IR 05000259/1981013
| ML18025B636 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 07/13/1981 |
| From: | Girard E, Herdt A, Zajac L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18025B630 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-81-13, 50-260-81-13, 50-296-81-13, NUDOCS 8109090446 | |
| Download: ML18025B636 (32) | |
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UNITED STATES'UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION. II 101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-259/81-13, 50-260/81-13 and 50-296/81-13 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga,.
TN 37401.
Facility Name:*
Browns Ferry 1, 2, and
Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296'icense Nos. DPR-33, DPR-. 52, and DPR-68 Date" Signed
~/3 cF/
Inspection at Browns Ferry site, near Decatur, AL. and the. Federal Records Center in Atlanta, GA j
~ 4 Inspectors: 8 ~.
7 y cp/
E. H. Gir L.
anzac.
ate Signed Approved. by:
A. R. Herdt, Section Chief Engineering Inspection Branch.
E'ngineering and Technical Inspection Division 7i3 gg at :Signed SUMMARY Inspection on May 18-22, and June 9-10, 1981.
Areas Inspected ',
k This routine,.
announced inspection involved 90 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of licensee action on previous inspecti'on findings (Unit 2),. IE Bulletins (Units 1, 2',
and; 3), implementation of NUREG'eport requi'rements (Units 1, 2, and 3), corrosion of carbon steel piping (Units 1, 2,, and 3), welding (Units 1, 2,
ahd 3)., nondestructive examination-(Units 1, 2, and 3),
and inservice inspection program and records review (Units 1, 2, and 3).
Bi0909044b 8i083i PDR ADOCK 05000259
', 9 PDR
Of the. seven areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in five.
areas; two violations were found in three areas (Violation - Inadequate examina-tion instructions, paragraph 8; Violation Oocument control; paragraph 9;
and one deviation in one area (Oeviation The quality of radiographic films for contaminment penetration welds are in nonconformance'ith ASME Code requirements, paragraph 5.(c)(2))..
REPORT DETAILS Persons,-Contacted Licensee:Employees WJ WJ 4'g.
- R" 9'M.
J; T'.
J.
S; ARE
AP-'.
Chi'nn, Compliance Supervisor L. Harness, Assistant Plant Superintendent (Maintenance)
R. Bynum, Assistant. Plant Superintendent (Operations)
A. Roberts, Compliance Staff T; Smith, gA Staff H. Miller, Outage Staff E. Gothard, PSI'/ISI Engineer=
E. Swindell'; Outage-Supervisor.
J. Childers; Torus'ystem Outage. Director Fox,,'Metallurgial Engineer, Metallurgy and Standards Group Jones.,
Mechanical Ehgineer, Stationary Equipment Group Balch,. Management Services. Staff.
Crabb,. Outage Staff Other licensee; employees, contacted: included five engineers, three techni-cians.and.three.
craftsmen.
NRC Resident'nspectors
"R'. F. Sull'ivan-.
"J,.
Chase.'.
- Attended.exit. interview at.l3rowns Ferry site
""Attended, exit. interview in Atlanta.,
GA.
I Exit. Interview
/
The, inspectionscope.
and. findings were summarized on. May 22,, 1981. for-the i'nspection" conducted at the: siteand'on. June 10',
1981';-- for,. the inspection conducted,; at; the. Federal Records;. Center* with. those persons: indicated.-in paragraph 1, above.
The following specific items. were discussed:
(Open) Yiolation 259;. 260;: 296/81-13-01:
"Inadequate examination instruc-tions." - paragraphs 8.c and d'.
(Open) VioTation 259,. 260, 296/81-, 13-02:
"Document control" paragraph.9.
(Open) Inspector Followup.- Item~ 259, 260, 296/81.-13-03:
"Liquid penetrant procedures,do not;provide complete. instructions" - paragraph 9.a.
(Open)
Inspector Fol 1owup Item 259, 260, 296/81-13-04:
"Magnetic particle procedure does not provide complete instructions" paragraph 9.b.
(Open) Inspector Followup Item 259, 260, 296/81-13-05:
"Jet pump hold down assembly replacement" paragraph S.a.
(Open) Inspector Followup Item 259/81-13-17:
"Inservice inspection program does not appear to meet minimum requirements of Section XI of ASME Code" paragraph 10.a.(3)
~
(Open) Unresolved Item 259/81-13-18:
"Base. metal adjacent to support welds does not appear to have, been adequately examined" - paragraph 10.a..(5).
(Open)
Unresolved Item 259/81;13-14:
"Possible unacceptable defect in weld" paragraph 9.c. (1).
(Open)
Unresolved.
Item 259/81-13-15:
"Possible unacceptable base metal defect" paragraph 9.c.(2)
(Open) Unresolved Item 259/81-13.-.16:
"High-stress die stamping used on main steam, pipe assemblies" paragraph 9.c.(3).
,r (Open) Unresolved.
Item.= 259/81'-13-11=
"Radiographic film identification not legible." paragraph 9..c.(4)
(Open)
UnresoTved, Item>> 259/81-13-12:
"Visual'. examination during ISI of reactor> vessel cladding was not compared with PSI results" paragraph
~ 10;b;(1).
(Open)
Unresol ved. Item-. 259/81-13.-13:,
"Threaded holes in reactor vessel flange not, examined!'
paragraph 10.a.(4-).
(Open)
Inspector Fol 1 owup Item 259,,
260, 296/81-13-06:
"NUREG 0313" paragraph 6'.a.
~ ~
(Open)
Inspector.
Fol 1 owup I'tern 259, 260, 296/81-13-OT:
paragraph 6.b.
(Open)
Inspector Fo 1'1 owup Item. 259, 260',
296/81-.13-08:
cati on s" paragraph 6.c.'NUREG 0619"
"Torus modifi-(Open) Inspector Followup Item 259, 260, 296/81.-13-09:
"Corrosion in carbon steel piping" paragraph: 7.
(Open)
Unresolved.
Item 259, 260, 296/81-13-10:
"ISI reports" paragraph 10.b.2.
(Open) Inspector Followup Item 259, 260, 296'/81-13-19,
"Supplemental infor-mation to be. provided to NRC." -. Paragraph 5.(c)(1).
3.
(Open) Deviation 259, 260, 296/81-13-20,
"The quality of radiographic films for containment.
penetration welds are in nonconformance with ASME Code
.
requirements" - paragraph 5.(c)(2).
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a 0 (Closed)
Violation 260/80-34-01:
Documentati on and di sposi tion of nonconfqrming condition.
TVA's letter of response dated February 15, 1981. has been reviewed and determined acceptable by Region II.
The inspector held discussions with the Quality Assurance (QA) Supervisor and reviewed. Corrective Action Report 81-30 OT.
The inspector is satisfied that TVA has. determined the extent of the violation and taken the necessary corrective actions.
~
b.
(Closed) Violation 260/80-34-02.:
Welding wire control s.
TVA'
letters of response dated February 18 and March 30, 1981 have been reviewed and determined acceptable by Region II.
The inspector held discussions with. the QA Supervisor regarding this. item and verified changes to TVA's'requirements for welding wire control in their instruction MAI-12.
(3/10/81 revision).
Proper control of weld. wire was"observed at issue stations at the outage tool room and the fabrication shop.
The.
inspector is satisfied that TVA has-determined the exte'nt of the violation and taken the necessary corrective actions.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine-whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or devia-tions.
New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 10.a, 9.c:,, and-10.b.
Status of I'nspection and Enforcement Bulletins (IEB's) (Units 1, 2, and 3)
a (Open)
IEB 80-BU-07 with Supplement No.
1:
BWR jet pump assembly failure.
The inspector observed portions of videotapes of the visual examinations of the Unit 1 (current outage)
and Unit 3 (1980 outage)
jet pump assemblies for compliance with IEB 80-07.
The visual exami-nation and ultrasonic, examination records for Unit 2, and the proce-dures for the examinations were examined in a previous inspection as described in IE Report No. 260/80-28.
The inspector was informed that TVA plans to replace the jet pump beam holddown assemblies on all three units using improved material s-type 316L stainless steel for the bolting and specially heat treated inconel for the beam.
The li.censee stated that they may not be able to begin this change until the next Unit 2 outage.
This Bulletin will remain open pending Region II's examination of TVA's compliance with Bulletin items B.2 and B.4 in a
subsequent. inspectio ~
~
TVA's work in replacement of jet pump beam holddown assembl.ies is being identified'nspector Followup Item 259,. 260, 296/81-13-05,
"Jet Pump Holddown Assembly Replacement".
(Open)
IEB 80-BU-13:
Cracking in core spray spargers.
The inspector observed. portions of videotapes of Unit 1 (current outage)
and Unit 3 (1980 outage)
visual examinations which'ere performed by TVA in accordance with the requirements of the Bulletin..
This Bulletin requires performance of the visual'examination each refueling outage.
This Bull'etin will re~ain open and will be examined. again in subsequent.
Region II inspections for future refueling outages.
(Open)
'IEB 80-BU-08:
Exami'nation of Containment Liner Penetration Welds'Units, 1, 2. and. 3)
IE Bulletin No..
80-08 was forwarded on April 7',
1980, and requested 1'icensee to determine if their facility contained.the'flued head. design.
'or.-penetration connections, or other designs: with containment..boundary.
butt. welds
.between the penetration sleeve and process piping as illus-
, trated in Figure NE 1120-1, Winter 1975 addenda to the 1974 and later editions'f the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. If the. 1'icen-see's facility. does contain this. design then the licensee was requested to determine if welds were made with a. backing ring and whether or not volumetric examination was conducted'. by radiography.
The Bul'letin indicates that. w'eld joints with a. backing ring that. have, not; been radiographed; are of particular concern as. they are poten-t.ial ly, defecti ve; In response-.
to. the, Bulletin, Tennessee Valley Authority forwarded a
letter dated July 7, 1980, which stated, that the fl.ued head, design was u'sed with a butt weld'.without a backing ring.
The-letter further stated that. some..'f the penetration assemblies were fabricated and welded; by the:. vendor (Tube Turns)
and the others were fabricated by the vendor.- but shi'pped. disassembled; to Browns Ferry site where the, welding
.
was performed.
The: joints in question were radiographed by Tube Turns.
for. those. welded by the. vendor; and by Browns Ferry for those welded on.
the: site.
D'uring. the.- visit., the,.inspector requested the. radiographs.
and, records for, a random-selection. of the. penetration welds..
However,
.none. were available. on the site:
Tube Turns has the records for the welds they made and the records for the welds made by Browns Ferry are. stored in the Federal Record Center in Atl'anta, Georgia.
The licensee'etrieved.
the radiographic records, for the. welds listed below,'rom the Federal=
Record, C'enter. on'une 9,
1981, and'presented-them to the inspector in Atlanta, Georgia for review., Records in the possession of Tube Turns.
will be. reviewed at a later dat ~
~
Weld Indent GMS-1"36 GMS-1-38 GFW-1 36 GMS"2 42 GFW-2-38'I-2-511A GMS-3-36 GFW.-38 TSBL-3-2 Penetration Indent X-7A X-7B X-9A X-7D X"9B X"41 X-7A
"X"9B X-42
~Sstem Main Steam Main Steam Feedwater Main Steam Feedwater Recirc.
Sample Main Steam Feedwater Standby Liquid Control Unit No.
1
2
2.
.3
3 The applicable-code: for the above welds is identified in the FSAR as ASME Section III,, Class-B(1965'dition) which refers to ASME Section VII'orradiographic. examination requirements.
The. inspector reviewed the, radiographs:
and noted the following dis-crepancies. with respect.
to the-ASME C'ode (Section VIII, paragraph UW-51) requirements:
Tennessee Valley Authority letter dated July 7, 1980, in response:
.
to the Bul'1'e'tin, stated that,no backing rings were utilized on the subject. joints... -However,. review of the radiographs shows: tha<
backing rings were utilized for all of the above listed joints except for TI-2-51'1A and.
TSBL-, 3-2.
In discussion with the
.licensee-the inspector was advised that they (Browns Ferry)
had not. implied,. in their correspondence to TYA'hatthnooga, that no backing rings were utilized.
The backing ring statement is apparently a misunderstanding within the TVA organization.
The licensee agreed to investigate-and resolve this problem and to provide.
a.
suppl,cmental response to the NRC.
This will be Inspector Fol 1 owup Item.- 259, 260, 296/81-13.-19,
"Supplemental information to be provided to" NRC".
(2)-
The radiographs of. the subject welds are of poor to unacceptable quality, and as such are'n noncompliance with ASME, Code require-ments.
Examp.l.es are:
GMS-1-38, the: film density of the weld area. is not within the density range of minus 15 or plus 30% of the penetrameter film density.
GFW-1-36, (a)
film numbers (0-2) are in the. weld area..
(b)
films (0-2), (2-4),, (4-6), (16-18) are overexposed in the. weld area to be evaluate ~ ~
(c)
~ the film density of the penetrameter is unaccept-able (=-same comment as for GMS-1-38).
GMS-1-36, (a)
the film (0-2) is underexposed in the weld area. to be evaluated.
(b)
same comment as for GMS-1-38.
(c)
one-half of, the backing ring width is burned away at.. film markers (20-1).
GMS-2-42, (a)
film (20-22) 'is overexposed, in the weld area to be evaluated.
(b).
the required. penetrameter hole is not discernable on films (18-20) and (16-18)
(c)
same comment as for GMS-1-38.
GFW;2.-38,. (a)
the= penetrameter is in the. weld. area.
on films (A-.C),. (G-.I),. (I;J) and.,(K-M).
(b)'il'm markers (g-S) are in the weld area.
(c)
same comment. as for GMS-1-.38,.,
GMS;-3.-26,, (a)
the-required penetrameter hole.is not di'scernible on films.(A-B) and (C-D)..
(b)
same comment;as for GMS-1-38.-
Not. only are the: above discrepancies.
in nonconformance with ASME-Code: requirements.
committed to in the Browns Ferry FSAR, 'but it, is questionable if'ome of'he films are even suitable for. evalu-ating the weld', quality,.
This is Deviation-259, 260, 296/81-1'3-20,,
"The: quality of,radiographic. films for containment pene-tration;welds are.i.n nonconformance. with ASME.Code requirements".
Except for the deviation noted above, no violations or deviati'ons
'ere ident>.fled.
6.
Implementation. of-NUREG.Report Requirements (Units. 1, 2, and 3)
a.
NUREG. 0313 Rev.,
1", Technical Report on Material Selection'nd Proces-sing. Guidelines for BWR Pressure Boundary Piping
b.
The-inspector questioned TVA personnel as to the steps they had. taken with regard, to implementation of requirements of this NUREG.. as
.
requested by-the NRC in their February. 26, 1981 letter=to Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) licensees.
The NRC,'etter had asked for a response by July 1, 1981"proposing a schedule to accomplish the requested, actions or a. description, schedule and justification for alternative. actions to accomplish the indicated objectives.
The inspector was informed that TVA had not completed formulation of their position on this item.
TVA's-actions with respect to this area is being identified as Inspector.
Fol lowup Item 259, 260, 296/81-13-06,
"NUREG 0313".
NUREG 0619, BWR Feedwater Nozzle and Control Rod Drive Return Line Nozzle Cracking:
In discussions with the'icensee, the inspector was informed that the.
Unit 1 feedwater spargers, were being replaced, to satisfy NUREG 0619 requirements, in accordance with TVA's letter of'esponse to the NRC dated. January 23-,
1981.
-The licensee stated that feedwater sparger changes required. for Unit-2 and Unit. 3 had'lready been
.completed.
Work and. examinations, with regard,.to the feedwater spargers and other NUREG. 0619 'areas are identified. as. Inspector Followup. Item 259, 260,,
296/81-1'3-07;,
"NUREG 0619" c.
NUREG 0661, Safety, Evaluation Report-: Mark, 1. Containment.
Long-Term Program'
The subject NURgG report describes:
proposed analyses and, the possible'eed.
for desig'n.changes or modificati,ons to increase the margin of safety for the. ccintainment structures of BWR's with 'the Mark 1 contain-ment (such as those at; Browns Ferry).,
jVA has undertaken to perform the:. analyses; and; changes for the Browns Ferry units.
The inspector discussed.'he-.
planned. changes; with TVA personnel and observed. partial-ly complete welds for, change; work. being performed.
on the, Unit. 1 torus structure.
The work, was in an. early, stage.
and none.-of the. welds had received a final'C inspection.,
TVA's work, on the..containment modifi-cations-,. which. are principally to the contai'nment torus, is being; identified. as Inspector. Fol'lowup Item 259',, 260, 296/81-13-08,
"Torus Modifications": 'etails of torus modification'welding work observed, by-the: inspector during, this. inspection are described. in paragraph '8.b.(1.)
. and (2)..
Within'the areas examined',
no violations or deviations were identified.
Corrosion. of Carbon Steel Piping (Units 1, 2 and 3)
During discussions; with; TVA personnel, the NRC; inspector.
was informed that TVA planned an examination. of several-carbon steel.
Emergency.
Equipment.
Cooling Water (EECW) system lines to view the'xtent and form of corrosion
product buildup inside the piping.
The= examination is to be= performed with a boroscope when smal.l openings are cut in the-lines for attachment of hypochlorite injection piping.
As described in IE Report 390, 391/81-02, corrosion product bui.ldups have been identified as a problem at several TVA plants including Browns Ferry.
The results of the EECW piping examination and their evaluation are identified Inspector Followup Item 259, 260, 296/81.-13-09,
"Corrosion in Carbon Steel Piping".
8.
Welding (Units 1, 2, and. 3)
The NRC inspectors examined welding related activities associated with the current modifications being undertaken on safety related, systems to verify compliance with NRC regulations and licensee commitments.
Code commitments identified. for the current safety related modifications examined included ASM'ection III (Vent Header Restraints),
AWS'1.1 (Box Beam Restraints),
and USAS B31.1. (Hypochlorite-Injection Piping).
Specific. areas examined by the inspectors were as follows:
a.
Welding Material, Controls The-following licensee.
procedural documents, were examined. for proper.
controls for the. purchase,. receipt and storage of welding materials (1)
MAL 15. (9/9/80),. Receiving, Inspection, Storage and Withdrawal of ECN Material b.
(2)
DPM 76A10 (T/25'/79)
Purchase Specificati'ons for Critical Stock Metal Materials, Wire and Cable Used Inside the. Containment, Welding Materials, Valve Parts and Pump Parts The. inspector aTso: traced the. weld material for-the. Vent Header'Rein-forcement and'ypochlo'rite Injection and Piping welds identified in b.
below,. from the work records back to the receiving documentation to verify proper traceability and:acceptance records.
Observation of Wel'ds and'Welding Documentation The inspectors observed the following in-progress and completed welds for proper records and for weld quality consistent with the specified wel'ding procedure requirements:
(1)
Vent Header Restraint Welds (In-Progress)
l-VHR-20-9, 28-9, 29-9 and 30-9 using welding. procedure SN 11B9-B (2)
Box Beam Restraint. Welds (In-Progress)
BBS-l, and 2; and BB-1,3 and 33 using welding procedure SM-P-1
~ ~
(3)
EECW system hypochlorite injection piping welds (completed)
through
AEECW, BEECW and FEECW (three welds on each of-seven spool pieces)
using welding procedure GT 4343-0-1 Note:
The welds in (1)
and (2)
above are for Unit 1 only, while the welds in (3) are. for Units 1, 2 and 3.
Visual and Penetrant Examination of Wel'ds The inspector observed the hypochlorite injection piping welds described in (3) above for proper visual and penetrant examinations.
In observing penetrant.
examination of welds lA through 7A EECW, which were the outside diameter welds attaching slip-on flanges to the piping, the inspector noted that the pipe end to flange inside diameter welds on the other side of the flanges were not being penetrant exam-ined.
The work instructions for examination of the piping (described in work plan 8476 R2) did not; specify penetrant examination of the pipe end. to. flange. welds.
The procedural requirements for this piping, given in'rocedure BF-45 R6, require pipe end to flange weld penetrant examination.
The omission of this requirement from the, instructions is considered noncompliance with of Criterion V of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, in= that the procedure (BF-45) requirement was not.properly specified in the instructions and the examination was not completed for subject pipe end, to flange welds.
This noncompliance is identified Violation 259, 260; 296/81-13-01,
"Inadequate Examination Instructions".
The inspec-tor. rioted that cracki'ng had occurred at the A EECW. weld on an eighth spool piece,, emphasizing. the.- importance of the penetrant examination.
Visual Examination Procedures The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures for visual examination of welds.
These procedures are-3.M.5. 1(d) (for ASME Section III. and USAS B31..1. codes);
and 3.C.5'.2(b)
(for the.
AWS 01.1 code).
The inspector
=noted that; 3.C.5.2(b)
failed to specify requirements.
for-inspection of transition in wel'ds between members of different thick-ness.
This appears to be another example of'the violation described in c above in that the omission of the, transitioniinspection from the isntructions given in the procedure is in considered noncompliance with the requirements of Criterion V of 10 CFR'50 Appendix B.
Welding Procedure and Welder Performance gualification Records.
The inspector reviewed the welding procedure qualification records for the procedures for the welds described in b.(1), (2) and (3) above; and the qualifications-of the wel'der s who performed the welds listed in b. (1). and (3).
The qualifications were reviewed for compliance with~
code and licensee requirement e
~ ~
~
~
Mithin the-areas examined no violations or deviations were identified, except for the. violation described in c and d above.
'9.
Nondestructive Examination (NDE) (Units 1.,
2 and 3)
a.,
Liquid Penetrant. Examination The inspectors observed liquid penetrant examination of 10 feet of control rod drive instrumentation one-inch stainless steel pipe to determine whether the examination was performed in accordance with the applicable ASME Code and licensee procedures.
The inspectors also reviewed the. licensee's written liquid penetrant procedures and the examiner's qualification:records.
The.following discrepancies were.
noted:
(1)
Procedure.
N-PT-1. prohibits the.
use= of power wire brushing on surfaces.to be penetrant tested,. but. procedures N-PT-2, N-PT-3 and HF-Pl=1 do not prohibit: the use of power wire brushing.
Since any one of-these procedures may be used;, they should'll have the same.
restricti'ons.
The. licensee agreed to revise the penetrant proce.-
,dures accordingly..
(2)
None. of the. penetrant procedures, identified above, specify the amount of. base metal adjacent, to welds that is required to be examined.
At least one of'hese procedures is also used for" inservice: inspection, wherein. different amounts of base metal are.
required'o be-penetrant tested.
The licensee agreed to revise the procedures to specify the amount of base metal to be. examined.
This will be. carried as Inspector Followup Item 259, 260, 296/
81.-13;03 "Li,quid Penetrant.
Procedures Do Not. Provide Complete Instructions".
b.
Magnetic Particle Examination The inspector reviewed the magneti.c, particle.(MT) procedure to deter-mine if it was; in compliance with ASME Code requirements.
No exami'na-tions were observed, since none were performed'uring the visit..
MT procedure N-MT-1, Rev.
does-not. specify the amount of lighting required for adequate examination of the test surface.
The licensee agreed-to revise the MT procedure to provide this information. This will be carried as Inspector Followup Item 259, 260, 296/81-13-04,
"Magnetic particle procedure does not provide: complete. instructions".
C.
Radiographic. Examination The ihspector reviewed radiographic procedure N-RT-1, Rev.
0 and the radiographic films for eleven Unit. 1 piping weld joints to determine-if
.'he requirements of ASME Code and licensee procedures were met.
The
~ r I
f
eleven weld joints for which the film were reviewed were in 10 inch carbon steel main steam relief tail pipes and were identified TP-1-A through -H, and -J through -L.
The following discrepancies were noted:
(1)
The films of TP-1-H, location (2-3),
show a 1',-inch long linear indication in the weld that was not evaluated on the film reader'
sheet.
The inspector recommended that this area be re-radio-graphed'sing a single wall exposure technique to better evaluate the indication.
The licensee agreed to evaluate this indication accordingly.
This will be Unresolved Item 259/81-13-14,
"Possible Unacceptable Defect in'Weld".
(2)
The films of TP-1-F, location (3-0),
showed a 3/4-inch long depression in the. base metal about. 1',-inch from the weld.
This indication was. not evaluated on the film reader's sheet.
The indication-,appears to be deep and could violate minimum pipe-wall requirements.
The licensee agreed to evaluate this condition accordingly.
This will be Unresolved Item 259/81-13-15,
"Possible Unacceptable Base Metal Defect".
(3)
The. films of TP-1-F also disclosed die stamp markings on the base
'etal that appeared to be sharp bottomed.
The inspector visually examined the surface-of this pipe and. found that die. stamping had..
been performed. at other locations, and. on all of the other pipe assemblies available for sighting.
The stamping appears. to have been done with high-stress die stamps.
The licensee checked their=
tool issue.
station.
and. found that high-stress die stamps. were available for issue.
The-licensee agreed to investigate this situation and evaluate the die stamping that'had been performed on
'he subject pipe-assemblies.
This will be Unresolved Item 259/
81-13-16,
"High-stress Die Stamping Used on Main Steam Pipe Assemblies"'..
(4)
The film identification for joints TP-1-D, TP-1-E and TP-1-F was very. faint to nonlegible.-
Section V of the.
ASME Cdde requires each film to be permanently identified.
The licensee agreed to investigate this problem and. clearly identify the subject films.
This will be carried as Unresolved.
Item 259/81-13-11,
"Radi'o-graphic Fil'm Identification Not Legible".
Control of NOE Procedures In attempting to borrow copies of the licensee's NDE procedures for review arid discussion, the inspector. found that the licensee's gC management and inspection personnel are not provided with controlled copies'of the procedures.
This is considered noncompliance with the
4 ~
12'equirements of Criterion VI of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, in that measures are not established to assure that approved documents (NOE procedures)
and. changes are. distributed to and, used at the locations where, the NDE activities are to be performed.
This is identified as Violation 259, 260, 296/81.-13-02,
"Document Control".
No violations or deviations were noted except-the violation described in d above.
10.
Inservice'Inspection (ISI) (Units 1, 2, and.3)
The inspectors reviewed the "Preservice Baseline Inspection and Inservice Inspection Program Unit 1 and Unit 2" dated February 11, 1980, to determine if. the program meetsSection XI'f. the-ASME Code requirements.
The inspector also. reviewed,.records of inservice inspections performed. for Unit.
1. and attempted. to obtain copies of code required ISI reports for review for all three units.
The fol'1'owing discrepancies were-noted:
a Inservice Inspection Program-(1')'ection. XI: requires for-pressure-containing weld in vessels, that'.
5%, of the length of each circumferential and 10% of-the length of'ach longitudinal weld be examined during inservice. inspection.
Browns. Ferry's program shows'hat 5 and 10 percent, respectively.
will be done on the total length of all of the RV. welds rather than;that;percentage on "each" weld.
(2)
Much of. the weld length on the-reactor vessel is not accessible for inservice inspection..
Consequently, the program specified
and 10 percent. of the: weld. length that is accessible rather than the. total length of individual welds.
For example, circumferen-tial welds outside. the, core region total 207 feet in length, but, only 79: feet.. in. length is. accessible for inservice inspection.
The program only calls for 7'feet of weld to be examined in lieu of 5%'of 207 feet (10.4 feet).
Even though the= entire 207 feet of weld is not accessible;.
the 5 percent examined should still be
'ased on'this total length; (3)
The program requires visual and: ultrasonic examination for vessel'losure-studs and nuts in one. area,. but requires-magnetic'.parti'cle and. ultrasonic examination for these items in the Table.
During inservice. inspection, visual and ultrasonic.
was performed.
Th'
~
program needs to be clarified'.
The Code gives an option to perform either visual or magnetic particle. with an ultrasonic examinatio 'P f
~ y
~ e r
~ 4 ~
The licensee advised that the PSI/ISI program was currently being revised and that the items identified above would be clarified in the. revised program which is expected to be issued about July 1981,.
This will.be carried as Inspector Followup Item 259/81-13-17, "ISI Program Does Not Appear to Meet Minimum Requi'rements of Section XI of ASME Code".
Section XI. of the.ASM'ode requires the threaded holes in the, base. material related to category B-G-1 pressure retaining bolting to be examined; Nei.ther the PSI'or the ISI functions address this item nor do the PSI/ISI records indicate this examination has been performed.
However, paragraph A-5 and A-6 of the FSAR
~ implies that this examination is to be performed.
Mhen this was discussed. with the licensee, the inspector was advised. that this inspection had. been deleted. in the-Summer
addenda of the
edition ot Section XI and thdijbre.,was not considered a required function.
The. inspector reviewed. the stated code revision and noted the inspection is still required'for threaded holes greater than Z.-inches in diameter
.
Since.'he threaded holes in the reactor vessel flange. are greater than 2-inches, the licensee is in violation of Code requirements'f these inspections have not.
been performed.
This is Unresolved. Item 259/81-13-13,
"Threaded Holes in Reactor Vessel Flange Not Examined".
k
- (5)
Section XI requires the-base metal for two plate thicknesses be examined adjacent to the vessel support skirt and. adjacent to support welds of valves and. pumps-.
The PSI/ISI program does not address this i'tern, nor does the applicable ultrasonic examination procedure, UT-N-7; indicate two,plate thicknesses are to be examined.
The licensee stated that this would be done during inservice inspection of Unit 1 and that the ultrasonic procedure.
would be revised to reflect this requirement.
The licensee also agreed to determine if two plate thicknesses were examined during pr eservice.
inspection.
This i s. Unresolved Item, 259/81-13-18,
"Base Metal Adjacent to Support Melds Does Not Appear-to Have Been Adequately Examined".
b.
Records The inspector reviewed the personnel qualification records. for a Level I, Level II, and Level IIlnondestructive examiner who performs inser-vice inspections.
In addition, the nondestructive examination records for reactor vessel welds RCH-1-IV and RCH-1;1C, three pressure retain-ing'ipe welds and the visual examination records for the reactor vessel were reviewed.
The following discrepancies were noted:
~
y
~
(1)
Although inservice: inspection-has already been performed of the six Unit 1'atches of reactor vessel cladding by video camera, no records were made of the cladding surface. condition, nor was the inservice examination compared with the photographs made during baseline examination.
The. inspector-showed the baseline photo-graphs to the examiner who performed the inservice inspection and he stated that he had not seen the photos before.
The licensee-agreed to resolve this situation accordingly.
This is Unresolved Item 259/81-13-12,
"Visual Examination During ISI of Reactor Vessel Cladding Was Not Compared With PSI Results".
(2)
The inspector requested the licensee to provide copies of the Inservice Inspection reports required by IS-622.2 of ASME Section XI (71571) for Units, 1 and 2, and by IWA-6220 of ASME Section XZ (74575) for Unit. 3 for review.
These 'reports are required to be prepared and. submitted within 90 days after each inservice inspec-tion.
The licensee-was not able to find copies of most. of the'eports in their. records'his is identified as Unresolved Item.
.259,, 260,. 296/81-13.-10, "ISI. Reports".
Within the areas examined, no vioTations or deviations were identifie J
J
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