IR 05000259/1981016
| ML18025B658 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 07/20/1981 |
| From: | Crowley B, Herdt A, Kleinsorge W, York J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18025B652 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-81-16, 50-260-81-16, 50-296-81-16, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-2, NUDOCS 8109240591 | |
| Download: ML18025B658 (24) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.IN., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Ropor t Nos. 50-259/81-16, 50-260/81-16 and 50-296/81-16 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility Name:
Browns Ferry Docket Nos.
50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License Nos.
DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 Inspection at Browns Ferry site near Decatur, Alabama Inspectors:
oui 7 'IIII Date
.
P.
leinsor J
. York Approved by.
A.
R. Herdt, Section Chief Engineering Inspection Branch Division of Engineering and Technical Inspection SUIOARY,;
Inspection on June 22-25, 1981 Areas Inspected Da Xt 17ier Date 74O Py Date This routine, unannounced inspection involved 87 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of inservice inspection (Unit 1); observation of welding activities (Unit 1); observation of nondestructive examination (Unit 1);
IE Bulletin 79-02, Concrete Expansion Anchors (Units 1, 2 and 3);
IE Bulletin 79-14, Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems (Units 1, 2 and 3).
Results Of the five areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in two areas; three violations were found in three areas (Violation-Fai lure to Follow Welding and Inspection Procedures-Paragraph 6.d(1);
Violation-Failure to Control PT Inspection-Paragraphs 7.a(1)
and 9.c; and Violation-Failure to Inspect and Verify Spring Hanger Settings in Accordance with ASNE Section XI-Paragraph 10).
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- H. L. Abercrombie, Power Plant Superintendent
- R. T. Smith, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- T. L. Chinn, Plant Compliance Supervisor
- J.
E. Swindell, Outage Supervisor
'T.
J. Childers, Torus System Outage Director
- D. T. Nye, Manager 79-02 and 79-14 Program
- M. E. Gothard, PSI/ISI Engineer - Level III Examiner R. A. Seals, ISI Coordinator J.
T. Lewis, Mechanical Engineer-Codes and Standards Other licensee employees included construction craftsmen, QC inspection personnel, security force members, and office personnel.
Other Organizations D.
E. Harvey, Site Coordinator, Lambert-MacGill-Thomas, Inc.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- R. F. Sullivan
- J.
Chase G. Paulk
- Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 25, 1981 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
(Open) Violation 259/81-16-01:
"Failure to Inspect and Verify Spring Hanger Settings in Accordance with ASME Section XI"-
Paragraph 10.
(Open) Unresolved Item 259/81-16-02:
"Qualification of Visual Examiners for ISI" - Paragraph 8.a.
(Open) Violation 259/81-16-03:
"Failure to Control PT Inspections"
- Paragraphs 7.a(1)
and (Open) Violation 259/81-16-04:
"Failure to Follow Welding and Inspection Procedures"
- Paragraph 6.d(1).
(Open) Unresolved Item 259/81-16-05:
"Conflicting Electrode Control Requirements"
- Paragraph 6.b(1).
(Open) Inspector Followup Item 259/81-16-06:
"Non-Retrievable Welding CHTR" - Paragraph 6.b(2).
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations.
New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 6.b(1)
and 8.a.
5.
Independent Inspection Effort (Unit 3.)
The inspectors conducted a general inspection of the torus, drywell and the turbine building to observe construction progress and construction activities such as welding, material handling and control, housekeeping and storage.
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Observation of Welding Activities (Unit 1}
The inspectors observed welding work activities for torus modifications as described below to determine whether applicable code and procedure requirements were being met.
AWS Dl.l is the applicable code for the welding activities observed.
a. Welding Welds on the below listed structures were examined in process to determine work conducted in accordance with traveler; welder identification and location; welding procedure assign-ment; welding technique and sequence; materials identity; weld geometry; fit-up; temporary attachments; gas purging; preheat; electrical characteristics; shielding gas; welding equipment condition; interpass temperature; interpass cleaning; process control systems; identity of welders; qualification of inspection personnel; and. weld history records.
SRV quencher Restraint - Bay 6 SRV Restraint at Main Vent - Bay 8
b.
Welding Filler Material Control The inspectors reviewed the TVA program for control of welding materials to determine whether materials are being purchased, accepted, stored, and handled in accordance with gA procedures and applicable code requirements.
The following specific areas were examined:
Purchasing, receiving, storing, distributing and handling procedures, and material identification.
Welding material purchasing and receiving records for the following materials were reviewed for conformance with applicable procedures and code requirements; Heat, Lot, Batch
~Te Size or Control No.
7018 7018 7018 7018 7018 7018 7018 1/8" 1/8" 3/32" 5/32" 3/16" 1/8" 3/32" 9158 411E8271 43C4041 412 E8991 422E9151 TTT-009
'338 (2)
With regard to the above inspection, the inspectors noted that the welding discussed in paragraph 6a was accomplished in accordance with TVA General Specification G29C, weld rod control was accomplished in accordance with Modifica-tion/Additions Instruction, MAI 21 "Control of Torus Modification Activities", dated April 15, 1981, and the applicable code for welding was AWS Dl.1.
The inspectors further noted that MAI 21 does not specify how, type 7018 electrodes, are to be controlled when the electrodes are returned within four hours after issue.
In addition the inspectors noted that there appeared to be a conflict in the control req'uirements for type 7018 electrodes returned more than four hours after issue, between AWS Dl. 1, G29C, G29M, and MAI 21.
The licensee indicated that they would look further into the matter.
The above will be identified as unresolved item 259/81-16-05:
"Conflicting Electrode Control Requirements".
With regard to the above inspection, the inspectors noted that the receiving records and the certified material test reports (CMTR) for type 7018 electrodes with control numbers TTT-009 and 9338, were not retrievable at the time of this inspection.
The licensee indicated that they would look into the matter.
The above will be inspe'ctor follow-up item no. 259/81-16-06:
"Non Retriev-able Welding CMTR".
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c.
Welder Qualification The inspectors reviewed the TVA program for qualifications of
~ welders and welding operators for compliance with QA procedures and ASME Code requirements.
The applicable code for welder, qualification is ASME B&PV Code Section IX.
The following welder qualification status records and
"Records of Performance Qualification Test" were reviewed relative to the welds listed in paragraph 6a.
Welder S mbol 202 BFO-177 8FO-151 BFO-46 d.
Visual Inspection of Welds The inspectors visually examined completed welds as described below to determine whether applicable code and procedure requirements were being met.
Approximately 25 welds on the below listed structures were examined relative to the following:
location, length, size and shape; weld-surface finish and appearance, transitions between different wall thickness; weld reinforcement height and appearance; joint configurations on permanent attachments and structural supports; removal of temporary attachment, arc strikes and weld spatter; finish-grinding or machining of weld surface, surface finish and absence of wall thinning; surface defects, cracks, laps, lack of penetration, lack of fusion, porosity, slag, oxide film and undercut exceeding prescribed limits:
Catwalk Knee Braces at Ring Girders 7 and
SRV Quencher Restraints-Box Beams Bay 6 (1)
With regard to the above inspection, the inspectors, on June 24, -1981, accompanied by a representative of the licensee noted the following:
(a)
Numerous arc strikes (b)
Large amounts of weld spatter (c)
Several welds with adhering slag (d)
The reinforcing fillet on a groove weld was approximately 1/16-inch under size
TVA Process Specification 1.C. 1.2(b), dated February 1, 1980, paragraph 8.9 and 15. 1 require welders to remove arc strikes and slag from welds and adjacent base material.
TVA Process Specification 3.M.5. 1(d), dated March 21, 1979, paragraph B.1 requires welding inspectors, to assure that all welds and adjacent base'aterial are free of arc strikes, weld spatter and slag.
Paragraph B.O of 3.M.5. 1(d}, requires welding inspectors to inspect all applicable welds for compliance to drawing'weld size requirements.
Therefore welders and welding inspectors were not following the requirements of drawings and procedures.
Failure to follow procedure for activities affecting, quality is violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V.
This violation will be
" identified as 259/81-16-04:
"Failure to Follow Welding and Inspection Procedures".
Within the areas examined no violations or deviations were identified except as described in paragraph 6.d(1).
7.
Observation of Nondestructive Examination (Unit 1}
The inspectors observed nondestructive examination work activities for torus modifications as described below to determine whether applicable code and procedure requirements were being met.
a ~
Liquid Penetrant Examination In-process l,iquid penetrant examination was observed on four vent downcomer pipe tiebar removal sites in bay 8; The above'examinations were compared'with the applicable procedure in the following areas:
Use of specified method Penetrant materials identified Penetrant materials analyzed for sulfur Penetrant materials analyzed for total halogens Acceptable pre-examination surface Drying time Method of penetrant application Surface temperature Solvert removal Dry surface prior to developing Type of developing Examination technique Evaluation technique Reporting results Requalificati'on conducted when required
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(1)
With regard to the above inspection, the inspectors, on June 24, 1981, noted a smeared surface residue visable on one removal site after cleaning and prior to the application of penetrant.
The examination would have continued without the removal of the residue had the NRC inspectors not intervened.
The above is contrary to TVA Procedure NPT-NC-1 Revision 1,
paragraph 4.2 which requires masking materials be removed prior to penetrant application.
Therefore the liquid penetrant examine did not follow the precleaning require-ments of the inspection procedure.
The preceeding matter indicates inadeq'uate measures to control special processes and is an example of violation 259/81-16-03, discussed further in paragraph 9.c.
8.
Inservice Inspection - Review of Procedure (Unit 1)
f The inspectors reviewed the ISI procedures indicated below to determine whether the procedure were consistent with regulatory requirements.
The applicable code for "Cycle 2" inspections in the ASME Boiler and Pressure,Section XI with the 1974 Edition, S75 Addenda being used for extent of inspection and 1977 Edition, S78 Addenda being used for technique, and evaluation.
Some "catch-up" inspections from "Cycle 1" are being performed during the current outage.
The applicable edition of Section XI for the "Cycle 1" inspections is the 1971 edition, S71 addenda.
a.
The following procedures were reviewed in the areas of procedure approval and qualification of NDE personnel:
N-VT-1, Rev.
2, "Visual Examinationof Nuclear Power Plant Components" N-VT-4, Rev..1,
"Visual Examination of Hangers, Supports and Restraints" N-UT-2, Rev.
3, Ultrasonic Examination of Pressure Vessel Nozzle Forging Inner Radii" N-UT-1, Rev. 4, "Ultrasonic Examination of Nuclear Coolant System Piping" N-PT-1, Rev. 3, "Liquid Penetrant Examination Using the Color Contrast Solvent Removable Method" During this review, the inspectors noted that visual inspection procedures required that the examiners for visual inspection be qualified only for liquid penetrant (PT) or magnetic p'article (MT) inspection methods.
Paragraph IWA-2300(b) of the 1974 edition of Section XI requires that,'For.nondestructive I
examination methods not covered by SNT-TC-1A documents, personnel shall be qualified by the owner or his agent to comparable levels of competency by subjection to comparable examinations on the particular method involved."
TVA Division procedure N75C01, "qualification and Certification Program for Nondestructive Examination Personnel";
has been in use since April 27, 1981 and requires qualification of visual examiners to visual inspection requirements.
However, discussions with the licensee indicate that visual examiners presently qualified (i.e.,
qualified based on PT or HT qualification) will not be requalified in accordance with procedure N75C03..
The inspector pointed out that this philosophy would allow visual examiner to perform inspections from April 27, 1981 until their next requalification without meeting the requirements of paragraph IWA-2300(b) of Section XI.
The licensee agreed to re-evaluate this matter.
This is identified as unresolved item number 259/81-3.6-02, gualification of visual examiners for ISI.
b.
In addition to the review of paragraph a.
above, procedure N-UT-1 was reviewed for technical content relative to:
type of apparatus, extent of coverage including beam angles and scanning technique, calibration requirements, search units, DAC curves, reference level for monitoring discontinuities, method for demonstrating penetration, levels for evaluation and recording indications, and acceptance standards.
C.
In addition to the review of paragraph a.
above, procedure N-PT-1 was reviewed for technical content relative to:
method consistent with ASME Code, specification of brand names of penetrant materials, specification of limits for sulfur and total halogen for penetrant materials, pre-examination surface preparation, minimum drying time following surface cleaning, method of penetrant application and penetration time, temperature requirements, solvent removal, method of surface drying, type of developer and method of application, examination technique, technique for evaluation and acceptance standards.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Inservice Inspection - Observation of Work and Work Activities (unit 1)
The inspectors observed the ISI activities described below to determine whether these activities were being performed in accord-ance with regulatory requirements and licensee procedures.
See paragraph 8.
above for the applicable code.
a.
Personnel qualification records for 2 level II PT examiners, 1 level II UT examiner, and 1 level I UT examiner were reviewe In-process ultrasonic (UT) inspection including calibration was observed for welds KFW-1-15, GFW-1-12 and GFW-1-9 on drawing CHM-1080.
The inspection was compared with applicable procedures in the following areas:
(1)
Availability of and compliance with approved NDE procedures (2)
Use of knowledgeable NDE personnel (3)
Use of NDE personnel qualified to the proper level 4)
Recording of inspection results (5)
Type of apparatus used (6)
Extent of coverage of weldment (7)
Calibration requirements 8)
Search Units (9)
Beam Angles (10)
DAC Curves (11)
Reference level for monitoring discontinuities (12)
Method for demonstration penetration (13)
Limits for evaluating and recording indications (14)
Recording significant indications (15)
Acceptance limits In-process PT inspection was observed for welds HS-1-H6, HS-1-H5 and HS-1-H4 on drawing CHM-2039C.
The inspection was compared with applicable procedures in the following areas:
(1)
Availability of and compliance with approved NDE procedures (2)
Use of knowledgeable NDE personnel, (3)
Use of NDE personnel qualified to the proper level (4)
Recording of inspection results (5)
Method consistent with procedure (6)
Penetrant materials identified and consistent with ASME Code (7)* Certification of Sulfur and Halogen content for penetrant materials (8)
Surface preparation (9)
Drying time following surface cleaning (10)
Penetrant application and penetration time (11)
Examination surface temperature (12). Penetrant removal (13)
Drying of surface prior to developing 14)
Developer type, application, and time interval after penetrant removal (15)
Time interval between developer application and evaluation (16)
Evaluation technique (17)
Reporting examination results During observation of PT inspection of the above welds, the inspectors questioned the level II examiner for weld HS-1-H6 relative to the procedure acceptance standards'and found that
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the examiner was not adequately famili.ar with acceptance standards, did not have a copy of the inspection procedure at the work site, and did not have any way to measure PT indica-tions to determine their acceptance/rejection.
In addition, the examiner accepted the weld which contained a linear indica-tion in excess of the procedure acceptance standards.
A re-PT of the indication area was witnessed by the licensee Level III examiner who agreed that the indication did not meet procedure acceptance standards.
This problem indicates that the Level II examiner was not properly trained and equipped to perform PT inspections.
The above conbined with the example discussed in paragraph 7.a(1) indicates that the licensee does not have adequate measures for the control of special processes.
Failure to have adequate measures to control special processes including NDE is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion IX.
This violation is identified as item number 259/81-16-03, Failure to,control PT inspections.
Mithin the areas inspected, no violations, except as noted in paragraph c., or deviations were identified.
10.
Inservice Inspection - Data Review and Evaluation (Unit 1)
The inspectors reviewed the ISI records described below to determine whether these records reflected inspections in accordance with regulatory requirements.
See paragraph 8 above for the applicable code.
Inspection reports for Variable Spring pipe hanger/supports CS-1-H4, CS-l-HS, CS-1-H2, CS-1-H1, RHR-1-H6 and RHR-1-H2 were reviewed.
This review revealed that the inspection was performed under procedure N-VT-1 in lieu of the program required procedure N-VT-4.
ASNE,Section XI requires that support settings for constant and variable spring type hangers, snubbers, and shock absorbers be inspected and verified.
Procedure N-VT-1'does not contain the requirement to verify spring settings for constant and variable spring type hanger and supports.
Therefore, these settings were not verified for the hangers and supports inspected during the current outage.
Although the required procedure, N-VT-4, does require inspection of spring
.settings, discus'sions with licensee personnel responsible for the inspection revealed that for hangers and supports inspected during past outages, the spring settings had been recorded but the recorded settings had not been verified to be within drawing design require-ments.
This failure to inspect and verify spring settings for constant and variable spring type hanger, snubbers; and shock absorbers in accordance with ASHE Section XI is in violation of 10 CFR 50.55a(g}(4$.
This violation is identified as number 259/81-16-01, Failure to inspect and verify spring hanger settings'. in accordance with ASNE Section X Within the areas inspected, no violations, except as noted, or deviations were identified.
(Open)
IE Bulletin 79-02, Concrete Expansion Anchors (Units 1,
and 3)
In all of the three units, each bolt in all of the support plates of the safety related components is removed and the concrete anchorage is inspected to IEB 79-02 criteria.
The inspection part of the program is almost complete."
The following tables shows the number of hangers with concrete anchors yet to be inspected.
Hangers To Be= Inspected Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3
37
Hechanical Maintenance Instruction 5.1-A "Inspection Program for Verifying Correct Installation of Self-Drilling Type Concrete Anchors" was reviewed.
The following table gives a summary of inspection and design evaluations:
Unit No. of No. of guestion-No.
Anchors Anchors able Tested Rejected "'ood Percent of Anchors Re 'ected.'., * uestion'able
,
Good
2419
141
2713
74
3934
148 2241 2604 3746 1.53 5.83 l.29 2.73 1;02 3.76 92,64 95,98 95,22 12.
- guestionable means that the anchors have not been determined to be either acceptable or rejectable.
The categorization of the reasons for rejection or questionable of the concrete anchors by numbers or percentages has not yet been made but will be included in the final report.
lJithin the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
(Open)
IE Bulletin 79-14, Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems (Units 1, 2 and'3)
In a report dated June 18, 1981 TYA has stated that all piping and hanger inspections required by IEB 79-14 will be completed by December 31, 1981.
The expected completion-dates are listed in the following table:
Unit Accessible Inaccessible 10/01/81 12/31/81 08/01/81 End of current outage Complete Complete
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A.
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The licensee has stated that the evaluation of the inspection data for potential safety problems will be completed almost concurrently'ith the inspection.
The significant safety problems will be corrected.
This is considered to be Phase I of the project (which has three phases).
The inspectors requested and received a detailed anticipated comple-tion date on a system by system basis for the three units.
The monthly progress reports that have been submitted did not reflect the reinspections and modifications.
The data has not been analyzed to determine if there were any trends in the inspection results, but the trends will be reflected in the final report for the Bulletin.
A discussion with the licensee revealed that, the program will involve a reanalysis of all the systems covered by IEB 79-14.
The procedure used for the inspection to satisfy the requirements of the bulletin, Hechanical Maintenance 99, "Instructions f'r the Implementation of.NRC IE Bulletin 79-14," was reviewed.
Inspection of hanger numbers H-68, H-69, H-.,70, H-73. and H-71A in the Core Spray System on Unit No.
3 was observed.
A configuration inspection on the Standby Liquid Control System of Unit 2 utilizing drawings 47W462-1 and -2 was witnessed.
A reinspection return package (requesting additional information) for the Radwaste Sump Pump Discharge System for Unit 1 was examined.
The organization performing the. bulletin inspection is in the Browns Ferry Outage Group and consists of 35 people.
The group has a manager, two engineers, two engineering aides and 31 inspectors.
The 31 inspectors consists of 21 TVA steamfitter sketchmen and
Bulter Services personnel (contract personnel).
At the time of the inspection four of the Bulter. Services personnel had been on site for only one week.
The personnel in this inspection group are divided such that two ten hour shifts are worked a day.
The work schedule is ten days on and two days off.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie a fl
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