IR 05000259/1981022
| ML18025B674 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 08/25/1981 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Chase J, Paulk G, Sullivan R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18025B669 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-81-22, 50-260-81-22, 50-296-81-22, NUDOCS 8110160440 | |
| Download: ML18025B674 (16) | |
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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA30303 I
Report Nos. 50-259/81-22, 50-260/81-22, and 50-296/81-22 Licensee:
Tennessee Val,ley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility Name:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Docket Nos.
50-259, 50-260, and 50-296 License Nos.
DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 Inspection at Browns Ferry site near Athens, Alabama Inspectors: 8 C.
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F. Sully,va
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Chase
. L. Paulk Approved by:
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S. Cantrell, Section Chief, Division of Resident and Reactor Project Inspection SUI)NARY Inspection on June 26 to July 26, 1981 Areas Inspected Date Signed-zs,=
&'ate Signed Date Signed Date Signed This routine inspection involved 224 resident inspector-hours in the areas of operational safety, reportable occurrences, plant physical protection, reactor trips, surveillance testing, and maintenance.
Results Of the six areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in four areas.
Three violations were found in two areas; (Failure to follow procedure, paragraph 5 and 7; Failure to provide proper dosimetry; Failure to cycle t
Containment Atmosphere Delution System (CAD) valves when required; and one deviation in one area (Failure to maintain CAD system at 100 psig as specified in the FSAR, paragraph 5).
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DETAILS Persons Contacted 2.
3.
4.
Licensee Employees H. L. Abercrombie, Power Plant Superintendent J.
R.
Bynum, Assistant Power Plant Superintendent J.
L. Harness, Assistant Power Plant Superintendent R. T. Smith, guality Assurance Supervisor R.
G. Metke, Engineering Section Supervisor D.
C. Mims, Engineering and Test Unit Supervisor R.
G. Cockrell, Reactor Engineering Unit Supervisor J.
B. Studdard, Operations Section Supervisor A. L. Burnette, Assistant Operations Supervisor R. Hunkapillar, Assistant Operations Supervisor T. L. Chinn, Plant Compliance Supervisor M.
W. Haney, Mechanical Maintenance Section Supervisor J.
A. Teague, Electrical Maintenance Section Supervisor J.
K. Pittman, Instrument Maintenance Section Supervisor J.
E. Swindell, Outage Director B. Howard, Plant Health Physicist R.
E. Jackson, Chief Public Safety R. Cole, gA Site Representative Office of Power Other licensee employees contacted included licensed senior reactor operators, reactor operators, auxiliary operators, craftsmen, technician, public safety officers, gA personnel and engineering personnel.
Management Interview Management Interviews were conducted on July 2, 10, and 16, 1981, with the Assistant Power Plant Superintendents and/or his Assistant Power Plant Superintendent and other members of his staff.
The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of their inspection activities.
The licensee was informed that three apparent violations and one deviation were identified during the report period.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee concerning the apparent violations or the deviation.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
Unresolved Items
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5.
There were no unresolved items identified during this report period.
Operational Safety.
The inspectors kept informed on a daily basic of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters'related to plant operations.
Daily
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discussions were held each morning with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff.
The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room such that each was visited at least daily when an inspector was on site.
Observation included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings; status of operating systems; status and alignments of emergency standby systems; pur pose of temporary tags on equipment controls and switches; annunciator alarms; adherence to procedures; adherence to limiting conditions for operations; temporary alterations in effect; daily journals and data sheet entries; and control room manning.
This inspection activity also 'included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisors.
General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basic.
Portions of the turbine building, each reactor building and outside areas were visited.
Observations included valve positions and system alignment; snubber and hanger conditions; instrument readings; housekeeping; radiation area controls; tag controls on equipment; work activities in progress; vital area controls; personnel badging, personnel search and escort.
Informal discussion were held with selected plant personnel in their functional area during 'these tours.
The inspectors performed a complete
"walkdown" of the Containment Atmosphere Dilution (CAD) system in July 13, 1981 and found the following items:
a.
Flow Control Valves (FCV) - 84-5 and 84-16, are on the outlet of the nitrogen storage tanks and are required to be cycled once a month per Technical Specification (TS) 4.7.G.1.a.
Since these valves are common to all three units the Unit 1 operator was assigned the responsibility to cycle these valves when the other valves in the CAD system for Unit 1 were cycled.
Since Unit 1 is shutdown for a refueling outage the requirement to cycle Unit 1 CAD valves was not required.
The common valves FCV-84-5 and 84-16 had not been cycled since triarch 1981.
On July 17, 1981 the Assistant Plant Superintendent was informed that this item was,an apparent violation of TS 4.7.G.l.a.
(260, 296/81-22-01).
The valves were cycled immediately after the inspector identified the problem to plant management.
C b.
The Browns Ferry FSAR section 5.2.6.2 states that the nitrogen storage tanks will be maintained at 100 psig in the gas space above the liquid nitrogen.
The inspector found the A and B storage tanks at 85 psig and 60 psig respectively.
The inspector could not identify any plant procedures which states what the minimum pressure in the tanks should be other than Operating Instruction (OI)-84 which discussed keeping the tanks at approximately 100 psig during filling.
The pressure in the storage tanks is the driving force for admitting nitrogen to the primary containment following a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) at a
flow rate of 100 SCB1 as discussed in the FSAR and Technical Speci-fication (TS).
The tanks were pressurized to 100 psig after the inspector brought the item to plant management attention and personnel in the Operations Section were made aware of the requirement.
On
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July 17, 1981, the Assistant Plant Superintendent was informed that not maintaining the CAD nitrogen storage tanks at 100 psig was an apparent deviation from the requirement state in the FSAR section 5.2.6.2.
(260/81-22-02, 296/81-22-03).
On June 20, 1981 while repairing the effluent radwaste discharge pipe (which is located in the Condenser Circulating Water (CCW) tunnel) for Unit 1, a health physics survey was made on a portion of this piping and it was found to be internally containmated to 7,240 DPH/smear.
The pipe was then cut by an outage craftsmen who wore a full face mask as his only means of protection against contamination.
No Special Work Permit (SWP)
was issued nor was contamination clothing other than the full face mask, worn.
Upon removing the pipe from the CCW tunnel on June 22, 1981, it was determined that the pipe was also externally contaminated to approx-imately 10,000 DPH/smear.
A survey of the tunnel by health physics indicated no other contamination other than that on the cut pipe.
Water samples in the tunnel indicated that the HPC fraction before dilution to be 0.023.
Licensee evaluation of how the pipe became externally contaminated was concluded to have possibly occurred from the cutting operation.
The licensee attributed this incident to poor communication between HP technicians and the craftsmen.
On June 25, 1981 the Assistant Plant Superintendent was informed that failure to have an SWP for this work was an apparent violation of Technical Specification 6.3.A.7.
The Assistant Plant tlanager committed to having this incident discussed with Health Physics personnel stressing the need for direct communication between themselves and the craftsmen.
In addition the requirements for when an SWP should be issued would also be discussed.
This item is included in the Notice of Violation, Appendix A, as one of the examples of a failure to follow procedure.
(259/81-22-01)
I'n June 29, 1981 an HP technician informed the resident inspector that on June 26, 1981 he had observed two outage craftsmen on the Scram Discharge Header (SDH) in which one craftsman was standing on a pipe which had a
15 REM/hr hot spot and the other craftsman next to the hot spot without having extremity dosimetry located on their person.
The technician said that he immediately had the men leave the area and he reported it to his supervisor.
When the inspector investigated the problem no management personnel could be found who were aware of this.incident, no radiological incident report (RIR) was issued and consequently no calculation of estimated dose received by the individuals was performed.
When the inspector brought the incident to the licensee's attention the licensee conducted and investigation and assigned 800 mrem to each craftsmen who was on the SDH piping.
The resident inspector reviewed the calculations from which the 800 mrem was derived and found them to be conservativ S
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The licensee attributed this incident to poor communication between HP and the craftsmen.
The Plant Superintendent was informed that the failure to wear extremity dosimetry was an apparent violation of 10 CFR 20.202(a)
which requires that personnel who enter a restrictive area in which they are likely to receive a dose in any calendar quarter in excess of 25 percent of 18.75 REM per quarter for extremities will be supplied appropriate personnel monitoring equipment.
(259/81-'22-02).
The inspector also investigated as to why no RIR was issued for this incident which would have brought it to the proper management attention.
The inspector interviewed three HP technicians and two HP supervisors.
All five personnel conveyed the same feeling which was one of apathy toward RIR in that they felt nothing became of them.
This feeling was not apparent to plant management who stated they used RIR's for identifying problems and personnel who were reluctant to follow proper HP practices.
Plant management stated that they would discuss the usefullness of RIR's with all HP technicians.
e The Plant Superintendent was informed that failure to issue an RIR on the above incident was an apparent violation of TS 6.3.A which requires written procedures to be adhered to.
RCI-1 required that violations which cause or would tend to cause a violation of 10 CFR 20 limits shall be reported per an RIR.
This item is included in the Notice of Violation, Appendix A, as one of the examples of a failure to follow procedure.
(259/81-22-03)
6.
Maintenance Observation
The inspectors observed the below listed maintenance activities for procedure adequacy, adherence to procedure and observed the actual per-formance of the work activity.
a.
Installation of Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI)
hiG Set b.
Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Modification c.
Torus Modification d.
Change Out of 3C Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
Pump Motor With regards to the change out of 3C RHR pump motor, which occurred while the plant was operating, the inspectors held numerous discussions with plant management, engineers and craftsmen involved in the work.
The inspectors found the work to be well planned and coordinated and that personnel involved in the change out were knowledgedable of the procedures.
The licensee developed contingency plans and performed safety evaluations to deal with an accidental drop of the new pump motor.
The safety evaluations and contingency plans considered various pipe breaks which could occur because of a dropped motor.
The change out of the motor went smooothly with little unforseen delay '
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In the above areas, no violations or deviations were identified.
Surveillance Testing Observation The inspectors observed the performance of Technical Instruction (TI)-60, Scram Pilot Air Header Low Pressure Switch.
The inspection consisted of a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, conformance to technical specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation on the conduct of the test, removal from service and return to service of the system and review of test data.
The instrument mechanics performing TI-60 did not utilize the procedure nor did they sign off the steps as each was accomplished but waited until a section was completed and signed them all off at once.
At one point the inspector discussed the requirements in the procedure with the instrument mechanics because they had deviated from the procedure and the potential existed for a possible unnecessary half-scram or a possible full scram if they proceeded any further.
After the discussion the instrument mechanics performed the TI per the procedure.
No other problems were identified during the conduct of this TI.
On July 10, 1981, the Plant Superintendent was informed that failure to follow the procedure, TI-60, was an apparent violation of TS 6.3.A which requires detailed written procedures to be adhered to.
This item is included in the Notice of Violation, Appendix A, as one of the examples of a failure to follow procedure.
(296/81-22-02)
Plant Physical Protection During the course of routine inspection activities, the inspectors made observations of certain plant physical protection activities.
These included personnel badging, personnel search and escort, vehicle search and escorts, communications and vital area access control.
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.
Reactor Trips The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the below listed reactor trips during this report period.
The review included determination of cause, safety significance, performance of personnel and systems, and corrective action.
The inspectors examined instrument recordings, computer printouts, operations, journal entries, scram reports and had discussions with operations, maintenance and engineering support personnel as appro-priate.
On June 28, 1981, Unit 3 tripped at 5:11 a.m. from full power due to main steam line isolation valves closure.
A surveillance test on the main steam line temperature sensors was in progress and initiated the isolation.
Personnel were following procedure but there was some doubt whether, one sensor retained some residual heat before heat was applied to a second
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No faults in the circuitry were found.
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system (RCIC) was manually initiated to control reactor water level and three main steam relief valves were manually cycled to control reactor pressure.
Plant safety systems performed satisfactorily.
On July 8, 1981, Unit 2 was manually tripped at 11:47 p.m. from 40$ power to repair an Electro-Hydraulic Control System (EHC) oil leak on turbine control valve 2A.
No relief valves were operated nor were any emergency core cooling systems initiated.
Plant safety systems performed satisfactorily.
Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Reportable Occurrences The below listed licensee event reports (LERs) were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC reporting requirements.
The determination included adequcy of event description and corrective action taken or planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety significance of each event.
Additional in plant reviews and discussion with plant personnel as appropriate were condcuted for those indicated by an asterisk.
LER No.
259/8113 R-1 259/8124 259/8126 259/8127 259/8128
- 259/8129
- 259/8130 259/8131 259/8134
- 260/8058 R-1
- 260/8118
- 260/8118 R-1
- 260/8123 260/8125 Date 6/22/81 6/17/81 6/25/81 6/15/81 6/16/81 6/11/81 6/22/81 6/29/81 6/16/81 6/30/81 5/11/81
, 6/9/81 6/17/81 Event Athens 161 Kv line tripped Standby Gas Treatment train "C" inoperable One channel for wind direction failed Surveillance test on rod sequence control system missed Standby Gas Treatment train "C" inoperable Turbine first stage pressure switches out of limits Secondary containment door interlocks defeated Eight scram accumulator level switches inoperable Seismic trigger HST C inoperable Scram discharge instrument volume 3 gallon switch failed APRN trip settings not adjusted Turbine first stage pressure switches out of limits Both doors on equipment airlocks opened simultaneously
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- 260/8128
- 260/8128 R-1 260/8129
- 260/8131 296/8049 R-1 296/8112 296/8117 296/8118 296/8124
- 296/8125 R-1 296/8127
- 296/8132 6/25/81 7/24/81 7/16/81 7/22/81 6/19/81 3/13/81 4/27/81 5/8/81 6/10/81 6/30/81 6/17/81 7/22/81 Reactor pressure switches for controlling RHR shutdown cooling valves out of limits
"A" flow bias loop for APRNs drifted high Three of four RHR'pumps on cross-connections not available 3D RHR pump inoperable Scram discharge instrument volume level switch above setpoint Reactor level switch inoperable Core maximum fraction of limiting power density above limit HPCI turbine trip on test Level switch in torus for HPCI failed to operate Reactor water level instrument inoperable during startup 3A RHR pump inoperable In addition to the LER's listed above the inspectors reviewed four recent'ERs dealing with problems with air start motors on the emergency diesel generators (DG).
The annual inspection and testing of seven of the eight DGs revealed that the left bank air motors on four of the seven failed to develop minimum rotational speed to pass test criteria.
This was reported in LERs 259/8119, 259/8120, 296/812 and 259/8135.
The cause has been attributed to dirt in the air motors which has contributed to sticking or broken vanes.
The evaluation by TVA is continuing with some question whether the operation of the solenoid - air operated valve is adversly affected by the dirt.
In none of the above cases did the DG fail to start.
The inspection frequency has been changed on an interim basis from annual to semi-annual with the intent to change out the air motors on each inspection.
In October the remaining DG will be thoroughly inspected including air piping and valves.
The inspectors will continue their review in this area.
Ho violations or deviaitons were identified within the areas inspecte <~r r 0