IR 05000259/1981026
| ML20032D300 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 09/23/1981 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Chase J, Paulk G, Sullivan R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20032D278 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-81-26, 50-260-81-26, 50-296-81-26, NUDOCS 8111130615 | |
| Download: ML20032D300 (8) | |
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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N REGION 11 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 g
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 s
Report Nos. 50-259/81-26, 50-260/81-26, and 50-296/81-26 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility Name: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Docket Hos. 50-259, 260, and 296 License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 Inspection at Browns Ferry site near Athens, Alabama Inspectors: kh
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R. F. Sullivan Date Signed
/\\. (d. 00W 9 - 23' 98 JyW. Chase Date Signed
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T-23-b G. L. Paulk Date Signed Approved by:
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S. Can~treT1, Section Chief, Division of Date Signed
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Resident and Reactor Project Inspection SullMARY Inspection on July 27 - August 25, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine inspection involved 211 resident inspector-hours in the areas of operational safety, reportable occurrence, plant physical protection, reactor trips, surveillance testing, maintenance, THI action items, and Plant Operating Review Committee.
Resul ts Of the eight areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in six areas. Violations were found in two areas; (Violation of a Limiting Condition of Operation (Unit 2) paragraph 5; failure to incorporate a design basis requirement (Unit 3), paragraph 5; failure to take appropriate action when a limiting A
condition of operation could not be met, paragraph 10 (Unit 2).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees H. L. Abercrombie, Power Plant Superintendent J. R. Bynum, Assistant Power Plant Superintendent J. L. Harness, Assistant Power Plant Superintendent R. T. Smith, Quality Assurance Supervisor R. G. Metke, Engineering Section Supervisor D. C. Mims, Engineering and Test Unit Supervisor E. D. Nave, Reactor Engineering Unit Supervisor J. B. Studdard, Operations-Section Supervisor A. L. Burnette, Assistant Operations Supervisor
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R. Hunkapillar, Assistant Operations Supervisor T. L. Chinn, Plant Compliance Supervisor M. W. Haney,11echanical Maintenance Section Supervisor J. A. Teague, Electrical Maintenance Section Supervisor J. K. Pittman, Instrument Maintenance Section Supervisor J. E. Swindell, Outage Director B. Howard, Plant Health Physicist R. E. Jackson, Chief Public Safety R. Cole, QA Site Representative Office of Power Other licensee employees contacted included licensed senior reactor operators, reactor operators, auxiliary operators, craftsmen, technicians, public safety officers, QA personnel and engineering personnel.
2.
flanagement Interviews fianagement Interviews were conducted on July 31, August 7,14 and 21,1981, with the Power Plant Superintendent and/or his Assistant Power Plant Superintendents and other members of his staff. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of their inspection activities.
The licensee was informed of three apparent violations identified during the report period.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee concerning these violations.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items There were no new unresolved items identified during this report period.
5.
Operational Safety The inspectors kept informed on a daily basic of the overall plant status
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and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Daily
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discussions were held each morning with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff.
The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room such that each was
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visited at least daily when an inspector was on site. Observation included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings; status of operating systems; status and alignments of emergency standby sys ems; purpose of temporary tags on equipment controls and switches; annunciator alarms; adherence to procedures; adherence to limiting conditions for operations; temporary alterations in effect; daily journals and data sheet entries; and control room manning. This inspection activity also included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisors.
General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basic.
Portion.. of the turbine building, each reactor building and outside areas were visited.
Observations included valve positions and system alignment; snubber and hanger conditions; instrument readings; housekeeping; radiation area controls; tag controls on equipment; work activities in progress; vital area controls; personnel tadging, personnel search and escort.
Informal discussion were held with telected plant personnel in their functional area during these tours.
During this report period, a complete.walkdown of the Fuel Pool Cooling (FPC) system for Units 1, 2 and 3 was performed and physical condition of the systems was noted. This walkdown consisted of valve lineup checks, instrument alignment, gauge readings.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed the surveillance instruction for technical adequacy and to ensure they were current.
The inspector found no significant problems with the FPC system.
On August 19, 1981, the licensee identified that the undervoltage (UV)
relays for Start Buses 1A and IB had been rendered inoperable by an approved work plan.
(Work plan 10141, Delete Degraded Voltage Relays on Start Buses 1A and 18).
The licensee h:d the UV relays reconnected and intervice on the same day they were discovered removed fron service.
The purpose of the UV relays is to sense a possible loss of power and start the emergency diesel generators prior to a complete loss of power.
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Technical Specification changes had been submitted, but not yet approved, to delete the UV relays on the Start Buses, since the UV relays on the Shutdown Boards provided adequate time to start the diesel generators with a pending loss of power. Work plan 10141 was generated to remove the UV relays on the Start Buses in anticipation of the technical specification change. The work plan was not " flagged"'as needing a technical specification change prior to Committee (PORC)y either the originator or the Plant Operating Review implementation b members who reviewed and approved the work plan for implementation.
Unrk was comenced on August 14, 1981 and one UV unit to the "A" dirsel generator was disconnected om that day. On August 15, 1981, Unit 2 was started up from a cold condition. On August 18, 1981 all UV relays on the
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Start Buses to the four diesels' were disconnected..The r.<xt day, the licensee identified the problem and reconnected the UV relays.
On August 21,1981,.the Plant. Superintendent was informed that failure to have all UV relays operable prior to startup of Unit 2 from a cold condition was an apparer.t Jiolation of Technical Specification 3.9.A.4.e which requires the Start Buses IA and IB UV relays to be operable prior to startup from cold condition (260/81-26-01).
The Plant Superintendent stated that he
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was concerned about the mechanism which allowed this work plan to be issued in conflict with the requirements of the technical specifications.
During this report period, the licensee identified to the inspectors that (H2-02)ple and return valves (three valves total) for the Hydrogen-Oxygen the sam system in Unit 3 torus were not adequately sealed where the conduit connected to the solenoid. This condition allowed moisture to enter the wiring of the solenoid and conduit, and caused the' return ' valve to fail shut, rendering one of two H2-02 systems for Unit 3 inoperable.
The conduit had been connected to the solenoids by a rubber groumet and masking tape, instead of a stainless steel fitting which was requiring and would have prevented the humidity from entering the solenoid.
The licensee inspected the solenoid valves for Unit 1, 2 and the rest of Unit 3 valves and found no similar problems to that described above; however, there were several fittings which were loose and a condulet cover was off for the valve in Unit 3 u.ywell.
J The inspectors review of this incident included a review of work plans for a
installing the valves, environmental qualification of the valves, and vendors manuals. The vendors manual stated that the owner was responsible
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for sealing the conduit connections to prevent the entrance of moisture to maintain IEEE 323 qualifications. This requirement was not referenced in any work plan nor were any special requirements placed on the installation
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of the conduit connections, i.e, Quality Assurance hold points, torque values, type fitting to be used, etc.
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On August 7,1981 the Plant Superintendent was informed that failure to adequately seal the conduit connections was an apparent vi,lation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III which requires that the design basis be correctly translated into specification, drawings, procedures and instruc-
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tions. The design bases for the H2-02 system requires it to be operable under a post Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and since the conduit connections were ?ot adequately sealed, it is unlikaly that the H2-02 system would have been operable for Unit 3 torus urder a LOCA environment.
(296/81-26-01).
6.
Maintenance Observation During the report period, the inspectors observed the below listed maintenance activities.for procedure adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to Technical Specifications, radiological controls, and adherence to Quality Control hold points.
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place the generator 01 the grid because of a repeat of high pressure in 2A main transformer (startup was after replacing bushing in transfomer).
No relief valves operated nor were any emergency core cooling systems initiated. Plant safety systems perfomed satisfactorily.
On July 30,1981, Unit 3 was manually scramed for a short outage to inspect H2-02 valves in the torus and to swap main transfomers.
No relief valves operated nor were any emergency core cooling systems initiated.
Plant safety systems perfomed satisfactorily.
On August 1,1981, Unit 2 was manually scramed at 9:18 p.m. from approx-inately 12% power. Prior to this the turbine had tripped when attempting to place the generator on the grid because of turbine generator load reject.
The load reject was caused by a wiring error in the spare transfomer which was incorrectly connected.
No relief valves operated nor were any emergency core cooling systems initiated. Plant safety systems performed satis-factorily.
On August '2,1981, Unit 3 was manually scramed at 1:31 a.m. to investigate and repair a low oil alann on 3A recirculation pump.
It was subsequently determined that the cause of the low oil alarm was a leaking thermocouple fitting on the recirculation pump motor.
The leak was repaired and tested with satisfactorily results. No relief valves were operated during the scram nor were any emergency core cooling systems initiated.
Plant safety systems per?ormed satisfactorily.
In the above area, no violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Reportable Occurrences The below listed licensee event reports (LERs) were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC reporting requirements. The determination included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety significance of each event. Additional in plant reviews and discussion with plant personnel as apprcpriate were conducted for those reports indicated by an aste. risk.
LER %.
Date Event
- 259/81-17 5/22/81 Failure to perfom required surveil-lance instruction
- 259/81-19 6/1/81 C diesel generator inoperable
- 259/81-20 5/29/81 D diesel generator inoperable
- 259/S1-35 7/15/8, 8 diesel generator inoperable
- 259/81-36 7/15/81 Seismic switch inoperable 259/81-38 7/28/81 Reactor low water level switch inoperable
- 260/81-24 6/10/81 Breach of secondary containment s
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Installation of Scram Discharge Heads crossconnect for Unit 1 2.
Installation of LPCI MG set for Unit 1 3.
Troubleshooting Facility Breaker Indication 1B 480V Shutdown Board Normal Feeder - Unit 1 and-2 4.
Torus modifications for Unit 1 5.
Instrument Maintenance Instruction (IMI) - 202 - Standard Calibration of Pressure Switches In the above area, no violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Plant Physical Protection During the course of routine inspection activities, the inspectors made observations of certain plant physical protection activities. These included personnel badginng, personnel search and escort, vehicle search and escort, communications and vital area access control.
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.
8.
Surveillance Testing Observation The inspectors observed the performance of the below listed surveillance test. The inspection consisted of a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, conformance to technical specification, verification of test instrument calibration, observation on the conduct of the test, removal from service and return to service of the system and review of test data.
a.
SI 4.2.B.6 Instrumentation that controls and Initiates CSCS Equipment -
(High Drywell Pre.ssure)
In the above area, no violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Reactor Trips The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the below listed reactor trips, during this report period. The review included detemination of cause, safety significance, performance of personnel and systems, and corrective action.
The inspectors examined instrument recordings, computer printouts, operations, journal entries, scram reports and had discussions with operations, maintenance and engineering support personnel as appro-priate.
On July 28,1981, Unit 2 tripped at 3:23 a.m. from full power due to a turbine taip which was caused by a sudden pressure increase in 2A main transformers. The sudden pressure increase was believed to have been caused by a faulty bushing.
No relief valves were operated nor were any emergency core cooling systems initiated.
Plant safety systems performed satis-factorily.
On July 30,1981, Unit 2 was manually scramed at 9:56 p.m. from approx-imately 15% power.
Prior to this the turbine had tripped when attempting to
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- 260/81-27 7/10/81 Core. spray d.p. switch out of tolerance
- 260/81-32 7/23/81 Breach of secondary containment
- 260/81-33 7/23/81 Reactor low pressure switch out of tolerance
- 260/81-34 7/22/81 RHRSW pump removgd for maintenance
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260'/81-38 7/27'/81 Breach of secondary containment
- 260/81-41 8/5/81 3C RHR pump inoperable
- 296/80-60 R1 7/31/81 Accumulator level switches inoperable
- 296/81-04 R1 4/27/81 3A diesel generator tripped
- 296/81-11 3/18/81 Low pressure coolant l injection motor generator set high vibration
- 296/81-20 5/20/81 High pressure coolant injection valve was not opened as required by.
procedure
- 296/81-23 6/4/81 3C diesel generator inoperable
- 296/81-26 6/15/81 Recirculation. loop discharge valve packaging leak
- P.96/81-30 7/29/81 Turbine first. stage pressure switches out of tolerance
- 29C/81-34 8/3/81 3C RHR pump. tripped
- 296/81-37 8/14/81 H2-02 sample return valve failed -
In the above area, no violations or deviations were identified.
Also reviewed was LER 260/8137 which reported that the R factor (flux peaking ratio) was out of limits during the July'7,1981 Unit 2 reactor startup.
Excessive time was taken in bring the ratio within limits.
Findings verified that the R factor was out of limits from 9:30 p.m. on July 8, 1981 until 10:30 a.m. on July 9, 1981.
Limiting Safety System Settings 2.1 requires modification of-the APRM scram and rod block setpoints when the R ratio is less than 1.0.
Although some setpoint adjustments were made they were insufficient to bring the setpoints within limits.
T.' S. 3.1 requires specific action when the APRM minimum operable channels is not met. Since the appropriate a-tion was not taken within the time period allowed, the inspector-identified this as an apparent violation of T.S. 3.1.(260/81-26-02).
Plant management was notified of this finding on August 14, 1981.
11. Plant Operating Review Committee On August 4,1981 the inspectors attended a Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC) :aeeting to determine if the requirements of the Technical Specifi-cations and Nuclear Operational. Quality Assurance Manual (N0QAM) were being met. The inspectors findings were that administrative ' requirements were met.
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In the above area, no violations or deviations were identifie r
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12. TMI Action Items The following TMI action items were reviewed by the inspectors during this report period:
a.
II.B.4.2. A Training for Mitigating Core Damage The licensee has cuamenced this training for all licensed operators and senior reactor operators. An inspector attended this two day course
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and found the course to be satisfactory. The licensee response and the action item requires this course also to be attended by Health Physics, Chemistry and Instrument Nechanic personnel; however, the inspector i
noted that this training was not scheduled for these personnel and brought this to the attention of the Plant Superintendent. The Plant Superintendent stated that this would be brought to the attention of the Training Department. The licensees response to this matter, is that this training is now scheduled for completior by January 1, 1982.
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l This itera will be reinspected at the completion of the training prog ram.
b.
III.D.3.3.2 Inplant Radiation lionitorii o This item wo., inspected by the NRC, Emergency Planning Team curing the week of July 13 and 20 and found to be satisfactory. This item is considered closed.
c.
I. A.1.1(3) STA Trained per Category "B" A total of nine plant employees with engineering degrees have completed the formal training program outlined by the licensee in the response to the NRC, December 23, 1980, on the implementation of NUREG 0737 items.
The course manual and completed training records were examined which revealed that all personnel satisfactorily completed the 33 week course.
Currently there are six of the nine assigned at the Browns Ferry site which is adequate to carry the STA work load. This item is considered closed.
d.
I.A.2.1.4.B liodify Operator Training Program An inspector verified that operator training program for both initial-and retraining have been modified to include the material discussed in this action item. The contents of the revised training manuals confirmed that the programs had been modified. The inspector examined the training records of two operators which showed successful completion of the modified training including graded exam papers.
This item is considered closed.
Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified.
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