 " Caseous Release," any release to C6:4di the environment resulting in offsite dose in excess of 1.0 rem (whole body) or 5.0 rem (thyroid) as indicated by:
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Field measurements at or beyond the exclusion l
area boundary.
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H+03:20 15.
An inspection has shown that the feedback linkage has (08:50 AM)
fallen off.
H+03:20 16.
PORV RV1-3 has reseated.
(08:50 AM)
r H+03:25 17.
Emergency Diesel "B" alarm Zor' ' APP-023-019 (08:55 AM)
(fire on diesel generator).
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SCN:86-4926 3.0-5 i
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INITIATING MESSAGE TIME NUMBER PLANT EVENT SUMMARY H+03:27 18.
Emergency Diesel "B" trouble alarm APP-010-03 (08:57 AM)
(emergency diesel trip).
H+03:32 19.
DS/DC will not start because bull gear will not (09:02 AM)
engage.
H+03:55 20.
Fire Brigade Team reports extensive fire damage (09:25 AM)
to "B" D/C.
A member of the "A" Diesel Generator Damage Control Team initially responds to the oil fire and receives significant burns to the left side of his body. The shortest route outside the Auxiliary Building for transport was identified through the SI pump room.
While Fire Brigade personnel were transporting the injured person outside, they slipped near SI pump
"A" and became soiled. The Fire Brigade individual and
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the injured person are potentially contaminated.
H+04:30 C-9 Pull pass sample.
(10:00 AM)
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H+04:40 21.
A bomb threat has just been received by the (10:10 AM)
switchboard operator. The conditions are:
1.
Located in the E1/E2 safeguards room.
2.
Set y at 12:00 noon.
..to....,.__
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NOTE: The search team will find a suspicious looking box on top of El.
H+04:42 C-10.
A Ceneral Emergency should be reclassified based on (10:12 AM)
8.0 - General Emergency - Loss of offsite power and failure of all 3 AFW trains for >l hour.
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Floating'
22.
A' contamination survey of the injured individual shows levels of 3000 cpm to 5000 cpm on the side and legs.
i H+04:45 23.
Dedicated shutdown D/C has been repaired and is (10:15 AM)
ready for operation.
H+04:55 24.
Emergency Diesel "A" has been repaired and can (10:25 AM)
return to service.
H+06:30 C-11.
Activate the RNPD Recovery Organization in accordance (12:00 AM)
with PLP-007, "RNPD Emergency Plan."
SCN:86-4926 3.0-6
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